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Introduction 
 
The current interest in communication studies is understandable given the proliferation of 
communication technologies that are part and parcel of today‘s world. However, while 
this interest tends to focus on the media applications of communication technologies, the 
concept of communication that underlies these technologies remains unexamined. The 
purpose of this text is to provide an overview of the different aspects that are entailed by 
the concept of communication.  
 
The early theories of communication adopted a relatively simple model to explain the 
process of communication. Known as the process or linear model of communication, it 
assumed a sender who transmitted a message to a receiver; in a slightly more complex 
version of this model, the sender encoded a message that was transmitted to the receiver 
who in turn decoded it to understand the message. Understanding the message entailed 
that the receiver would be able to understand what the speaker intended to mean when 
he/she communicated his/her message. Although popular, this model of communication 
is too simple as it fails to take into account the situation within which communication 
takes place: communication is not an abstract activity dislocated from a context of 
conventions, rules or a way of life.  
 
The goal of this book is to highlight the role of the context in the process of 
communication. Although the study of communication includes the domain of non-verbal 
communication (kinesics, paralanguage, proxemics, chronemics, and haptics) I am 
focussing mainly on linguistic communication. However, in the case of C.S. Peirce and 
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Umberto Eco I outline their accounts of perception in so far as these provide the basis for 
understanding their semiological theories. 
 
The concept of communication has a number of characteristics: it always takes place 
within a context of production (chapters 1 to 3), of reception (chapters 4 to 6) and of 
action (chapters 7 to 10).  Although the writers I am focussing on tend to prioritise one 
characteristic rather than another, this is not to say that they ignore the other features. It is 
merely that for the purpose of analysis that I have placed each writer in the category 
where I consider his work to be particularly influential. Some of the themes dealt with by 
these writers could be better placed within other categories, in the interest of clarity, I 
have placed each writer in the area where he is widely held to have made the strongest 
contribution. A general theory of communication would necessarily include all these 
characteristics in a comprehensive account.  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 tackle the founding fathers of structuralism and semiology, F. de 
Saussure and C.S. Peirce respectively. Saussure has tended to be the source of inspiration 
for Continental theorists, while Peirce has provided the intellectual background for 
American theorists. Nowadays however, theorists of communication and philosophy 
cannot afford to ignore either of them and in some ways they can be said to complement 
each other. One major difference between the two is that while Saussure focussed 
exclusively on language as a system of signs, leaving the application of his insights to 
others, Peirce widened his theoretical enterprise and attempted to explain the nature of all 
signs starting from the non-linguistic and culminating in the linguistic.   
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With Saussure‘s writings I examine the two basic principles for the study of language. 
These are the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign and the principle of difference. 
The consequence of these principles is that language is no longer considered as 
representational i.e. as a mirror of the world, but as a system that constructs the world. 
The world does not come to us already neatly parcelled out, with language ‗picturing‘ or 
representing it, but rather, the network of differences that make up a language in effect 
constitutes the world. To argue for his case on what the appropriate study of language 
should entail, Saussure introduces a number of conceptual distinctions, such as the 
distinction between langue and parole, value and signification, the synchronic and 
diachronic and the syntagmatic and paradigmatic aspects of language. I end the chapter 
by showing the pervasive influence of Saussure‘s concepts upon a number of disciplines. 
 
The writings of Peirce examine the nature of signs from a different perspective. Whereas 
the background to Saussure‘s study of signs was that of linguistics, the background to 
Peirce is that of mathematics. From mathematics he became convinced that the only way 
to understand a sign was by applying a triadic conception of Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. A sign establishes a connection or what he calls an Interpretant (Thirdness) 
between a quality (Firstness) and a thing (Secondness). In this chapter I continue to 
develop Peirce‘s theory of signs together with the way basic signs can be combined into 
more complex ones. The chapter ends with an overview of Peirce‘s pragmatism that 
connects the meaning of a concept to its consequences and the method of dialogue in the 
production of knowledge.  
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In chapter 3 I outline the views of Michel Foucault. Although not typically associated 
with communication studies, some of his views contribute interesting insights to the 
philosophy of communication. The first part of the chapter provides an in-depth 
description of one of his major theoretical innovations in both philosophy and 
communications, namely the theory of discourse. Following this theoretical elaboration, 
the next sections describe Foucault‘s archaeological reading of the history of madness 
and the histories of knowledge since the Renaissance. In these archaeological studies, 
emphasis is placed on discourse and epistemes. The next sections are marked by the shift 
in Foucault‘s writings from archaeology to the genealogical readings of incarceration and 
sexuality. In the genealogical writings Foucault moves away from an analysis of 
discourse to the relation between discourse and institutional sites. The context of 
discourse becomes important since it enables him to highlight the relationship between 
power and knowledge.  
 
In chapter 4 I turn my attention Umberto Eco. I start with his generalised account of signs 
and codes as the foundation for the study of culture, and its development into a set of 
overlapping concepts, namely, communication and signification. On Eco‘s account, while 
communication describes the transfer of information between machines, signification 
entails the insertion of humans in the process of communication. In the next sections I 
examine the concepts of abduction, the role of labour in the production of signs, and 
Eco‘s distinction between the dictionary and the encyclopaedia. After this generalised 
theory of signs, I examine Eco‘s contribution to semiology and literary interpretation 
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through the twin distinction between Model Authors and Model Readers, and Open and 
Closed texts. The last section of the chapter is an application of Eco‘s semiological 
theory to the James Bond novels. 
 
In chapter 5 I turn to the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and the philosophy of 
deconstruction. I first examine Derrida‘s critique of two popular accounts that consider 
language as either representing the world or expressing mental states. This is followed by 
a discussion of Derrida‘s deconstruction of the spoken-written contrast in the writings of 
Plato and Saussure. With these readings in mind, I then return to Derrida‘s analysis of 
language where he develops the concept of meaning in terms of differance and his 
generalised notion of writing, arche-writing or grammatology. I close the chapter with an 
examination of both Derrida‘s reading of speech act theory as formulated by J.L. Austin 
and his subsequent engagement with John Searle.  
 
The hermeneutics of H.G. Gadamer is the topic of chapter 7. As with deconstruction, 
hermeneutics is also concerned with the processes of interpretation. The first section of 
the chapter offers an account of Gadamer‘s interpretation of the history of hermeneutics 
in an attempt to show the historical displacement of hermeneutics by science. This is 
followed by Gadamer‘s critique of natural science as being the sole repository of truth 
that justifies its claims on the strength of the use of a specific method. Gadamer proposes 
an alternative account where prejudice and authority – tradition – are revived to counter 
the hegemony of science and its claim to truth. In the subsequent sections, I develop 
Gadamer‘s account of the understanding of the processes of interpretation in terms of 
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what he calls the ‗fusion of horizons‘. The chapter ends with two more sections, the first 
dealing with interpretation as a form of dialogue that follows the model of question and 
answer, and the second with language as the very foundation of human existence. 
 
In chapters 7 to 10 I examine communication from the point of view of the things done or 
performed by participants in the act of communication. I start chapter 7 with a discussion 
of J.L. Austin‘s theory of speech acts. Austin starts by drawing a sharp contrast between 
‗constative‘ and ‗performative‘ utterances i.e., between statements that describe things or 
events and those whose utterance (in the right circumstances) is also a doing. He then 
comes to realise that formulated in this way, the opposition is untenable. He therefore re-
configures performatives and descriptive statements within the broader theory of speech 
acts. It should be pointed out that although it is customary to use the label ‗speech act,‘ 
this generic term subsumes all forms of communication, including writing and gestures. 
 
In Chapter 8 I turn to H.P. Grice, whose work focuses on the study of language from the 
point of view of the speaker‘s intentions in the communication of meaning.  After 
analyzing both the role of the speaker‘s intention to mean something and the recognition 
of that intention in the act of communication, I go on to look at Grice‘s account of those 
contexts within which an utterance can be true, though misleading. This account 
anticipates Grice‘s later theory of the maxims of conversation and his reflections on 
conversation. In the final part of the chapter I examine Grice‘s stance on the relation 
between logic and conversation.  
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In Chapter 9 I examine John Searle‘s elaboration of speech act theory where he focuses 
on the intentions speakers have in communicating, together with the rules that make the 
communication of such intentions possible. This elaboration of speech act theory takes as 
its point of departure an analysis of speech acts in terms of their reference and 
predication. Searle also identifies the conditions that make speech acts possible, as well 
as formulating a taxonomy that shows the difference between the various speech acts. 
This makes it possible to both classify speech acts and examine the more complex types. 
The next section describes Searle‘s discussion of the context – as a network and as a 
background – of speech acts. The chapter closes with an account of the way language 
functions in the construction of social reality. 
 
In Chapter 10 I focus on the writings of Jurgen Habermas who places communication at 
the heart of his attempts to provide an explanation of the way social order is maintained 
and society reproduced. I open the chapter with a detailed investigation of the processes 
involved in acts of communication and I follow this up with an account of the way 
breakdowns in communication are repaired in discourse. The next sections examine the 
relation between communication and social theory and Habermas‘s declared aim of 
inserting communication within a social context distinguishing between the different 
types of action (communicative, strategic and instrumental) as well as between the 
lifeworld and the system. I close the chapter with Habermas‘ analysis of communication 
within the narrower sphere of ethical discussion. 
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It is therefore possible to conceive of a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life; it would 
form a part of social psychology and hence of general psychology; we shall call it semiology (from the 
Greek semeion, ‗sign‘). It would investigate the nature of signs and the laws governing them. Since it does 
not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready for it in 
advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general science of semiology. The laws which semiology 
will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly defined 
place in the field of human knowledge. (1983: 15-16) 
 
Saussure on the Structure of Communication 
 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) is quite rightly considered the founder of structural 
linguistics and his posthumously published work Course in General Linguistics (1983) 
formulated the general principles for the scientific study of language. His goal was that of 
establishing the scientific credentials for the study of language so that linguistics would 
no longer be judged as ‗speculative‘, and instead acquire a certain degree of prestige as a 
discipline. 
 
In general, it could be said that Saussure revolutionized linguistics by proposing a new 
method for the study of language. This method focused on explaining the way language 
as a system functioned to generate meanings that are subsequently communicated; it was 
the system used for communication - rather than the actual things communicated - that 
was prioritized.  This insight into the workings of language led to the further realization 
that the model of language could also be used to understand the way non-linguistic 
systems functioned.  
 
The influence of Saussure upon a number of key thinkers cannot be underestimated and 
his model was adopted by different generations of thinkers from a spectrum of disciplines 
such as structural philosophy (Foucault), structural literary theory (Barthes), and 
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structural anthropology (Levi-Strauss). It is no exaggeration to claim that the structural 
revolution of the 1960s traces its origins to the Course in General Linguistics.  
 
In this chapter, I shall (a) outline the innovations that distinguish Saussure‘s approach to 
the study of language from the historical and comparative approaches of his predecessors.  
In the next section, I shall introduce (b) Saussure‘s founding concepts on the arbitrary 
nature of the sign followed by (c) the principle of difference. The final sections examine 
(d) the conceptual innovations that justify the status of linguistics as a science, and (e) the 
developments that ensued in other domains. 
 
1.0. Historical background 
 
The context within which Saussure‘s study of language unfolded was dominated by two 
main ways of studying language: (a) the first phase was that of comparative philology or 
comparative grammar that took as its starting point the work of Franz Bopp on Sanskrit 
in 1816; (b) the second phase occurred at around 1870 when questions concerning both 
the historical origin of words and methodology were raised.  
 
Culler (1985: 53-70) points out that these developments in the study of language were 
themselves reactions to the theories proposed by the seventeenth century Port Royal 
Grammarians and the theorists of the eighteenth century. Both - for different reasons - 
justified the study of language on the grounds that by studying language it would be 
possible to understand human thought, and, consequently acquire a deeper understanding 
11 
 
of the human mind. The Port Royal Grammarians considered language to be a picture or 
a mirror of thought, so that by studying language one would in fact be studying the laws 
of reason, laws that are common to all humans, and therefore universal. The underlying 
assumption was that speech and grammar had a rational foundation. Commenting on the 
Port Royal Grammarians, Saussure acknowledged their contribution to the study of 
language in their emphasis on the synchronic dimension of language (1983:82). 
 
The eighteenth century theorists (for e.g. Condillac) found the emphasis of the Port Royal 
Grammarians on the synchronic study of language as unsatisfactory. They felt that the 
study of thought or reason first required knowing how ideas originated out of sensation. 
The search for origins is the pattern of western civilisation in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century: it was argued that to understand the nature of something – linguistic, 
political, or psychological – one must discover its origins. In the case of language, the 
eighteenth century attempted to explain linguistic signs and abstract concepts by reducing 
them to their non-linguistic origins in gestures, actions and sensations. By understanding 
the origins of language it was believed that one could understand the nature of language 
and therefore the nature of thought.  
 
The nineteenth century theorists of language rejected the concerns with language and 
mind. The word was no longer considered a sign that represented something and 
linguistics turned to comparative studies. With Franz Bopp the object of study became 
the form of words and by comparing forms from different languages a pattern was 
identified that would explain its historical evolution. The interest in comparing forms of 
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different languages was the result of the discovery of Sanskrit by European linguists who 
noticed a number of similarities between Sanskrit, Greek, Germanic and Latin. Instead of 
trying to find an original primitive meaning that would be the basis or foundation for 
different expressions, the goal of linguists became that of finding similarities between 
different languages. By identifying the similarities between different languages it was 
realised that each language followed its own internal laws. Although Saussure 
appreciated the work of the comparative grammarians he is clear that they did not 
succeed in establishing linguistics on a scientific basis since they failed both to identify 
what it was they were studying and to recognize the implications of their own work 
(1983: 3). 
 
There were two other major influences upon Saussure. The first was the work of the Neo-
Grammarians who at around 1870 began to lay the foundations for the proper study of 
language
i
. The Neo-Grammarians argued that the laws that governed changes in sounds 
functioned without any exceptions. Culler explains  
 
…the principle at stake – of change without exceptions – is crucial, for reasons which perhaps none but 
Saussure understood. The absolute nature of sound change is a consequence of the arbitrary nature of the 
sign. Since the sign is arbitrary, there is no reason for a change in sound not to apply to all instances of that 
sound; whereas if sounds were motivated (‗naturally‘ expressive, like bow-wow) then there would be 
resistance, depending on the degree of motivation, and exceptions. There are no exceptions because, given 
the arbitrary nature of the sound and its phonetic realizations, change does not apply directly to signs 
themselves but to sounds, or rather, to a single sound in a particular environment. (1985: 65) 
 
The second influence upon Saussure were the developments that took place after 1870 
when the Neo-Grammarians attempted to establish the historical evolution of languages 
using the results of their comparative accounts. Their goal was therefore the 
reconstruction of a language historically, which, though important did not satisfy 
Saussure for it confused the synchronic with the diachronic aspect of language. By 
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focussing excessively on historical reconstruction, the Neo-Grammarians did not 
understand the nature of what they were studying: in effect, they had forgotten to ask the 
question of how language functions. Saussure realised that by returning to the question of 
the sign as representational, the crucial elements that would transform linguistics into a 
scientific study could be identified. However, his use of the concept of representation 
differed from that of the earlier eighteenth-century linguists since it involved the sign as 
representing a particular meaning that differed from another meaning within the linguistic 
system. Of the Neo-Grammarians he wrote 
 
The achievement of the Neo-Grammarians was to place all the results of comparative philology in a 
historical perspective, so that linguistic facts were connected in their natural sequence…at the same time, 
there emerged a realisation of the errors and inadequacies of the concepts associated with philology and 
comparative grammar. However, great as were the advances made by the Neogrammarians, it cannot be 
said that they shed light upon the fundamental problems of general linguistics, which still await a solution 
today. (1983: 5) 
 
Although comparative studies were the intellectual context within which Saussure was 
working, his work returned – with modifications – to the work of the eighteenth century 
linguists (Culler, 1985: 69-70). He re-introduced the study of language in terms of the 
study of signs but instead of studying signs in isolation from each other, he argued that 
signs can only be studied in relation to each other. Furthermore, his focus on the 
methodology needed for the study of language also reveals an indirect answer to the 
question concerning the connection between language and mind: the operating principle 
for the functioning of language as a system that generates meaning is its power to 
differentiate. And this process is not only an aspect of language but is, in fact, a 
description of the way the mind operates so as to understand meaning. 
 
2.0. The Nature of Language 
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Linguists, according to Saussure, had failed to establish what it was that there were trying 
to study: they ‗never took very great care to define exactly what it was they were 
studying. And until this elementary step is taken, no science can hope to establish its own 
methods.‘ (1983: 3). As a result of this failure, linguistics could never aspire to the status 
of a science and could therefore not achieve the respectability that it deserved. Saussure 
was determined to change this but he first needed to identify those features that are 
essential for the functioning of a language. The difference between a language and noise 
is that noise does not communicate anything whereas a language communicates ideas. In 
order to communicate ideas there must be a system to which the ideas belong, and since 
there is a system, there are therefore a number of conventions that govern the way the 
signs are used to communicate ideas. Language is therefore a system of signs. 
 
To argue for the thesis of language as a system of signs – as opposed to language as a 
mirror or as representing the world - Saussure gives importance to rejecting the 
nomenclaturist theory of language. According to this view, the meaning of a word is the 
object that it names so that the relationship between a word and an object is one of 
naming or labeling. The Biblical narrative of Genesis that portrays Adam as naming the 
objects of the world shows how ingrained within our cultural psyche this view of 
language is. This view presupposes that there is a radical separation between language 
and the world: objects – whether material (‗table‘, ‗dog‘) or abstract (‗love‘, ‗happiness‘) 
exist independently of language, and are named by it. 
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There are several difficulties with this theory. For a start, the most obvious one is that if 
this theory were true, then translating from one language to another would be a relatively 
easy task: all one has to do is to change the words from one language to another. But 
anyone who remembers their translation exercises at school will remember that it was a 
difficult task because each language had a different way of talking about the world. For 
example, if one had to translate the French word ‗aimer‘ into English, one would have to 
see the sense with which it is being used, for ‗aimer‘ can mean either ‗to love‘ or ‗to like‘ 
in English. Another difficulty with nomenclatures is the way they ignore the passage of 
time: according to this view, over time the name or label changes but the meaning or 
concept remains the same. The concepts, as language-independent entities, would be 
immune to historical evolution. But, in actual fact, the history of language is full of both 
concepts changing their meanings and words changing their form: the word ‗silly‘ used to 
refer to a happy and blessed person but with time the meaning changed and in the 
sixteenth century it referred to an innocent and helpless person, today, the word ‗silly‘ is 
used to refer to a foolish person. And just as the concept changed its meaning, the name 
also changed with its central vowel modified (Culler, 1985: 22).  
 
The Sign 
 
What Saussure‘s criticism of language as naming shows is that the relationship between 
words and meaning is not as clear cut as one might have presupposed. It is in this light 
that we can perhaps understand the introduction of the terminology of ‗signs‘ by Saussure 
into the study of language. His use of the term is narrower from the way it is used in 
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everyday life, as when, for example, we say that the dark clouds are a sign of the 
approaching rain. Saussure uses the term ‗sign‘ to mean the combination of a sound (a 
spoken word) or graphic inscription (a written word) together with a concept or a 
meaning. Although Saussure uses the terminology of ‗signification‘ and ‗signal‘, 
contemporary writers have replaced these terms with ‗signified‘ and ‗signifier‘ 
respectively. I am following this practice. 
 
We propose to keep the term sign to designate the whole, but to replace concept and sound pattern 
respectively by signification [signified] and signal [signifier]. The latter terms have the advantage of 
indicating the distinction which separates each from the other and both from the whole of which they are 
part. We retain the term sign, because current usage suggests no alternative by which it might be replaced. 
(1983:  67) 
 
Although for the purpose of analysis these two components can be differentiated, it 
should be pointed out that they can never be found independently of each other. Within a 
language, a sound or graphic inscription always has a concept or a meaning attached to it. 
Saussure pointed out that for the linguist it was the psychological aspect of 
communication that should be given absolute priority; it was the meaning that speakers 
wanted to communicate rather than the sounds that were produced that are important. By 
analogy, Saussure argued that the instrument used to transmit the Morse Code was 
secondary to what was communicated. Despite the emphasis on language as a tool for the 
communication in general, Saussure goes on to privilege the spoken medium over the 
written one. This is odd because, given his claim that the medium is not important then 
both the spoken and the written should be on an equal footing. Derrida (Chapter 5) will 
later seize upon this inconsistency.  
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Saussure‘s fundamental contribution to the study of language is the principle of the 
arbitrary nature of the sign:  
 
The principle stated above is the organizing principle for the whole of linguistics, considered as a science 
of language structure. The consequences which flow from this principle are innumerable. It is true that they 
do not all appear at first sign equally evident. One discovers them after many circuitous deviations, and so 
realizes the fundamental importance of the principle.  (1983: 68) 
 
By ‗arbitrary‘, Saussure is claiming that there is no intrinsic or necessary reason as to 
why a particular sound is connected with a particular concept. This is why the connection 
is described as ‗arbitrary‘: the signifier ‗long‘ has nothing long about it, just as there is 
nothing dog-like about the signifier ‗dog‘; and just as ‗cactus‘ means a particular type of 
vegetation there is no reason why this vegetation could not have been called anything 
else. There is nothing in the vegetation, no essential  property, that obliges a person  to 
call it  with a particular signifier; it could be equally called, ‗toots‘ or ‗plat‘ so long as 
communication between members of the community is successful. This latter point is 
important, for despite the arbitrary connection between signifier and signified, Saussure 
insits that there is no question of a person changing the meaning of a sign at will (as 
Humpty Dumpty does in Alice in Wonderland). It is the linguistic community that has the 
power to change the meaning of signs not the person; arbitrary does not mean an 
individualistic free for all. 
 
The only possible exceptions to the principle of the arbitrary constitution of the sign are 
those of,  
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(a) onomatopoeic words where the sound is similar to the meaning so that the signifier 
‗cookoo‘ means or represents the bird because the bird produces the sound; (b) 
interjections: when, as a result  of some  injury, a person says ‗ouch‘. The sound is a 
natural prduction. Saussure rejects both: in the case of onomatopoeic words, there are too 
few to even remotely make up a language (and even the naturally produced sound is an 
approximation) and the fact that there are so few re-enforces the arbitrary thesis. 
Interjections are dismissed outright without consideration. 
 
By arguing for the arbitrary nature of language, Saussure realizes that he has placed the 
study of language on a non-rational foundation. To counter the tendency of equating to 
arbitrary with individual, Saussure re-iterates the fact that languages are a historically 
constituted social institution. It is therefore up to him to explain both how changes occur 
and why languages are relatively stable. Saussure offers four reasons that account for the 
stability of language:  
 
(a) Since the sign is arbitrary and therefore non-rational, there can be no (rational) 
discussion about whether to change it or not:  
 
One can, for example, argue about whether monogamy is better than polygamy, and adduce reasons for and 
against…But for a language, as a system of arbitrary signs, any such basis is lacking, and consequently 
there is not firm ground for discussion. No reason can be given for preferring soeur to sister, Ochs, to 
boeuf, etc. (1983: 73) 
 
(b) The sheer number of signs within the linguistic system makes it difficult to change: 
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A system of writing, comprising between 20 and 40 letters, might conceivably be replaced in its entirety by 
an alternative system. The same would be true of a language if it comprised only a limited number of 
elements. But the inventory of signs in any language is countless.  (1983: 73) 
 
(c) The fact that the system can only be understood by ‗experts‘ means that the masses 
are unaware of it and cannot, therefore, change it. ‗Any such change would require the 
intervention of specialists, grammarians, logicians, and others. But history shows that 
interference by experts is of no avail in linguistic matters.‘ (1983: 73) 
 
(d) As an institution language differs from all others: while institutions require the  
involvement of a certain number of people, language is used by everybody; it is hard to 
get everybody to change a language but it is even harder to get an individual to change an 
aspect of it, 
 
Legal procedures, religious rites, ships‘ flags, etc are systems used only by a certain number of individuals 
acting together and for a limited time. A language, on the contrary, is something in which everyone 
participates all the time, and that is why it is constantly open to the influence of all. This key fact is by itself 
sufficient to explain why a linguist revolution is impossible. Of all social institution, a language affords the 
least scope for such enterprise. It is part and parcel of the life of the whole community, and the 
community‘s natural inertia exercises a conservative influence upon it. (1983: 74) 
 
However, given that the reasons for the stability of language are so compelling, 
explaining change turns out to be a rather difficult task and in this respect Saussure‘s 
reasons are quite weak. It is, again, the arbitrary nature of the sign that accounts for 
change: ‗A language is a system which is intrinsically defenseless against the factors 
which constantly tend to shift relationships between signal [signifier] and signification 
[signified]. This is one of the consequences of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign.‘ 
(1983: 76) Saussure does introduce a limitation upon the principle of the arbitrariness of 
the sign, since without any limitation there would be chaos rather than a functioning 
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linguistic system. Arbitrariness in language is limited by the fact that as a system, 
language is a complex and sophisticated phenomenon and this cannot be the result of 
complete arbitrariness. Holdcroft argues that this justification is weak for the fact that a 
sign is constructed systematically does not make it any less arbitrary.  (Holdcroft, 1991: 
93-4) 
 
Although Saussure was aware of the radical implications of his view on the arbitrary 
nature of signs, it was only in the 1950s that these implications became central tenets to a 
number of different disciplines. One could say that Saussure is the precursor of the 
movement broadly known as constructivism, for, on his account, language constructs or 
organizes reality rather than reflect or name what is already articulated or categorized. 
This is why, for example, the English word ‗river‘ means a large moving body of water, 
whereas the French word, ‗fleuve‘ means both a moving body of water and the entry of 
the water into the sea. The point is that each language constructs or organizes the world 
differently. 
 
3.0. Identity and Difference 
 
Given Saussure‘s argument on the arbitrary connection between the signifier and the 
signified, how does language function as a medium for communication? How is it that 
both a signifier and a signified can be identified as the same despite variations of, (for 
example) the tone of voice? A word or sentence might be uttered with a different tone of 
voice and yet be identified as the same word or sentence. The innovative solution that 
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Saussure offers is that the identity of the sound (signifier) or the meaning (signified) is 
established relationally or negatively by a process of difference.  
 
In the case of signifiers, the phoneme – or the basic unit of sound - is recognized because 
it is differs from other sounds within the linguistic system; the letter /b/ can be 
pronounced in a number of ways and still be identified as /b/ as long as the different 
pronunciation does not overlap into the letter /p/. The extent to which a signifier is 
considered identical depends on its not being confused with another signifier; in other 
words, a sound can be considered functionally significant in a language only to the extent 
that it can be contrasted with other sounds from the spectrum of sounds within a 
language. 
 
The argument from difference also holds for signifieds: the meaning of a signified 
depends on its being different from other signifieds within the linguistic system. A 
signified has a identity constructed out of its relations to other signifieds, so that the 
meaning of ‗man‘ is, ‗not woman‘, ‗not boy‘, ‗not lady‘, ‗not youth‘ and so on. What is 
important in understanding the signified ‗man‘ is not that of finding some essential 
property or characteristic that belongs to all men, but to know that ‗man‘ is the product of 
a system of distinctions.  The linguistic system that Saussure is proposing constitutes a 
flexible grid between signs but one where the borders are precisely established by their 
negations. Saussure is helpful in elaborating this crucial point by using the game of chess 
as an analogy. How do we know the significance of each piece? We know the 
significance of the king not because it is made of wood or of plastic and neither because 
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it is bigger that the other pieces; rather, the identity of the King is established because we 
know the value of the King within the game of chess. This value is that of being able to 
move one square in any direction (and who must be checkmated so as to be defeated) as 
opposed, for example, to the Queen who can move in any direction and for any distance 
(and who can be killed without the game being lost). And just as the King has an identity 
in relation to the Queen, the meaning of the King is also established in relation to the 
other pieces. 
 
Holdcroft (1991:125) clarifies that the differences between terms in a relation are 
different in respect of something, but it must be emphasized that not all differences 
necessarily give rise to an opposition. The terms ‗dog‘ and ‗table‘ are different but not 
opposed to each other. The emphasis is on belonging to the same domain: if one says ‗x 
is a male‘ then clearly ‗x is not a female‘. These terms exhaust the gender domain but not 
all terms within domains are necessarily exhausted: if one says ‗x is not Monday‘, it 
could imply any other day of the week. The point is that not all differences give rise to 
opposites, but those differences that do are significant for otherwise there would be an 
endless number of differences without significance. To have differences that are opposed 
to each other, the binary set must have some underlying similarity; thus, while ‗man‘ and 
‗woman‘ are opposed, they are similar in that they are both human. 
 
So far, most of the examples used to describe the relational aspects of signs have 
involved words and this might lead one into thinking that Saussure‘s theory applied 
solely to vocabulary. However, he points out that the relational aspect also applies to the 
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grammar of language so that the difference between a word in the singular and a word in 
the plural is precisely a relational distinction: the singular ‗night‘ has its identity as 
opposed to the plural ‗nights‘. ‗In isolation, Nacht and Nächte are nothing: the opposition  
between them is everything…[linguistic] ‗units‘ and ‗grammatical facts‘ are only 
different names for different aspects of the same general fact: the operation linguistic 
oppositions.‘  (1983: 120) 
 
In sum: the identity of a sign is the product of its differential relations within a linguistic 
system. This is why Saussure claims that ‗in a language there are only differences, with 
no positive terms.‘ (1983: 118). On this account, language is a system of signs that refer 
to each other: these are locked in a (relatively) stable network of contrasts that give them 
their vocal and conceptual identity. And while all differences are relational, it is not 
necessarily the case that all relations are differential. Saussure had used the example of a 
train timetable to argue for the differential nature of the sign: just as a train has a place in 
a timetable that opposes it to another train (the 8.15 train to Zurich as opposed to the 8.30 
train to Zurich) likewise a sign has a place in the linguistic system that opposes it to other 
signs. 
 
Let us examine the problem of identity in linguistics in the light of some non-linguistic examples. We 
assign identity, for instance, to two trains (‗the 8.45 from Geneva to Paris‘), one of which leaves twenty-
four hours after the other. We treat it as the ‗same‘ train, even though probably the locomotive, the 
carriages, the staff etc. are not the same…the train is identified by its departure time, its route, and any 
other features which distinguish it from other trains.‘ (1983: 107) ii 
  
4.0. Key Concepts 
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Langue and Parole 
 
Although it is common to think that speech is natural to humans, Saussure argues that it 
is not the spoken word that is natural to humans, but rather the ‗faculty‘ of language for it 
is this faculty that explains the possibility of learning a language at all. Clearly, Saussure 
distinguishes between natural language [the faculty of language], a particular language 
(langue) and speech (parole). The latter two are subsumed within the category of natural 
language:  
 
[l]inguistic structure [langue] is only one part of language, even though it is an essential part. The structure 
of a language is a social product of our language faculty. At the same time, it is also a body of necessary 
conventions adopted by society to enable members of society to use their language faculty. (1983: 9-10) 
 
Langue is the system of rules that the individual absorbs as he/she learns a language: it is 
the inherited body of linguistic knowledge that enables the continued existence of the 
community. Parole, on the other hand, is the externalization of this internalized system: it 
is the expression of the individual‘s thoughts through a physical medium i.e., larynx. The 
importance of the langue-parole distinction is that it provides Saussure with the 
possibility of identifying what the proper object for the scientific study of language. The 
analysis of parole cannot constitute a science for it is not what one should know so as to 
claim that one knows a language. Rather, knowledge of a language involves knowing the 
rules that enable a speaker to combine words in the language. Again, the analogy taken 
from the game of chess is fruitful: to learn how to play chess, it is not necessary to 
observe and study every move that was played in the history of chess, but more 
importantly, that one learns the rules that enable each piece to move in the game.  
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However, although langue constitutes the primary object of linguistic study, the 
importance of parole should not be underestimated. There are three reasons for this 
importance: (a) parole as face-to-face communication enables language to get 
consolidated into a social system; (b) parole describes the free choice with regard to word 
selection that the speaker is permitted from within the available system; (c) parole shows 
how changes can take place within langue, in effect performing the ‗double‘ function of 
providing an explanation for the relative stability of the linguistic system but also of its 
openness and possibility of change. 
 
Godel (in Holdcroft, 1991:20-21) proposes an excellent classification of the 
characteristics of langue and parole: 
 
Langue     Parole 
     
Social      Individual 
Essential     Contingent 
No active individual role   Active role 
Not designed     Designed 
Conventional      Non-Conventional 
Furnishes a homogeneous subject  Furnishes a heterogeneous subject matter  
matter for a branch of social   studied by different disciplines 
psychology 
 
 
The utility of distinguishing between langue and parole can be seen in the way each has 
developed into a separate branch of the linguistic study of sound. Langue has developed 
into the discipline of phonology, while parole has developed into the discipline of 
phonetics. In the case of the latter, it is the actual physical event that is considered 
important, while in the case of the former, what is studied is the functional difference 
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between signifiers within the linguistic system. And the same point can be applied to 
‗meaning‘: a sentence establishes its meaning in relation to other sentences (langue), but 
two utterances (parole) of the same sentence might have a different meaning on account 
of the tone and the context. 
 
Synchronic and diachronic 
 
It is obvious that language is continually in evolution and subject to historical and 
contingent forces. These changes make it difficult to pinpoint what it is we are supposed 
to study in language and yet, Saussure argues that such a study is both possible and 
necessary. To explain the effect of time and history upon a language he introduces a 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics.  
 
The situation with the study of language is paradoxical: if signs are historical – the 
product of a community at a particular time – then how is it possible to study language as 
a (relatively) stable system that enables communication to take place? To put this in 
another way: if a language is evolving and changing how is its‘ functioning to be studied? 
The solution to this paradox is that of conducting an ahistorical analysis: in other words, 
to transform language into an object of study one must ‗step outside‘ language in order to 
be able to observe it. Despite the element of change that a language undergoes, it must be 
‗frozen‘ in time so that the relations between signs within the system can be studied. The 
synchronic study of language focuses precisely on the interrelationship between signs at a 
particular moment within the linguistic system. In effect, this is another result of the 
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arbitrary nature of the sign: since there is no essential or necessary meaning that is 
inherent in a sign and since the meaning is derived from its relationships to other signs, 
then it is the way signs function within the total system at a given moment that enables 
them to be studied: ‗a language is a system of pure values, determined by nothing else 
apart from the temporary state of its constituent elements.‘ (1983: 80) 
 
Saussure describes the difference between synchronic and diachronic linguistics: 
 
Synchronic linguistics will be concerned with logical and psychological connections between coexisting 
items constituting a system, as perceived by the same collective consciousness. 
Diachronic linguistics on the other hand will be concerned with connections between sequences of items 
not perceived by the same collective consciousness, which replace one another without themselves 
constituting a system. (1983:98) 
 
The two domains are mutually exclusive and for Saussure it was synchronic linguistics 
that had absolute priority: synchronic linguistics constituted the scientific study of 
language since it entailed the study of the psychologically real units of the linguistic 
system as opposed to diachronic linguistics that studied the successive relations or 
evolutionary development of linguistic units. The latter is irrelevant to the study of 
language, so much so that it is from synchronic statements that diachronic statements can 
be derived. It is not changes in sounds that lead to changes in the system but rather, the 
other way around. When a signifier acquires a new phonetic association, the old form and 
the new form differ but are used interchangeably by speakers. From a phonological point 
of view, they retain the same functional identity within the synchronic system, but over 
time one of the forms is dropped even though the synchronic system that supports that 
form remains the same. Diachronic changes can only be explained by reference to a 
series of successive synchronic systems.  
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When it comes to explaining the origins of change, Saussure realizes that changes take 
place in parole, in the actual performance of language. The linguistic system reacts and 
adjusts to these changes: clearly, it is not the system that causes the changes, but in order 
to understand change one needs to know the synchronic system. The point that Saussure 
vehemently opposes is the idea that there is an intrinsic goal towards which change in 
language is directed towards, i.e., a teleological movement of language. When a language 
changes from one state to another it is not the result of some goal but the result of a 
reaction to changes that happen outside language. It cannot be claimed that language 
changes from one state to another in a progressive evolutionary steps 
 
While Saussure uses morphological and grammatical examples to explain the way the 
linguistic system adjusts to changes, he admits that it is much harder to explain semantic 
changes. Culler (1985) offers an explanation, 
 
Suppose one were studying the change in the meaning of Kunst in Middle High German between roughly 
1200 and 1300. What would be synchronic and what diachronic here? To define change of meaning one 
needs two meanings and these can only be determined by considering synchronic facts: the relations 
between signifieds in a given state of the language which define the semantic area of ‗kunst‘. At an early 
state it was a higher, courtly knowledge or competence, as opposed to lower, more technical skills (‗list‘), 
and a partial accomplishment as opposed to the synoptic wisdom of ‗wisheit‘. In a later stage the two major 
oppositions which defined it were different: mundane versus spiritual (Wisheit‘) and technical (‗wizzen‘) 
versus non-technical. What we have are two different organizations of a semantic field. A diachronic 
statement would be based on this synchronic information, but if it were to explain what happened to ‗kunst‘ 
it would have to refer to non-linguistic factors or causes (social changes, psychological processes, etc.) 
whose effects happened to have repercussions for the semantic system. For the analysis of language the 
relevant facts are the synchronic oppositions. The diachronic perspective treats individual filiations which 
are identifiable only from the results of synchronic analysis. ( 45) 
 
However, it should be mentioned that although Saussure favored the synchronic approach 
to the study of language it would be inaccurate to say that he dismissed entirely 
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nineteenth century historical linguistics, since he also attempted to develop a 
methodology for both historical and comparative linguistics. 
 
Syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
 
While we have spoken so far about the relational aspect of signs within the synchronic 
linguistic system, this relational aspect is developed by Saussure into a further set of 
concepts: the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic (or associative). The difference between 
the two is that syntagmatic relations involve a ‗horizontal‘ axis of meaning whereas the 
paradigmatic involves a ‗vertical‘ axis of meaning. ‗Syntagmatic relations hold in 
praesentia. They hold between two or more terms co-present in a sequence.  Associative 
relations, on the contrary, hold in absentia. They hold between terms constituting a 
mnemonic group.‘ (1983:122) 
 
Syntagmatic relations occur when elements can be combined sequentially. With 
syntagams, there is a relation between what goes on before or after. As examples, 
Saussure uses, ‗re-read‘ and ‗God is good‘ (1983: 121), where in the case of the first  
both items are syntagmatically related to each other while in the case of the second, the 
‗is‘ is related to both God and ‗good‘. On the other hand, paradigmatic relations occur 
when there are similarities of form and meaning and Saussure outlines three instances: 
(1983: 124) 
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(1) The sign ‗teaching‘ is associated with ‗to teach‘ and ‗we teach‘ so there is a common 
or similar element between the idea or concept and the signifier. 
(2) The sign might be associated with a series such as verbs with the ‗---ing‘ ending, such 
as ‗singing‘, ‗laughing‘, etc. 
(3) The sign might be associated with a series that has a similar meaning, such as 
‗lecturing‘, ‗educating‘ and ‗teaching‘.  
 
It is clear that the way the series is constructed differs according to what is being 
compared. Series (2) is constructed according to the grammatical structure of the sign 
while series (3) is constructed according to the contrast between the similarities of 
meaning. 
 
The problem with Saussure‘s views on paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations is that 
while he is clear that paradigmatic belong to the domain of langue he is unclear about the 
position of syntagmatic relations. But if we recall Saussure‘s claim that paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic relations are mutually interdependent, then the conclusion would be that they 
both belong to langue: ‗Syntagmatic groups formed in this way are linked by 
interdependence, each contributing to all. Linear ordering in space helps to create 
associative connections, and these in turn play an essential part in syntagmatic analysis.‘ 
(1983: 127). The interdependence of the syntagams and the paradigms within the field of 
langue is further highlighted by Saussure‘s example of  the syntagm ‗un-do‘ which is a 
combination of ‗un‘ and ‗do‘, but is also paradigmatic in its contrastive relation to other 
possibilities such as un-pick. These processes can be described in the following way: in 
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the case of syntagms there is a relation of combination where one combines elements 
together; in the case of paradigms there is a relation of selection where one chooses one 
element instead of another.  
 
While the analysis of syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations has so far concentrated 
on words it would be a mistake to think that Saussure restricted his analysis to phonemes 
and morphology. These relations were also applied to the syntactical level, to sentences. 
While the uttering of a sentence would clearly belong to domain of parole, it was also 
clear that their analysis belonged to the domain of langue. In the case of a sentence, the 
same relations of combination and selection take place; in a syntagmatic relation words 
can be combined to produce a sentence and the meaning is not evident until the final 
word has been uttered. To know the meaning of the sentence ‗the cat sat on the…‘ we 
must wait until we hear or read the last word, ‗mat‘; with this word the sentence is 
complete and the meaning is generated. Syntagmatic relations are spatial ones with one 
word following the other. But it is also important to note that not all possibilities can be 
realized: it is not possible to say ‗the cat sat on the sea‘ or ‗the cat grumbled‘. Knowing 
the syntagmatic possibilities influences our paradigmatic choices. Paradigmatic relations 
differ from syntagmatic ones in that each individual word in a sentence is selected by the 
speaker out of a series of potential words. In the sentence ‗the cat sat on the mat‘, the 
speaker might select ‗rat‘ or ‗dog‘ instead of ‗cat‘ or he might select ‗table‘ instead of 
‗mat‘. The sentence context conditions the choices that are possible for the speaker, and - 
according to what is selected - a different meaning is generated. The paradigmatic 
relations of sentences show that the meaning of a sign is constituted by what is absent; 
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the sign ‗cat‘ is present while the other signs that could replace it are absent from the 
sentence and yet part of the linguistic system that makes the sign ‗cat‘ possible.  
 
Value and Signification 
 
Another set of concepts that Saussure introduces are those of value and signification: 
while the value of a sign is determined by its place within the linguistic system, 
‗signification‘ does not refer to the functioning of the linguistic system but to the way it 
connects to the world. The difference between value and signification is derived from the 
distinction between langue and parole: values are the elements that acquire an identity 
within langue, while signification describes the relationship between the utterance and the 
world. In the case of signification, it is the ‗extra‘ linguistic element that comes into 
playiii.  
 
Saussure explains the difference between meaning and value when he describes the 
difference between the English sentence ‗I saw a sheep‘ and the French sentence ‗J‘ai vu 
un mouton‘. The two sentences are the same in terms of their signification, in the way 
that they both refer to a particular animal in the world. Signification describes the 
speaker‘s relation to a state of affairs in the world. But the value of the terms ‗sheep‘ and 
‗mouton‘ differs within the English and French languages: in the case of English, when 
sheep are eaten the meat is called mutton, while in the case of French, mouton means two 
things, the meat itself and the animaliv.  
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5.0. The Impact of Semiology 
 
The impact of Saussure‘s work did not take place for some time. It first received 
recognition by Claude Levi Strauss who adopted the linguistic method for the domain of 
anthropology. When one speaks of the structural revolution that took place in the late 
1950s the structuralism mentioned was in fact another name for semiology.  Although the 
labels ‗structuralism‘ and ‗semiology‘ are frequently interchanged, it should be pointed 
out that despite studying similar phenomena, there is a fundamental difference between 
them. Whereas structuralism was concerned with discovering what is common or 
universal to a large number of phenomena, semiology had no interest in seeking out any 
universal structures. While Levi-Strauss used structuralism to find the universal structure 
of the human mind that lie behind the various and numerous myths, Barthes‘s 
semiological analysis of myth focussed on the historical and the specific i.e., on the way a 
society constructed certain myths to legitimise its power. In the interest of simplification I 
am retaining the practice of using both labels synonymously.  
 
Human actions differ from events that take place in the natural world because whereas 
the latter can be just described in terms of the causal relations between them, in the case 
of human actions, what is distinctive about them is that they have a meaning. And, since 
there is a meaning, then there must be a system that generates the meaning that is to be 
communicated. Semiology comes into being as the study of those systems that generate 
meaning and for semiologists, what is important is the study of the system as a whole 
since it is the system that determines the distinctive meanings of objects or actions. 
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What Saussure realised is that the linguistic system can be used as a model for studying 
non-linguistic systems; these non-linguistic systems - fashion, food, music, and human 
behaviour among others – also function as systems of sign that that generate meanings. It 
is because of the crucial insight into the arbitrary nature of the sign that the study of non-
linguistic systems becomes possible. In the case of clothing, for example, within a 
particular culture, it is not the material used that is important but the meaning the clothes 
communicate, a meaning that is socially understood: this is why a short skirt and a long 
skirt communicate different meanings. Clothes are not merely functional i.e., something 
to wear, but are part of a system of signification. It is common knowledge that in western 
cultures, white clothes are appropriate for weddings; this is a form of social knowledge 
that we understand and take for granted. The task of the semiologist is to bring out the 
rules that make such social knowledge possible and communicable. 
 
Many times we think that what we do – the clothes we wear, the food we eat, and the 
signs of affection we show – are expressions of our ‗natural‘ or our ‗authentic selves‘. 
However, semiology shows that what we frequently take as ‗natural‘ or ‗authentic‘ is in 
fact conventional: the arbitrary nature of signs highlights the importance of the social and 
communal at the expense of the individual. There are a very small number of signs that 
one can consider to be strictly ‗natural‘: (for example) there is no culture or society in the 
world where slapping someone in the face is considered a warm and friendly greeting. 
But apart from this small number, most signs are conventional so that, for example, while 
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in some cultures a handshake is considered a greeting, in others a kiss on the cheek is the 
appropriate form of greeting. The difference is purely one of convention.  
 
For any means of expression accepted in a society rests in principle upon a collective habit, or on 
convention, which comes to the same thing. Signs of politeness, for instance, although often endowed with 
a certain natural expressiveness (prostrating oneself nine times on the ground is the way to greet an 
emperor in China) are none the less fixed by rule. It is this rule which renders them obligatory, not their 
intrinsic value. (1983: 68) 
 
It is the degree of sophistication between signs that make up the various domains subject 
to semiological analysis. Culler (1985: 99-103) groups these domains into four 
categories:  
 
(a) signs that are used for direct communication: these vary between relatively simple 
signs such as those of language, the Morse code, Braille and those that communicate 
specialised information such as the periodic tables, traffic signs, road signs, logical and 
mathematical symbols. For these sign systems there are codes that enable one to decode 
these signs to find out what they are communicating. As these codes are formulated with 
the purpose of communication it is not so difficult to understand the processes though 
which they are made to signify something, but the upshot is that they do not form such an 
interesting study. 
 
(b) signs that are used for the communication of open ended phenomena: the best 
example of these signs are those used in aesthetics – literature, music, painting - where 
the codes are not easy to formulate. Unlike the codes used for direct communication, 
these codes are not explicitly specified: there are no books that tell you how to 
understand art since the nature of art is such that it experiments with the codes that are 
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used to produce it. There is a constant process of self-undermining and questioning so 
that a work of art is considered ‗original‘ when it breaks free from the established codes 
of its time; and once this becomes the norm, the process is repeated until it is usually 
replaced by another aesthetic code. The difficulty in finding the codes of art are usually 
what makes this an interesting semiological study. 
 
(c) signs that are used for the communication of values and beliefs: this broad area of 
semiology includes social practices such as rituals, etiquette, fashion, food, hobbies, etc. 
The underlying premise of research conducted in this area is that everything humans do 
has an inherent social meaning. Objects do not just have a functional value but also a 
semiological value: the choice in the type of accommodation one buys is not merely a 
question of functionality, of having somewhere to live, but also includes an important 
communicative dimension. While people have an implicit understanding of the meaning 
of the objects and things they consume, the semiologist reconstructs the system that 
generates these meanings. The semiologist makes the operating system explicit. 
 
(d) signs that are used in the social and natural sciences: this is an unlikely domain for 
semiological analysis because what is important for these sciences is that they are able to 
establish a causal relation between objects and events. When such causal relations are 
established we have entered the domain of truth. The semiologist however is concerned 
with other matters when studying these sciences: he/she is not questioning the truth or 
falsity of such discourses but rather examining the way signs have meanings associated 
with them. A semiological study of astrology is not interested in whether it is true that the 
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stars have an effect on a person‘s life; rather, the semiologist is interested in the system 
that attributes a certain meaning to the position of a planet.  
 
6.0. Critical Remarks 
 
The work of Saussure has not passed without critical examination and a number of 
objections have been raised about his work. One particular objection concerns the 
connection between the linguistic system, on the one hand, and the non-linguistic world, 
on the other. Saussure provides no account of the way these two different realms are 
connected together. Fiske (1990: 44) points out that Saussure neglected this aspect 
concentrating more on the intra-linguistic relationship between terms, while the 
semiology of C.S. Pierce (Chapter 2) explained this connection. In addition, Culler (1985: 
33) defends Saussure on this point arguing that the distinction between signification and 
value was intended to show that there were two kinds of meaning, a relational one where 
the meaning or value of a term is defined by its place in the linguistic system and a 
meaning that is the result of signification where the meaning depends upon the context of 
actualization of utterances.   
 
There are also problems with Saussure‘s ‗internal‘ account of language. Peter Serracino 
Inglott (1995) argues that explaining the nature of language as a self-enclosed system of 
signs does not necessarily entail excluding reference to the world. Furthermore, the 
Saussurian model leads to the more serious difficulty in making it impossible to explain 
the way language is learnt. Strinati (1995: 94-5) also points out that the Saussurean 
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distinction between langue and parole is inadequate for it assumes that langue represents 
the social dimension of language while parole represents the individual use of language. 
The problem is that Saussure places speech and writing on the side of parole and it is 
obvious that these are also social and not individual phenomena; and it was Saussure who 
recognized that the only way to learn about the rules of langue was indirectly through 
parole. As Strinati points out, it is not possible to understand langue independently of 
parole, i.e., of its particular uses.   
 
Others, such as the Marxist critic Volosinov lament the total of recognition of the role of 
ideology in Saussure‘s theory of language and in particular of his concept of langue. As 
opposed to Saussure‘s view of langue as a stable system that is the condition of the 
possibility of meaning, Volosinov argues that meaning is produced in the process of 
ideological struggle: meaning is the site of a contestation between different groups 
within, ranging from class, race, profession, gender etc. There is no homogenous 
structure of language that produces the same meanings within a society but rather a 
number of different groups that read different meanings into signifiers. And this has 
important consequences for the meaning associated with a signifier can have a significant 
effect on the actions and behavior of these groups (in Schirato and Yell, 2000:26) 
 
Despite these criticisms, Saussure‘s theory of signs rightly highlights the centrality of the 
context in the production of meaning. In the process of understanding the way meaning is 
generated, Saussure‘s analysis of language highlighted the social dimension of language: 
insofar as the members of a community use units of meaning to communicate between 
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each other, then this community has constructed a system of signs each of which has a 
distinct meaning precisely for this purpose.  
 
In this chapter, I have outlined (a) the historical background within which Saussure 
develops his linguistics and followed this with (b) an examination of the nature of the 
sign and (c) the underlying principles that accounts for the generation of meaning. The 
rest of the chapter is taken up with (d) the conceptual distinctions introduced by Saussure 
and with the way (e) his innovative ideas have become central to the semiological 
analysis of non-linguistic domains.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 The Neo-Grammarians Hermann Osthoff and Karl Brugman wrote, ‗every sound change, in as much as it 
occurs mechanically, takes place according to laws that admit no exception. That is, the direction of the 
sound shift is always the same for all members of the linguistic community except where a split into 
dialects occurs; and all the words in which the sound subjected to the change appears in the same 
relationship are affected by the change without exception. ( in Culler, 1985: 65) 
ii
 Holdcroft (1991: 97) uses this analogy to argue that if a train needs to connect with another train to reach 
its destination this is clearly a case of a relationship that is not differential but rather a positive one, 
precisely the opposite of what Saussure is claiming. 
iii
 Using an economic model, Saussure makes two claims about the way something is given a value: first, if 
two dissimilar things have an equal value they can be exchanged so that, for example, one can buy a 
magazine or a sandwich for 2 Euro; secondly, if two things have an equal value then they can be compared, 
so that ten Euros can be exchanged for 16 U.S. dollars. (1983: 113). In the case of language, a word can 
also be exchanged with another word or idea, or it can be compared to other words. But to know the value 
of the word, one must be able to relate it to other words within the linguistic system; the possibility of 
exchanging a word with another word can only be realized if one can compare and contrast it to other 
words. It is clear that the value of a sign is the result of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations between 
signs within langue. 
iv
 Saussure elaborates, ‗The French word mouton may have the same meaning as the English word sheep; 
but it does not have the same value. There are various reasons for this, but in particular the fact that the 
English word for the meat of this animal, as prepared and served for a meal, is not sheep but mutton. The 
difference in value between sheep and mouton hinges on the fact that in English there is also another word 
mutton for the meat, whereas mouton in French covers both.‘ (1983: 114) 
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by ―semiosis‘  I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three 
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs. (Houser and Kloesel, 1992-1998b:411) 
 
 
 
Peirce on the Dynamic Life of Signs 
 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was a philosopher and logician whose writings range 
across a number of different areas of philosophy from perception to science, metaphysics 
and religious experience. However, the questions that really interested him were those 
concerning meaning and reference and his theory of signs or semiotics offered a 
framework that accounted for them. The centrality of semiotics to his philosophical 
writings cannot be understated and Peirce claimed that the only way he could approach 
these philosophical subjects through semiotics
iv
. Unlike Saussure who focused solely on 
linguistic signs and their binary relations, Peirce‘s theory of signs and its triads were 
applied to both linguistic and natural realms. 
 
Peirce‘s general theory of signs grew over the years from the basic triads into a 
classification of ten signs and ultimately into a complex one of sixty-six kinds of signs, 
which through various combinations led to 59,049 types of signs. The latter system is 
highly sophisticated and it is not the point of this chapter to delve into the details of that 
typology. The domain of Peirce‘s theory of signs is composed of ‗speculative grammar‘, 
‗critical logic‘ and ‗speculative rhetoric‘. Speculative grammar deals with the formal 
conditions of signs, while critical logic concerns the relations of signs to objects, raising 
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the question of truth; speculative rhetoric studies the necessary conditions for the 
transmission of meaning from the sign to its interpretants. This chapter focuses on 
speculative grammar with its emphasis on the necessary conditions for the production of 
signs, and on speculative rhetoric with its emphasis on meaning situated within a 
pragmatic context.  
 
Throughout his lifetime, Peirce produced a prodigious amount of material and this is 
available in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958). The main 
source that I am using is the shorter The Essential Peirce Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 (Houser and 
Kloesel, 1992-1998) where one finds two of his crucial papers: ‗On a New List of 
Categories‘ (1867) and ‗A Guess at the Riddle‘ (1887-1888).  Currently, there is an 
ongoing project to reorganize his writings in a more chronological order that should 
culminate in a thirty volume set - some of which have already been published - called, 
The Writings of C.S.Peirce. 
 
Although Peirce‘s semiology is not restricted to linguistic communication, but to the 
broader field of interpretation, his influence upon theorists of textual interpretation is 
such that an account of his philosophy deserves examination. In this chapter, (a) I first 
outline the categories that are fundamental to his thought, followed by (b) an account of 
his theory of signs; (c) the next section develops the account of signs showing how their 
possibilities of combination, while the final sections examine (d) the role of pragmatism 
as a tool for the examination of meaning,  and (e) the method that should be used for the 
acquisition of knowledge.  
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1.0. The Categories of Mathematics and Phenomenology: Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness. 
 
One of the most enduring influences upon Peirce was the philosopher Kant who had 
attempted to unify philosophy into a system of categories that had a logical foundation. 
Peirce admired this systematic attempt and likewise attempted to organize philosophy 
into a systematic order that would reflect the whole structure of knowledge. His 
categories were an alternative to the Kantian categories and he continually refined them 
throughout his life. His point of departure was the need to revise logic itself since he 
considered the way it was formulated as inadequate. Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce 
believed that logic is derived from mathematics and that mathematics was the foundation 
of any philosophical system: in effect, logic was applied mathematics. Peirce is today 
considered one of the founders of modern mathematical logic 
 
The difference between logic and mathematics is that the goal of the latter is to establish 
the necessary relations of hypothetical constructions, together with their conclusions, 
independently of whether these apply to anything real or ideal. On Peirce‘s account, it is 
this concern with everything that situates mathematics at the pinnacle of knowledge: 
‗Mathematics…is the only one of the sciences which does not concern itself to inquire 
what the actual facts are, but studies hypotheses exclusively.‘ (1992-1998b: 35) 
Mathematicians are indifferent as to whether the objects of their study are real as can be 
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seen by the study of imaginary numbers, such as the square root of -1, an ‗impossible 
number‘. 
 
On the other hand, the goal of logic is that of right reasoning and, since it is concerned 
with the rightness or wrongness of reasoning, it should be considered a normative 
science, i.e., with how one should reason. Given the equation of logic with rightness, 
Peirce considered logic a branch of ethics: ‗A logical reasoner is a reasoner who exercises 
great self-control in his intellectual operations; and therefore the logically good is simply 
a particular species of the morally good.‘ (1992-1998b: 200-201) 
 
Since mathematics focuses on working out the necessary consequences of propositions, 
all other disciplines depend upon it.
iv
 Just as Kant had devised twelve categories that 
could explain how it is possible for us to experience objects, Peirce attempted a similar 
strategy, but reduced the twelve to three more basic ones. The three categories were 
derived mathematically and the whole point was to show that these categories can be 
applied to any and all objects and topics, irrespective of whether they actually existed or 
whether they were just a possibility. If it is possible to think about something, then the 
categories must be applicable to it. It is in this specific sense that the categories should be 
considered universal. The universality of these mathematically derived categories shows 
that they apply equally to cars, airplanes, Achilles and centaurs. The inclusiveness of 
mathematical thinking demonstrates why it is foundational.  
Pierce derived the categories from the study of graphs that was proposed by J.J.Sylvester. 
If your place a dot or point on a white piece of paper you have a first, but since the dot or 
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point is contrasted with the paper you have a second (the black dot and the while paper) 
and the connection between them is a Third (the black dot relates to the white 
background) to someone. The use of graphs to exemplify the categories is better 
illustrated with more dots: when you have two dots on a paper, the mind supplies the 
connection between them. Peirce‘s use of graphs demonstrated some of the basic points 
of his categories: no matter how many dots and lines are added these can always be 
reduced to the basic two dots and one line schema (. - . -. = .-.) . To show that the three 
Categories cannot be reduced to two Peirce uses the example of the relation of giving: A 
gives B to C. If A gives B to C, this action cannot be reduced to three sets of dual 
relations ( (a) A connecting to C ; (b) A connecting to B; (c) B connecting to C ) since all 
these would show are three disconnected events rather than a single act of giving. So too, 
when it is a relation between four, these can be reduced to two sets of three. 
 
Take giving for example. The mere transfer of an object which A sets down and C takes up does not 
constitute giving. There must be a transfer of ownership and ownership is a matter of Law, an intellectual 
fact. You now begin to see how the conception of representation is so peculiarly fit to typify the category of 
Thirdness. (1992-1998b: 171) 
 
Peirce‘s argument is that this reduction or ‗derivation‘ is neither psychological not 
linguistic but mathematical. His categories are interconnected: the First produces a 
Second that entails a Third: he called them the ‗cenopythagorean‘ categories (ceno is 
Greek meaning ‗new‘) because his thinking was similar to that of the Pythagoreans who 
believed that mathematics was concerned with the structure of reality, unlike the 
contemporary view of number as concerned with quantities.  
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After mathematics, Peirce considered philosophy to be a fundamental study but, unlike 
mathematics, it was concerned with what is real. On the other hand, the difference 
between philosophy and the other sciences is that unlike the other sciences, philosophy 
does not require any special equipment or laboratories, but can be practiced by anyone, 
‗the kind of philosophy which interests me and must, I think, interest everybody is that 
philosophy, which uses the most rational methods it can devise.‘ (in Waar, 2001: 15) 
 
Phenomenology (or as called by Pierce also called ‗phaenoscopy‘ by Peirce) is the first 
branch of philosophy: it is concerned with whatever appears before consciousness, from 
perception to imagination to conception. Since its domain is fairly broad – anything that 
appears before consciousness – it also includes aspects that would not usually be 
analyzed (hallucinations and illusions). The truth of what appears is, so to speak, put on 
hold and is therefore not an issue. Peirce describes the task of phenomenology vividly,  
 
the initial great department of philosophy is phenomenology whose task it is to make out what are the 
elements of appearance that present themselves to us every hour and every minute whether we are pursuing 
earnest investigations, or are undergoing the strangest vicissitudes of experience, or are dreamily listening 
to the tales of Scheherazade (1992-1998b: 147) 
 
 
Peirce‘s fundamental categories are those of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness: since 
they were the basis for his new philosophical system, he had to show that these categories 
were universal, irreducible and complete.  
 
First is the beginning, that which is fresh, original, spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, 
terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitated, reacting. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, 
bring about. (1992-1998a: 280) 
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Whether existing or not, it is always some ‗thing‘ that is being considered and in this 
respect is independent of anything else. This is the idea of Firstness. When we think of 
something, we can oppose it, or think about it as different from something else. 
Secondness is this otherness, this negation of Firstness. The category of Thirdness 
connects the two distinguishable objects: it mediates between them. Waar writes,  
 
The relation of a first to a second, however, brings with it the notion of mediation; that is, of setting two 
objects in relation to one another. This introduces the third category, which is that mode of being that 
derives its identity entirely from it relating two objects to one another. For example, when a fox chases a 
rabbit, the relation of chasing can be distinguished from both the fox and the rabbit. Moreover, this relation 
is what it is purely by virtue of the relation between the fox and the rabbit. (Waar, 2001: 10) 
 
It is useful to think of the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as roughly 
the domains of possibility (what might be), of actuality (what is) and of potentiality, 
probability and necessity (what could be, would be or should be). This triad is 
analytically broken down for methodological purposes as in fact the three are found 
together: while Firstness is the abstract possibility of a sensation, feeling or quality in an 
agent, it is experienced as Secondness in a particular object, existing in the world as a 
token or particular instantiation of a type; it is the other of the agent. Thirdness connects 
the first (sensation, vague feeling) to the second (the Object) to generate a meaning: 
Thirdness is the category of classes of types: a particular object (Second) belongs to a 
type or class of objects that have a function within a society.  
 
Firstness is a quality, Secondness is effect, and Thirdness is product; and Firstness is possibility (a might 
be), Secondness is actuality (what is), and Thirdness is potentiality, probability, or necessity (could be, 
would be, or should be, given a certain set of prevailing conditions)‘ (Merrell, 1995: 38). 
 
The Firstness of perception is not that of something that we are immediately conscious 
of: it is chaotic, formless, pre-conscious and elusive, ‗Stop to think of it, and it has flown! 
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What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn 
any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence…‘ (1992-1998a: 248). It 
is the realm of the possible. Secondness is the domain of ‗facts‘, of ‗brute actuality‘: it is 
‗eminently hard and tangible. It is very familiar too; it is forced upon us daily: it is the 
main lesson of life.‘ (1992-1998a: 249). While in the course of walking in the street, the 
pavement remains a sensation that we are hardly aware of. The moment we slip it 
becomes a Second: we are now aware of it as other, as something hard. We should 
remember that Peirce‘s Firstness is always about possibilities that can be actualized into 
Secondness, rather than Secondness replacing Firstness as though one is superior to the 
other. Thirdness takes place when we pick ourselves up: we have realized what happened 
and acted upon it. It is ‗the representation mediating between these two that is 
preeminently third.‘ (1992-1998a: 250) 
 
The condition that makes Firstness possible is that of ―nothingness‘ – which is to be 
differentiated from negation. Peirce writes, 
 
We start,…with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of negation. For not means other than, and 
other is merely a synonym of the ordinary numeral second. As such it implies a first; while the present pure 
zero is prior to every first…it is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved and 
foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility – boundless possibility. There 
is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom. (in Merrell, 1995 : 69) 
 
It is evident that phenomenology is devoted to the universal features that can be found in 
all phenomena. Since the categories are derived from mathematics and these categories 
are universal, then they must also apply to phenomenological objects. However, instead 
of applying the categories that are fundamental to mathematics, Peirce opts to show that 
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the same categories can be derived from phenomenology. The Firstness of 
phenomenology is the fact that it is there, it is present without reference to anything else: 
it would be consciousness of ‗just an odor, say the smell of attar.‘ (1992-1998b:150) The 
second feature of phenomenology is that a First is opposed, contrasted or connected to 
something else. The Category of Secondness describes the singularity of the object, its 
otherness.  The Category of Thirdness connects the First and the Second:  the smell with 
the flower we call ‗rose‘. Although each category is distinct whatever appears before 
consciousness includes all three categories. 
 
Abduction is Peirce‘s novel contribution to logic and his theory of signs. While deduction 
and induction have been given much attention, Peirce introduces this third mode of 
reasoning that takes place prior to deduction and induction.  
 
Deduction is defined as an argument such that ‗in the long run of experience the greater 
part of those whose premises are true will have true conclusions.‘ (1992-1998b: 298). On 
the other hand, although with induction it is not necessarily the case that true premises 
will lead always lead to true conclusions, ‗it will in the long run yield the truth, or an 
indefinite approximation to the truth, in regard to every question.‘ (1992-1998b: 298). 
Abduction is defined as ‗a method of forming a general prediction without any positive 
assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justification being 
that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct rationally…‘ (1992-
1998b: 299) 
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Abduction is the process of grouping a number of facts together that impress the person. 
The facts are combined with others until an explanation can be offered. At this stage, a 
hypothesis is proposed and if the hypothesis is true, then the facts have been explained. 
Deduction involves examining the necessary consequences of a hypothesis: if one is 
proposing a certain hypothesis, then within the framework of that hypothesis, we should 
be able to ascertain what must follow. A trivial example of a hypothesis is that if it has 
been raining, then necessarily the street must be wet. Induction is that process of 
checking whether the way things are corresponds to the way it has been hypothetically 
proposed. Again, the actual wet road confirms the hypothesis that it has been raining. At 
this stage, the ‗theory‘ conforms to the facts. Peirce writes that an abductive inference 
suggests that something may be, deduction shows that something must be and induction 
shows that something is (1992-1998b: 216). 
 
Abduction falls within the category of Firstness and it can be described as a ‗creative 
guess‘. It is the preliminary hypothesis that is subsequently confirmed or rejected: 
slipping on the wet pavement, we – for an instant – don‘t know what is happening until 
we realize that we have slipped. The initial hypothesis is confirmed as we look around 
sitting on the pavement. Abduction, like Firstness, concerns the domain of the possible: 
these possibilities are not only unusual events (like slipping on the pavement) but a part 
of our everyday life - it is the process that takes place from the vague sensation of 
Firstness to the actuality of Secondness: from the vague sensation of hardness to the 
actuality of the pavement. Peirce writes, 
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‗Looking out of my window this lovely spring morning I see an azalea in full bloom. No, no! I do not see 
that; though that is the only way I can describe what I see. That is a proposition, a sentence, a fact; but what 
I perceive is not a proposition, sentence, fact but only an image, which I make intelligible in part by means 
of a statement of fact. This statement is abstract; but what I see is concrete. I perform an abduction when I 
[so much] as express in a sentence anything I see. The truth is that the whole fabric of our knowledge is one 
matted felt of pure hypothesis confirmed and refined by induction. Not the smallest advance can be made in 
knowledge beyond the state of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step (in Merill, 1995: 
57) 
 
2.0. The Nature of the Sign 
 
Peirce uses Locke as his point of departure and develops a highly sophisticated account 
of signs (the term semeiotic‘ is derived from the Greek word for sign ‗semeion‘, though 
the ‗e‘ is dropped and an‗s‘ is added nowadays, to produce semiotics). Given Saussure‘s 
background in linguistics, his account of signs focuses on their arbitrary and conventional 
nature; on the other hand, Peirce‘s background in the natural sciences directs his attention 
toward ‗natural‘ signs and subsumes conventional signs within the category of natural 
signs. The branch of semiotics that studies the conditions that transform something into a 
sign i.e., their formal character, is called ‗speculative grammar‘.  
 
A sign is defined as, „anything which stands for something to something. What the sign 
stands for is its object, what it stands to is the interpretant. The sign relation is 
fundamentally triadic: eliminate either the object or the interpretant and you annihilate the 
sign.‘ (1992-1998a: xxxvi) 
 
This definition highlights three fundamental and interrelated features of a sign:  
 
(a) a representamen (that is itself sometimes confusingly called a sign);  
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(b) an object that the representamen is related to and  
(c) the interpretant (not to be confused with the interpreter) as the activation of the 
meaning of a sign.  
 
The process of semiological activity moves along this triad: a representamen is associated 
with an object that is connected by or through the interpretant. In turn, the object and the 
interpretant have the possibility of being transformed into another sign for other objects 
and interpretants. Corresponding to the representamen-object-interpretant triad, is the 
Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness triad: while the First is independent of everything else, 
the Second is related to something else and the Third connects the First and Second. The 
Category of Thirdness is important in that it generates the interpretation of the sign: the 
sign-object relation requires an interpretant to have a meaning or significance. To say ‗the 
sun is shining‘ requires an interpretation that could focus on the sentence as an 
explanation of what the words mean, or on my suggestion that we go swimming, or on 
my pleasure that summer is approaching. Unless a sign can generate these further 
interpretations then it would have no significance. One might say that the significance of 
a sign depends upon its effects, upon the interpretants it produces.  
 
An important feature of Peirce‘s account of signs is that they are always embodied: in 
other words, there is always some ‗vehicle‘ that he calls the ‗ground‘ or ‗representamen‘ 
that function as a sign. The material in which signs are embodied range from mental 
states (dreams) to metal (road-signs) or wood (chairs), to the entire universe (as a sign of 
God). However, this embodiment has its constraints as not every feature functions as a 
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signifying one: the material of a signpost is not important, but that the representamen is 
clearly indicated as a tunnel and not a one way road is important. 
 
In the relationship between the representamen and its object, the sign is passive since it is 
the object that determines the representamen without the representamen having any effect 
on the object (the quality of Redness is the result of the apple not the other way around). 
On the other hand, in the relationship between the representamen and the interpretant, the 
representamen plays an active role since it determines the interpretant (the quality of 
redness ‗imposes‘ itself upon the interpretant).  
 
An important and fundamental characteristic of Peirce‘s theory of signs is the notion that 
it is the nature of signs to continually generate new signs: the interpretant can enter into a 
new sign-relation thereby becoming an object that will function as a sign for another 
interpretant. Eco has labeled this process ‗unlimited semiosis‘ (1976: 69) and it refers to 
the way a sign is associated with a certain meaning that in turn activates other meanings. 
Merrill highlights the dynamism of signs:  
 
…a sign‘s ―life‖ is precisely the essence of what it is like to be a sign. Signs are relatively insignificant 
unless they are translates, bearing witness to the ongoing semiosic process.  
Take, for instance, the solitary term ―atom‖. From an ―impenetrable sphere,‖ throughout the centuries it 
became, among other things, like the ―solar system,‖ then like a ―smear‖ or a ―cloud,‖ and finally no more 
than a statistical matrix. ―Atom‖ never rested on its laurels; it was always on the go; and it still is. With 
respect to a sign in a particular culture at the same point in history, consider philosopher Hilary Putnam‘s 
(1988) example of ―gold.‖ What does it mean for the physicist who pushes the electrons of an ―atom‖ of 
―gold‖ aside to get to the nucleus, the high school chemistry teacher who has pedagogical interest in 
―electron shells,‖ or the jeweler, the prospector in the jungles of Brazil, the newly engaged dreamy-eyed 
couple, the coin collector? In fact, bring to mind the numerous transmutations of terms such as ―cigarettes,‖ 
―guns,‖ ―flag,‖ ―U.S. Constitution,‖ ―harassment,‖ ―gays,‖ ―abortion,‖ ―racial prejudice,‖ ―cholesterol,‖ 
―polyunsaturated fats,‖ and so on. How complex, how rhizomic, how apparently ―chaotic,‖ this semiosic 
rush, this sparkling, shimmering race of signs.‖ (1995: 70) 
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Peirce does not allow for the ultimate meaning of a sign, since a sign can always be 
‗translated‘ into another sign. The process of semiosis is on going and to talk of a final 
meaning or of a grand Sign would be to talk about something outside human life. This is 
why it is fruitful to say that when a person interacts with a situation, the person – as a 
thinking, feeling being woven into the web of semiosis – responds  by producing more 
signs. The airplane flying overhead might mean an inconvenience to the person living in 
the flight path, summer holidays to the student, and pollution to the environmentalist. The 
same sign can produce different interpretants.  
 
In Peirce‘s view, the universe is an endless process of signs generating more signs. But 
for signs to generate meanings it is necessary to have interpreters – a sign must be a sign 
of something for someone. There are many things that are signs but for them to function 
as signs there must be interpreters to generate the interpretant: 
 
Mayan hieroglyphs are signs, no doubt, and we can assume they once enjoyed a set of relatively developed 
interpretants. But remaining to this point in time largely undeciphered and undecipherable by present-day 
archeologists, they have not produced a massive body of interpretants for some group of interpreters in our 
cultural milieu. They are a set of signs in search of their fulfillment. (Merrell, 1995: 93) 
 
It is the interpretant that accounts for the dynamism of signs, for once a sign has an 
interpretant, then it has the potential for transformation into another sign. Semiosis is a 
process that is always on the way to something else and in this process, the sign is 
transformed into something other, something different from what it was before.  
 
Peirce‘s definition of signs is broad precisely because it is intended to include within it 
almost everything, since almost everything can function as a sign. On his account, the 
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entire universe is ‗perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.‘ (1992-
1998b:394) Given the breath of his definition, Peirce‘s understanding of the world differs 
greatly from that of, say Aristotle, for whom the world can be understood by reference to 
substances, essences and purposes. Aristotle‘s world was fundamentally a static one, 
while Peirce, on the other hand, offers a dynamic vision of the world that can be 
explained in terms of events, processes and happenings.  
 
The following table (Merrell, 1995: 80) reveals the several different sub-classes of signs.  
 
     
 
Ø 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIRSTNESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECONDNESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIRDNESS 
 
Representamen (R)  
 
FIRST 
 
The sign of itself as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUALSIGN 
 
A feeling of quality 
prior to consciousness 
of it. 
 
 
 
SINSIGN 
 
A particular sign,  
a token 
 
 
LEGISIGN 
 
 
A general sign,  
a type 
 
Object (O) 
 
SECOND 
 
The relation of the 
sign to its ―semiotic 
object‖ is 
dependent upon 
 
 
 
ICON 
 
Some quality the 
sign shares with its 
―semiotic object‖ 
 
 
 
INDEX 
 
Some actual relation 
between the sign and 
its ―semiotic object‖ 
 
SYMBOL 
 
 
Some relation 
between the sign and 
its ―semiotic object‖ 
to its interpretant 
 
Interpretant (I) 
 
THIRD 
 
The sign‘s relation to 
its ‗semiotic object‖ 
in relation to its 
interpreter is that: 
 
 
 
TERM 
 
Of a stated quality 
 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSITION 
(SENTENCE) 
Of a statement 
relation the sign to is 
―semiotic object‖ 
 
ARGUMENT 
(TEXT) 
 
Of an interpretation  
(using logic, reason, 
or rhetoric) by 
conventional means 
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In the case of the Representamen, the sign can be a quality, an individual object or a 
general type. 
 
(a) First: the Representamen as Qualisign is a feeling, sensation or the vagueness of 
something that we cannot identify as something existing. The First of a perceptual object 
is the ‗qualisign‘: the ‗quali‘ is a quality such as redness or sourness. Since redness or 
sourness do not exist on their own, for them to function as a sign they must be embodied 
in objects. Despite being embodied, the quality itself as a sign is not affected by the 
object (1992-1998b: 291).  
 
(b) Second: the Representamen as Sinsign. When the Representamen is a second, it is a 
sinsign or a token: it is singular so that it functions as a sign by being ‗an actual exitent 
thing or event‘ (1992-1998b: 291). A sinsign is the sign of a thing or event that exists 
now in isolation from other signs: it is a sign of something or an event that we are 
conscious of.  
 
(c) Third: the Representamen as Legisign. Legisigns usually signify as a result of 
conventions, habits or laws (e.g. traffic lights) and they include classes or types. They 
become legisigns as a result of their being repeated. It is language that best exemplifies 
legisigns because language entails the use of general terms such as ‗dog‘ or ‗car‘. A 
general term or type applies to all particular instantiations or tokens, such as this dog and 
this car. The word ‗dog‘ is a general type a legisign, but each time the word is uttered, the 
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utterance is a token of the type, an instantiation of it. In addition, the event of uttering the 
word ‗dog‘ does not influence the type ‗dog‘. Peirce writes that a legisign is ‗not a single 
object, but a general type…thus the word ―the‖ will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-
five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same 
legisign. Each single instance of it is a replica. The replica is a sinsign.‘ (1992-1998b: 
291)  
 
In the case of Objects, the sign can be an icon, index or symbol. 
 
(a) Firsts: Objects as Icons. The iconic sign functions as a sign by virtue of resembling or 
being a likeness to an object. Icons ‗serve to convey ideas of the things they represent 
simply by imitating them.‘ (1992-1998b: 5) Among these are included photography, 
paintings, maps and caricatures. Other icons include resemblances even to objects that do 
not necessarily exist, such as a picture of a unicorn. However, Peirce does point out that 
the terminology or ‗likeness‘ or ‗resemblance‘ is too restrictive if it is used to mean only 
a correspondence between a physical likeness and its object. Iconic signs include:  
 
(a) images where the image resembles the object to such an extent that they can be 
considered as one: the image is like the object without any difference from it  
 
(b) diagrams which resemble their object but are different from them. The resemblance 
could be of parts, or of the structure of the object (for example, the diagram of a house 
and the house). 
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(c) metaphors: when signs that are not usually found together are combined in a sentence, 
the relation between them generates a metaphor. It is not usual to associate a human 
being with a lion, but in the sentence ‗Charles Borg is a lion‘, a man is said to resemble 
the qualities that are associated with lions.  
 
An icon functions as a sign irrespective of whether the object exists or not, and 
irrespective of whether it is interpreted or not. The road sign of a tunnel functions as a 
likeness of a tunnel, even if there is no tunnel or anyone to interpret it; a sign that 
functions as a warning ‗do not enter‘ still signifies a warning, whether it is at the entrance 
of an field or whether it is lying in a heap of scrap.  There is no way of knowing whether 
there is anything more than just the sign functioning.
iv
 
 
Can there be such a thing as a ‗pure‘ icon? If icons belong to the category of Firstness, 
and if this category is independent of everything else, then a pure icon would be a 
Qualisign, a pure sensation or feeling without any connection to a consciousness (since 
consciousness would transform it into a Sinsign). The notion of a pure icon is therefore 
only hypothetical and Peirce calls them ‗hypo-icons‘ since he believed that there was 
always a conventional element involved. Take (for example) maps: although maps are 
supposed to be ‗just‘ a resemblance or likeness of the terrain that they are maps of, they 
too have a conventional element in that there are rules that tell us how to use the map as 
an icon.  So too, when icons are defined as ‗resemblances‘ this does not carry with it the 
negative connotation of being without value: on the contrary, icons are valuable insofar 
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as they enable us to learn since by studying features of the icon, it is possible to learn 
more about the object. By observing a map, we can learn more about the terrain; by 
examining a photograph, we can learn more about a building. 
 
(b) Second: Object as Index. A sign is indexical if there is a natural or causal relation 
between the sign and the object; such a relation or connection is existential since it 
involves actual existing objects or events. Indices direct our attention to the object as 
when the weather cock directs our attention to the wind blowing; they function like 
pronouns since they point to something and their ‗force‘ is such that they connect an 
object to our senses and to our memory (since we remember having experienced such a 
connection). So, for example, when we hear thunder we know – because we remember 
our past experiences of thunder – that lightening is the cause of it.  
 
I see a man with a rolling gait. This is a probable indication that he is a sailor. I see a bowlegged man in 
corduroys, gaiters, and a jacket. These are probable indicators that he is a jockey or something of the sort. 
A weathercock indicates the direction of the wind. A sun-dial or a clock indicates the time of day. 
Geometricians mark letters against the different parts of their diagrams and then use those letters to indicate 
those parts. Letters are similarly used by lawyers and others. Thus, we may say: if A and B are married to 
one another and C is their child while D is brother of A, then D is uncle of C. Here A, B, C, and D fulfill 
the office of relative pronouns, but are more convenient since they require no special collocation of words. 
A rap on the door is an indication. Anything which focuses the attention is an indication. Anything which 
startles us is an indication, in so far as it marks the junction between two portions of experience.  Thus a 
tremendous thunderbolt indicates that something considerable happened, though we may not know 
precisely what the event was. But it may be expected to connect itself with some other experience. (1992-
1998b: 8) 
 
Peirce describes the indexical sign as something ‗which it could not have if its object did 
not exist, but which it will continue to have just the same whether it be interpreted as a 
representamen or not.‘ (in Merill, 1995: 84) The weather cock is a sign of the direction of 
the wind; it ‗depends‘ upon the wind and will point somewhere independently of whether 
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the person is looking at it or not. As with icons, indices still signify irrespective of 
whether there are interpreters: a can with a bullet hole still functions as a sign of a bullet 
shot irrespective of whether there is anybody to interpret it. While indices refer to actual 
things or events, these do not necessarily occur in the external world, as they could just as 
easily be occurrences that that take place within our minds (as in dreams or mathematical 
constructions). 
 
There are two kinds of indexical signs: genuine indices (or ‗reagents‘) point to actual 
existing objects or events and these indexical signs have a natural connection between 
them. On the other hand, degenerate indices do not point to actual existing objects but are 
mental or artificial. A prime example of a degenerate sign is a symbol since there is no 
natural connection between the sign and the object, even though it still points to the 
object.  
 
some merely stand for things…while others may be used to ascertain facts. Of the former class which may 
be termed designations, personal, demonstrative, and relative pronouns, proper names, the letters attached 
to a geometrical figure, and the ordinary letters of algebra are examples. They act to force the attention to 
the thing intended. Designations are absolutely indispensable both to communication and to thought. No 
assertion has any meaning unless there is some designation to show whether the universe of reality or what 
universe of fiction is referred to. The other class of indices may be called reagents. Thus water placed in a 
vessel with a shaving of camphor thrown upon it will show whether the vessel is clean or not. (cited in 
Merill, 1995: 85) 
 
The question once again is whether there is such a thing as a pure index and clearly since 
a genuine index describes the relation between a sign and an actual object, then a pure 
indexical relation would be one without any human involvement in it. This - Peirce 
acknowledges - is ‗impossible‘, for it is impossible to know the world as it is 
independently of humans; furthermore, even if it were a case of genuine indexices there 
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is always an element of human psychology since the human mind associates one event 
with another (association by contiguity). Pointing with our fingers to an object seems to 
be a prime example of a pure index, but the rule which tells us that a finger points to an 
object does not tell us which object it is pointing too. Peirce calls these ‗sub-index‘.  
 
(c) Third: the Object as Symbol. A symbol has a meaning by virtue of its habitual 
associations: symbolic signs ‗or general signs…have become associated with their 
meanings by usage. Such are most words, and phrases, and speeches, and books and 
libraries.‘ (1992-1998b: 5) Symbols are signs that are conventionally and habitually 
related to their object (for example, a flag is conventionally associated with a country, 
and words are conventional agreements to use them in a certain way: the word ‗dog‘ and 
the animal dog. The best examples of symbols are natural languages (English, Maltese), 
formal languages (mathematics, logic) and artificial languages (the Morse code, braille).  
 
Linguistic signs are a prime example of symbols:  
 
any ordinary word, as ―give,‖ ―bird,‖ ―marriage,‖ is an example of a symbol. It is applicable to whatever 
may be found to realize the idea connected with the word; it does not, in itself, identify those things. It does 
not show us a bird, nor enact before our eyes a giving or a marriage, but supposes that we are able to 
imagine those things, and have associated the word with them. (1992-1998b: 9) 
 
The relation between symbolic signs and objects is the product of human minds: the 
symbol has nothing in common with what it refers to. While an icon might resemble 
something real or fictional and an index points to something independently of semiotic 
agents, symbolic signs depend entirely on minds. It is humans who agree to use a symbol 
in a certain way, to use the sign ‗dog‘ to refer to particular dogs or to the category or class 
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of dogs.  Symbols are conventional through and through. The difference between the 
symbol and icons or indices is that symbols depend upon the interpretant: since anything 
can function as a symbol, the symbol needs an interpretant, a meaning to function as a 
sign. Symbolic signs as interpretants or meanings can generate other interpretants or 
meanings. 
 
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, and particularly from likenesses 
or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. These 
mental signs are of a mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new 
symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. 
Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in 
experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very different 
meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. (1992-1998b: 10) 
 
The Sign as Interpretant can be a word, proposition or argument. The final classification 
concerns the way signs relate to the interpreter: the interpreter can ‗read‘ the sign in terms 
of its qualities, its existence or generality. Peirce considers this classification similar to 
the division in logic between terms, propositions, and argument.  
 
(a) Firstness: the Interpretant as Term or Word (a rheme). The word functions as a 
possibility, ‗such and such a kind of possible Object. Any rheme, perhaps, will afford 
some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so.‘ (1992-1998b:292) A term 
represents the possibility of a type of object and as a term (e.g., dog) it cannot be true or 
false. 
 
Although a sign is symbolic this does not mean that there are no traces of iconicity and 
indexicality in them: the iconic aspect involves the similarity or resemblance evoked in 
the agent by other uses of the sign and the indexical aspect involves what the sign points 
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to (for the agent). The sign ‗dog‘ functions iconically because it resembles other times 
that the person used the sign, and it functions indexcially when it points to any 
associations, real or imagined (a real dog ‗causes‘ us to say ‗dog‘ or when we remember 
our dog and start talking about it) that we have of it.  
 
(b) Secondness: the Interpretant as a Dicent Sign (a sentence or proposition). The 
interpretant is the ‗dicent‘ and propositions are the best models of dicents since it is of a 
proposition that one can say that it is true or false. A proposition combines ‗rhemes‖ into 
a whole, such as ‗the dog is sleeping‘ and this proposition describes whether something 
exists or not. A sentence is composed of a number of symbols strung together: in ‗the sun 
is shining‘ the ‗sun‘ here functions chiefly in an indexical way – it is about the sun – and 
the verb functions in a iconic way since it resembles other instances of when the sun 
shone
iv
.  
 
(c) Thirdness: the Interpretant as Arguments.  The function of this sign is to arrive at a 
conclusion as a result of dialogue and argumentation. Here, language – as the most 
developed of signs – is used as a tool to further communicative exchanges in the form of 
reasoned arguments.   
 
A word on its own – the first of Thirdness – is a word that has the possibility of being 
combined with other words. At this stage, we could say that the word still needs to be 
realized, its potential as yet unfulfilled. This fulfillment begins when it is placed within 
the context of a sentence since solitary words are useless for communication. The 
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sentence is the second of Thirdness: in ‗the sun is shining‘, the sun is seen as shining, a 
quality is attributed to a subject. The third of Thirdness is the condition of possibility for 
dialogue and communication: our utterance, ‗the sun is shining‘ might lead to a 
discussion of the depletion of the ozone layer and the resulting increase in skin related 
problems.  
 
The use of symbols carries with them a background, a form of life. Symbols 
communicate - directly or indirectly – the values and beliefs of a community. Given this 
implicit background knowledge, an utterance will never be able to express a complete 
context: it is always possible for more to be communicated. Peirce‘s account helps to 
explain the way signs proliferate and multiply: from icons to indices to symbols to icons 
again and so on. When a symbol is a term it has the potential to generate other symbols: 
the term ‗Shakespeare‘ is not just about a particular person but carries with it a network 
of cultural associations. So too, just as a term can generate a profusion of signs, a 
sentence can generate texts: the sentence ‗The war on terror must be won‘ generated a 
multitude of discourses – economic, political, military - that together make up the 
intertextual world.  
 
3.0. The Combinations of Signs 
 
Given the three different classes of signs each with their own types, Peirce thought it was 
possible to combine them to account for all possible signs. In principle, this should have 
amounted to twenty-seven possible signs, but given certain rules of combination these are 
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reduced to ten classes. The two rules for the classification of the signs is that (a) there is 
one from each of the tables: one from the representamen, from the object and from the 
interpretant; and (b) a ‗lower‘ level sign cannot be combined with one from a level above 
it. So (for example) a qualisign, icon or rheme cannot combine with any above it, and a 
sinsign, index or dicent cannot combine with one from the list above it. Schematically, 
this is what the rules of combination allow
iv
: 
 
 
Interpretant  Object   Sign-  Examples (from CP 2.254-263 
      Vehicle  1903) 
 
Rheme   Icon   Qualisign ―A feeling of red‖ 
Rheme   Icon   Sinsign  ―An Individual Diagram‖ 
Rheme   Index   Sinsign  ―A spontaneous cry‖ 
Dicent   Index   Sinsign  ―A Weather Cock‖ 
Rheme    Icon   Legisign  ―A diagram [type]‖ 
Rheme    Index   Legisign  ―A demonstrative pronoun‖ 
Dicent   Index   Legisign  ―A street cry‖ 
Rheme   Symbol   Legisign  ―A common noun‖ 
Dicent    Symbol   Legisign  ―Ordinary proposition‖ 
Delome   Symbol   Legisign  ―An argument‖ 
 
 
1. Rhematic iconic qualisign. This is the most basic and fundamental level of signs:  it is 
the minimum of information processed by the human body in terms of its biological 
structure from the pre-First ‗world‘. The formless-ness of the ‗world‘ is the condition that 
makes any sensation and experience for humans possible.  
 
2. Rhematic iconic sinsigns. This sign includes within it qualisigns and, since it is as yet 
unrelated, it is chiefly iconic. Peirce‘s example of a ‗self-contained diagram‘ (Merrell, 
1995: 132) is an individual copy of a map that is not related in the agent‘s mind to other 
maps (since it is one replica among others) and neither is it related to the territory that it 
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is a map of. The map is a self-contained entity. Merrell gives an example of rhematic 
iconic sinsigns,  
 
Some unintelligible squiggles on a subway wall in some unknown language can contain the possibility of 
symbolic signs, but as such they are for us related to nothing; they are no more than meaningless marks. At 
this juncture they enjoy interaction with no semiotic agent conscious of them as signs of something that 
have such-an-such characteristics, hence they are devoid of a well-wrought symbolic interpretant. If they 
vaguely resemble, say, a bow-tie, they can make up an ironic sinsign. But they do so only insofar as the 
squiggles-tie connection has not (yet) been established, for the icon is at this point no more than self-
contained, without relation to anything else.  (1995: 132) 
 
3. Rhematical indexical signs. These signs are pointers that direct the attention of the 
interpreter. A scream – or as Peirce calls it ‗a spontaneous cry‘ – directs the interpreter to 
the person screaming without knowing why he or she is screaming. Given certain 
contextual cues, the interpreter can probably figure out why the person is screaming since 
the context conditions our expectations of what might be about to happen (‗look out!‘ as 
we are walking past a building site). At this stage, the reaction to the sign is spontaneous 
and therefore, there is no full blown conscious awareness of the sign as a sign.  
 
4. Dicent indexical signs: the indexical character of this sign is that of causality where 
there exists a natural connection between the two events. The direction of the weather 
cock is the effect caused by the wind: when we look at it, we learn about the wind. As the 
nature of a sign is to incorporate, and not eliminate, other signs, this indexical sign retains 
the iconic aspect in that the direction of the weathercock is like the direction of the wind. 
Merrell elucidates,  
 
a photograph, when related to that of which it is a photograph, functions in indexical fashion. But it cannot 
so function without its iconic quality that endows it with the wherewithal for its indexicality. An image of 
Madonna on the cover of a magazine at the news-stand can be at a glance tacitly acknowledged as 
Madonna, without any explicit relation consciously and conscientiously established between sign and 
object. But the image, to be seen as a photograph, involves indexicality – without there (yet) being any 
words (symbolicity), either evolved in the mind or expressed, regarding the image.‘ (1995: 132-3) 
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5. Rhematic iconic legisigns. These are signs that establish a relation between a sign and 
an aspect of the object: the image of cutlery displayed on a door is a sign of a place to eat, 
a restaurant or diner. The cutlery is like the cutlery found in any kitchen but they 
represent food. So too, other signs of this class include onomatopoeic words that are like 
the object: the sound of ‗cuckoo‘ resembles the sound of the cuckoo bird (it is different in 
the case of the written ‗cuckoo‘ since the written sign does not resemble the cuckoo bird). 
 
6. Rhematic indexical legisign. Although this sign points to something else, there is a 
sense of absence, of deferral. The pointing does not have to be immediate as when the 
weathercock points to the direction of the wind. This class of signs includes 
demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and other place markers (here, there). Using these 
signs also enables one to talk about something implicitly, to talk about absences (‗I didn‘t 
do that‖). Signs of this type are legisigns because they involve a degree of generalization: 
they are a type as opposed to a token of a thing. ‗The shout of ―Hullo!‖ is an example of 
the ordinary variety,---meaning, not an individual shout, but this shout, ―Hullo!‖ in 
general---this type of shout.‘ (1992-1998b: 297) 
 
7. Dicent indexical legisign. These signs can be of two kinds: linguistic and non-
linguistic. Both the linguistic and the non-linguistic are general or routine but not 
necessarily conventional. In the case of linguistic signs, the generality of a legisign is 
displayed in everyday expressions (‗how you doing?‘, ‗o.k.?‘). The indexical element of 
these signs can be seen in the way they are used to connect with other people - as 
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greetings, or acknowledgements – whom we are familiar with. The iconic aspect is the 
resemblance or likeness of these expressions with other similar expressions. In the case of 
non-linguistic signs, communication in the animal world displays these generalized 
patterns of behavior that are innate: bees perform the Waggle Dance not because they 
have learnt it from other bees, but because nature has programmed them (instinct) to 
communicate in this way. 
 
8. Rhematic symbolic legisigns. These signs are words or general terms, usually nouns 
(‗table‘ or ‗television‘). They are generated in the interpretant by virtue of the semiotic 
agent‘s previous experience of them: having in the past used the sign ‗chair‘ with a chair, 
this association is memorized and upon future experiences of a chair one is able to 
retrieve the sign ‗chair‘ from  his memory. Since these signs are the exclusive domain of 
humans, there is something in the person‘s memory bank that predisposes them towards 
using these signs. The activation of these signs requires both an interpretant and objects 
that are particular instantiations of the general term; thus (for example) the general term 
(‗chair‘) can be applied to an infinite number of particular chairs of all shapes, sizes and 
colors.  
 
9. Dicent symbolic legisigns are sentences or propositions. From a single sign a series of 
responses are enacted that combine signs into a whole. This stage can be considered as a 
preliminary conversation. Propositions in formal language (2+2=4) belong to this 
category and while a proposition might seem context-free, it is always embedded within a 
linguistic context.  
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10. Delome Symbolic Legisigns are arguments whereby one moves from premises to 
conclusions: ‗an Argument is a sign whose Interpretant represents its Object as being an 
ulterior sign through a law namely, the law that the passage from all such premises to 
such conclusions tend to the truth.‘ (1992-1998b: 296) 
 
4.0. Pragmatism, knowledge and dialogue.  
 
Peirce‘s ideas on pragmatism (renamed pragmaticism in 1905) are chiefly discussed in 
‗The Fixation of Belief‘ (1877) and ‗How to Make Our Ideas Clear‘ (1878). Although the 
term pragmatism was coined by Peirce as a way of testing the content of concepts, 
propositions and hypothesis within science, its range of application was broadened to 
both logic and philosophy. The idea behind pragmatism was that the investigator of 
concepts adopts an experimentalist approach, an approach similar to one used by 
scientists in laboratories.   
 
Pragmaticism forged a link between the understanding of a concept and the consequences 
of that concept. To understand a concept, to know what it means, entails that it has some 
observable effect: ‗Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.‘ (1992-1998a: 132). This formulation 
of the pragmatic maxim suggests that if a person can provide all the conditional 
propositions (if one did A, then one can observe B) related to the concept, then if one 
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applies them to the object, one can predict the results or consequences: ‗To say that a 
body is heavy simply means that, in the absence of opposing force, it will fall….what we 
mean by the force itself is completely involved in its effects.‘ (1992-1998a: 133) For 
Peirce, the meaning of a concept is nothing but the sum total of possible effects
iv
.  
 
Since the observable effects of a concept constituted the criterion of meaningfulness of a 
concept, this also implied what counted as meaninglessness: if a concept has no 
observable consequences, then it is empty or useless. Peirce‘s hope was that by adopting 
the pragmatic maxim, several questions that had seemed irresolvable, could now be 
eliminated. In one of his examples, Peirce dismisses the religious concept of 
transubstantiation as meaningless since it can have no conceivable practical effect. 
According to the doctrine of transubstantiation, during mass, the bread and wine literally 
change into the body and blood of Christ. Since we know what bread and wine are 
through their qualities (their taste, texture or color) and since these remain the same after 
the transubstantiation, then how can we say that they are now the body and blood of 
Christ? In other words, the same qualities are now supposed to belong to a different 
substance. If, according to the pragmatic criterion, we understand the meaning of a 
concept according to its conceivable effects, then the concept of transubstantiation has no 
meaning: ‗We can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct 
or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters 
of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon.‘ (1992-1998a: 131) 
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One might disagree with this view by arguing that the doctrine of transubstantiation 
makes a difference or has an effect upon a person. Such a view is not Pierce‘s as the 
pragmatic maxim is not a psychological tool but a conceptual one: it is not a question of 
what the doctrine of transubstantiation might have for you or me, but a question of 
whether the doctrine is conceptually tenable or not. And this is why Peirce proposes 
experience as the counter weight to all those theorists that have relied exclusively on 
reason: while we might be led to a conclusion through our reason, experience is the ‗test‘ 
for whether these conclusions are valid or not. ‗In all the works on pedagogy that ever I 
read…I don‘t remember that any one has advocated a system of teaching by practical 
jokes, mostly cruel. That, however, describes the method of our great teacher, 
Experience.‘ (1992-1998b:154) 
 
Pragmatism is closely connected with truth for it enables us to differentiate those 
propositions that are true (since the effects support them), from those that are false (since 
they run counter to the effects). Talisse and Aiken provide an example 
 
…understanding the truth of the proposition the cat is on the mat is constituted by an understanding of the 
practical consequences of the cat being on the mat – a bowl of milk next to the mat will likely be drunk, 
mice will avoid the mat, one should expect howls of protest if one wipes one‘s feet on the mat. Truths have 
consequences, and to understand those truths, we must grasp the differences they make for our experience. 
(2008: 61) 
 
Aside from the question of how to sort out those concepts that were tenable from those 
that should be discarded, Peirce was also greatly interested in the method that should be 
used for the attainment of knowledge both about ourselves, and about the world.
iv
 As a 
point of departure, Peirce clarifies the difference between being in the condition of doubt 
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and being in the condition of belief. While the characteristic of belief is that a person is 
serene, in the condition of doubt a person is dissatisfied. A person in the condition of 
dissatisfaction attempts to return to the condition of belief.
iv
 (1992-1998a: 114) The 
reason for thinking about something or conducting an inquiry is precisely to remove that 
doubt. Once a belief is achieved – whether true or not – then the thinking or inquiring 
ceases. Peirce‘s approach differs from the Cartesian approach that proposed doubting 
everything before one can proceed to a state of belief; rather, the opposite is the case, as 
one always starts with some belief, but should that belief be challenged by the evidence, 
then the belief should be abandoned or modified accordingly. There are four ways for 
settling an opinion: 
 
(a) the method of tenacity is the one where a person adamantly holds on to, and defends 
his/her ideas. It is the method of ‗stubbornness‘ where one clings to one‘s belief despite 
evidence to the contrary.  Anybody has the right to believe what they want, but an idea 
must hold favor with the rest of the community for it to be accepted: without their 
approval or agreement it would always be difficult to establish whether the belief 
deserves being listened to or dismissed as something personal. This method fails because 
it is not very useful in solving disputes since one ignores the views of others or the facts; 
and if they are listened to, one is disturbed to hear contrary views: 
 
The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to 
him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own and this will shake his 
confidence in his belief. (1992-1998a: 116) 
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(b) the method of authority. This is similar to the method of ‗tenacity‘ but rather than 
being individually-centered, it is upheld by an institution such as the state or the church:  
 
Let an institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of 
the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to 
prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed. (1992-1998a: 117) 
 
Something is believed because the authorities say so and whoever disagrees with this 
belief or idea is plainly mistaken. The problem with this method is it assumes that 
knowledge is completely in the hands of the institutional authorities who monitor the 
evidence, eliminating anything that threatens the belief. As a result, any individual who 
comes up with new ideas is seen as threatening to the order of things. This method 
eventually fails as an institution cannot control everything all of the time. 
 
(c) the ‗a priori‘ method. Descartes thought that he had discovered a method that could 
eliminate all doubt, a method that would guarantee certainty. On his account, the search 
for knowledge is the work of the solitary individual using his reason. Any conflict of 
opinion is settled by supporting those beliefs that we find agreeable i.e., that conform to 
our reason. If the belief fits into our network of beliefs then we tend to agree with it. This 
method fails because  
 
It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more 
or less a matter of fashion, and accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any fixed agreement, but 
the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy, 
from the earliest times to the latest. (1992-1998a: 119) 
 
As a result, beliefs change according to the times. According to Peirce this method 
overlaps with the previous two: the solitary person promotes what he/she considers 
knowledge, i.e., the ‗method of tenacity‘, and if these beliefs are accepted as founding 
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truths, these truths become ‗eternal‘ because of the respect gained by the person who 
founded them, i.e.,  ‗the method of authority‘.  
 
However, despite the overlap Peirce noticed a big difference between the a priori method 
and the methods of authority and tenacity: since the a priori method is influenced by what 
is agreeable to reason, the ‗what‘ or the content of the beliefs is determined, by what is 
agreeable at the time. In the case of the methods of tenacity and authority, the content is 
determined according to the strength or power of the individual or the institution. Strictly 
speaking, since there is no discussion of the content but a mere exercise of force, the 
methods of tenacity and authority should not be considered legitimate methods of 
inquiry.  
 
The problem common to the three methods is that none seem able to offer a way of 
providing secure belief because in all three it is we who determine what is to be believed 
or not. As a result, Peirce thought that a better way would be one where our beliefs are 
fixed by something independent, or larger than us. If our beliefs were not affected by 
what we thought about them, then it is more likely that they would provide security.  
 
(d) the dialogical method. This is the method proposed by Peirce where knowledge is 
achieved by members of the scientific community in dialogue with each other. ‗Thus, the 
very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the 
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits and capable of an indefinite increase 
of knowledge.‘ (1992-1998a: 52) The advantage of Peirce‘s method is that it eliminates 
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the following unpleasant situations of perseverance of foolish ideas (tenacity), the 
pretensions of grandiose persons (authority) or the solitary discovery of truth (the 
Cartesian method). 
 
Within the context of a dialogue, the movement of ideas between participants who might 
agree, challenge or defend an idea is essential to its justification and subsequent 
acceptance. While the method of dialogue ensures that an idea or belief is always open to 
succeeding developments, at that point in time, by virtue of being shared by members of 
the community, it remains true. 
 
This is not to say that knowledge is constructed by the members or the community 
irrespective of reality. On the contrary, reality operates independently of anything that a 
person or a group might think about it, 
 
There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities 
affect our senses according to regular laws, and though our sensations are as different as are our relations to 
the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things 
really are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it will be led to the one 
true conclusion.  (1992-1998a:120) 
 
The interesting thing about Peirce‘s view on reality is that a number of people thinking 
about it on their own, will – over time – have a convergence of their thinking. Reality, as 
a zone of experience ‗co-ordinates‘ the reasoning of these persons into a shared belief. It 
would seem that eventually a final opinion, a true conclusion would be arrived at. Since 
the pragmatic maxim applies to ‗conceivable‘ practical effects, and since anything can be 
rationally examined, at some point in time there would be nothing left to examine. In 
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addition, the communal aspect of inquiry also plays a part in ensuring that the ‗true 
conclusion‘ is achieved: a group of investigators each contributing their opinions will 
eventually – in the process of discussion and debate – overcome any mistakes taken. 
Peirce‘s example of the blind and deaf man highlights this communal process, ‗One hears 
a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim 
cry; the other sees the murder done.‘ (1992-1998a: 89) Eventually, the two men with their 
different perceptions of what happened will arrive at one conclusion. The scientific 
method works by following a process where errors are eliminated the final conclusion is 
reached. 
 
And while the differences of opinion might delay arriving at the final opinion, ultimately, 
and independently of the persons, the final opinion ‗imposes‘ itself: ‗the arbitrary will or 
other individual peculiarities of a sufficiently large number of minds may postpone the 
general agreement in that opinion indefinitely; but it cannot affect what the character of 
that opinion shall be when it is reached.‘ (1992-1998a: 89) The innovative aspect of 
Peirce‘s view is the idea that it is the ‗community of inquirers‘ dialogically engaged that 
acquire knowledge. Unlike the model offered by Descartes of the solitary man who 
searches for knowledge, the Peircean model for the acquisition of knowledge involves 
communication between members of the community: knowledge acquisition is a 
collaborative process. This final opinion can be considered the truth. 
 
It should be pointed out that by the ‗final opinion‘, Peirce is not suggesting that we are 
unable to pass a judgment on whether something is true or false until the final opinion is 
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reached. Rather, the search for a final opinion functions as a regulative ideal: it is an ideal 
because should the discussion be continued, eventually, the final opinion would be 
achieved. But in practice, this does not mean that we must suspend judgment until it is 
reached for if this were the case, then it would be unlikely that anyone questioned 
anything since it would seem that they could never get an answer. 
 
On Peirce‘s view, then, all advanced thinking depends on one‘s participation in a linguistic or semiotic 
community. Peirce‘s stress on the importance of community was a common theme throughout his work, and 
it increased as he came to understand more full the importance of convention for semiosis.  Peirce appealed 
to a community of inquirers for his theory of truth, and he regarded the identification with community as 
fundamental for the advancement of knowledge (the end of the highest semiosis) and, also, for the 
advancement of human relations. (1991-1998a: xl) 
 
Critical Remarks 
The impact of Peirce cannot be underestimated and his ideas have influenced a wide 
range of contemporary thinkers - Sebeok, Eco, Derrida, Davidson, Habermas, Kuhn and 
Popper - to name just a few. Although he has contributed to several fields, such as ethics 
and religion, his legacy in ensured in the now established field of semiotics, a field that 
he is acknowledged as one of its founding fathers. The value of semiotics also lies in its 
range of application so that it contributes to a better understanding of the more traditional 
disciplines of epistemology, anthropology, literary theory and linguistics. Furthermore, 
and in relation to semiotics, Peirce will be remembered for introducing pragmatism or, as 
he preferred to call it, pragmaticism as a method for the clarification of concepts.  
 
Peirce has also been a major influence upon Habermas who has adopted his ideas to 
buttress his social and political philosophy. In particular, Habermas transforms Peirce‘s 
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concept of the community of inquirers from that of a regulative ideal that legitimizes 
knowledge to a ground that functions within actual communities enabling free and open 
debate within democratic societies (in Edgar, 2006: 119-121). However, in his paper 
‗Peirce and Communication,‘ (in Ketner Laine, Kenneth, 1995: 243-266) Habermas 
comments that Peirce neglects the importance of communication between persons 
because he focuses on the representative function of the sign. Peirce is more interested in 
the relation between the sign and the world and as a result, Habermas claims that the 
interpretant replaces the interpreter who has, in a sense, become invisible, with serious 
consequences for semiotics and ethics. In ‗A Response to Habermas‘ (in Ketner Laine, 
Kenneth, 1995: 267-271) Oehler defends Peirce arguing that Habermas‘ critique is 
formulated along the lines of his theory of communicative rationality whereby reason is 
manifested in intersubjective communication. But Peirce did not think that language was 
an adequate medium for the expression of rationality, as is evidenced by his preference 
for diagrams and graphs to enable understanding.  
 
Peirce‘s concept of ‗unlimited semiosis‘ has led some to argue that given that everything 
is a sign and signs in the process of interpretation produce more signs,  then signs contain 
within them the possibility of unlimited interpretations.  Eco (1995: 205-222) rejects this 
interpretation of Peirce arguing that while there is this potential in signs, these signs do 
not float freely and endlessly but are situated within a context of relevance. This context 
of relevance or the ‗given universe of discourse‘ sets the limit on what counts as a 
legitimate interpretation at a given moment: in other words, it is not a question of 
anything goes since what is being interpreted always takes place within a framework
iv
.  
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Eco argues that both interpretations in general and textual interpretation in particular are 
subject to ‗habit‘: according to Peirce‘s pragmaticismiv, habit lies outside the sphere of 
interpretation since is a disposition to behave in a certain way towards something. Habit 
is closely connected to communities that both regulates and are the source of 
interpretations. So too, textual interpretations are subject to the habits of the community 
that ‗decides‘ which further interpretations of the text are possible. 
 
Finally, Sebeok‘s paper on Peirce entitled ‗Indexicality‘ (in Ketner Laine, Kenneth, 1995: 
222-242) demonstrates why Peirce rightly considered the index as the most important of 
type of sign. It is the sign that is used in a large number of disciplines not usually 
associated with semiology such as biology and ornithology. However, the more important 
point is that the indexical sign always reminds us of a specific and relevant context. As 
Sebeok points out these contexts include the features that identify a person as a member 
of a group, a region, a social situation or an occupation; they can point to a person‘s 
personality, psychology or physiology.  
 
In this chapter I have given a broad overview of Peirce‘s writings focusing chiefly on his 
theory of signs. The first section (a) shows the mathematical and phenomenological basis 
of his theory of signs, (b) followed by a detailed account of the nature of signs. The next 
section (c) develops Peirce‘s account of combinations of signs and with the final section 
(d) examining his views on pragmatism and knowledge.  
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Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. 
We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. (1978: 100-101) 
 
 
Foucault on Discourse and Power  
 
 
 
Michel Foucault‘s (1926-1984) writings present a challenge to the way western 
civilisation has constructed its own identity, an identity that is heir to the values of the 
Enlightenment. The values of reason, progress and knowledge have been accepted 
unquestioningly as signs of the maturity of the west so it is no surprise that Foucault‘s 
challenge of these foundational values has disturbed many. 
 
Foucault‘s writings are divided into three phases: the first is commonly known as the 
archaeological period and the texts include The Order of Things (1970) and Madness and 
Civilisation (1993). These are philosophical-historical analyses of the conditions that can 
account for the emergence of knowledge and madness in western civilisation. The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) also belongs to the early Foucault, but unlike his other 
texts it is not an analysis of any historical phenomena but is a methodological text 
explaining the concepts that he used in his early writings.  The genealogical phase reveals 
a change of emphasis in Foucault‘s writings with an increasing awareness of the 
relationship between power and knowledge in the formation of carceral institutions and in 
the study of sexuality. The texts included in this phase are Discipline and Punish (1991) 
and The History of Sexuality Vol. 1. (1978). In the later writings, Foucault once again 
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shifts the direction of his thinking towards the subject or agency and the texts here 
include The History of Sexuality Vol. 2 and Vol. 3.  
 
It should be pointed out that when Foucault discusses the historical emergence of 
discourse in the archaeological and the genealogical writings, the time frames he adopts 
for historical periodization differ from those customarily used within the English 
speaking world. The historical periods or epistemes that constitute the object of 
Foucault‘s attention are those of the Renaissance (1450-1640), the Classical world (1650-
1800) and the Modern world (1800-1960). 
 
While his writings have produced a number of theses on the interconnectedness between 
subjectivity, knowledge and power in modern society, my interest is that of showing the 
way power communicates through discourse. In this chapter I shall be (a) first elaborating 
the concept of discourse, followed by (b) an overview of Foucault‘s archaeology of 
knowledge and (c) his genealogical analysis of prisons and sexuality; I will finally (d) 
show the way Foucault‘s theses on discipline and surveillance are being utilized as a 
platform for the critique of contemporary social practices. 
 
1.0. A Theory of Discourse 
 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault presents a theoretical account of his earlier 
writings such as Madness and Civilisation and The Order of Things, offering an 
explanation of the conceptual tools - discourse, episteme and archive – that he had 
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employed in these analyses. In this text Foucault both explains what his archaeological 
method involves and provides a detailed analysis of the concept of discourse. However, 
the concept of the episteme - that had been central to the earlier writings - is sidelined.  
 
Discourse is defined as ‗the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts 
for a number of statements…‘ (1972: 80) What this definition highlights is the idea that 
statements are produced within institutions and that these institutions operate according 
to certain rules that permit some statements and forbid others.  These are transcendental 
in the sense that they are the conditions that make knowledge possible. Clearly a 
discourse should not be confused either with a way of using language or as an analysis of 
conversations; it is used by Foucault to define an area of social knowledge constituted by 
a regulated body of statements. This is why within a particular historical period it is 
possible to think and communicate in a certain way about an area of knowledge (madness 
or punishment). However one should not be misled into thinking that there is a 
uniformity in a domain: the discourse of madness in the nineteenth century differed both 
from those of other centuries, and within the same period: other institutional sites 
constructed a different object that was called madness:  
 
the object presented as their correlative by medical statements of the seventeenth or eighteenth century is 
not identical with the object that emerges in legal sentences or police action; similarly, all the objects of 
psychopathological discourses were modified from Pinel or Esquirol to Bleuler…One might, perhaps one 
should conclude from this multiplicity of objects that it is not possible to accept, as a valid unity forming a 
group of statements, a ‗discourse concerning madness‘. (1972: 32)iv 
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Given that statements are essential to the concept of discourse, Foucault describes the 
nature of the statement by contrasting it with,  
 
(a) propositions: a proposition is the basic unit of analysis that logicians focus upon. In 
the study of propositions the content of a proposition is considered as remaining the same 
throughout different usages; in addition, a proposition depends on truth conditions 
independently of other propositions. A statement, on the other hand, is dependent on 
other statements within a conceptual framework for its truth conditions: it belongs to a 
network of other statements. Foucault offers this example to differentiate the proposition 
from the statement:  
 
‗No one heard‘ and ‗it is true that no one heard‘ are indistinguishable from a logical point of view, and 
cannot be regarded as two different propositions. But in so many statements, these two formations are not 
equivalent or interchangeable…If one finds the formulation ‗No one heard‘ in the first line of a novel, we 
know, until a new order emerges, that it is an observation made either by the author, or by a character 
(aloud or in the form of an interior monologue); a silent discussion with oneself, or a fragment of a 
dialogue a group of questions and answers. In each case, there is the same propositional structure, but there 
are distinct enunciative characteristics. (1972: 81) 
 
While a proposition as a declarative utterance represents or describes states of affairs as 
true or false, a statement does things, producing certain effects. Statements are analysed 
from the point of view of its functioning. So as to highlight their function or effect in the 
world he introduces the term ‗statement-event‘. 
 
(b) sentences: a sentence is typically analysed by linguists from the point of view of its 
syntax, of the ordering of units with the sentence. A statement can also have an order or 
sequence to it but need not be a sentence: it is possible to order words into a certain 
83 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
sequence such that although it would not count as a sentence it would still count as a 
statement, 
 
When one finds in a Latin grammar a series of words arranged in a column: amo, amas amat, one is dealing 
not with a sentence, but with the statement of the different personal inflexions of the present indicative of 
the verb amare… a classificatory table of the botanical species is made  up of statements, not sentences 
(Linnaeus‘s Genera Plantaruma is a whole books of statements, in which one can recognise only a small 
number of sentences); a genealogical tree, an accounts book, the calculations of a trade  balance are 
statements…an equation of the nth degree, or the algebraic formula of the law of refraction must be 
regarded as statements…lastly, a graph, a growth curve, an age pyramid, a distribution cloud are all 
sentences: any sentences that may accompany them are merely interpretation or commentary. (1972: 82) 
 
From the aforementioned examples, it is evident that statements are not necessarily 
linguistic. Foucault‘s analysis of the statements takes place in terms of their functions 
both at a semiological level and at the level of the relations between statements within a 
discourse.  
 
(c) speech acts: although there is an overlap between the statement and speech act since 
they both produce effects, they are not identical. Speech act theory as proposed by Austin 
(chapter 7) and Searle (chapter 9) offers an analysis of the speech acts of everyday life 
(promising, commanding) in terms of their success. However, while a successful speech 
act usually consists of a number of statements, for Foucault, a statement can be analysed 
individually in terms of its effects and is situated within a certain historical period. 
McHoul and Grace offer an excellent example to highlight the difference between speech 
acts and statements, 
 
Can we say, for instance, that there is equivalence between ‗I promise‘ (when it is said as a proposal of 
marriage within the discourse of medieval romance) and ‗I promise‘ (when it is said as an agreement to 
meet for lunch)? Perhaps these are equivalent speech acts (strictly, they are both ‗commissives‘), but each 
is a different statement. The two statements occur in totally different social ‗technologies‘ and historically 
formed discursive practices. Each, if successful produces distinct individual human subjects: lovers and 
lunchers; each, again if successful, (re)creates and maintains political institutions ad different as love and 
lunch! (1993:38) 
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The statement, in sum, is not a stable entity since it depends upon the (varying) 
conditions of its production within a discourse and which can be put to various uses 
(from statistics to a literature). McHoul and Grace sum up Foucault‘s description of the 
statement as (a) a functional unit;  (b) belonging to the domain  of knowledge and (c) one 
of the techniques that institutions use to produce subjects. (1995: 37-38) 
 
Given the centrality of discourse in the acquisition of knowledge the question that 
Foucault must examine concerns the origin or cause of a discourse. A popular view in the 
‗history of ideas‘ is that a particular person, a genius (Darwin or Einstein) is the 
originator of a discourse.  The assumption underlying the ‗history of ideas‘ is that there is 
a continuity between the great minds of the past who have communicated their ideas 
successively to each other, culminating in the present. This view implies that the present 
period – as the culmination of ideas – is superior to the past. Studies in the ‗history of 
ideas‘ focus on the causes of these ideas, on what led to the originality or creativity of the 
author. But, paradoxically, as Foucault points out, by focussing on the background causes 
that conditioned the author, the value and the centrality of the author as the original 
creator is displaced. Foucault‘s analysis is critical of the assumptions underlying the 
history of ideas and this critique is directed at a cluster of concepts that serve to bolster 
the assumptions of continuity:  
 
(a) the concepts of tradition, influence, development and evolution and spirit. The 
concept of tradition ensures that the continuity in history can be traced back to certain 
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origins – the founding genius – so that what is new and different now leads back to this 
origin, in effect revealing it to be more of the same, ‗tradition enables us to isolate the 
new against a background of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to 
genius, to the decisions proper to individuals.‘ (1972: 21). The concept of influence also 
explains discourse as a repetition of something previously said where by virtue of causal 
processes an author is influenced by another across time. The concepts of development 
and evolution serve to give a unity to a number of discourses: they serve ‗to discover, 
already at work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future 
unity, to master through a perpetually reversible relation between an origin and a term 
that are never given, but are always at work (1972: 21-22). The concept of ‗spirit‘ enables 
a number of discourses to be gathered under the ‗sovereignty of a collective 
consciousness [and] to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation.‘ (1972: 22). 
 
(b) the concept of the genre: genres – of philosophy, science and literature are 
constructed – within a certain historical period,  but can they be applied to past 
discourses?   
 
after all, ‗literature‘ and ‗politics‘ are recent categories, which can be applied to medieval culture, or even 
classical culture, only by a retrospective hypothesis…but neither, literature, nor politics, not philosophy and 
the sciences articulated the field of discourse, in the seventeenth  or eighteenth century, as they did in the 
nineteenth century. (1972: 22) 
 
(c) the book and the oeuvre. The problem with the book is that it is a false unity: would 
we consider the text of a trial, a novel, a work within the collected writings of an author 
in the same way? And what is the relationship between two books by different authors 
and two books by the same author, but constituting a series? On Foucault‘s account, a 
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book belongs to a network of books that are interrelated to each other; the category of the 
book as an independent entity is an effect of a particular discourse: ‗the frontiers  of a 
book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its 
internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references 
to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network.‘ (1972: 23) In 
the case of the oeuvre or the complete works of the author, the problem is accentuated in 
that it is difficult to justify what to place and what to exclude in the oeuvre: are the 
private letters of the author part of the oeuvre? The unpublished notes? Those works 
published under a pseudonym? And what about the works that the author him/herself 
rejects?  
 
such a unity [the oeuvre] far from being given immediately, is the result of an operation; that this operation 
is interpretative…and that the operation that determines the opus, in its unity, and consequently the oeuvre 
itself, will not be the same in the case of the author of Le Théâtre et son Double (Artaud) and the author of 
the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, and therefore when one speaks of an oeuvre in each case one is using the word 
in a different sense. (1972: 24) 
 
(d) Marxist or hermeneutic explanations of discourse. These explanations posit an 
underlying origin that is cause of the discourse: for Marxists, it is the material conditions 
of the sub-structure that explain the surface or apparent statements of the discourse; for 
hermeneutic theorists, the text has a secret meaning that needs to be decoded. The 
problem with the search for origins is that the origins can always be displaced to another 
further origin. The archaeologist is not interested in either psychological or sociological 
explanations of ideas. For Foucault, the statements of a discourse are what they are – 
material manifestations that do not necessitate looking ‗behind‘ them or an act of 
interpretation. ‗Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but 
treated as and when it occurs.‘ (1972: 25) 
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The analysis of discourse that Foucault proposes is radical in that does not focus on what 
the writers – scientists, historians, philosophers - are saying but on the rules that make 
their discourse possible. In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault offers a detailed 
theoretical elaboration of the rules that govern the production of statements and the role 
they play in the formation of discourse.  
 
In his early descriptions of discourse, Foucault adheres to the constructivist view where 
discourses create or construct their objects rather than mirroring a pre-existing reality. 
His goal is to ‗substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‗things‘ anterior to discourse, the 
regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To define these objects 
without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the 
body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the 
conditions of their historical appearance.‘ (1972: 47-48) This construction takes place at a 
particular moment and the analysis of their rules describes the conditions of their 
historical importance. It is not a question of who is saying something, but a question of 
what it is possible to say in accordance with certain rules. These rules concern:  
 
(a) the formation of objects: the question Foucault tackles concerns the way an object 
such as madness comes into being. Its emergence is the result of : 
 
(a.i) mapping out of the ‗surfaces of their emergence‘: to show how objects become 
identified it is necessary to 
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show where these individual differences, which, according to the degrees of rationalisation, conceptual 
codes, and types of theory,  will be accorded the status of disease, alienation, anomaly, dementia, neurosis 
or psychosis, degeneration, etc., may emerge, and then be designated and analysed.
iv
 (1972: 41) 
 
(a.ii) a practice of ‗delimitation‘ where the authorities regulate and police which objects 
belong to which discipline: 
 
[I]n the nineteenth century, medicine (as an institution possessing its own rules, as a group of individuals 
constituting the medical profession, as a body of knowledge and practice, as an authority recognized by 
public opinion, the law, and government) became the major authority in society that delimited, designated, 
named, and established madness as an object…(1972: 42) 
 
(a.iii) an analysis of the ‗grids of specification‟: objects are classified according to 
properties or symptoms: ‗these are the systems  according to which the different ‗kinds of 
madness‘ are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another 
as objects of psychiatric discourse…‘(1972: 42) 
 
(b) the modalities of enunciation: Foucault describes the process whereby statements are 
not produced by subjects or persons working independently of each other. Rather, the 
subject is immersed in a network of discourses
iv
. These are: 
 
(b.i) the right to speak: what is it that gives certain persons the right to speak and have 
their discourse legitimised? 
 
[w]hat is the status of the individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, 
juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse? The status of doctor involves 
criteria of competence and knowledge; institutions, systems, pedagogic norms; legal conditions that give 
the right – though not without laying down certain limitations – so practise and to extend one‘s knowledge. 
(1972: 50). 
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(b.ii) the institution: the institution as the location or space from which statements are 
produced:  
 
[we] must also describe the institutional sites from which the doctor makes his discourse, and from which 
this discourse derives its legitimate source and point of application (its specific objects and instruments of 
verification). In our societies, these sites are: the hospital…the laboratory…the ‗library‘ or documentary 
field… (1972: 51) 
 
(b.iii) the relation between the subject and the object: the subject can occupy various 
positions in relation to different objects and domains
iv
. Foucault offers an example,  
 
The various situations that the subject of medical discourse may occupy were  redefined at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century with the organisation of a quite different perceptual field (arranged in depth, 
manifested by successive recourse to instruments, deployed by surgical techniques or methods of autopsy, 
centred upon lesional sites), and with the establishment of new systems of registration, notation, 
description, classification, integration in numerical series and in statistics, with the introduction of new 
forms of teaching,  the circulation of information, relations with other theoretical domains (sciences or  
philosophy) and with other institutions (whether administrative, political, or economic). (1972: 52-53) 
 
(c) the production of concepts. In his analysis of the way concepts are developed within a 
discursive field, Foucault‘s interest is directed at  
 
(c.i) the ‗forms of succession‘: Foucault includes two ways in which concepts are 
organised, ‗the orderings of enunciative series‟ and the ‗types of dependence of the 
statements‘. The former establishes both the rules between statements, so that inferences, 
implications and demonstrative reasonings are established in a certain way and the way 
statements are described sequentially; the latter examines the relationship between 
statements such as, ‗the dependences of hypothesis/verification, assertion/critique, 
general law/particular application; the various rhetorical schemata according to which 
groups of statements may be combined, (how descriptions, deductions, definitions, whose 
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succession characterises the architecture of a text, are linked together)‘ (1972: 56-7). 
Foucault offers a helpful example of his point: 
 
Take for example, the case of Natural History in the Classical period:  it does not use the same concepts as 
in the sixteenth century; certain of the older concepts (genus, species, signs) are used in different ways; new 
concepts (like that of structure) appear; and others (like that of organism) area formed later, but what was 
altered in the seventeenth century, and was  to govern the appearance and recurrence of concepts, for the 
whole of Natural History, was the general arrangement of the statements, their successive arrangement in 
particular wholes; it was the way in which one wrote down what one observed and, by means of a series of 
statements, recreated a perceptual process; it what the relation and interplay of subordinations between 
describing, articulating into distinctive features, characterizing,  and classifying; it was the reciprocal 
position of particular observations and general principles; it was the system  of dependence between what 
one learnt, what one saw, what one deduced, what one accepted as probably and what one postulated.‘ 
(1972: 57) 
 
 (c.ii) the forms of ‗coexistence‘: these forms include the ‗field of presence‟, the ‗field of 
concomitance‘ and the ‗field of memory‟.  
 
The field of presence describes the way some statements belong to or are excluded from a 
discourse:  
 
it is easy to see that the field of presence of Natural History in the Classical period does not obey the same 
forms, or the same criteria of choice, or the same principles of exclusion, as in the period when Aldrovandi 
was collecting in one and the same text everything that had been seen, observed, recounted, passed on 
innumerable times by word of mouth, and even imagined by the poets, on the subject of monsters.(1972: 
58)  
 
The field of concomitance describes those statements that are not part of a discourse but 
still active: 
 
 the field of concomitance of the Natural History of the period of Linnaeus and Buffon is defined by a 
number of relations with cosmology, the history of the earth, philosophy, theology, scripture and biblical 
exegesis, mathematics (in the very general form of a science of order); and all these relations distinguish it 
from both the discourse of the sixteenth-naturalists and that of nineteenth-century biologists. (1972: 58)  
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The field of memory concerns those statements that are no longer part of the accepted 
discourse but that still have a connection through ‗filiation‘, ‗geneis‘, ‗transformation‘ 
‗continuity‘ and ‗historical discontinuity‘ with a particular discourse: 
 
the field  of memory of Natural History, since Tournefort, seems particularly restricted and impoverished in 
its forms when compared with the broad, cumulative and very specific field of memory possessed by 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century biology; on the other hand, it seems much better defined and better 
articulated that the field  of memory surrounding the history of plants and animals in the Renaissance: for at 
that time it could scarcely be distinguished from the field of presence; they had the same extension and he 
same form,  and involved the same relations. (1972: 58) 
 
(c.iii) the ‗procedures of intervention‟: as these procedures are not the same for all 
discursive formations. It is possible identify specific formations through the links and 
unities established between them. Foucault (1972: 58-59) specifies these interventions: 
 
--- the ‗techniques of rewriting‟: there is a procedure that allows for the rewriting of data 
from one period (lists and groups) to another in another form (tables of classification). 
 
--- the ‗methods of transcribing‟ statements so that statements of a natural language are 
transcribed into a more formal one. 
 
--- ‗the modes of translating‟: here quantitative statements are translated into qualitative 
formulations (and vice-versa) so that, for example, statements of perceptual data can be 
translated into descriptive accounts. 
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--- ‗the means used to increase the approximation of statements and to refine their 
exactitude‘: by using form, number, arrangement and size of the elements, it became 
possible to produce a degree of constancy in descriptive statements.  
 
--- ‗the way in which one delimits once again‘: one intervenes in a discourse either by 
extending or by restricting the domain of what counts as the validity of statements. 
 
--- ‗the way in which one transfers a type of statement from one field of application to 
another‘: in this case, for example, the characteristics used to describe vegetal life are 
transferred to the animal world. 
 
--- ‗the methods of systemizing propositions‘: Foucault writes that this procedure has two 
possibilities; the first is of those propositions that already exist in a separate state but are 
utilized in a new way and the second consist of those statements that are already part of a 
discursive formation but re-arranged to form a new whole. 
 
(d) the formation of strategies refers to the way a theory or a theme emerges within a 
discourse. This depends upon  
 
(d.i) the ‗points of diffraction‟: these follow a certain sequence. First, as „points of 
incompatibility‟ opposite objects, concepts or utterances that do not belong to the same 
discursive formation appear within the same discourse; then, they are established „as 
points of equivalence‟ as alternatives to the either-or opposition despite being 
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chronologically different, or of unequal importance.  Finally, they are organised into ‗link 
points of systemization‟ so that they come to constitute ‗discursive sub-groups‘ within the 
total discourse. 
 
…the Analysis of Wealth, in the eighteenth century, was the result (by way of simultaneous composition or 
chronological succession) of several different conceptions of coinage, of the exchange of objects of need, 
of the formation of value and prices, or of ground rent; one does not consider that it is made up of the ideas 
of Cantillon, taking up from those of Petty, of Law‘s experience reflected by various theoreticians in turn, 
and of the Physiocratic system opposing Utilitarist conceptions. One describes it rather as a unity of 
distribution that opens a field of possible options, and enables various mutually exclusive architectures to 
appear side by side or in turn. (1972: 66) 
 
(d.ii) the ‗economy of the discursive constellation‟: out of the several possibilities that are 
available, not all have materialised. For certain objects or concepts to become prominent, 
a number of choices by the relevant authorities need to made and this entails seeing  other 
contemporary or relevant discourses.  
 
A  discursive formation does not occupy therefore all the possible volume that is opened up to it of right by 
the systems of formation of its objects, its enunciations, and its concepts; it is essentially incomplete, owing 
to the system of formation  of its strategic choices….we are not dealing with a silent content that has 
remained implicit,  that has been said and yet not said, and which constitutes beneath manifest statements a 
sort of sub-discourse that is more fundamental, and which is now emerging at last into the light of day; 
what we are dealing with is a modification in the principle of exclusion and the principle of the possibility 
of choices; a modification that is due to an insertion in a new discursive constellation. (1972: 67) 
 
(d.iii) the role of the authorities: first, when a discourse is being studied, what is taken 
into consideration by the authorities is its function in relation to ‗a field of non-discursive 
practices‟. Thus, for example, General  Grammar played an important role in pedagogy 
as did politics in the Analysis of Wealth; there is also what Foucault calls ‗rules and 
processes of application‘ where choices can only be taken by certain individuals or 
groups with the right to speak; „the possible positions of desire in relation to discourse‟ 
describes the relation of desires of authority to a discourse: usually this relation is 
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considered are rightly belonging to fiction or poetry, but Foucault claims that ‗the 
discourse on wealth, on language (langage), on nature, on madness, on life and death, and 
many others, perhaps  that are much more abstract, may occupy very specific position in 
relation to desire.‘ iv (1972: 68) 
 
The corpus of texts or other materials that the archaeologist works with is found in what 
is customarily called the archive. Usually, the value of the archive is that of providing the 
texts and materials that enable historians to examine their content, to see what they have 
to say. This is not Foucault‘s concept of the archive: rather, he considers it to be the 
repository of those conditions that made it possible for something to be said. From an 
archaeological analysis of the statements found in the archive it is possible to uncover the 
rules that make knowledge within a period possible:  
 
By this term  I do not mean the sum of all the texts that a culture has kept upon its person as documents 
attesting to its own past,  or as evidence of a continuing identity….The archive is first the law of what can 
be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. (1972: 128-129) 
 
The consequence of Foucault‘s analysis of the archive is that it reveals both the transitory 
and (relatively) unstable way in which the statements that constitute knowledge at a 
particular point  in time are produced and, furthermore the way these statements are 
transformed into new ones (1972: 130). The archive situates what can be known between 
the continuum of the momentary and the enduring: it does not change every other day, 
but neither does it last forever. 
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While Foucault had explained in detail the way the rules functioned to produce the 
statements within a discourse, he still had to explain the way a discourse was controlled 
and regulated. An analysis of the relationship between discourse and power still needed 
to be undertaken, and in ‗L‘ordre du discours‘, somehow translated as  ‗The Discourse on 
Language‘ Foucault writes, ‗In every society the production of discourse is at once 
controlled selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of 
procedures…‘ (1972: 216) There are both external and internal procedures for the control 
of discourse. 
 
The external procedures involve:  
 
(a) an exclusion that is topically oriented: certain discourses are permitted while others 
are forbidden; at the time of writing Foucault claimed that the areas in which freedom of 
discourse was prohibited were those of politics and sexuality.  
 
(b) an exclusion based on ‗division and rejection‘: a discourse is classified according to 
the criteria of rationality, so that statements are judged according to whether they are 
reasonable or unreasonable. Foucault demonstrated this in the History of Madness and 
Civilisation, where discourses were structured according to the division of the sane and 
the insane; as a result, the utterances of the insane were immediately disqualified.  
 
(c) an exclusion based on the exclusion of the false: Foucault characterises contemporary 
discourse as dominated by the will to truth. The will to truth – as propositional – is the 
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acknowledged mode of cognition and is supported by institutional mechanisms: ‗…it is 
both reinforced and accompanied by a whole strata of practices such as pedagogy – 
naturally – the book-system, publishing, libraries, such as the learned societies in the 
past, and laboratories today.‘ (1972: 219) The function of the institutions in modern 
society is that of perpetuating and circulating true statements while eliminating false 
ones. 
 
The internal procedures for the control of discourse:  
 
(a) those of the commentary: a commentary is a series of statements about the statements 
of other texts. According to Foucault, they bring out what is already in the text, but that 
has not yet been said: ‗[i]t must – and the paradox is ever-changing yet inescapable - say, 
for the first time, what has already been said, and repeat tirelessly what was, nevertheless, 
never said.‘ (1972: 221) The importance of the commentary is not only that by 
commenting on a text it remains in circulation, but that the author of the commentary 
acquires a privileged position since he is able to say what the author struggled to say, or 
said unclearly. 
 
(b) those of the author: the function of the author is to provide a principle of organisation 
over disparate texts so that a unity is established. In this way, if a number of texts are 
produced by the same author over a period of time, and if these texts are very different 
from each other, their diversity is nullified and subsumed under the name of the author. 
In contemporary society, the author is a privileged figure on account of the legal status 
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and rights endowed upon him/her; but these rights have been historically acquired, 
coinciding with the emergence of capitalism; in the Middle Ages, for example, literature 
was enjoyed without the need to establish the identity of the author.
iv
 
 
(c) those established by the discipline: each discipline or subject places boundaries or 
limits as to what counts as knowledge within that discipline; each subject has certain 
rules and procedures that allow for the production of new statements. The difference 
between linguistics and philosophy can be described as the difference between what 
practitioners in each consider as belonging to their discipline. One of the goals of 
academic journals and magazines is that of policing their domains. As a result of policing 
what counts as the knowledge of the subject, other ‗threatening‘ knowledge is excluded. 
‗Disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits 
through the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules.‘ 
(1972: 224) 
 
There are a further cluster of rules that form the third mechanism for the control of 
discourse:  
 
(a) the ‗rarefaction among speaking subjects‘: not everybody is entitled to speak on every 
subject and only those speakers who are qualified can participate in a discourse. Only 
those who have been vested with the authority to speak are entitled to do so: this is the 
domain of specialists. It is the educational system that transforms persons into 
professional giving them the ‗right‘ to talk about certain things. 
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(b) rituals: participating in a discourse entails adhering to conventions. Rituals dictate the 
qualifications that the person must hold to be part of the discourse, the behaviour that is 
appropriate and the language used within the discourse. ‗Religious discourse, juridical 
and therapeutic as well as, in some ways, political discourse are all barely dissociable 
from the functioning of a ritual that determines the individual properties and agreed roles 
of the speakers.‘ (1972: 225) 
 
(c) the ‗fellowship of discourse‘: the fellowship of discourse refers to those communities 
that tightly control the preservation and reproduction of discourse, ensuring that the 
possession  of the discourse remains within the community. Within a fellowship, the role 
of the speaker and the listener are not on a par. 
 
(d) ‗doctrinal groups‘: a doctrinal group differs from a fellowship of discourse in that a 
doctrine is a sign that its holders belong to a particular class, status (social or racial), 
national identity, etc. ‗Doctrine links individuals to certain types of utterance while 
consequently barring them from all others. Doctrine effects a dual subjection, that of 
speaking subjects to discourse, and that of discourse to the group, at least virtually, of 
speakers.‘ (1972: 226) 
 
(e) ‗social appropriation‘: persons acquire a discourse through the education system. But 
while in principle, the educational system is open to all, it still operates within a social-
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political framework: ‗…we well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in 
what it prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. ‘ (1972: 227) 
 
There are some far reaching and interesting implications of Foucault‘s analysis of 
discourse. Mills (2003: 71-72) describes the way nineteenth century European botanists 
travelled to non-European countries with the classification of plant life that was devised 
by Linnaeus.  When they discovered new plants, they fitted their discoveries to the 
classification of Linnaeus that they were familiar with. It was not considered important 
that the local people classified plants differently (in terms of their medicinal use, food 
value, or ritualistic value). It could be said that the local knowledge was colonised by the 
European botanists who renamed the plants according to the Latin names of the 
Linnaeus‘ system, coupled with the name of the person who discovered them. This 
supports the argument that the European quest for knowledge has never been a neutral 
project but is tainted by political expediency. The discursive formations constructed by 
western botanists had far-reaching political effects for they furthered the cause of 
colonisation.  
 
2.0. Archaeological Analysis 1: the discourse of madness 
 
In his early writings, Foucault focused his attention on the way knowledge is produced 
during differs stages of western civilisation.  The concepts of episteme and discourse are 
utilized as the theoretical tools with which he conducts his analysis. I have already 
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described in detail his concept of discourse and in this section, I will describe his concept 
of episteme as it is applied in Madness and Civilisation and The Order of Things. 
 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault describes an episteme as  
 
the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to 
epistemological figures, sciences, and possible formalised systems…The episteme is not a form of 
knowledge or type of rationality which,  crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the 
sovereign unity of a subject,  a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered for a 
given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities. (1972: 
191) 
 
Within an episteme, a various number of discourses circulate and achieve the status of 
knowledge on account of their adherence to the underlying rules of a particular episteme; 
they constitute both what counts as knowledge as well as the limits of that knowledge. 
 
However, what Foucault‘s analysis strikingly shows us is that although disciplines within 
a specific period might be different, at the level of the rules there is a striking similarity. 
Different discourses are conditioned by the same underlying rules operating ‗behind‘ the 
backs of their authors and each episteme has its own specific rules for the formation of 
discourses. In The Order of Things, Foucault brings out these similarities between natural 
history, economics, and linguistics:  
 
what was common to the natural history, the economics and the grammar of the Classical Period was 
certainly not present to the consciousness of the scientist; or that part of it that was conscious was 
superficial, limited and almost fanciful, (Adanson, for example, wished to draw up an artificial 
denomination for plants; Turgot compared coinage with language);  but unknown to themselves, the 
naturalists, economists and grammarians, employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own 
study, to form their concepts, to build their theories. (1970: xi) 
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What the analysis of the Classical Period shows is that scientists from different 
disciplines shared certain assumptions about the world (that it existed out there ‗waiting‘ 
to be mapped) and about what counted as knowledge of the world. These operational 
assumptions conditioned the scientists without them being aware of it; as a result, we find 
knowledge in the Classical Period consisting of tables and lists of classifications. By way 
of contrast, in today‘s world, to know the nature of something does not require the search 
for large quantities of data that is then organised into lists and grids.  
 
In Madness and Civilisation Foucault examined the way western culture came to terms 
with the experience of madness. In this early writing, he still used the terminology of 
‗experience‘, a term that he replaced in his other writings with the much less subjective 
‗episteme‘. The analysis of madness focuses on the Renaissance, the Classical Age and 
the Modern Age so as to trace the different ways that madness was understood and 
spoken about. The result of this analysis reveals: (a) the emergence of two different 
categories of thought: the Renaissance distinction between reason and unreason and the 
Classical distinction between reason and madness, the latter distinction giving rise to the 
disciplines of psychiatry and psychology; and (b) the demise of the houses of 
confinement and the birth of the asylum in the eighteenth century. 
 
The Renaissance understood madness as a particular kind of wisdom and strictly 
speaking it was not called madness but ‗unreason‘. It was still conceptualised in relation 
to reason constituting an interrelationship rather than an opposition. However, the 
Renaissance also displayed an ambivalent relation to madness as depicted by the Ship of 
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Fools with the mad sailing across the canals of Europe (1993:8). The Ship of Fools 
symbolized, on the one hand, madness expelled from the cities, from reason, but, on the 
other hand, they – as unreason - were still free to navigate from city to city. No attempt 
was made either to confine or eliminate them and at times, they were even allowed to 
enter different towns. The dialogue between reason and unreason was maintained but 
kept at a distance. Within the framework of Renaissance thinking, the mad were 
considered as having certain insights into life, into the truths of human existence that 
were unattainable from  a rational perspective. The mad were privileged in that they had 
access to a different world of meaning, a world that revealed the absurdity of reason. 
With this mind-set, madness was not considered a disease or an illness and, at this stage, 
Foucault argues that reason and unreason were still in dialogue, a dialogue that would 
end with the opposition of reason to madness. 
 
The break occurs in the Classical Age which ‗was to reduce to silence the madness whose 
voices the Renaissance had just liberated, but whose violence it had already tamed.‘ 
(1993: 38) During the seventeenth century, an assorted number of people – the poor, the 
sick, the mad, the promiscuous, rebellious children, irresponsible parents – were locked 
up in the empty leper houses that dotted the countryside of Europe. These houses had 
originally been built in the Middle Ages when leprosy had posed a problem for public 
health.  Once leprosy had been contained, the leper houses were disused and remained 
empty; however, and crucially, the way of thinking that excluded those who posed a 
danger remained (1993: 3). This exclusivist way of thinking resurged with the creation of 
the houses of confinement from 1656 onwards where the aforementioned individuals 
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were obliged to work. Although there was a strong economic incentive to the practice of 
confinement - since it prevented these people from committing crimes in times of 
unemployment, while at the same time providing a cheap source of labour in times of 
employment - Foucault argues that the underlying motive was a moral one (1993: 57). 
Through the discipline of labour the moral reform of these individuals would take place 
since forced labour induced a sense of responsibility. The problem was that the mad were 
unable to follow the work routines; they disrupted the patterns of work within the houses 
of confinement and this eventually led to special routines being devised for them. The 
mad were beginning to be identified as a different category from the rest on account of 
the spectacle they offered through their madness.  
 
Foucault rejects the view that the mad were confined on scientific grounds. Their 
confinement was justified morally according to this pattern: (a) madness belonged to the 
category of unreason; (b) it was therefore opposed to reason; (c) it involved a moral 
choice of unreason over reason; (d) it needed control and administration i.e., it could not 
be let along, unchecked; (e) it was a form of ‗animality‘, a space beyond reason and 
humanity (1993: 71-78). Given their animal nature, human methods could not work upon 
the mad, so the only solution left was that of disciplining them; the mad could not be 
treated either by medicine nor guided by morality.  
 
Apart from the exclusion of the mad on moral grounds, Foucault‘s study of madness also 
takes into consideration the cognitive understanding of madness in the Classical Age. It is 
not only from the perspective of the practices enacted  - as specified in the manuals and 
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records of the period - that Foucault‘s reading operates, but also from the perspective of 
the theorisation of madness as conducted by philosophers and scientists. They argued that 
since madness was a deviation from the norm of reason, it was therefore something that 
reason and science could know. It was recognized as a negative form of knowledge, as 
unreason. The important point is that for the Classical Age, as an illness, madness still 
constituted a form of knowledge and attempts were made to identify its varieties with the 
tables and charts common to this period.  The problem the thinkers of this age had to 
contend with was that, on the one hand, the acquisition of knowledge was that of positive 
things i.e., to know meant that one could identify and tabulate rationally the object of 
one‘s knowledge, but on the other hand, madness constituted a negation of reason, a 
knowledge that was beyond knowledge. This problem was never resolved by Classical 
thinkers.  
 
Despite their differences, both the moral assessment and the cognitive considerations of 
madness shared a common underlying basis that justified the exclusion of the mad. They 
negated the very reason that the Classical Age upheld.  There was therefore no place for 
madness within the structures of Classical thinking so that the only remaining solution 
was to exclude them: as a result, the mad remained alone in the houses of confinement. 
 
Despite being segregated from the rest of society, the houses of confinement created a 
new social problem. The inhabitants living close to them complained to the authorities 
that they were at risk to illness (1993: 202). The inhabitants remembered that lepers used 
to be confined in these houses and this generated a fear of contamination. The mad were 
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slowly being identified with illness and it was at this stage that the doctor entered the 
scene, not to help the mad, but to protect the local inhabitants. In effect, madness became 
medicalized.  
 
In 1793, Pinel liberated the mad from the chains of their confinement and instead created 
the asylum as the space for the humane treatment of the mad (1993: 243). Pinel in France 
and Tuke in York are considered the forerunners of Modern Age psychology and 
psychiatry, for they replaced the system of physical restraint with a system of controls, 
routines, rewards and punishments, ‗Tuke created an asylum where he substituted for the 
free terror of madness the stifling anguish of responsibility…‘ (1993: 247) Tuke and 
Pinel considered their practices scientific for the mad were placed in a system of 
observation where their actions were constantly observed and scrutinised
iv
.   
 
The space of the asylum created a relation between the guards and the patients and this 
would later develop into the relation between the psychiatrist and the patient. Through the 
practice of assessing and writing reports on the patients, the asylum was transformed into 
a medical space. But, Foucault points out, while the entry of the doctor seems to have 
marked the entry of science into the asylum, the ability to cure was not grounded in 
medical knowledge but upon on the moral authority of the doctor, who ruled the asylum 
as a miniature bourgeois society. The asylum was the space 
 
in which were symbolized the massive structure of bourgeois and its values: Family-Child relations, 
centred on the theme of paternal authority; Transgression-Punishment relations, centred on the theme of 
immediate justice; Madness-Disorder relations, centred on the theme of social and moral order. It is from 
these that the physician derived his power to cure… (1993: 274) 
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It was the doctor who imposed a regime on the mad using the standard of bourgeois 
morality which the mad deviated from and to which they must return. Ironically, the 
fathers of Modern psychiatry admitted that their work was morally inspired: in their 
respective practices – Tuke used farm work and Pinel used the new asylum - they 
deployed systems that would ensure the internalization of fear and guilt. The valorisation 
of science was merely a mask for their moral activities, ‗what we call psychiatric practice 
is a certain moral tactic contemporary with the end of the eighteenth century, preserved in 
the rites of asylum life, and overlaid with the myths of positivism.‘ (1993: 276).  
 
Foucault is critical of the commonplace view that the Modern Age brought about an 
improvement in the lives of the mad. The difference between the Modern Age and the 
Classical Age is that although the mad were physically imprisoned in the Classical Age, 
they were free to think whatever they liked. The new ‗advanced‘ techniques of the 
Modern Age placed the mind of the insane under observation: they were not free to think 
whatever they liked because it was their consciousness, their thoughts that were subjected 
to therapy.  
 
In Madness and Civilisation Foucault traces the emergence of madness from the earlier 
distinction between reason and unreason to its subsequent transformation into a science 
that is concerned with individual pathology. It is a central part of his argument that the 
emergence of this specific view of the mad could only take place within the modern 
episteme in the interplay of both discursive and non-discursive practices.  
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3.0. Archaeological Analysis 2: the discourses of the sciences. 
 
In The Order of Things, Foucault shifts his attention to the historical conditions that 
enabled man to be become both the object (the known) and subject of knowledge (the 
knower). The concepts of the episteme and of discourse continue to play an important 
role and his analysis is broadened to cover three discourses within an episteme. While the 
discourses have changed, the epistemes that frame these discourses have remained the 
same: the Renaissance, the Classical and the Modern.  
 
Towards the beginning of The Order of Things, Foucault quotes a short story of Borges 
who tells of a ‗Chinese encyclopaedia‘ where the ‗animals are divided into: (a) belonging 
to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) tame, (d) suckling pits, (e) sirens, (f) 
fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) 
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just 
broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.‘ (1970: xv) The 
point that this system of classification brings home is that there are different ways of 
ordering the world, different ways of including and excluding data. Given that there are 
different ways of classifying the world, what does this say about the way western 
civilisation has ordered the world, about the assumptions used in its system of 
classification? In The Order of Things, Foucault answers this question by offering an 
historical account of the way these systems of classification developed. 
 
108 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
While western science has favoured the disciplines - such as mathematics and physics - 
that deal with necessary truths, it has tended to look down upon the ‗messy‘ subjects of 
languages, living things, or economics. Foucault‘s archaeological thinking is intended to 
redress the balance: according to the Classical episteme the general categories of life, 
labour and language will offer an analysis of man as a living, productive or speaking 
animal; under a different episteme – the Modern one - man will be studied as a 
biological, economic or philological animal. The innovative point is that while there are 
dissimilarities between the epistemes, within the same episteme there is a similarity of 
thinking, a similarity in the conceptual structure that organises the classifications.  
 
The epistemes are not only different from each other but from the point of view of one 
episteme it is impossible to think with the mind-set of the other episteme: they are 
incommensurable, which explains why Buffoon in the eighteenth century (the Classical 
Age) was completely baffled by the Renaissance thinker Aldrovandi‘s classification of 
dragons and serpents. The problem is not that Buffoon is superior to Aldrovandi but that 
the way each saw the world was completely different, conditioned as it was by a 
completely different episteme.  
 
The epistemes under analysis are the pre-classical, spanning from the Renaissance to the 
mid-seventeenth century; the Classical Age that lasts until the end of the eighteenth 
century and the Modern Age that ends in the 1950. Foucault‘s analysis focuses on the 
characteristic features of the epistemes without offering an explanation of why the 
changes between them took place. 
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The Renaissance episteme is characterised by resemblances between words and things: a 
word is like its object. There are four types of resemblances (1970: 18-25)  
 
(a) the resemblances of things that are close to each other (convientia) such as animals 
and places, the earth and the sea, the body and the soul;   
(b) the resemblance of things based on distance (aemulatio) so that the sky resembles the 
face because it has two eyes (the sun and the moon);  
(c) the resemblances constructed out of analogies where the relations between things are 
important;  
(d) the resemblances of sympathy which in effect meant that everything could be seen to 
resemble everything else since all of reality was interconnected. The problem with 
sympathy was that it had the potential to transform everything into the same; this problem 
was thwarted by antipathy that counteracted the force of sympathy by setting into motion 
all of the resemblances. 
 
The underlying assumption of the Renaissance episteme was the world as a text written 
by God: things resembled each other because God ‗signed‘ them to show their 
interconnectedness. ‗Convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy tell us how the 
world must fold in upon  itself, reflects itself, or form a chain with itself so that things can 
resemble one another….[but] There are no resemblances without signatures.‘ (1970:26) 
The problem was that it was not easy to know the signature of God and this led to an 
endless series of interpretations. Knowledge was more a question of guessing rather than 
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proving since the relation between words and things was God-given. Renaissance writers 
sought to find the original ground of meanings, the primal natural and universal language 
before its break-up into many languages. 
 
In his discussion of the Renaissance, Foucault adopts the much criticized strategy of 
using relatively minor figures as sources of information. Thus, while a study of the 
Renaissance would not usually fail to mention the leading figures of the times such as 
Leonardo or Erasmus (among others), in Foucault they barely get a mention, and are 
replaced by lesser known figures such as Aldrovani or Ramus. 
 
With the Classical Age, a new form of knowledge or episteme suddenly appears. The 
language of analogy is replaced with that of analysis: 
 
the activity of the mind…will no longer consist in drawing things together, in setting out on a quest for 
everything that might reveal some sort of kinship, attraction, or secretly shared nature within them, but on 
the contrary, in discriminating, that is, in establishing their identities. (1970:55) 
 
The goal of the Classical episteme was that of representing the world through the method 
of analysis. Representation took two forms: of mathesis, where objects were measured, 
and of taxonomia, where objects were ordered and classified (1970: 71-77). The 
discourse of general grammar studied the representation of words, the discourse of 
natural history studied the representation of nature and the discourse of wealth studied the 
representation of needs. The Classical strategy had the benefit of eliminating the infinite 
resemblances (typical of the Renaissance episteme) with finite differences. Tables of 
varying degrees of complexity were constructed so as to represent and give order to the 
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world; these representations were enacted through a system of signs, where the orderings 
took place according to those signs that were identical to each other, and those that were 
different from each other. Signs were therefore related to each other in such a way that 
there ‗is a bond established inside knowledge, between the idea of one thing and the idea 
of another.‘ (1970: 63) In this way, it was believed that definitive knowledge could be 
acquired with the endless guessing and the prolific interpretations of the Renaissance no 
longer considered forms of knowledge. The problem with the Classical episteme was that 
by emphasizing the differences between things and organising these differences 
accordingly, no value was attributed to the origin of things: in other words, the historical 
background was ignored. 
 
The interesting feature of Foucault‘s claim is that while the knowledge these discourses 
revealed was important to man, man was left out of the picture; he was not represented 
within the classifications. It was only when the Classical episteme dissolved that the 
possibility of a science of man i.e., the human sciences, arose.  
 
With the Modern Age the lack of historical interest shown in the classical episteme is 
compensated for with a renewed interest in the origin of things. In their analysis of 
nature, classical theorists were unaware that historical considerations were slipping into 
the tables that they were formulating: it is as though life sneaked in from behind to 
reassert its importance.  The transition from one episteme to another could be detected in 
the way the early writers attempted to re-insert history into their studies of life, labour 
and language even though they still employed concepts from the Classical Age. It was 
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from about 1795 onwards that the Modern Age came completely into being with Curvier 
in biology, Ricardo in economics and Bopp in philology.  
 
Within the category of life, the classical discipline of natural history was replaced by the 
discipline of biology so that function not structure was important; in the realm of 
economics the classical study of wealth and exchange was replaced by the study of 
production and of who controlled the forces of production; within the domain of language 
the classical discipline of grammar was replaced by philology so that emphasis lay on the 
origins of language. However while biology, labour and language were domains of 
empirical analysis and therefore sciences, they were not human sciences since the human 
sciences were interested in what these subjects mean or represent to humans themselves.  
 
In the attempt to acquire their own identity, the human sciences adopted the methods and 
models used within the sciences: first, they adopted the biological model that used 
functions for their explanations; then, they adopted the economic model that explained 
phenomena in relation to conflict and finally they adopted the philological model that 
sought hidden meanings and interpretations. In addition to this, the human sciences 
shifted their emphasis from processes that are accessible to consciousness to those 
unconscious structures that influence consciousness, structures of ‗norms, rules and 
systems.‘ (1970: 361) 
 
In the mentality of the modern theoretician, the study of phenomena needed to include 
the historical forces that affected and constituted these phenomena. Deeper forces 
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affected these surface phenomena and needed to be accounted for. The important point 
for Foucault is that these new domains were not just developments of earlier ones but 
new domains with new concerns: 
 
Philology, biology, and political economy were established, not in the places occupied by general 
grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth, but in an area where those forms of knowledge did not 
exist, in the space they left blank, in the deep gaps that separated their broad theoretical segments and that 
were filled with the murmur of the ontological continuum.  (1970: 207) 
 
The conclusion Foucault arrives at from his analysis of the Modern Age is that it was the 
age that ‗invented‘ the category of mankind as an object of knowledge. This was the 
period when a number of disciplines – the human sciences - came into being and directed 
their attention towards humans. The dilemma of the human sciences is that man was both 
the subject doing the studying and the object of that study. Man is the condition of 
possibility for the study of man: humans represent themselves within the various human 
sciences and are the beings that make these representations possible. It is perhaps the 
label ‗sciences‘ that is misleading and Foucault‘s point is that the categories used in these 
sciences to understand humans were created in the first place by the sciences themselves. 
The scientific credentials of these disciplines turned out to be human creations. This is 
why Foucault claims that the time has arrived for us to realise that we must awake from 
our ‗anthropological slumber.‘ 
 
4.0. Genealogical Analysis 1: the discourse of punishment. 
 
With both Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault turned his 
attention to the way changes occurred between epistemes. In his archaeological writings, 
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he had failed to take into account the influence of institutions in the transition from one 
episteme to another. In the genealogical approach, Foucault broadens his analysis to show 
that non-discursive forces, whether economic, political, social, juridical, or pedagogical, 
contribute to the formation of epistemes. One concern that receives sustained attention is 
the interaction between power and knowledge, with the aforementioned texts providing 
specific applications of the relationship between power and knowledge in the domains of 
criminality and sexuality. 
 
The starting point of Foucault‘s re-configuration of power is the critique of what he calls 
the ‗juridical‘ view of power. Society is divided into those who dominate and have the 
power and those who are dominated and want the power. The juridical view of power is 
common to both the left and the right of the political spectrum with the former thinking 
of it as something that should be seized, with the latter thinking of it as something that 
must be held on to. According to this view, power is defined in the negative, as a force 
that says ‗no‘ to everything. For Foucault, this view fails to take into account, the positive 
dimension of power, 
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‗excludes‘, it 
‗represses‘, it censors‘, it ‗abstracts‘, it ‗masks‘, it ‗conceals‘. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it 
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of 
him belong to this production. (1991: 194)  
 
Foucault‘s re-configuration of power is conducted at the micro-level: relations of power 
permeate society so that power is not a monolithic overbearing structure but is localised 
and diffused throughout the social network. Foucault‘s analytic of power introduces two 
key characteristics: power is both productive and relational. It is productive because it 
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produces new social categories (the criminal, the homosexual) that in turn constitute new 
objects of knowledge. It is relational because it is generated by the differences between 
persons, organisations, institutions: the differences between teachers and students, parents 
and children, the priest and the confessant, the psychoanalyst and the patient. While it is 
the interaction between them that leads to the production of knowledge, these power 
relations are characterised by an imbalance of power: some dominate and others are 
dominated. ‗Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that 
one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in 
the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations.‘ (1978: 94) It is those in the  
dominant position of power that produce knowledge, so that you find many more studies 
about the marginalised – deviants, immigrants – than you do about those considered 
‗normal‘. It is the uneven distribution of power that transforms an object into an object of 
knowledge. 
 
The dynamics involved in the acquisition of knowledge lead Foucault into 
conceptualising the knowledge-power relation as symbiotic. Knowledge and power feed 
on and into each other, ‗power and knowledge directly imply one another;… [such] that 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor 
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.‘ 
(1991: 27) This is a controversial claim because the prominent status of science within 
western culture has always been justified on the basis of its objectivity, its freedom from 
the interests of its practitioners. On Foucault‘s account, power produces knowledge and 
knowledge empowers.  
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The interrelationship between power and knowledge is highlighted in his account of the 
will-to-knowledge that characterised the modern episteme in the nineteenth century. In 
order to obtain information, procedures were developed to identify, classify, measure and 
calculate objects. During the age of imperialism, colonists, travellers, missionaries 
contributed to the compilation of knowledge about the countries they visited. This will-
to-knowledge was not impartial but served the interests of the western colonizing states; 
it is a type of knowledge that is tied to a particular historical moment in western 
civilisation, a moment when western civilisation considered itself superior to other 
cultures and in so doing judging other cultural systems as superstitious and therefore, not 
worthy of being considered as knowledge (Mills: 71). 
 
In Discipline and Punish and the History of Sexuality Vol. 1 Foucault, evidently more 
influenced by Nietzsche, understands discourses as the result of power relations and 
forces. The influence of Nietzsche brings out the fundamental difference in the goals of 
the genealogist and the archaeologist: while the archaeologist is interested in describing 
discourses and their production, the genealogist is interested in their historical-
institutional emergence. As a result, a critical engagement with institutional-discourses is 
possible, together with the realisation that things do not have to be as they are, but can 
always be otherwise.  Unlike the traditional historian who considers the goal of 
historiography as the objective writing of the past, the genealogist is involved in the 
writing of the past.  
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The opening lines of Discipline and Punishment offer a striking illustration of the way 
punishment was handed down in the Classical Age, 
 
On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was condemned ‗to make the amende honorable before the main 
door of the Church of Paris‘, where he was to be ‗taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, 
holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds‘; then, ‗in the said cart, to the Place de Greve, where, 
on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with 
red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with 
sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning 
resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs 
and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds. (1991: 3) 
 
Eighty years later, punishment was no longer physical, but took the form of rules and 
timetables regulating the entire day of the criminal, from when to get up, to eat, to pray, 
to work and to rest. How did such a change in punishment take place within such a short 
space of time? 
 
Punishment in the Classical Age necessarily involved brutality and visibility: criminals 
were punished violently in front of a public since this would serve to reassert the 
authority of the law. Punishment was read as revenge upon the transgressors for their 
actions and it always involving torture to a lesser (flogging, branding, etc) or greater 
degree (public execution). Capital punishment was considered the appropriate 
punishment for potential regicides since it involved breaking the law both by attempting 
to commit murder and by attempting to kill the king whose very person represented the 
law. The savage revenge by the king was justified on the grounds that it was an attack on 
the law itself. But despite the barbaric spectacle that was intended to highlight the 
seriousness of the Law, Foucault notes that frequently, public executions were 
transformed into support for the criminal and the occasion used as a springboard for 
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rioting. It became increasingly evident that public execution was not a certain way of re-
asserting the sovereignty of the law.  
 
With the Enlightenment it was realized that punishment as brutal force was failing to 
prevent crime in addition to being inhuman. There was a shift in the way punishment was 
conceptualised: it was no longer considered an attack upon the sovereign, but upon 
society as a whole. Rather than the revenge of the sovereign, punishment should strive to 
re-insert the person into society. The criminal had to be made to understand the nature of 
his crime: it was the mind not the body that had to be punished. To teach the prisoners the 
rationality of their punishment, the Modern Age theorists devised a system of 
connections between the crime and the punishment. It was important that the punishment 
did not seem to be capricious, for otherwise, social re-integration would be harder to 
achieve. Punishment was undertaken by a moral impulse, an impulse toward the re-
habitation of the criminal. 
 
The prison system as re-habitation replaced the concept of punishment as a spectacle of 
physical brutality. This involved the maintenance of numerous prisons and a large 
number of rules that structured and disciplined a prisoner‘s daily life. The modern 
penitentiary adopted a whole strategy of techniques for the implementation of its policies 
ranging from dossiers that noted in detail all the observations made of the prisoner to the 
establishment of the right of the penal authorities to punish. Central to Foucault‘s 
argument is the model of the Panopticon: it was designed as a structure for the complete 
and constant surveillance of the prisoner (1991: 200-209). The Panopticon was an 
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architectural blueprint created by Jeremy Bentham for the construction of a new prison 
system. In this new prison the behaviour of prisoners would be monitored through a 
system of windows. The crucial and important feature was that the prisoners would never 
know when they were being watched by the wardens. As a result they would learn how to 
control their own behaviour; in effect, the prisoners were their own correctional officers, 
and the penal authorities hoped that their self-controlling behaviour would become the 
norm. Although the Panopticon was an architectural blueprint, it represented the model 
for an emerging type of society and the discipline needed to control it. 
 
Modern disciplinary practices made great use of observational techniques with the 
prisoner unaware that he was being observed. The filtering of the data collected  
necessitated a hierarchical system to ensure that it arrived at those at the summit of the 
hierarchy. The analysis of these observations led, in turn, to a system of evaluations 
grounded in the Normal: the prisoner was judged to be normal or abnormal with the 
notion of deviancy as a falling away from the norm. For Foucault, the Modern Age 
establishes the normal as the basis of judgement in a number of different fields so that 
those who failed to adhere to the norm could be corrected. The difference between pre-
modern punishment and modern punishment is that whereas in the Classical Age a person 
was punished for his/her actions in relation to the law, in the Modern Age actions were 
judged in terms of how behaviour related to the norm.  
 
Foucault‘s critical analysis is directed at the values of the modern age. The bourgeois and 
their disciplinary drive introduce a specific value system and practices such as fair trials, 
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the assumption of innocence, and a rational system for the examination of evidence. But 
while these worked well for an educated, upper middle classes, i.e., for the class that used 
it, in relation to the working class, another system of values was adopted, a system that 
reflected the fear of the bourgeois: social instability. The maintenance of the social order 
was achieved through surveillance, repression and punishment. For Foucault, the success 
of the prison system can be found not in the unattainable dream of reducing, let alone 
eliminating crime, but in its ability to offer a system for the classification of all crimes 
that in turn justified the intervention and infiltration of power within every sphere of 
society. 
 
From the violence of the Classical Age to the prison of the Modern Age the change in the 
implementation of punishment was not the result of an Enlightened view of humaneness 
(at least this was not its primary objective) but the result of a changing society that made 
it necessary to think of punishment in terms of control. Foucault is also critical of the 
liberal-humanist concept of prison that seeks to reform the ‗criminal‘ so as to re-integrate 
him/her into society. Rather, he argues that prison itself functioned as a model of the way 
society should be, i.e., a disciplined body. This can be seen from the way spatial locations 
and time tables were organised not only in prison but in society as a whole: from schools, 
to factories to army barracks, students, workers and soldiers were subjected to a 
disciplinary routine that had the goal of transforming them into disciplined bodies.  
 
But how are disciplined bodies created? The vision of a disciplined society could be 
enacted : (a) through the organisation of physical space with persons were segregated in 
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cells, barracks, dormitories, factories and these spaces were organised functionally and 
placed under supervision; (b) through the regulation of activities: from timetables for 
worker, prisoners, soldiers and schoolchildren to specific rules prescribing how to write, 
to hold a gun, to salute; (c) through the use of exercise, especially in the army and the 
schools, with a view to the maximum efficiency of time; (d) the use of tactics where the 
co-ordination of individuals working together as a disciplined body became essential. 
Foucault‘s analysis of the transition to a disciplined society highlights an important point: 
discipline and power had been broadened from a state of prevention, of preventing things 
from happening to that of production: the point of these disciplinary techniques (for 
example) in the army and the factory was that of increasing efficiency, productivity and 
skill. In addition, for these disciplinary techniques to succeed, supervision was necessary. 
A hierarchy of supervisors, each reporting to their respective supervisors, was required 
for the complete surveillance of the individual (1991: 135-170). 
 
From his analysis Foucault concludes that since the Modern Age there has been a 
collusion between the social sciences and the state; for the social sciences to function 
they need the techniques of the state to gather information and create the relevant 
documentation, while the power of the state in turn needs the social sciences to develop 
the data into knowledge that can be used to justify the exercise of power. The human 
sciences were born with ‗the modern play of coercion over bodies, gestures and 
behaviour…‘ (1991: 191). The importance of the social sciences – criminology, 
psychiatry, social worker, and pedagogy – is that they who determine the norm so that 
anyone who doesn‘t follow the norm is labelled as deviant.  
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In the contemporary world membership within society entails behaving normally and this 
normality is ensured by a legion of social workers, teachers, doctors and judges. In what 
Foucault calls the carceral system, all society is a prison, with the actual prison as the 
most tangible structure of the disciplinary society. ‗Normalisation‘ is now so ingrained 
within western culture that a whole series of tests, questionnaires, and programs have 
been established to ensure that citizens are dutiful, children are healthy, etc. The 
combination of observation and evaluation culminates in the examination: throughout a 
person‘s life, examinations – whether for school, for health, or for employment – are 
held. These examinations are crucial to the functioning of modern societies for they 
oblige the person to reveal the truths of what they know, of their health, or of their 
ambitions. In effect, this knowledge is then used to control the person: it might reveal that 
a student is not apt for a particular course of studies or that a person needs some kind of 
therapy. The information derived from these examinations is then documented: one could 
describe this system as an early version of contemporary databases where information is 
collected and used to construct a profile or identity of the person. A person, in fact, is 
transformed into a case study and this suggests that he/she is an object of knowledge: 
social workers, for example, are agents that monitor the norm. Everyday life in modern 
society is subject to Foucault calls the ‗normalising gaze‘.   
 
Interestingly, the norm functions as a continuum so that one is a rapist or a petty thief, 
one‘s actions are judged relative to the standard of normal behaviour. Unlike the 
Classical Age when the category of the outlaw lived on the fringes or outside society, in 
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the Modern Age there is the category of deviancy, with the deviant as the permanent 
danger inserted within society. This danger justifies the necessity of constantly 
surveilling society in the search for potential deviants. For Foucault, we today live in an 
age of surveillance that has its origins in the Modern Age.  
 
5.0. Genealogical Analysis 2: the discourse of sexuality 
 
Both Discipline and Punish and the History of Sexuality Vol. 1, are genealogical analyses 
of power and knowledge with each text focussing on a specific object of knowledge, 
namely crime and sexuality. However, while Discipline and Punish focussed on the 
control of others and had a fixed institutional space (the prison) to enact this control, 
sexuality did not have a fixed space making it more pliable and conducive to the 
strategies of power and knowledge. The important point about Foucault‘s study on 
sexuality is his emphasis upon the actual discourses of sexuality rather than a study of the 
development of different sexual practices. 
 
The question Foucault asks is, why did sexuality become the focus of intense scientific 
investigation in western civilisation? Why is it that Western civilisation developed a 
science of sexuality, a ‗scienza sexualis‘, whereas in other cultures sexuality developed 
the erotic arts, an ‗ars erotica‘: the erotic arts are directed towards the intensification of 
the sexual experience under the guidance of a master; eroticism emphasizes the 
maximization of sexual pleasure. Sexuality in western civilisation was transformed into a 
science. It did not focus on the subjective quality of the sexual experience, but on its 
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objectivity. The goal of this science was to collect information about a person‘s sexuality 
so as to discover the truth of sexuality.  
 
Foucault‘s central claim is that the modern concern with the sexuality of the person has a 
pre-modern origin in medieval confessional practices framed within the discourse of sin 
and salvation. The interiorisation of sexuality has its origins in medieval confession 
where the penitent expressed the truths about him/herself. Confession was established as 
the system for the production of truth about the self. Penitents were encouraged, not only 
to confess their external sexual actions, but also what went on internally, their thoughts, 
desires, and inclinations that accompanied or were ‗behind‘ their sexual actions. At the 
beginning, confession was relatively infrequent since the public was expected to confess 
only once a year so that the monitoring of sexuality could not have been thorough. 
However, by 1550, this changed and with it a new concept of identity emerged: whereas 
previously the identity of a person took the form of an avowal, with one‘s identity 
guaranteed by those whom he/she knew, identity was formulated in relation to the truths 
‗lying‘ within the person, ‗for a long time, the individual was vouched for by the 
reference of others and the demonstration of his ties to the commonweal (family, 
allegiance, protection); then he was authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or 
obliged to pronounce concerning himself.‘  (1978: 58) Truth, although hidden, was now 
located within the person. The importance of the medieval confessional system was that it 
transformed desire into discourse. 
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From the Middle Ages to the Modern world, a shift in context frames the discourse of 
sexuality differently.  While the discourse of the Middle Ages was framed within the 
religious context of sin and salvation, the discourse of the Modern Age was framed 
within a scientific context concerned with health and illness. The Modern Age 
transformed the religiously grounded discourse of sexuality into a science of sexuality, a 
science that aimed at discovering the truth about sex. Despite the different frameworks 
the dynamics of power in both religious and secular confessional practices operated along 
the same binary of questioner and questioned,  
 
the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), but in the 
one who listens and says nothing; not in the one who knows and answers, but in the one who questions and 
is not supposed to know. And this discourse of truth finally takes effect, not in the one who receives it, but 
in the one from whom it is wrested. (1978: 62) 
 
By the eighteenth century, sexuality became a target for the authorities since a link was 
established between what a person did with their sexuality and the administration of 
society. This connection can be seen in the studies concerning the population, prostitution 
and the spread of disease. Knowing the sexuality of its citizens provided the information 
for developing of a politics of the body (anatomopolitics) and for planning the population 
(biopolitics). The sexualized body became the locus of the study for medicine, 
psychology and demography, studies that in turn fed into the concerns of the state. By 
managing sexuality, the state was in effect managing life.  
 
The question that faced the scientist of the nineteenth century was that of transforming 
the pleasures that the individual confessed into a science, into a systematic account rather 
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than just a collection of random experiences. This transformation took place by following 
a number of procedures (1978: 65-67):  
 
(a) ‗Through a clinical codification of the inducement to speak‟: by using interrogations 
and questionnaires, the confession was transformed into an acceptable scientific 
document. 
(b) „Through the postulate of a general and diffuse causality‟: by introducing the 
principle of sex as the causal origin for all ailments: any illness of a child, adult, old 
person and ever an entire race, could be reduced to a sexual origin.  
(c) „Through the principle of a latency intrinsic to sexuality‟: by considering sex as a 
something that wanted to remain hidden but could only be extracted through scientific 
examination.  
(d) „Through the method of interpretation‟: by establishing sexuality as a system of signs 
that could be interpreted and whose results contributed to the truth. 
(e) ‗Through the medicalization of the effects of confession‟: by replacing the categories 
of sin with the categories of the normal and the pathological: with sex understood as an 
unstable pathological field medical intervention was justified. 
 
The irony of history is that while the Modern Age showed a great interest in questions of 
sexuality, the period is usually depicted as an age of Victorian Puritanism where any talk 
of sex was forbidden. Popular opinion has it that the Victorian Age was one that 
repressed all sexuality to the extent that the use of the word ‗sex‘ was taboo. Foucault 
calls this alleged denial of sexuality the ‗repressive hypothesis‘ and his strategy is that of 
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re-inserting the discourse of sexuality from the narrow period of the Victorian Age to the 
broader developments that took place within western civilisation from the twelfth century 
onwards. What one realises is that rather than a repression of sexuality, the Victorian Age 
reveals a large number of discourses on sexuality, discourses that radiated from a number 
of institutions. While at the level of everyday life talking about sex was forbidden, 
Foucault shows that at the institutional level – medical, legal, pedagogic, social, and 
psychiatric – rather than censorship, there is a multiplication of discourses related to 
sexuality. 
 
Until the end of the eighteenth century, the married couple were the object of observation 
and at this stage there was no qualitative difference between violating the rules of 
marriage and other violations, such as incest, sodomy or homosexuality. These 
infringements were considered as belonging to the same class of violations. The big 
change occurred in the nineteenth century when discourses on sexuality assumed that 
since the family unit was the standard of normality, other sexualities did not belong to the 
same class as that of the family, but something qualitatively different. In other words, a 
shift of emphasis took place where other sexualities were noticed, observed and studied.  
They became privileged sites for the investigation of sexuality (1978: 104-105):  
 
(a) the hysterical woman whose hysteria was the result of sexual problems and who, as a 
potential future bearer of children, necessitated investigation.  
(b) the problem of masturbation for the child who should be protected from its dangers. 
(c) the question of reproduction which was vital for the growth of the population. 
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(d) the sexuality of adults, which under investigation, revealed an increasing number of 
‗non-normal‘ sexual activities, leading to the creation  of a new category of sexual 
beings,  the pervert.  
 
The creation of new sexual identities is famously described by Foucault in his elaboration 
of the category of homosexuality. Strange as it might sound, before the nineteenth 
century, the homosexual did not exist. This does not mean that before the nineteenth 
century there were no same-sex relations, but that same-sex relations were considered 
something one did, as actions. The idea that there is a class of humans whose identity 
belonged to that of the homosexual is a product of the nineteenth century. What this 
means is that the homosexual became a type of being, a being who exists in reality and 
whose homosexuality was the result of something internal (psychological or 
physiological). In the nineteenth century the homosexual became a type, a class of beings 
with a particular sexual identity: 
 
The nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition 
to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality….The sodomite 
had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species. (1978: 43). 
 
As with Discipline and Punish, while it might seem that the interest in ‗deviant‘ forms of 
sexuality had the goal of eliminating them, the impossibility of actually achieving these 
goals suggests that something else was at stake. The intensity with which campaigns were 
organised to eradicate masturbation in children, campaigns that could never in fact 
succeed, indicated that rather than eradication what was intended was control. The 
various discourses on sexuality were in effect ways of penetrating into society to control 
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and monitor the behaviour of the population. By internalising the values and norms of 
society, an individual becomes his/her own keeper, becomes not only an object of sexual 
knowledge but also a sexual subject monitoring him/herself according to the norms 
established within society.  
 
Foucault‘s criticism of bourgeois sexual values is similar to his criticism of the bourgeois 
justice in Discipline and Punish. The bourgeois concern with sexuality was primarily a 
concern with the preservation of their own class,  
 
it was in the ―bourgeois‖ or ―aristocratic‖ family that the sexuality of children and adolescents was first 
problematized, and feminine sexuality medicalized.…the bourgeoisie began by considering that its own sex 
was something important, a fragile treasure, a secret that had to be discovered at all costs. (1978: 120-1)   
 
The bourgeois had an interest in safeguarding and promoting themselves by advocating 
the heterosexual, monogamous couple as the basis of society and morality. They were not 
interested in the sexuality of the working class and changes in working class sexuality 
were enacted only by the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
Foucault‘s analysis of the functioning of power reveals that power uses communication to 
control and monitor others. The way power operates makes it seem like a monolithic and 
inescapable force from which there is no possibility of escape. However, Foucault offers 
a glimmer of hope. If discourse plays an important role in the communication and 
transmission of power since genealogy specifically connect the discursive to the non-
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discursive, institutional domains, discourse itself becomes the site of contestation or 
resistance. It is therefore possible to resist the normalising forces of society. Foucault 
claims that while power-knowledge has the possibility of its own transmission, there is 
also the possibility of resisting it: ‗discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces 
it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart 
it.‘ (1978: 101).  
 
6.0. Communication as Surveillance: an analysis of contemporary 
society. 
 
Towards the end of Discipline and Punish Foucault wrote,  
 
our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images,  one invests bodies in 
depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful 
forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of 
knowledge  (1978: 217) 
 
Although Foucault recognised the emergence of surveillance as a phenomenon in the late 
twentieth century, he did not perhaps realise the extent to which the technologies used 
would become such a common feature of daily life that in turn, they, would be 
transformed into the perfect tool for surveillance. In The Mode of Information, (1990) 
Poster describes the development of communicative technologies in the contemporary 
world, a development which sees Foucault‘s Panopticon transformed into what he calls, a 
‗Superpanopticon‘.   
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One of the keys to understanding the changing face of contemporary society is the 
‗database‘. Poster‘s central thesis is that the role and function of the database constitutes 
a new way of dominating subjects. The database is not a neutral tool, it is not just a new 
system for gathering information about a person but rather, a system that makes it 
possible to monitor large numbers of individuals. The use of databases has been 
increasing at a rapid pace since the 1980s and it is so widespread that it is considered part 
of the modern world. When we watch a police show on television we expect the 
investigators to check the fingerprints found at the scene of the crime against their 
database to see if there is a ‗match‘. What we do not realise is that collecting information 
about individuals is not solely a matter of police work, but also a commercial enterprise. 
Private companies - insurances, hospitals, banks, etc - also collect information that is 
stored on databases. This has raised a number of worries in the United States and an 
attempt was made both to regulate database information and to control those who could 
have access to it. Unfortunately, this attempt was inadequate as the Privacy Act did not 
apply to a number of institutions (banks and states), and it also failed to create structures 
to enforce infringements. 
 
In part the widespread development of databases is connected to the pervasive influence 
of the capitalist system that dominates economic life in advanced modern societies. It 
might be thought that the new technologies of information would have eliminated the 
control that capitalism had over the objects it produced: whereas in the past, it was 
necessary to buy the books or clothes or furniture that one needed, with the new 
technologies the consumer could reproduce the data him/herself (for example, video and 
132 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
DVD recorders; downloading music or films from the net). But, while this may be the 
case, the search for profit took a different form as the internet itself is today a major 
source of any type of business transactions.  
 
And this in turn has produced an unintended consequence: when one searches for 
something from an online catalogue on the internet, one is accessing the database of that 
company, but as the person conducts the search, he/she is being transformed into a bit of 
information for another database. Poster writes,  
 
In the home networking information loop, one database (product information) generates another database 
(consumer information) which generates another database (demand information) which feeds the 
production process. In this context, the commodification of information creates its own system of expanded 
reproduction: producers have databases about consumers which are they commodities that may be sold to 
other producers. (1990: 75) 
 
Poster argues that the technology used in the database constitutes a new form of 
domination because of its specific form of electronic writing (digital encoding). His 
argument hinges upon the distinction between speech, writing and electronic writing: 
such a distinction is necessary because while speech and writing are frequently described 
in oppositional terms, electronic writing is usually considered an extension of writing, 
and not as something with its own identifying features. This, Poster contends, is 
mistaken: the identifying features of speech are presence, face-to-face communication, 
and small scale social organisation; the identifying features of writing are distance (or 
absence as the sender is not immediately in contact with the receiver), and a solitary 
mode as a text can be read on its own (and critically thought about) in a linear and causal 
manner.  
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Electronic writing is different from speech and writing because the framework of 
electronic language undermines the very foundations of speech and writing. Both of these 
forms of communication are structured in terms of the spatio-temporal presence or 
absence of the sender and receiver; electronic language, on the other hand, undermines 
the distance that underlies presence and absence because it is everywhere and nowhere at 
the same time: electronic language collapses or undermines the space-time distinction. 
The database, like the virtual world of computers, can be accessed from anywhere in the 
world and yet it is nowhere in the world.  
 
The use of the database in contemporary society is a qualitative improvement on the 
panopticon that Foucault had analysed in Discipline and Punish. The function of the 
panopticon was that of ‗forcing‘ prisons to constantly monitor their own behaviour since 
the building was designed in such a way that the inmates would not know when the 
wardens were watching them. As a result, (and coupled with the collection of information 
on the inmate onto a filing system) by repeatedly behaving normally they would become 
normal and be eventually returned to society, ‗rehabilitated‘. Despite the improvement of 
the panopticon in terms of inmate-warden proportions since only a few wardens were 
needed to monitor several prisoners, the panopticon was still limited since it relied on a 
physical structures – the location, the equipment -  and a centralised administration for 
the organisation of the  warden supervision, the filing, and the processing of the 
information. With the database, the physical limitations of the panopticon have been 
superseded and Poster suggests that we now live in an era of the Superpanopticon. 
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In the world of the Superpanopticon not only are citizens constantly under surveillance, 
but they actively contribute to their own surveillance. Information is collected from a 
number of sources such as, identity cards, credit cards and driver‘s licences. However, 
credit cars are probably the most widespread source of data collection: information is 
collected about the kinds of restaurants we go to, the magazines and books we read, the 
clothes we wear, etc, and stored into a database. This information is actively sought by 
marketing companies as it enables them to construct a profile about the person, a profile 
that can be used for commercial reasons. And there are companies that pool the data from 
various databases into a super-database for marketing purposes. It is in this sense that 
Poster argues, databases constitute individuals, create new kind of subjectivity, 
 
The discourse of databases, the Superpanoticon, is a means of controlling the masses in the postmodern, 
post-industrial mode of information. Foucault taught us to read a new form of power by deciphering 
discourse/practice formations instead of intentions of a subject of instrumental actions. Such a discourse 
analysis when applied to the mode of information yields the uncomfortable discovery that the population 
participates in its own self-constitution as subjects of the normalizing gaze of the Superpanopticon. We see  
databases not as an invasion  of privacy, as a threat to a centred individual, but as the multiplication of the 
individual,  the constitution of an additional self,  one that my be acted upon to the detriment of the ‗real‘ 
self without that ―real‖ self every being aware of what is happening. The figural component of databases 
consists in such a self constitution. The innocuous spread of credit card transactions, today into 
supermarkets, tomorrow perhaps into classrooms and homes, feeds the databases at ever increasing rates, 
stuffing ubiquitous computers with a language of surveillance and control. (1990: 97-98) 
 
From a political perspective, the database is extensively used to store information and 
create profiles on those who are involved in any activity that goes against the dominant 
social order. The information is stored in a database though a list of grids such as age, 
gender, address, identity card number, social security number, driving licence, phone 
number etc. 
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Since Poster‘s book was published, the mode of information has made further rapid 
strides in its application of communication technologies. Some aspects that were only 
hinted at in his book (for e.g. home networking) have now become commonplace. 
Commercial shopping with the use of credit cards is now a common fact of business 
transactions, so that data is collected by the company one purchases from, and by the 
credit card companies. On the personal level, communication possibilities have been 
further developed with online or virtual communities, with online instant communication 
(chat groups) and with online companies ready to provide any service your money can 
buy (a partner, a friend). There is the further and more insidious intrusion of the 
technologies of surveillance into the lives of citizens that is given a veneer of justification 
by claiming that intrusion is necessary to protect their lives  (even though they might not 
have asked for this protection). Indeed, since the attacks of September 11, 2001 the 
search for potential terrorists has sanctioned the widespread use of information collection 
and storage: state administrators have been given a free hand into reading emails, 
listening in on telephone conversations the technology that was supposed to make the 
world a better place into a global big Brother. 
 
Critical Remarks 
The concept of discourse plays a crucial role throughout Foucault‘s writings with varying 
degrees of emphasis: after 1971, he virtually abandons the concept until he re-utilizes it 
in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1.  The problem, however, is that in the span of time that 
he used it, the concept of discourse had a different meaning, and this therefore causes 
considerable difficulty in interpretation. On the one hand, Foucault argues that discourse 
136 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
actively constructs or produces reality (1971: 47-48; also, 1981: 67). This is Foucault at 
his most constructivist moment: on this account, our perception of the world is 
constructed by the discourse within which we find ourselves. This raises the serious 
question of whether there is no reality other than discourse.  If this is the case then how 
would he explain hunger or pain? On the other hand, Foucault also offers a different 
version of discourse, a version that suggests the existence of a non-discursive realm. In 
The Order of Things he seems to suggest that there could be practices independent of 
discourse that affect discourse; in order to explain the transition from one episteme to 
another Foucault realises that certain forces outside discourse need to be taken into 
account (1970: 50). It is evident that in the later writings, Foucault connects institutional 
practices and interests with the promotion of a particular discourse. In defence of 
Foucault, Mills (2003: 56) suggests the early concept of discourse does not describe a 
sort of discursive idealism. It is not that there is no non-discursive realm but rather that 
the non-discursive realm - reality - is mediated by language. On this account, language is 
the ‗filter‘ or ‗grid‘ by which and through which we understand reality.  
 
Foucault‘s shift towards genealogy with Discipline and Punish was intended to show the 
change from one episteme to another but in this transition the concept of episteme seems 
to get lost. Gutting (2001:281-282) points out that in Discipline and Punish the concept 
of episteme is mentioned only once. In addition, there seems to be a difference between 
the episteme of Discipline and Punish and that of The Order of Things:  whereas The 
Order of Things is concerned the epistemological question of the subject and the object, it 
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is not the same subject that is being considered in Discipline and Punish. The subject 
under examination is the criminal subject.  
 
Best and Kellner (1991) are generally supportive of Foucault‘s goals although they point 
to a number of limitations of his thought.  Best and Kellner (1991: 44) defend Foucault 
against the mistaken view attributed to him about the ‗discontinuities‘ in history. Some 
have thought that by discontinuity Foucault is suggesting complete and radical breaks 
between historical periods such that there is no connection between them. However, 
Foucault argues that each episteme feeds off the previous one: the connection between 
them is not a causal one, where one is the cause of the other; rather, the connection is one 
where one episteme is the ‗soil‘ out of which the new one comes about. The point 
Foucault is trying to emphasis is that there is no teleology of history, no ultimate goal that 
can be explained in progressive and rational terms. On the other hand, Best and Kellner 
(1991:70) argue that Foucault‘s analysis of power with its focus on the way power 
operates is interesting as it brings out the way struggles of domination occur in relations 
between individuals and groups; however, this analytic emphasis on the impersonal 
mechanisms of power fails to take into consideration or ignores those who are in 
positions of power, such as bankers, the mass media, land developers, etc.  And as Ruiz-
Miguel
iv
 points out, the concept of power in Foucault is so broad that it becomes useless 
for analytic purposes; while it is trivially true that power can be read into every social 
situation, such a claim prevents one from achieving any depth or complexity of 
understanding of the concept.  
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The purpose of this chapter has been to show the way Foucault‘s writings can be read 
within the context of communication studies. In this chapter, I have shown the way (a) 
Foucault analysis the relationship between epistemes and discourse in the production and 
transmission of knowledge; and (b) that he supplements this relationship by grounding it 
within the context of institutions so that (c) the localization of discourse within 
institutional contexts necessitates a re-configuration of the power mechanisms operating 
within them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet death, once it has occurred, and only then, constitutes the one and only referent, or event which cannot 
be semioticized (in that a dead semiotician no longer communicates semiotic theories).  But right up to a 
moment before it occurs, <<death>> is mainly used as a cultural unit. (1976: 66) 
 
 
Eco on Culture and Communication 
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Umberto Eco (1932- ) is probably a brand name for Italian culture and is well known 
among the general public for his literary writings, such as The Name of the Rose (1983), 
Foucault‟s Pendulum (1989) and The Island of the Day Before (1994). However, it is his 
writings on semiology – A Theory of Semiotics, (1976) Semiotics and the Philosophy of 
Language, (1984) and The Role of the Reader (1979) among others - that have positioned 
him as one of the leading intellectuals in the world today.  
 
Eco was one of the first Italian academics who undertook a serious analysis of popular 
culture at a time when other intellectuals of both the right and the left considered the 
association of ‗popular‘ with ‗culture‘ as a contradiction in terms. Culture, in their view, 
could not be ‗popular‘ (defined roughly as appealing to ordinary people) but rather the 
preserve of those who understood and appreciated it. This elitist view of culture 
considered popular culture as having nothing intrinsically valuable to communicate. 
Although Eco could be loosely aligned with the cultural left, he did not accept this thesis, 
arguing that popular culture had a contribution to make in the analysis of society.  
 
In this chapter, I shall start (a) by outlining Eco‘s theory of signs and codes, followed by 
(b) the crucial distinction between communication and signification. The next section (c) 
describes the process of abduction as an integral part of (d) the production of signs. This 
leads to (e) Eco‘s elaboration of the encyclopaedia. The last sections of this chapter focus 
on the narrower domain of textual interpretation starting with (f) the distinction between 
Model Authors and Model readers and (g) open and closed texts. The chapter closes with 
an analysis by eco of the James Bond novels. 
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1.0. The Study of Signs 
 
Eco‘s ‗pre-semiotic‘ career was grounded in the then fashionable structuralism as the 
method for the analysis of human culture. The central tenet of structuralism was that by 
using the models of linguistics and communication it was possible to understand human 
culture in terms of coded and decoded messages between the sender and the receiver. 
Semiotics is also grounded in the interrelation between codes and messages but unlike 
structuralism, it does not seek to find an ultimate code - an Ur-code - that would explain 
all the other codes. Since the structuralist Ur-code is ahistorical, transcending space and 
time, it remained indifferent to political and social values and could easily be described 
as conservative. On the other hand, the codes that semiologists are interested in are 
historical, the products of a culture at a particular point in time: it therefore makes social 
critique possible. 
 
In A Theory of Semiotics (1976) Eco outlined the domain of semiology. Eco‘s central 
argument was that semiology is the discipline that makes it possible to study culture as a 
system of communication since ‗the laws of signification are the laws of culture. For this 
reason culture allows a continuous process of communicative exchanges, insofar as it 
subsists as a system of systems of signification. Culture can be studied completely under 
a semiotic profile.‘ (1976: 28). Since the communication that takes place within a culture 
is the communication of signs, Eco spends a considerable amount of effort explaining the 
ways signs are produced and the codes that makes the communication of signs possible.  
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There are a number of influences upon Eco but the primary ones are those of the 
founding fathers of both branches of semiological theory, Saussure and Peirce. Saussure 
had already realised that semiology had the potential for becoming a general science of 
signs, a science that studied the life of signs within society, with linguistics as the most 
important branch of this general study. From Saussure, Eco learns that although the 
connection between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, once it becomes common 
usage within a society the relation could be described as ‗necessary‘. This ‗necessary‘ 
relation is imposed by the code that regulates the language. Saussure‘s concept of a sign 
‗is implicitly regarded as a communicative device taking place between two human 
beings intentionally aiming to communicate or express something.‘ (1976: 15)  
 
From Peirce Eco learns that a sign has a meaning even if there is not interpreter: it is the 
concept of the interpretant that gives a sign its validity. Eco develops the concept of 
interpretant defining it as a process of ‗unlimited semiosis‘: in the process of defining the 
interpretant one must use other signs, and these in turn require further interpretation and 
so on. Unlimited semiosis describes the endless possibility of generating meaning. While 
Eco takes into account Saussure‘s contribution he considers Peirce‘s contribution to be of 
broader application (to non-humans) and therefore more fruitful to semiology; Peirce‘s 
concept of the sign ‗does not demand, as part of a sign‘s definition, the qualities of being 
intentionally emitted and artificially produced.‘ (1976: 15).  
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Apart from these influences, Eco has also adopted insights derived from information 
theory to formulate his theory of semiotics.  
 
The term /information/ has two basic senses:  (a) it means a statistical property of the source, in other 
words, it designates the amount of information that can be transmitted; (b) it means a precise amount of 
selected information which has actually been transmitted and received.‟(1976: 40)  
 
The justification for the use of information theory is twofold: (a) it is increasingly evident 
that concepts derived from information theory have infiltrated and benefited a number of 
other disciplines with interesting results and Eco hopes that information theory can, 
likewise, be fruitful for semiological theory; (b) basic communication involves the 
transmission of information between machines and so this offers, at the very least, a 
starting point for a model for understanding the processes of communication that involve 
the use of signals (Caesar, 1999 :55).  
 
Non-human communication is the starting point of Eco‘s semiological theory. An 
elementary form of communication of information is that of a petrol gauge in a car 
marking empty; when the buoy in the petrol tank reaches a certain level a signal is 
communicated to the petrol gauge. At this stage, Eco is interested in the communication 
that takes place before a person reads the petrol gauge as standing for empty or half-full: 
the relationship between the buoy and the gauge is said to be one where the former 
‗stimulates, provokes, causes, gives rise to the movement of the pointer.‘ (1976: 33)  
 
To explain the processes of communication prior to human intervention Eco uses the 
model of a water catchment that he calls the ‗Watergate Model‘, with the water 
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catchment functioning as the source or origin of information. This model shows the way 
codes develop from basic to more complex ones. When the water level rises to a certain 
point it reaches the danger level of 0 and if this level is reached an apparatus transmits a 
signal through a channel to a receiver that in turn responds to the signal by sending 
another signal to the machine that operates the water-catchment  (to decrease water in the 
catchment). A system is created to warn the receiver about the danger: the system 
consists of a bulb that, when lit, means the danger level 0 has been reached and, when un-
lit, then the water-catchment is safe. In this case, there is a correspondence between the 
signifier (lit) and the signified (danger) (or signifier (un-lit) and signified (safe)). This 
sequence can be described as a basic code. Problems occur when ‗noise‘ (such as a power 
cut) disrupts the communication possibilities of this code, since the bulb would remain 
unlit even if the danger level was reached. Safeguards are therefore introduced and this 
involves a more complex code: another bulb is added so that when bulb A is lit this 
means safety, and when bulb B is lit this means danger. If there is a power cut then both 
bulbs would remain unlit so one would suspect that there are problems with the power 
supply.  
 
But what if the disruptive power supply caused one bulb to light up and not the other i.e., 
the ‗danger‘ bulb lights up but not the ‗safe‘ one. This necessitates improving the lighting 
system by adding more bulbs not only to improve security, but also to make more 
messages possible. The introduction of a code helps organise the various messages that 
the bulbs can communicate. He defines a code as,  
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(a) A set of signals ruled by internal combinatory laws. These signals are not necessarily connected or 
connectable with the state of the water that they conveyed in the Watergate Model, nor with the 
destination responses that the engineer decided they should be allowed to elicit. They could 
convey different notions about things and they could elicit a different set of responses: for instance 
they could be used to communicate the engineer‘s love for the next-watershed girl, or persuade the 
girl to return his passion. Moreover, these signals can travel through the channel without 
conveying or electing anything simply in order to test the mechanical efficiency of the transmitting 
and receiving apparatuses. Finally they can be considered as a pure combinational structure that 
only takes the form of electric signals by chance, an interplay of empty positions and mutual 
oppositions, … They could be called a syntactic system. 
(b) A set of states of the water which are taken into account as a set of notions about the state of the 
water and which can become (as happened in the Watergate Model) a set of possible 
communicative contents. As such they can be conveyed by signals (bulbs), but are independent of 
them: in fact they could be conveyed by any other type of signal, such as flags, smoke, words, 
whistles, drums and so on. Let this set of ‗contents‘ could be called a semantic system. 
(c) A set of possible behavioural responses on the part of the destination. These responses are 
independent of the (b) system: they could be released in order to make a washing-machine work or 
(supposing that the engineer was a ‗mad scientist‘) to admit more water into the watershed just 
when the danger level was reached, thereby provoking a flood. They can also be elicited by 
another (a) system: for example the destination can be instructed to evacuate the water only when, 
by means of a photoelectric cell, it detects an image of Fred Astaire kissing Ginger Rogers… 
(d) A rule coupling some items from the (a) system with some from the (b) or the (c) system. This 
rule establishes that a given array of syntactic signals refers back to a given state of the water, or to 
a given ‗pertinent‘ segmentation of the semantic system; that both the syntactic and semantic 
units, once coupled, may correspond to a given response even though no semantic unity is 
supposed to be signalled; and so on.‘ (1976: 36-7) 
 
Eco offers some examples of these different codes: for (a) we have the ‗phonological 
code‘; for (b) we have the code of kinship (when considered as ‗a system of pertinent 
parenthood‘); for (c) we have the genetic code and for (d) the Morse code. As a result of 
the possible confusion that arises out of using the word ‗code‘ for these different 
domains, Eco distinguishes between the s-codes  or the code as system (codes as syntax, 
semantic and behaviour as (a), (b) and (c)) from (d) where a rule couples (a) with (b) or 
(c) as code.  
 
2.0. Communication and Signification. 
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A crucial distinction developed in A Theory of Semiotics is that between communication 
and signification and their relation to the code. Although there is an overlap between the 
domains of communication and signification, there is an important difference between 
them: communication is the process whereby a signal is transferred from a source to a 
destination. As such this process can take place either between machines, machines and 
humans or only humans. If the source and destination are machines, then what we have is 
the communication of information. But, if the destination is human then what we have is 
a process of signification. The difference between humans and machines is that when the 
human is the receiver of the message he/she knows that 0 means danger, unlike the 
machine that responds without knowing. As a result, other elements come into play, such 
as the fear that might affect the receiver upon reading the message. The introduction of 
the human element into the model involves a change from the communication of 
messages as signals to the communication of messages as signification. This is because 
there are different possibilities of response: interpretation, rather than conditioned reflex, 
is the characteristic of signification. Communication between humans presupposes the 
existence of a system of signification and it is this system that makes human 
communication possible.  
 
The function of the code is to organise the process of signification: ‗A code is a system of 
signification, insofar as it couples present entities with absent units. When – on the basis 
of an underlying rule – something actually presented to the perception of the addressee 
stands for something else, there is signification.‘ (1976: 8) Having clarified the concept 
of codes Eco starts to examine codes in relation to the process of signification. Crucial to 
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his view of semiology as a method for understanding human culture is the strategy of 
breaking free of the tendency to equate the sign with the linguistic sign. Eco now adopts 
Hjelmslev‘s model of the sign that distinguishes between content and expression: ‗…a 
sign is always an element of an expression plane conventionally correlated to one (or 
several) elements of a content plane.‘ (1976: 48) 
 
While the code establishes the relation between content and expression at the 
conventional level, Eco points out that ‗conventional‘ is not necessarily ‗arbitrary‘ since a 
sign might be an icon (and therefore motivated). But, how does the sign relate to the 
code? And what about its referent? Eco‘s proposed solution leads to the introduction of 
another of Hjelmslev‘s concepts, namely the sign as function or sign-production. A sign-
function occurs when the expression and content are correlated and when these become 
correlated to something else, then a new sign-function is born. This sign-function allows 
for a shift in the understanding of codes: codes do not organise signs but are the rules that 
enable new signs to be produced. The interaction between codes and sign-function is 
described in the following way:  
 
(a) a code establishes the correlation of an expression plane (in its purely format and systematic aspect) 
with a content plane (in its purely format and systematic aspect); (b) a sign-function establishes the 
correlation of an abstract element of the expression system with an abstract element of the content system; 
(c) in this way a code establishes general types, therefore producing the rule which generates concrete 
tokens, i.e., signs such as usually occur in communicative processes. (1976: 50) 
 
However, having established that the sharing of codes between the sender and the 
receiver enables communication Eco adds that contextual cues or circumstances or even 
different codes can generate the reception of a different message despite the sharing of 
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fundamental code. Everybody knows that a skull on a bottle means poison but if the 
bottle is found in a drinking cabinet, a different message is being communicated. This is 
why Eco claims that ‗the criss-cross play of circumstances and abductive presuppositions, 
along with the interplay of various codes and subcodes, make the message (or the text) 
appear as an empty form to which can be attributed various possible senses.‘ (1976: 139) 
At its most extreme the denotation that is usually common to both the sender and the 
receiver can be different,  
 
A paradoxical example is provided by the sentence /i vitelli dei romani sone belli/ which can be read either 
as a Latin one (<<Go Vitellus, to the sound of war of the Roman god>>) or as an Italian one (the calves of 
the Romans are beautiful>>). However paradoxical, this example should be taken as the allegory or 
emblem of the basic nature of every message. (1976: 140) 
 
The multiplicity of codes, sub-codes and context show the limitations of the Watergate 
Model as a model for the explanation of the process of communication and signification. 
Eco offers a more sophisticated model (1976: 141): 
 
Sender--------- coded messages---------channel-------- messages as-----------addressee--------- interpreted  
                          a source of           ↓                    text as content 
                                 information 
    ↓                   (expression) 
                                                                                             ↓                                                           ↑ 
codes     ↑                   (context)                     codes                           
subcodes} →                                [circumst.]     →       { subcodes     → 
 
 
On the question of the referent, Eco followed the practice of semiology to ignore from its 
considerations the domain of objects and things to which signs refer. In his discussion of 
the concept of meaning, Eco, is concerned to show that ‗meaning‘ and ‗referent‘ are not 
the same since it is possible to use a symbol or word that has no referent, such as (for 
example) ‗unicorn‘. So too, we can have different symbols that express different thoughts 
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(referents) but that refer to the same thing (referent). Semiology is therefore concerned 
with the cultural conventions used in acts of communication. To return to the example of 
the water-catchment, while the signifier AB denotes the level 0, to the person reading the 
sign, the signifier connotes danger. The connotation is the meaning added to the signifier; 
from within the parameters of a code a new signified is generated. His theory of codes is 
not concerned with meaning and truth but only with meaning (or signification). His 
reasoning is that whether the sender will be telling the truth or lying, a coded system of 
signification is always being used. It is on this ground that Eco excludes any 
consideration of the referent when explaining his theory of codes.  
 
…there exist sign-vehicles which refer to non-existent entities such as ‗unicorn‘ or ‗mermaid‘…Within the 
framework of a theory of codes it is unnecessary to resort to the notion of extension, nor to that of possible 
worlds; the codes, insofar as they are accepted by a society, set up a ‗cultural‘ world which is neither actual 
nor possible in the ontological sense; its existence is linked to a cultural order, which is the way in which a 
society thinks,  speaks and, while speaking, explains the ‗purport‘ of its thought through other thoughts.  
(1976: 61) 
 
Meaning is therefore a socio-cultural production that organises the world. A statement 
such as ‗/There are two natures in Christ, the human and the divine and one Person/‘ 
(1976: 68) has a meaningful content despite not having a referent and irrespective of the 
beliefs of the community. That the statement itself has generated a number of other 
messages to explain it points to the fruitfulness of accepting Peirce‘s notion of 
interpretant together with that of ‗unlimited semiosis‘,  
 
The very richness of this category [the interpretant] makes it fertile since it shows  us how signification (as 
well as communication), by means of continual shifting which refer a sign back to another sign or string of 
signs, circumscribes cultural units in an asymptotic fashion, without ever allowing one to touch them 
directly, though making them accessible through other units…Semiosis explains itself by itself; this 
continual circularity is the normal condition of signification and even allows communication to use signs in 
order to mention things. (1976: 71)  
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In Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (1984), Eco clarifies a notion that is 
mistakenly attributed to signs: this clarification involves the distinction  between the sign 
as equivalence and the sign as inferential. Frequently, the sign is understood in terms of 
equivalence so that for example, Aristotle‘s definition of man is that /man/ is equal to 
<rational animal>, ‗but certainly not in the expression /mom, there is a man with a 
package to deliver/, where the content <<man>> can be analyzed according to many 
properties, (male, unknown, human being, person of low social extraction, even foreign 
presence or threat), but certainly not as a rational animal.‘ (1984: 34) Eco suggests that 
the inferential model better explains the dynamism of semiosis: knowing the meaning of 
a sign requires an act of interpretation, since we infer its meaning in order to understand 
it:  
 
A sign is not only something which stands for something else; it is also something that can and must be 
interpreted. The criterion of interpretability should hold also for linguistics signs, even though they were 
based, by a long historical tradition, on the model of equivalence (p≡q). This latter idea of a sign as identity 
was due to the persuasion that the meaning or the content of a given linguistic expression was either a 
synonymous expression or its definition. (1984: 46) 
 
3.0. Abduction 
 
In A Theory of Semiotics Eco adopts the concept of abduction from Peirce distinguishing 
between ‗abduction‘ ‗overcoded abduction‘ and ‗undercoded abduction‘.  
 
(a) abduction. Peirce had distinguished between logical deduction, logical induction and 
abduction. Logical deduction takes place when one passes from a general rule, to a 
specific case and one infers a result, ‗All the beans from this bag are white – These beans 
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are from this bag – these beans are white.‘ (1976: 131) Logical induction is the move 
from a result to a case so as to infer a rule, ‗These beans are from this bag –These beans 
are white – All the beans from this bag are white (probably).‘ (1976: 131) Logical 
abduction differs in that from the rule and the result, it invents or guesses the case, ‗All 
the beans from this bag are white –These beans are white – These beans are from this 
bag (probably). (1976: 131)   
 
Abductive inferences play an important part in our everyday lives and Peirce describes an 
experience of his to demonstrate its everyday use. Upon landing at a Turkish port he 
came across a man travelling on horseback surrounded by four other men holding a 
canopy over him. Peirce could only guess that this man was the governor of the province 
since he was being treated with such honour. Eco writes, ‗Peirce did not know that (or 
whether) a canopy was the ritual sign distinguishing a governor (in which case there 
would have been a simple decoding). He invented or supposed a general rule.‘ (1976: 
131) Abduction plays a crucial role in Eco‘s semiological theory because it represents the 
possibility of new codes, possibilities that were not foreseen, but having been performed 
become ‗a customary social reflex.‘ (1976: 132).  
 
Eco points out that Peirce‘s discussion of abduction involves two different aspects:.  
 
(b) overcoding. Using Peirce‘s example, Eco points out that Peirce inferred that the 
person was the governor because there already was a convention that established a 
canopy over a person‘s head that functions as a sign of honour. What Peirce did was 
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‗complicate‘ the code by using other available evidence, such as being in a province, 
surrounded by four men, etc. ‗Therefore he has accomplished an operation of overcoding: 
on the basis of a pre-established rule, a new rule was proposed which governed a rarer 
application  of the previous rule‘ (1976: 133). Overcoding also takes place with the use of 
rhetorical and stylistic devices: when a person says /how are you/ or we see the sign 
/closed on Sundays/ what we have is the basic code of language that is being complicated 
by the certain circumstances coupled with certain stylistic devices (1976: 133). 
 
(c) undercoding takes place when one lacks the rules but assumes them to be parts of a 
code. Eco uses as an example the familiar situation of a person going to live in a country 
in which he does not know the language. After some time the person infers from his 
experience in the country that a number of expressions /I love you/ or Hi, man!/ or /How 
are you?/ can be translated as <<friendship>>. Eco‘s point is that the above expressions 
(and his list is longer) do not neccessarily mean the same in English but this code should 
prove sufficient to interact in the new country. This is a case of undercoded abduction, 
where despite the lack of a precise code, one tentatively posits a code 
 
At times both codes can be mixed together and Eco calls this process ‗extra-coding‘: 
 
Overcoding proceeds from existing codes to more analytic subcodes while undercoding proceeds from non-
existing codes to potential codes. This double movement, so easily detectable in various cases 
(paralinguistics is a clear case of overcoding, aesthetic judgements – beautiful vs. ugly – are very deceptive 
cases of undercoding), is frequently intertwined in most common cases of sign production and 
interpretation, so that in many such threshold-cases (in which the programmed march toward codes is 
mixed with the free activity of semiosic production and innovation) it would be wiser to speak of extra-
coding (such a category covering both movements at once. The movements of extra-coding are the subject 
mater of both a theory of codes and a theory of sign production. (1976: 136) 
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In Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, Eco develops the concepts of overcoded 
and undercoded abduction but also introduces the concept of creative abduction.  
 
(a) ‗overcoded abduction‘ occurs when the rule is given to us such that we do not realize 
we are following the rule; the interpretation of a sign takes place ‗automatically or quasi-
automatically‘:  
 
When someone utters /man/, I must first assume that this utterance is the token of a type of English word. It 
seems that usually we do this kind of interpretive labour automatically, but it is enough that we are living in 
an international milieu in which people are supposed to speak different languages, and we realise that our 
choice is not completely an automatic one. To recognise a given phenomenon as the token of a given type 
presupposes some hypothesis about the circumstances of utterance, the nature of the speaker, and the 
discursive co-text. (1984: 41) 
 
(b) ‗undercoded abduction‘ involves selecting the rule out of a number of equivalent 
alternatives from within a shared body of knowledge: the point is to choose the most 
plausible one: 
 
…we have no guarantees that the meaning of /man/ is necessarily, and in every context, <<rational mortal 
animal>>. According to different contextual and circumstantial selections (see Eco 1976, 2.11), a man also 
can be a very virile person, a brave male, a two-footed creature, and so on. Therefore, when one utters /this 
is a man/, we have to decide whether one says that this is a rational animal, a mortal creature, or a good 
example of virility, and so on…The decision as to whether certain properties (belonging to the meaning of 
the term) must be blown up or narcotized (see Eco 1979 and Chapter 2 of this book) represents a good case 
of undercoded abduction (1984: 42) 
 
(c) ‗creative abduction‘ necessitates the invention of a rule to make the interpretation of  
a sign possible. The interpretation of detective novels and the work of scientists provide 
the best examples of this rule. 
 
We implement creative abduction when dealing with poetic texts, as well as when solving criminal cases.  
Many interpretive decisions concerning symbols (see Chapter 4 of this book) involve creative abductions. 
Many cases in which language is used not to confirm but to challenge a given world view or a scientific 
paradigm, and to decide that certain properties cannot belong any longer to the meaning of a given term 
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(see chapter 2 of this book) require an interpretive cooperation that displays many characteristics of a 
creative  abduction (1984: 43) 
 
4.0. The Production of Signs 
 
The importance of Eco‘s theory of codes lies in its ability to explain the production of 
signs. He defines a sign as ‗everything that, on the grounds of a previously established 
social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else.‘(1976: 16) Eco 
attempts to reconcile pragmatics with semantics since his theory of codes explains the 
way signs and their meaning are generated through usage.  
 
The starting point for Eco‘s theory of sign-production is that it involves labour, work: 
there is labour involved in the production of signals, in choosing from a number of 
signals, in co-ordinating signals into an acceptable sign-function and in interpreting these 
signals. This is the labour involved in the production of signs (1976: 153-156):  
 
i. There is a labour performed on the expression continuum in order to physically produce signals;  
ii. There is a labour performed in order to articulate expression-units…;  
iii. There is a labour performed in order to correlate for the first time a set of functives with another 
one, and thus making a code;  
iv. There is a labour performed when both the sender and the addressee emit or interpret messages 
observing the rules of a given code… 
v. There is a labour performed in order to change the codes shared by a given society; 
vi. There is a labour performed by many rhetorical discourses, above all the so-called ‗ideological‘ 
ones, in which the entire semantic field is approached in apparent ignorance of the fact that its 
system of semantic interconnections is more vast and more contradictory that would appear to be 
the case.  
vii. There is a labour performed in order to interpret a text by means of a complex inferential process.  
viii. There is a labour performed by both sender and addressee to articulate and to interpret sentences 
whose content must be correctly established and detected. 
ix. There is a labour performed in order to check whether or not an expression refers to the actual 
properties of the things one is speaking of. 
x. There is a labour performed in order to interpret expressions on the basis of certain coded or 
uncoded circumstance. 
xi. The labour which the sender performs in order to focus the attention of the addressee on his 
attitudes and intentions, and in order to elicit behavioural responses in other people….it may be 
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noted that among these various communicational acts figure not only the so-called locutionary 
ones, which may correspond to semiotic and factual judgements, but also all those types of 
expression that do not express any assertion but on the contrary perform an action or ask, 
command, establish a contact,  arouse emotions and so on (illocutionary and perlocutionary acts)  
 
By replacing the traditional typology of signs with a typology of sign-production, Eco re-
iterates his criticism of traditional semiology that over-emphasises the linguistic model. 
While language is one of the most sophisticated sign-systems available for study it is not 
the only one. 
 
Interestingly, Eco applies his theory of sign-production to aesthetic messages i.e., to the 
use of language for aesthetics. His hope is that, by doing so, traditional problems in 
philosophical aesthetics might be resolved using semiotic analysis. The relation between 
semiology and aesthetics can be seen because aesthetic texts involve the manipulation of 
expressions which, as a result, create a new content that in turn initiates a change of codes 
producing a new understanding or knowledge of the world. In Eco‘s analysis of aesthetic 
texts both the sender and the reader focus on the material that has been produced and that 
has been transformed into ‗interesting‘ material through the process of semiology. The 
material transformed into aesthetics is different from the material used for the 
communication of signals by information theorists.   
 
A red flag on a highway or at a political meeting can be based on various differently manipulated matters in 
order to be grasped as an expression: but the quality of the cloth and the shade of red are in no way 
relevant. What is important is that the addressee detects /red flag/. Yet a red flag inserted in a pictorial work 
of art depends, among other things, upon its chromatic quality, in order to be appreciated (and to convey its 
signification). (1976:  266) 
 
In aesthetic texts, both at the level of expression and at the level of content, the codes are 
‗transcended‘: at the level of expression, the material used is semiologized. It is the code 
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that produces the new expressions rather than the individual. At the level of content, 
aesthetic texts communicate an abundance of meaning that might leave the impression 
that no communication is taking place at all. It is by answering the question of how new 
works of art are produced that one can see how communication still takes place. Because 
works of art stimulate an interrogation into their own status as works of art, this could 
lead to the production of a new code, a code that seem connected to a personal style or 
movement. Once the unique style becomes recognised it tends to become the norm. 
Despite standardization, the uniqueness of a work of art is still retained because 
imitations emphasize those aspects that they are imitating. Aesthetic texts have a 
communicative value in that they involve a process of changing a denotation into a 
connotation; aesthetic texts communicate a meaning that Eco points out is a form of 
knowledge. If aesthetics also concerns knowledge we can acquire of the world, then, he 
suggests, it can likewise contribute to semiology: ‗If aesthetic texts can modify our 
concrete approach to states of the world then they are of great importance to that branch 
of a theory of sign production that is concerned with the labour of connecting signs with 
the states of the world.‘ (1976: 275). 
 
The communication between the sender and the receiver in an aesthetic text involves an 
interplay between the intention of the author and the freedom of interpretation of the 
receiver. This explains why the meaning of the text is not always or completely 
predictable. An aesthetic text is ‗a multiple source of unpredictable “speech acts” whose 
real author remains undetermined, sometimes being the sender of the message, at others 
the addressee who collaborates in its development‘ (1976:  276). 
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Following A Theory of Semiotics, Eco‘s research focussed on two overlapping areas: the 
use of semiology in more general social concerns where interpretation and inference are 
part of cognitive activity and the application of his general semiological insights to texts. 
However, in Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, he elaborates upon the domain 
of semiotics as a discipline by distinguishing between three different types of semiotics:  
 
(a) a ‗specific semiotics‘ that is concerned with particular sign systems and the rules of 
signification that allow communication: these fields range from the grammars of sign 
language for the deaf, traffic signals, to poker.  The crucial point for Eco is that the study 
of these systems leads to a ‗scientific‘ kind of knowledge that entails prediction and the 
possibility of social engineering: 
 
notwithstanding, a specific semiotics can aspire to a ‗scientific‘ status. Specific semiotics study phenomena 
that are reasonably independent of their observations. Their objects are usually ‗stable‘---even though the 
duration of a code for traffic signals has a shorter range than the duration of a phonological system, 
whereas lexical systems are in a continuous process of transformation. Being scientific, a specific semiotics 
can have a  predictive power: it can tell which expressions,  produced according to the rules of a given 
system of signification, are acceptable or ‗grammatical‘ and which ones a user of the system would 
presumably produce in a given situation. (1984: 5) 
 
(b) an ‗applied‘ semiotics that Eco describes as a ‗twilight zone‘ whereby semiological 
concepts are applied to 
 
literary criticism, the analysis of political discourses, perhaps a great part of the so-called linguistic 
philosophy…Frequently, the semiotic practices rely on the set of knowledge provided by specific semiotics 
sometimes they contribute to enriching them, and, in many other cases, they borrow their fundamental 
ideas from a general semiotics. (1984: 6).  
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(c) a ‗general semiotics‘ that differs from the other two types of semiotics in that it 
focuses on general categories: this is more of a philosophical enterprise than a scientific 
one. In this case, semiology posits the category of the ‗sign‘ in much the same way as the 
philosopher posits the ‗good‘ or the ‗true‘:  
 
To walk, to make love, to sleep, to refrain from doing something, to give food to someone else, to eat roast 
beef on Friday---each is either a physical event or the absence of a physical event, or a relation between 
two or more physical events. However, each becomes an instance of good, bad, or neutral behaviour within 
a given philosophical framework.  Outside such a framework, to eat roast beef is radically different from 
making love, and making love is always the same sort of activity independently of the legal status of the 
partners. From a given philosophical point of view, both to eat roast beef on Friday and to make love to x 
can become instances of ‗sin‘, whereas both to give food to someone and to make love to y can become 
instances of virtuous action. (1984: 10) 
 
Since philosophical and ‗general‘ semiotics attempt to make sense of the world by giving 
it a coherent form, ‗general semiotics‘ has the benefit of explanatory power since it can 
put together data that seems disconnected and it is also a ‗practical power‘ since it can 
change the world. For example, Marxism explained the relations between classes as one 
of conflict suggesting ways in which to transform society; however, while it has this 
practical potential, unlike science or ‗specific semiotics‘, philosophical or ‗general 
semiotics‘ does not have predictive power. In other words, it cannot say how things will 
turn out. The importance of general semiotics is that its objects are all the domain of 
human signifying practices. Language, in particular, is the fundamental semiotic activity 
of humans: the paradox is that we can only understanding language by using language 
and as a result, ‗a general semiotics transforms, for the very fact of its theoretical claim, 
its own object.‘ (1984: 12) 
 
5.0. Dictionaries and Encyclopaedias. 
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Linguists have argued that meanings can only be analyzed linguistically and therefore 
‗belong‘ to the dictionary. From within this conceptual framework, they oppose the 
intensional constructs of the dictionary to the extensional material of the encyclopaedia. 
Eco collapses this distinction arguing that when defining a term the meaning of the term 
points to or depends upon an external context. It is not possible to have a ‗pure‘ 
dictionary, uncontaminated by the external world. Consequently, he concludes that the 
encyclopaedia remains the most fruitful concept of human knowledge, both for that 
which is true and for that which has been imagined. It is potentially an open-ended field, 
given that it includes the knowledge of all cultures. Social competence relies upon the 
encyclopaedia.  
 
 In A Theory of Semiotics, Eco discussion the model proposed by Fodor and Katz (1963) 
and dubbed by him the KF model (1976: 97) 
 
 
Bachelor 
             │ 
Noun 
      │ 
 
 (Human)       (Animal) 
      │               │ 
(Male)        [Having the academic                  (Male) 
         degree conferred for                     │ 
          completing the first    (Young) 
            four years of college]          │ 
                                            (Seal) 
(Adult)                 (Young) 
      │        │ 
 
(Never-married)    (Knight)                                  <ω3>    
       │                       │ 
        
<ω1>                 [serving under the            [When without a  
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      standard of another]          mate during the  
            │           breeding time] 
          │              │  
         <ω2>           <ω4> 
 
 
Eco point to a number of weaknesses with this model: 
 
(a) Dictionary and encyclopaedia.  This model, while supposed to explain the ideal 
competence of an ideal speaker, turns out to be very similar to a dictionary: it fails to 
explain the social competence of the speaker. (1976: 98) Eco points out that such a 
competence is a requirement for a semiotic theory of communication and signification. 
Fodor (1972) is very much concerned to leave the world out of his semantic model but 
Eco argues that as long as a term is coded and recognised by society then one need not 
worry about whether what the term refers to exists or not. The basis for recognition is the 
one ‗that allows the KF Model to assume that a /bachelor/is an unmarried man and not a 
toothpaste; on the basis which allows not only an encyclopaedia but also a dictionary to 
record that a given entry means one thing in a certain context or for given uses, and in 
other case means another.‘ (1976: 99) 
 
(b) Connotations. Another problem with the KF Model is that it fails to take into 
consideration the connotations that can be associated with a term: ‗it offers the semantic 
theory of a strictly denotative language, and gives the rules for a basic dictionary that 
might be useful for tourists who wanted to order lunch, but would be of little help if they 
really wanted ‗to speak‘ a given language‘. (1976: 100) 
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(c) Distinguishers. In the KF Model, the weakness of markers is supplemented by the use 
of distinguishers, but this in turn leads the Model out of a purely intensional domain (as 
originally intended) into an extensional one. Thus, for example, the intensional 
description of an Animal Male Young Seal leads to the external world of seals without a 
mate during the breeding season, and ‗the more dangerous result is that, without such an 
extensional description, there is nothing to distinguish a seal with a mate from a seal 
without one – except that the latter is called a /bachelor/.‘ (1976: 102). There is a further 
problem in that while the Human Male Adult Never-Married is considered a marker, the 
Animal Male Adult when without a mate during breeding season is considered a 
distinguisher. It might seem that an unmarried man is always unmarried while the 
unmated seal is unmated only during the breeding season. However, this is mistaken 
since both are situational and can therefore change.   
 
In Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, Eco develops the concept of the 
encyclopaedia using the metaphor of the labyrinth. He describes three different kinds of 
labyrinths: 
 
(a) the classical labyrinth: the labyrinth of Crete is the prototypical example of the 
classical labyrinth. It was linear and its only purpose was that of reaching the centre and 
return out of it. As such, one could not get lost in it, and it cannot be considered a model 
for the encyclopaedia. 
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(b) the maze: this is a ‗true‘ labyrinth for within it one can get lost. A number of 
alternatives are available and out of all the alternatives it is a question of finding the right 
one in order to be able to get out of it. 
 
(c) the net: the labyrinth as a net is one where every point is connected to every other 
point leaving open the possibility of establishing new connections. ‗The territory of the 
United States does not oblige anyone to reach Dallas from New York by passing through 
St. Louis, Missouri; one can also pass through New Orleans‘ (1984: 81) 
 
Eco lists the fundamental characteristics of the encyclopaedia as a net (1984: 83-85): (a) 
it is ‗structured according to a network of interpretants‟; (b) it is ‗virtually infinite‘ since 
it takes into account all the interpretations generated by different cultures; (c) it includes 
what has been believed as true, false, imagined or legendary ‗provided that a given 
culture had elaborated some discourse about some subject matter‘; (d) it is a ‗regulative 
idea‟ since it allows for the isolation of a portion of the social encyclopaedia to enable the 
interpretation of texts and discourse; (e) it  provides ‗structured knowledge,‘ as long as it 
is realised that this knowledge is local and not global. The attempt to think of one‘s local, 
encyclopaedic knowledge as the only worthwhile knowledge, i.e., as global, is in effect, 
an ideological gesture. 
 
Eco‘s developing ideas on the encyclopaedia as the embodiment of both linguistic and 
factual knowledge (since the encyclopaedia represents the cultural knowledge generated 
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by the interpretant) is indicative of his thinking away from codes as rules to that of codes 
as making inferences possible.  
 
6.0. Model Authors and Model Readers 
 
A considerable amount of Eco‘s work is oriented towards the specific application of 
semiology to the narrower domain of textual interpretation where the object of 
interpretation is the complete text rather than simple sentences. These two areas are not 
mutually exclusive since interpretation is central both to perception and to texts. The sign 
could be the text as a whole whereby the reader chooses from alternative interpretations. 
In The Role of the Reader (1979) Eco conducts an analysis of the status of the reader as 
an important pole in the actualizing of texts. The reader must be assumed both as a 
necessary condition for communication and for the attribution of meaning: it is the reader 
that makes both communication and signification possible.
iv
 
 
Using concepts derived from his semiological theory, Eco‘s starting point is the words of 
the text that he had described as the level of expression. This level needs a reader to 
actualise them for without the reader the text (and any message) remains empty. The 
reader correlates a meaning with an expression in accordance with a code. At the very 
minimum, it is assumed that the reader has a certain grammatical competence so that 
he/she knows how to combine each word to generate a meaning. In the case of written 
texts the situation is even more complex since what the reader has to actualise is more 
than he/she finds on the page at the level of expression. 
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But while the text assumes that there is a reader who will actualise it, it is not necessarily 
the case that the message the sender communicates will be the same as that which is 
interpreted. Eco had already discussed this in the theory of semiotics (1979: 139) where 
he criticised the sender-message-receiver model of communication because it assumed 
that the message arrived in ‗pure‘ form from the sender to the receiver. A number of 
elements come into play in the interpretation of a message: it is subject to the different 
codes of the sender and the receiver; the code itself is complex, structured by a number of 
rules; and that to understand a linguistic message, it is not enough merely to know the 
linguistic code since other elements come into play that can hinder or help the reception 
of the linguistic message: these range from the circumstances, idiosyncrasies, and 
assumptions involved in the production and reception of the message. Eco elaborates 
(1979: 5) 
 
…the standard communication model proposed by information theorists (Sender, Message, Addressee---in 
which the message is decoded on the basis of the a Code shared by both the virtual poles of the chain) does 
not describe the actual functioning of communicative intercourses. The existence of various codes and sub-
codes, the variety of sociocultural circumstances in which a message is emitted (where the codes of the 
addressee can be different from those of the sender), and the rate of initiative displayed by the addressee in 
making presuppositions and abductions---all result in making a message (insofar as it is received and 
transformed into the content of an expression) an empty form to which various possible senses can be 
attributed. Moreover, what one calls ‗message‘ is usually a text, that it, a network of different messages 
depending on different codes and working at different levels of signification. Therefore the usual 
communication model should be written… 
 
 
sender →  coded text   →   channel   →   text as expression   →   addressee   →  interpreted text as content 
   ↕                   ↑        ↑  ↓   ↑ 
Codes − 
subcodes                                                           context,             ←   codes            −  ↑ 
                                                                          circumstances             subcodes 
 
                                  ↓ 
                                                   ‗philological‘ effort to reconstruct sender‘s codes                             ↑ 
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The difference between spoken and written communication is that while spoken 
communication has the possibility of limiting the range of interpretations due to the non-
verbal background of signs, written communication is allows for many different 
interpretations.  
 
In his analysis of textual interpretation, Eco distinguishes between two sets of concepts: 
the empirical author and the empirical reader are opposed to the Model Author and the 
Model Reader. Perhaps the best way to start is by examining the role of the empirical 
author and many consider the empirical author as essential to the interpretation of a text. 
Is he/she the empirical, flesh and blood person? Or is the author the subject who intends 
to mean something by the text? In literary theory the empirical author is considered a 
problem insofar as the life of the author is unimportant to the meaning of the text.  
 
However, although the empirical author is unimportant for the interpretation of a text, the 
author is important in another way:  
 
To organize a text, its author has to rely upon a series of codes that assign given contents to the expressions 
he uses. To make his text communicative, the author has to assume that the ensemble of codes he relies 
upon is the same as that shared by his possible readers. The author has thus to foresee a model of the 
possible reader (hereafter Model Reader) supposedly able to deal interpretatively with the expressions in 
the same way as the author deals generatively with them. (1979: 7) 
 
Through the text itself the Model Reader is constructed as one who is competent enough 
to co-operate with it: ‗it seems that a well-organized text on the one hand presupposes a 
model of competence coming, so to speak, from outside the text, but on the other hand 
works to build up, by merely textual means, such a competence‘ (1979: 8).  Eco lists the 
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way texts posit every possible reader through a series of choices: the choice involved in 
the use of a shared linguistic code, the choice in the use of a specific literary style, and 
through the choice in the use of specific markers of specialized subjects. There are also 
instances where the text is directed at a particular reader (for example, children‘s stories); 
there are also texts that seek their Model Readers by activating their encyclopaedic 
knowledge so that this in turn creates the kind of Model Reader it is looking for. Using 
the historical novel Waverley (1815) written by Sir Walter Scott as an example, Eco 
writes that  
 
whoever approaches Waverley (even one century later and even---if the book has been translated into 
another language---from the point of view of a different intertextual competence) is asked to assume that 
certain epithets are meaning <<chivalry>> and that there is a whole tradition of chivalric romances 
displaying certain deprecatory stylistic and narrative properties. (1979: 7) 
 
The text generates its possible interpretations and its possible readers. The text postulates 
a series of competences that the Model Reader is capable of: it is the difference between 
the competence shared by author and reader and the actual knowledge of the addressee 
that opens the way for different interpretations. The textual clues that point to the Model 
Readers are ‗signalled by a number of different means: language, the choice of a 
particular kind of encyclopaedia or ensemble of cultural references, particular vocabulary 
or style, or genre.‘ (Caesar, 1999:  122-3) 
 
In turn, the Model Reader postulates the Model Author: a process of reciprocal co-
operation takes place where the Model Reader activates the textual strategies of the 
Model Author. It is the Model Reader who postulates the Model Author through the text. 
The intention of the empirical author and reader are irrelevant. It does not matter what the 
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empirical reader thinks the empirical author might have wanted to say; rather, what 
matters is the text out of which one infers or postulates the author. This is why the 
empirical author and the empirical reader are considered by Eco as ‗textual strategies‘:  
the use of the grammatical markers such as ‗I‘ or ‗you‘ in a text do not refer to actual 
persons but function to actualise a text.  
 
…the author is textually manifested only (i) as a recognizable style, or textual idiolect---this idiolect 
frequently distinguishing not an individual but a genre, a social group, a historical period (Theory, 3.7.6); 
(ii) as mere actantial roles (/I/ = <<the subject of the present sentence>>); (iii) as an illocutionary signal (/I 
swear that/ or as a perlocutionary operator (/suddenly something horrible happened…/). (1979: 10) 
 
Another key element in the analysis of texts is that of ‗Inferences by intertextual frames‘, 
where ‗[n]o text is read independently of the reader‘s experience of other texts.‘ (1979: 
21) Eco argues that a text is understood when the appropriate frame is used (just as the 
use of the wrong frame leads to misinterpretation). Eco (for example) cites a line from Un 
drame bein parisien by Alphonse Allais where a quarrel takes place between Raoul and 
Marguerite. When a person reads, ‗Hands raised to strike, with a remorseless gaze, and a 
moustache bristling like that of a rabid cat, Raoul bore down on Marguerite, who quickly 
stopped showing off.‘ (1979: 264), it is evident that the passage belongs to the frame 
‗violent quarrel‘; the reader knows that Raoul‘s raising his hand was not a situation of 
him voting for some issues or person. While these ‗frames‘ govern our reading 
expectations it must be added that each reader beings with him/her the reading of other 
texts. The notion of intertextuality refers to this: texts ‗carrying‘ in their wake other texts 
and these different ‗frames‘ belong to the mind-set of the reader.  
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Eco distinguishes further between the ‗common‘ frames that members of a culture share 
as part of their encyclopaedic competence and intertextual frames that are narrower in 
scope and recognised by a restricted audience, ‗Common frames come to the reader from 
his storage of encyclopaedic knowledge and are mainly rules for practical life (Charniak,  
1975). Intertextual frames, on the contrary, are already literary ‗topoi‘, narrative schemes 
(see Riffaterre, 1973; 1976).‘ (1979: 21) These intertextual frames differentiate readers 
who are informed about what is taking place in the text, who recognise the ‗tricks‘ or 
‗twists‘ in the text from those readers that ‗simply‘ follow the text without a degree of 
competence.  
 
7.0. Open and Closed Texts 
 
Related to the concepts of the Model Reader and Model Author are those of open and 
closed texts. The closed text aims for a particular type of Model Reader: he/she is the 
average person who, for example in the case of detective novels, is merely interested in 
the way the text ends.  
 
Those texts that obsessively  aim at arousing a precise response on the part of more or less precise 
empirical readers (be they children, soap-opera addicts, doctors, law-abiding citizens, swingers,  
Presbyterians, farmers, middle-class women, scuba divers, effete snobs, or any other imaginable 
sociopsychological category) are in act open to any possible ‗aberrant‘ decoding. A text so immoderately 
‗open‘ to every possible interpretaion will be called a closed one. (1979: 8) 
 
This is the paradoxical feature of closed texts: because they are supposed to produce a 
determinate response, it might – and frequently does – happen that readers produce 
‗aberrant‘ interpretations. The text as a closed ‗entity‘ produces interpretations that were 
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not intended by the text; they are interpretations produced from outside or externally to 
the text. In this situation, what one is doing is not interpreting the closed text but using it 
since the interpretation is taking place without any consideration of the textual strategies 
inherent within the text. As examples of closed texts Eco refers to superman comics, 
Eugene Sue and Ian Fleming‘s James Bond novels. And in support of this claim, Eco 
argues that while the closed texts of the Bond novels are aimed at a specific reader, he 
himself has produced a semiological interpretation of them. The problem with closed 
texts is that they ‗seem to be structured according to an inflexible project. Unfortunately, 
the only one not to have been ‗inflexibly‘ planned is the reader.‘ (1979: 8)  
 
While closed texts suggest the construction of a certain Model Reader, open texts suggest 
another kind of ‗sophisticated‘ reader. The construction of this reader depends entirely on 
the text itself, ‗You cannot use the text as you want, but only as the text wants you to use 
it. An open text, however ‗open‘ it be, cannot afford whatever interpretation.‘ (1979: 9).  
The text posits a reader with a certain competence, a reader who, given the appropriate 
competence, would be considered a ‗good‘ reader of that text; if he/she fails in that 
competence then he/she has not satisfied the ‗felicity‘ conditions of that text. The kind of 
good reader expected from Ulysses can be discerned from the text itself ‗because the 
pragmatic process of interpretation  is not an empirical accident independent of the text 
qua text, but is a structural element of its generative process…..the text is nothing else but 
the semantic-pragmatic production of its own Model Reader‘ (1979: 9-10). Eco argues 
that the good reader of Finnegans Wake cannot be a Greek from the second century B.C 
or an illiterate man of Aran because they would not have the required syntactical and 
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lexical competence. Without the necessary competence to understand the text, Bondella 
describes the situation as ‗a missed opportunity for the actual empirical reader to 
transform himself or herself into the model reader envisioned by the model author.‘ 
(1997: 167) 
 
The underlying assumption of this distinction between readers is that some readers carry 
a larger encyclopaedia with them so that their reading of a text is better informed, and 
therefore allowing for an appreciation of insights that the naïve reader would fail to 
notice. In ‗The Limits of Interpretation‘ (1990), Eco re-iterates this point:  
 
Once again we must remember that every text presupposes and constructs always a double Model reader- a 
naïve and a ‗smart‘ one, a semantic reader and semiotic or critical reader. The former uses the work as 
semantic machinery and is the victim of the strategies of the author who will lead him little by little along a 
series of previsions and expectations. The latter evaluates the work as an aesthetic product and enjoys the 
strategies implemented in order to produce a Model Reader of the first level. (1990: 92) 
 
While the naïve reader co-operates with the author at the minimum level of generating a 
narrative from the text, the sophisticated reader goes through the same motions as the 
naïve one but takes a step back, whereby he/she appreciates the textual strategies inherent 
in the text. ‗In order to know how a story ends, it is usually enough to read it once. In 
contrast, to identify the model author the text has to be read many times, and certain 
stories endlessly.‘ (1995: 27) So too, it is possible that some texts posit through their 
textual strategies both the ‗naïve‘ and the ‗critical‘ reader and Eco refers to Alphone‘s 
Allais Un dram bien parisienne pointing out that there is a big difference in the responses 
of these readers: ‗The naïve reader will be unable to enjoy the story (he will suffer a final 
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uneasiness), but the critical reader will succeed only by enjoying the defeat of the 
former.‘ (1979:10) 
 
A question that has always interested Eco concerns the limits of interpretation, and he has 
long argued against the idea that interpretation is infinitely open ended, ‗you may infer 
from texts things they don‘t explicitly say---and the collaboration of the reader is based 
on this principle---but you can‘t make them say the contrary of what they have said.‘ 
(1995: 92) To counter the claim - popular with some American practioners of 
deconstruction - that every interpretation is equally acceptable, Eco argues that there is 
something external to the text, something that acts as a boundary or limit to what 
constitutes an acceptable interpretation. The limits of possible interpretations are 
established by what he calls the ‗consensus of the community‘ (1992: 144) of 
interpreters. This community establishes the rules of interpretation and produces a 
standard for judging its value and while acceptable interpretations will continue to 
generate other interpretations, unacceptable interpretations will be eventually forgotten 
since they are ‗unable to produce new interpretations or cannot be confronted with the 
traditions of the previous interpretations.‘ (1992: 150) The limits that Eco proposes are 
flexible enough to permit different interpretations but also provide the framework for 
those that are unacceptable. Caesar elaborates, ‗The reader, we are told, cannot make a 
text say anything that she or he wants it to say. The Name of the Rose contains abundant 
information on medieval herbalism as well as much useful advice on how to poison 
people, but it cannot be read as a treatise on botany, pharmacology or toxicology.‘ (1999: 
149) 
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An illuminating example of the limits of interpretation is offered by Eco himself who 
shows how the interpretations of Dante‘s The Divine Comedy by Gabriele Rossetti, 
Eugene Aroux and Luigi Valli in the nineteenth century were fundamentally flawed. 
These writers who Eco labels ‗Followers of the Veil‘ were convinced that Dante‘s poetic 
work was really a ‗veil‘ hiding secret messages, secret societies, and conspiracies. The 
point is their interpretations have no historical evidence to support their claims so it is the 
text itself that sets the limit to the way it is interpreted in its interaction with the 
community of interpreters. When a misinterpretation occurs it is the result of the 
commentaries about the text, rather than the text. This is not to say that commentaries 
have no contribution to make: on the contrary, a commentary, despite being open to 
potentially endless interpretation, folds upon the text to show its autonomy. 
 
The community of interpreters are those who establish the boundaries of what counts as a 
good or bad interpretation. Authority and interpretation go hand in hand since judging a 
reading as bad or unacceptable is in practice an exercise of power. It might be claimed 
that the author of the text has the ‗authority‘ or ‗power‘ to decide on questions of 
interpretations. This is a claim Eco rejects: the empirical author has no authority over the 
text.  Rather, authority lies in the hands of the Model Reader. 
 
8.0. Reading the Bond Novels 
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Eco has always been a defender of the texts produced within the category of popular 
culture arguing that such texts should not be dismissed so easily as ‗escapist‘, but are 
worthy of serious analysis. Popular culture has often been viewed as inferior by cultural 
theorists of both the left and the right who maintained the elitist position where only 
certain works of art deserved to be considered for study.  
 
In ‗Narrative Structures in Fleming‘ (1979) Eco reads the series of James Bond novels 
written by Ian Fleming. His goal is to explain the success of these novels to both the 
everyday man in the street and the sophisticated or cultured reader. What is it that makes 
these texts appealing? How do they function to attract such different kinds of readers? 
The answer to these questions is that these texts are based on two fundamental sets of 
relations: the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic.  
 
Paradigmatic relations consist of the rules that are combined to generate the novels. 
These rules constitute a ‗narrative machine‘ that tap into the values and desires of 
different kinds of audiences. While these basic rules are common to all of Fleming‘s 
novels, it is the ways in which they are combined and re-combined that make each of the 
novels different. The paradigmatic rules involve both a series of oppositional terms and a 
relationship between the terms, 
 
I have singled out fourteen couples, four of which are opposing characters, the other being opposing values, 
variously personified by the four basic characters: 
 
(1)  Bond-M; 
(2)  Bond-Villain; 
(3)  Villain-Woman; 
(4)  Woman-Bond; 
(5)  Free World-Soviet Union; 
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(6)  Great Britain-Non-Anglo-Saxon Countries; 
(7)  Duty-Sacrifice; 
(8)  Cupidity-Ideals; 
(9)  Love-death; 
(10) Chance-Planning; 
(11) Luxury-Discomfort; 
(12) Excess-Moderation; 
(13) Perversion-Innocence; 
(14) Loyalty-Disloyalty. 
 
 
These pairs do not represent ‗vague‘ elements but ‗simple‘ ones that are immediate and universal, and, if 
we consider the range of each pair, we see that the variants allowed in fact include all the narrative devices 
of Fleming.‘ (1979: 147) 
 
A number of relationships are entailed by this list: relations between characters, between 
ideologies and between values. The novels constitute the way these different relationships 
are played out and Eco examines the different combinations that are used in the 
respective novels. 
 
Syntagmatic relations explain the sequence of events that takes place in the novels. These 
sequences are likened to a game where, just as one move by one player is followed by 
another move by another player, in a similar manner a Bond novel follows a certain 
number of moves that are ‗prearranged‘ and ‗invariable‘, 
 
A. M moves and gives a task to Bond; 
B. Villain moves an appears to Bond (perhaps in vicarious forms); 
C.  Bond moves and gives a first check to Villain or Villain gives first check to Bond; 
D. Woman moves and shows herself to Bond; 
E. Bond takes woman (possesses her or begins her seduction); 
F. Villain captures Bond (with or without Woman, or at different moments); 
G. Villain tortures Bond (with or without Woman) 
H. Bond beats Villain (kills him, or kills his representative or helps at their killing); 
I. Bond, convalescing, enjoys Woman, whom he then loses 
 
The scheme is invariable in the sense that all the elements are always present in every novel (so that it 
might be affirmed that the fundamental rule of the game is ―Bond moves and mates in eight moves‖). That 
the moves always be in the same sequence is not imperative. (1979: 156) 
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Eco‘s detailed analyses of Fleming‘s novels show that while the syntagmatic relations 
may change, the paradigmatic ones remain the same. It is this possibility of variation 
upon a structure coupled with a number of incidental features that make the novels a 
pleasure for the audience. In From Russia with Love (1957) the Soviet secret agency 
called SMERSH plans to assassinate James Bond but since Bond is no ordinary person 
his assassination must not be ordinary but rather an embarrassment both to him and to the 
British secret service. A trap is laid where Bond must go to Istanbul to get hold of a code-
breaking machine and where his contact there is a 24 year old Russian woman. M, 
Bond‘s chief tells him that the girl is apparently in love with him after having read all 
about him. Bond is suspicious of the whole story but is persuaded by M that it is a 
plausible scenario. Bond agrees finally say ‗There‘s no reason why a Russian girl 
shouldn‘t be just as silly as an English one‘. ( in Radford, 2003: 37) 
 
The narrative continues and readers know he will get captured but the suspense lies in 
how he will turn the tables on his captors. Captain Nash is the agent of SMERSH who 
has been entrusted with the task of killing Bond. His professionalism is shown by the 
accuracy with which he has shot Bond‘s wristwatch; evidently, there is no escape for 
Bond this time. His execution is timed to coincide with the train passing through a tunnel 
so as to mask any possible sounds that bond might utter as he dies. But as it turns out, 
Captain Nash‘s shooting ability is turned against him. Bond – recalling that Captain Nash 
mentioned wanting to shoot him through the heart – places a copy of War and Peace in 
front of his heart. ‗It had all depended on the man‘s accuracy.  Nash had said that Bond 
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would get one bullet through the heart.  Bond had taken a gamble that Nash‘s aim was 
good as he said it was. And it had been.‘ (in Radford, 2003:180) 
 
As readers, we know that Bond will survive and yet we still enjoy reading Fleming‘s 
novels. However, Eco distinguishes between two kinds of readers or audience: the 
‗passive‘ and the ‗cultured‘ types. With the passive audience pleasure is generated in ‗the 
repetition of a habitual scheme in which the reader can recognise something he has 
already seen and of which he has grown fond….[he] finds himself immersed in a game of 
which he knows the pieces and the rules – and perhaps the outcome – and draws pleasure 
simply from following the minimal variations by which the victor realizes his objective.‘ 
(1979: 160). The passive reader is the one who enjoys going through the motions that 
structure the novel. Evidently, this type of reader contributes little to the reception of the 
text and Eco argues that Fleming‘s use of cold war ideology is drawn from the context 
that readers were familiar with at the time. By deploying the ideology of the cold war 
Fleming made sure that the reader could identify with the novel passively since no 
contribution was needed on their part. 
 
So too the popularity of the novels among the general public was the result of a re-
working of theme of good versus evil. This opposition is, on Eco‘s account, a ‗universal‘ 
theme and Fleming‘s novels replay in modern form what was traditionally characteristic 
of the fairy tale. In the fairy tale a certain pattern is followed: the knight (Bond) is sent by 
the King (M) on a mission to destroy some evil being (the Villain) and rescue the Lady 
(the Woman). The universal opposition of good versus evil belongs to the collective 
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consciousness of mankind that has viewed them as forces in eternal conflict. Without 
knowing it, the passive audience recognises this conflict since it constitutes the human 
condition. 
 
There still remains to explain why the Bond novels also appeal to the ‗cultured‘ or 
‗sophisticated‘ reader. The appeal is grounded in a number of features found in the novels 
that a person with a cultured background would appreciate. For example, the ‗evil 
characters‘ in the Bond novels recall Marino‘s Satan who through the poet Milton 
influenced the romantics; Satan is depicted as ‗fascinating and cruel, sensual and 
ruthless‘(1979: 171), features that are found in the Villain and Bond; or the physical 
characteristics of James Bond, ‗the ruthless smile, the cruel,  handsome face, the scar on 
his cheek, the lock of hair hat falls rebelliously over his brow, the taste for display‘ 
(1979: 171) would remind this reader of the Byronic hero. 
 
In his analysis of the Bond texts, Eco notices the contrast in Fleming‘s style between 
lengthy descriptions of the ‗obvious and the banal‘ and short descriptions of key actions 
and events. This is because Fleming wants the reader to identify with what he/she is 
already familiar with: ‗he describes a game of canasta, an ordinary motor car, the control  
panel of an airplane, a railway carriage, the menu of a restaurant, the box of a brand of 
cigarettes available at any tobacconist‘s. Fleming describes in a few words an assault on 
Fort Knox because he knows that none of his readers will ever have occasion to rob Fort 
Knox.‘ (1979: 167) The point of these long descriptions and digressions is, according to 
Eco, that Fleming believes that the reader considers these to be the mark of high 
177 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
literature. But Eco‘s assessment of Fleming is that while the Bond novels succeed in 
pleasing the public, in the way they attract they reader they are ‗only a more subtle, but 
not less mystifying, example of soap opera.‘ (1979: 172). 
 
In a later work, Eco revises his criticism of Fleming arguing that his own critique was 
ideologically biased and that Fleming‘s technique of shifting from long passages of 
inessential descriptions to short descriptions of eventful ones was a technique also used 
by Allessandro Manzoni (1995: 68). In his revision of Fleming, Eco now considers him 
as a Model Author from whom other aspiring authors might learn something of value. 
 
Critical remarks 
Eco is a prolific writer who has raised several interesting points, which in turn, have been 
commented upon and challenged.  For a start, on the distinction between open and closed 
texts, Lévi-Strauss disagrees with Eco‘s claim that what defines a work of art is its being 
‗closed‘. Lévi-Strauss argues that there are intrinsic properties within the work that 
justify its status as a work of art
iv
; in other words, he shifts the question of establishing 
the status of something as art onto the search for objective qualities. 
 
Caesar‘s (1999: 155-157) detailed study of Eco questions the distinction between the 
naive and the sophisticated reader arguing that it does not seem to be tenable distinction 
to maintain. He gives the following reasons: (a) in both cases the reader is passive, but 
with the sophisticated reader, the sophistication lies in his/her admiration towards the 
author‘s ‗cleverness‘; (b) the relation between the Model Reader and the Model Author is 
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restricted to an appreciation of the skills and techniques in the text; this goes against the 
reading experience of many to whom texts contribute and highlight their own 
experiences; in addition, the pleasure of reading consists of immersing oneself in the 
character and the situation, rather than in admiring he author‘s skills; (c)  the strict 
disjunction between naïve and sophisticated/critical reader is weak since reading can be 
both: it is not impossible to conceptualise a reader who is naïve but develops a critical 
attitude or vice versa. The distinction between the ‗sophisticated‘ and the ‗naïve‘ reader 
has led Caesar to comment the concept of the Model Reader is being ‗tainted‘ with 
empirical (psychological, sociological) considerations. 
 
In the analysis of popular culture, Strinati‘s (1995:106-107) discussion of Eco‘s 
semiological reading of the Bond novels points to a tension in his theoretical position. On 
the one hand, Eco claims that it is impossible to know what readers will make of 
Fleming‘s texts with the implication that the reception of these texts depends upon the 
readers; but on the other hand, Eco‘s own analysis is directed at the universal structures 
that produce the text, independently of readers. In addition, Strinati (107-8) refers to the 
work of Bennettt and Woolacott who argue that there are no universal codes that lie 
outside history, but rather, contexts with specific codes. Readers approach these texts 
with certain cultural knowledge and their reading codes are in-formed through this 
cultural knowledge. Many readers would have had knowledge of British spy thrillers as 
they read the Bond novels. 
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In this chapter, I have started by offering a detailed account of Eco‘s semiological theory. 
This account has covered (a) the study of signs, followed by (b) the distinction between 
signification and communication, (c) the concept of abduction and (d) the production of 
signs, and (e) dictionaries and encyclopaedias. I then focus on the narrower domain of 
textual semiotics, (f) starting with the distinction between Model Authors and Model (g) 
Readers and (h) Open and Closed Texts; this is followed (i) Eco‘s semiological analysis 
of the James Bond novels.  
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Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written (in the current sense of this opposition), in a 
small or large unit, can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given 
context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable. This does not 
imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without 
any centre or absolute anchoring [ancrage]. This citationality, this duplication or duplicity, this iterability 
of the mark is neither an accident nor an anomaly, it is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could 
not even have a function called ―normal‖. What would a mark be that could not be cited? Or one whose 
origins would not get lost along the way? (1988: 12) 
 
 
Derrida and the Deconstruction of Communication  
 
Jacques Derrida (1930-2002) and the practice of deconstruction that has become 
synonymous with his name became widely known in the late 1960s for a new approach to 
the analysis of texts irrespective of the discipline to which they traditionally belonged. 
While such an approach has been judged by its adherents as a radical liberation from the 
outdated categories of thought that permeate western culture, its detractors accuse 
Derrida of wilful obscurantism. Derrida‘s rise to intellectual fame initiated with his 
publication of three books in 1967: these are Of Grammatology, Speech and Phenomena 
and Writing and Difference. 
 
Derrida‘s notoriety and rejection is closely related to what he conceives of as the practice 
of deconstruction. This practice entails closely reading other philosophers with a special 
focus or attentiveness to their written language; this practice reveals a concern with the 
literary-ness of philosophy, with the fact that much of philosophy is communicated 
through texts with the result the language used - ambiguity, metaphor and imagery - 
disrupts the content that is being expressed. This is not the traditional view of 
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philosophical practice where philosophers assume that a ‗proper‘ piece of philosophical 
writing communicates an argument or thesis clearly and logically. Derrida argues that 
certain words will always escape the control that the author attempts to exert on the text, 
that the intentions expressed and the language used to express those intentions are not 
necessarily synchronised.  
 
In this chapter, I am going to (a) elaborate on what are considered traditional theories of 
language and use this elaboration to introduce some of the terminology associated with 
the practice of deconstruction. This followed by (b) an examination of Derrida‘s account 
of the spoken-written hierarchy which will serve to highlight (c) the role of differance in 
Derrida‘s philosophy and finally (d) discuss Derrida‘s relation to speech act theory and 
his engagement with John Searle. 
 
1.0. Language 
 
While reading Derrida might initially seem a rather daunting task, once one is 
comfortable with a number of terms used in his writings, then these become (relatively) 
more accessible. A good place to start is with the concept of ‗presence‘ as it features 
throughout Derrida‘s texts. When an object (a tree) or a thought (a holiday) is present to 
us, it would not be mistaken to say that the ‗tree‘ is next to us or that we are thinking 
about our holiday at the moment: both the tree and the holiday are present ‗here and now‘ 
to us externally (in the world) or internally (as a thought or idea in our mind). This model 
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assumes that there is a truth beyond and independent of our language, about which we 
can only communicate by using our words and language.  
 
Derrida
iv
 challenges this view arguing that there is no truth outside language for language 
is the ‗filter‘ that prevents any direct access to the world or to our minds. Derrida is 
critical of traditional theories of language that explain the way meaning is produced in 
terms of either (a) language‘s relation to the world, such that the meaning of a sentence is 
located in its ability to represent the external world; or (b) language‘s relation to the self 
where meaning is produced by the mind or consciousness. The underlying assumption 
operating in these theories is that of ‗presence‘: in the case of the former the presence of 
the world acts a guarantor of meaning, while in the case of the latter, the mind or 
consciousness acts as a guarantor of meaning. Both the world and the mind are the 
foundations that offer stability to language.  
 
The notion that there is a truth outside language that is present to the person is one that 
has ‗haunted‘ western thinking about reality, and Derrida has labelled this the 
‗metaphysics of presence‘. He argues that western metaphysics can be read as 
 
determinates of being as presence in all the senses of the word….all the names related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the centre have designated an invariable presence – eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia, 
(essence, existence, substance, subject), aletheia, transcendentalisy, consciousness, or conscience, God, 
man, and so forth. (1978: 279-280) 
 
The metaphysics of presence is closely connected to what Derrida calls ‗logocentrism‘ 
and ‗phonocentrism‘. Logocentrism refers to the classical use of the Greek word logos to 
mean, ‗word‘, ‗speech‘, ‗law‘, and over time has been associated with ‗reason‘. With 
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logocentrism Derrida identifies a close connection in western thought between the self as 
a conscious, rational mind and language: according to this view, the self is both prior to 
and the source of meaning which then expresses itself through the medium of language. 
This is not an uncommon view of the self for it is widely believed that each of us is a 
unique self that communicates its uniqueness through language. The problem with this 
account, according to Derrida, is that when we look into our self and listen to the voice 
‗within us‘, this voice ‗within us‘ is already an effect of language. The critique of 
logocentrism is that there is no self that exists prior to and apart from language.  
 
Furthermore, logocentric thinking with its emphasis on reason promotes a specific way of 
thinking by subscribing to the values of logic as the tool for the communication of 
thought. Logical thinking excludes all meaning that cannot be controlled by the principles 
of identity and non-contradiction: as a result, a concept has a single, identical meaning 
and this meaning is opposed to another, such that to assert it and its opposite at the same 
time would be a contradiction (for e.g. to say a bachelor is a married man). There are 
three consequences of this way of thinking that Gutting (2001: 293-4) labels as  
 
(a) the principle of opposition where the world is structured into binary opposites (the 
true versus the false, the soul versus the body, good versus evil, etc).  
 
(b) the principle of exclusion where the meaning of a concept excludes, by definition, that 
which does not fall within it. Given the way (for example) good is defined then certain 
acts would by definition be considered evil.  
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(c) the principle of priority where thinking is structured not only in terms of oppositions 
and exclusions, but where the terms in the opposition are value loaded. There is, 
according to Derrida, an inherent bias that favours one of the terms in the opposition so 
that (for example) truth is privileged over error, the good over the bad, the soul over the 
body and the masculine over the feminine.  
 
Phonocentrism is intimately tied to logocentrism in the sense that it is a symptom of the 
logocentric bias of western thought. Since by communicating our thoughts with language 
there is the danger that the language used might influence our thoughts, a superior form 
of communication would be one without language, a kind of ‗telepathy‘ between minds 
in direct communication with each other. But since this ideal form of communication is 
unattainable the spoken word is the next best option. Phonocentrism favours the spoken 
word since the voice is closest to the mind and is therefore best suited to communicate 
our thoughts. Derrida notices, in his reading of the history of western thought, that 
different writers from different disciplines have always privileged speech while 
considering writing as a secondary and inferior medium. The problem with writing is that 
it involves the use of stylistic devices that can prevent the ideal of clarity in 
communication from being attained.  
 
For Derrida, logocentrism and phonocentrism are the attempt to explain away differences 
of meaning by reducing them to a single meaning; logocentric thinking is oppressive in 
that it attempts to control the multiple potential meanings with language. Derrida‘s goal is 
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to liberate language so that its inherent potential, its many possibilities of meaning are 
released.   
 
It might be useful at this stage to answer the question ‗what is deconstruction?‘ The 
answer, however, is not so simple for it is the characteristic feature of deconstruction to 
resist any attempt to be simply defined in terms of an ‗is‘ because the ‗is‘ presumes an 
ontology that deconstruction works against and from within. In ―Letter to a Japanese 
Friend‘, (1983) Derrida suggests to Japanese translator ways in which the term 
deconstruction can be translated into Japanese and in the process outlines a number of 
ways in which deconstruction should not be conceived. For a start, (a) deconstruction is 
not some nihilistic destruction of everything and (b) neither is it a type of analysis for 
analysis is a process of reducing elements to their basic units, but it is these basic units 
that deconstruction is engaged with; (c) it does not involve critique of any sort, for the 
concepts involved in critique - choice, judgement, the Kantian transcendental – are those 
things that deconstruction operates upon; (d) it is not a method which is in competition 
against or methods or which can be taught as a kind of procedure in educational 
institutions; (e) it is not something that a person or an institution does to a text from the 
outside. Derrida closes the Letter by writing, ‗What deconstruction is not?  Everything of 
course! What is deconstruction? But nothing of course!‘ (1983: 5)  
 
2.0. Speech and Writing 
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Most people would be taken aback if they were told that to understand the nature of 
language, to understand what is essential and unique about it, then they should look to 
writing rather than speaking to achieve this goal. It is generally assumed that oral 
communication is the primary function of language, with writing considered an additional 
and secondary feature. And it is not hard to imagine the basis for this assumption for 
when we speak we feel as though we are both producing and in control of the meaning as 
we speak. 
 
Derrida controversially argues for the priority of writing, but this should be immediately 
qualified: in arguing for the priority of writing, he is not discussing the chronological 
evolution of language i.e., whether, historically, writing came before speaking, but rather 
the logical preconditions that make a language possible.  The deconstruction of the 
speech-writing opposition is an important feature of Derrida‘s overall project of 
undermining the metaphysics of presence since the spoken word is widely associated 
with the presence of the speaker.  In this section I am taking two of Derrida‘s texts that 
demonstrate his deconstruction of the spoken-written opposition: these are his reading 
Plato in Dissemination (1981) and his reading of Saussure in Of Grammatology (1976). 
 
In the essay ‗Plato‘s Pharmacy‘ in Dissemination, Derrida offers a sophisticated reading 
of Plato‘s Phaedrus where towards the end of this text, we find Socrates engaged in 
defending the priority and superiority of speaking as opposed to the inferiority and 
secondary aspect of writing. Derrida‘s deconstructive strategy renders this opposition 
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untenable by questioning those values that the privileged term in this contrast - speech - 
assumes.  
 
A cursory reading of the Phaedrus immediately challenges our understanding of Plato‘s 
philosophy. Plato was a firm believer in the power of the dialectical process that uses 
reason and logical deduction to arrive at the truth. But Plato‘s attempt to justify the 
superiority of speech over writing is framed within a mythical context. This is highly 
unusual because Plato had always insisted on the superiority of rational explanations over 
mythological ones. Derrida will demonstrate that though this is unusual, Plato is obliged -  
perhaps without knowing - to start in this way given that mythology and writing share the 
common feature of repeating without  being able to provide reasons for what they are 
repeating. In ‗Plato‘s Pharmacy‘ Derrida‘s strategy is not merely that of reversing 
oppositions, but of going further by displacing the entire spoken/rational and 
written/mythical opposition. 
 
The myth in question concerns the presentation of a number of gifts invented by the god 
Tholth to the Egyptian King Thamus. These gifts would benefit humanity and they 
include numbers, geometry, mathematics, astronomy, and writing. The benefit of writing 
is that it will make ‗the Egyptians wiser and [it] will improve their memories: both 
memory and instruction have found their remedy.‘ (1981: 96-7) However, King Thamus 
is not convinced. He approves of all the inventions except for writing, offering a number 
of interrelated reasons for rejecting it. 
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The fact is that this invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it because 
they will not need to exercise their memories, being able to rely on what is written, using the stimulus of 
external marks that are alien to themselves rather than, from within, their own aided powers to call things to 
mind. So it‘s not a remedy for memory, but for reminding, that you have discovered. And as for wisdom, 
you‘re equipping our pupils with only a semblance of it, not with truth. Thanks to you and your invention, 
your pupils will be widely read without benefit of a teacher‘s instruction; in consequence, they‘ll entertain 
the delusion that they have wide knowledge, while they are, in fact, for the most part incapable of real 
judgment. They will also be difficult to get on with since they will be men filled with the conceit of 
wisdom, not men of wisdom. ( in Derrida,  1981: 102) 
 
The negative assessment of writing can be summarized as follows:  
 
(a) Writing replaces the living voice and presence of the speaker with inanimate signs. 
Instead of the presence of the teacher who can guide and instruct the student, who can 
activate the knowledge within the student, writing offers a system of signs that does 
not challenge the student in the search for truth, but merely repeats the same thing. 
When someone reads and re-reads a text, he/she will find exactly the same words. If 
the person has difficulty in understanding the text, they will remain with their 
difficulty because there is no author to explain the meaning of the text. Writings 
‗seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything 
about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the 
same thing forever.‘ (in Derrida, 1981: 135-6) 
 
(b) Writing makes people lazy. The memory of those who rely on writing will decline 
because they will no longer find the need to exercise their memory since they can 
consult the written text whenever they feel like. But the acquisition of knowledge and 
wisdom is not merely the result of blind repetition but the active exercise of memory 
framed within the student-teacher model.  
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(c) The teacher-student relationship will no longer have any importance since the student 
can dispense with the teacher and just read the text. But true knowledge and wisdom 
is accumulated over time as a result of the maturity of the teacher who can transmit 
this knowledge and wisdom orally to the student. The authority of the teacher is in 
effect challenged and the natural social order is disrupted.  
 
(d) The written text acquires a life of its own. Since a written text can communicate a 
meaning without requiring the speaker to explain that meaning, the written text, in 
effect, makes the speaker redundant: texts can be read and understood even when the 
author is dead. The problem and danger with writing is its autonomy since the written 
word is meaningful independently of the author  and as a result it is possible to offer 
interpretations that differ from what the author originally intended:  
 
And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, 
getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business 
with it; it doesn‘t know how to address the right people, and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-
treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its aid being unable to defend itself or 
attend to its own needs.  ( in derrida, 1981: 143)  
 
There is an evident paradox in the relation between Plato, Socrates and the Phaedrus 
itself. Socrates argues for the priority of the spoken word as the medium for the practice 
of philosophy while denouncing writing in the process; consistent with this belief 
Socrates does not write his own philosophy. But, unless the philosophy of Socrates is 
written down, it would soon be forgotten after his death. And even if he does not 
explicitly say so, Socrates wants his philosophy to be remembered. Writing down his 
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philosophy is therefore a necessary evil and this ‗duty‘ is performed by his diligent 
student, Plato, who thereby ensures that what was taught by Socrates is communicated to 
posterity.  
 
Despite this inconsistency between what Socrates says and what Plato does, Derrida‘s 
deconstructive reading goes further: he focuses on certain features of the text that other 
readings tend to skim over or ignore as unimportant details. With extreme meticulousness 
he unravels the different senses of certain terms used by Plato to articulate his point of 
view. What these different senses show is that there is no single, clear-cut rationality that 
can communicate the truth of the Phaedrus: the values of reason, logic and speech – 
values that are central to Plato‘s philosophy - are disrupted by a number of metaphors 
that are found in the text. Plato (for example) uses the Greek word ‗pharmakon‘ to 
discuss the nature of writing as both a ‗poison‘ and a ‗cure‘. What Derrida points out is 
that although these two senses of ‗pharmakon‘ are opposed to each other, they are found 
together when Plato describes writing. Writing is a ‗poison‘ since it threatens the purity 
of living speech: with the spoken word the speaker knows what he/she means, but with 
writing the connection between the speaker and the meaning is dislocated since a written 
text has no need of the speaker to explain its meaning. On the other hand, writing is a 
‗cure‘ for old age, a ‗cure‘ that aids the failure of memory with the passage of time. And 
as a ‗cure‘ it enables a person to remember what was spoken about in the past since 
through writing the original intention of the speaker is preserved forever.  
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The pharmakon reveals the inability of the text to transmit a single meaning. The 
difficulty is that of deciding which of the two senses Plato intends.  Derrida answers that 
it is not possible to decide and the term ‗pharmakon‘ is one that Derrida describes as an 
‗undecidable‘. Writing as pharmakon is the sign of irreconcilable opposites, a disruption 
of the logic of identity: 
 
If the pharmakon is ―ambivalent,‖ it is because it constitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed, 
the movement and the play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross over 
into the other (soul/body, good/evil, inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing.). It is on the 
basis of this play or movement that the opposites or differences are stopped by Plato. The pharmakon is the 
movement, this locus, and the play: (the production of) difference. (1981: 127) 
 
Memory plays an important role in Plato‘s account of truth and it is from within this 
memory-truth axis that writing is considered a disruptive influence on the grounds that 
writing impoverishes memory. However, while Plato sees writing as a threat to memory, 
he then goes on to distinguish between a ‗good‘ type of memory and a ‗bad‘ one. The 
‗good‘ type of memory (anamnesis) occurs when those truths that the soul has forgotten 
are recalled through proper teaching. The ‗good‘ use of memory involves the living 
presence of the speaker/teacher, who in dialogue with the student, activates his/her 
memory so as to repeat what was already known but forgotten.  The ‗bad‘ type of 
memory is the one that replaces the genuine live interaction of the intellect with 
‗shorthand‘ signs; it is not genuine knowledge since it is not the product of reflection. 
The ‗bad‘ type of memory is repeats blindly without any understanding of the material 
under consideration. Derrida‘s argument is that this contrast is untenable since both the 
‗good‘ and the ‗bad‘ type of memory rely equally on the possibility of repetition, on the 
ability to repeat what happened in the past. 
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On both sides of that line, it is a question of repetition. Live memory repeats the presence of the eidos, and 
truth is also the possibility of repetition through recall. Truth unveils the eidos or the ontōs on, in other 
words, that which can be imitated, reproduced, repeated in its identity. But in the anamnesic movement of 
truth, what is repeated must present itself as such, as what it is, in the repetition. The true is repeated; it is 
what is repeated in the repetition, what is represented and present in the representation. It is not the repeater 
in the repetition, not the signifier in the signification. The true is the presence of the eidos signified. (1981: 
111) 
 
It is on the question of repeatability that Derrida‘s argument hinges: on the one hand, for 
truth to present itself as truth it must be repeated in the presence of the teacher, through 
the use of the spoken word and the exercise of memory; on the other hand, repetition is 
also the characteristic of non-truth, writing and bad memory: ‗The true and the untrue are 
both species of repetition.‘ (1981:168) 
 
However, while writing is pejoratively described, it would seem that – at some level - 
Plato is unable to relinquish writing completely. One of the clearest examples of the 
conflict between what Plato intends to say and what he actually writes can be seen in his 
attempt to define speech by using metaphors of writing. When Phaedrus asks Socrates to 
specify which form of discourse is superior to writing, he replies, ‗the sort that goes 
together with learning and is written in the soul of the learner.‘ (in Derrida, 1981:148). As 
Derrida points out, isn‘t it remarkable that after Socrates put so much effort into 
condemning writing, he then goes on to define speech as ‗writing‘ on the soul?  Writing, 
in some sense, must be necessary after all and this is why a distinction is made between 
good and bad writing: 
 
According to a pattern that will dominate all of western philosophy, good writing (natural, living, 
knowledgeable, intelligible, internal, speaking) is opposed to bad writing (a moribund, ignorant, external, 
mute artifice for the senses). And the good one can be designated only through the metaphor of the bad one. 
Metaphoricity is the logic of contamination and the contamination of logic (1981:149). 
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Derrida also argues that the ‗instability‘ of writing, its effect and disruption of speech was 
also played out in ancient Greek society which defined itself in opposition to those 
persons who did not fit in. But, while Greek society excluded its others, it also 
maintained within its walls a number of individuals who could be used as scapegoats in 
times of crisis, ‗the representative of the outside  is nonetheless constituted, regularly 
granted its place by the community, chosen, kept, fed, etc., in the very heart of the 
inside.‘ (1981: 133) Interestingly, the Greek word for these scapegoats is pharmakos 
(defined as wizard, magician, prisoner and scapegoat), a word not found in the Phaedrus 
but whose etymology reveals an overlap with the pharmakon.  Derrida argues that there is 
continuum of sense between the words found within Plato‘s text and those found outside 
it. And just as the purity of Greek society was contaminated by maintaining within itself 
those it wanted to exclude, likewise the purity of speech is ‗contaminated‘ by writing. 
 
Among the other values that constitute the framework of the discussion on the spoken 
and written are also questions concerning the role of authority and the legitimation of 
tradition as a way of ensuring the continued existence of the community. This existence 
is ensured by the tradition which acknowledges the father as the natural authority 
transmitting orally to his legitimate son the values and knowledge of that community.  
Within this father-legitimate son framework, writing is an ‗orphan‘ permitted only 
because it is non-threatening, 
 
the specificity of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the father….the status of this 
orphan, whose welfare cannot be assured by any attendance or assistance, coincides with that of a graphein 
which, being nobody‘s son at the instant it reaches inscription, scarcely remains a son at all and no longer 
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recognizes its origins, whether legally or morally. In contrast to writing, living logos is alive in that it has a 
living father (whereas the orphan is already half dead), a father that is present, standing near it, behind it, 
within it, sustaining it with his rectitude, attending it in person in his own name.(1981: 77) 
 
Underlying Plato‘s text is another logic that operates by exclusion with the goal of 
protecting truth from the corrupting influence of writing. The model of speech as the 
medium that leads to truth through dialogical interaction can only and necessarily 
condemn writing as a secondary and impoverished derivative. The Phaedrus is situated at 
a relatively early stage in western philosophy and is indicative of a certain way of 
thinking about language, truth and reality. It might lead one to argue that Plato is the 
‗founder‘ of this way of thinking. However, despite this prominent historical position, 
Derrida carefully rejects talk of both ‗origins‘ and ‗ends‘ as these belong to the ‗luggage‘ 
of logocentric metaphysics whose assumptions he seeks to undermine. To claim that 
Plato is the originator of this way of thinking about speech is to return to the framework 
of binary oppositions that belong to the discourse of the metaphysics of presence. In his 
close reading of ‗Plato‘s Pharmacy‘, Derrida has shown the play of differences work 
within the text. The term pharmakon has the structure of the double that is undecidable 
since it is used simultaneously as both a poison and a cure. 
 
In Of Grammatology (1976) Derrida uses a similar strategy to question Saussure‘s claim 
of the superiority of the spoken word over the written word. While Derrida remains 
indebted to Saussure for the radical innovations he brought to linguistics, Derrida‘s 
reading develops these innovations to their logical conclusions. The importance of 
Saussure‘s linguistics is that it offers a tentative critique of logocentrism: by arguing that 
a sign is composed of a signifier and a signified, Saussure is, in effect, dismissing the 
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view that a sign is used to communicate ideas lie outside the sign system. And yet, 
despite this promising start, Saussure did not realise the implications of this own 
linguistic model and remained ‗trapped‘ within the metaphysics of presence that has 
characterised western culture (1976: 53). And while Saussure considered his linguistics to 
be a scientific study of language, Derrida argues that his ‗scientific‘ model is tainted with 
logocentric and phonocentric assumptions. 
 
The starting point for Saussure‘s linguistics immediately reveals his prejudice in favour 
of speech: in the study of language, it is the sound or phonology that should be the focus 
of attention. ‗For each language uses a fixed number of distinct speech sounds and this is 
the only sound system which has any reality as far as the linguist is concerned.‘ (1983: 
34) This is prejudiced because if one is studying language as a whole then this should 
include both the spoken and the written word; by stressing sounds or phonology it is 
evident that Saussurean linguistics – allegedly scientific and objective - values the spoken 
word from the outset. As a result, writing is positioned as the external other to speech and 
‗outside‘ language in general. 
 
The phonocentric bias is even more evident in Saussure‘s account of the relation between 
speech and writing: ‗[t]he object of study in linguistics is not a combination of the written 
word and the spoken word. The spoken word alone constitutes that object.‘ (1983: 24-25) 
And yet, despite this exclusion of writing, he goes on to say that although ‗writing is in 
itself not part of the internal system of language, it is impossible to ignore this way in 
which the language is constantly represented. We must be aware of its utility, its defects 
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and its dangers.‘ (1983: 24) There is a tension in Saussure‘s thinking on the relation and 
value of the spoken and the written word for while the spoken word is exclusively 
privileged as the object of study for linguistics, it seems that the written word shouldn‘t 
be dismissed out of hand. On the contrary, Saussure warns us to be vigilant since many 
people continually and mistakenly think of writing as part of language. 
 
But Saussure is not only issuing a warning: in his analysis of writing, his rhetoric 
describes writing as having many ‗dangers‘, as something with the power to ‗usurp‘ the 
spoken word, as exercising a ‗tyranny‘ over language as a whole. It is odd to h ear 
writing condemned with such an outburst of indignation. Derrida asks why Saussure felt 
the need to resort to such forceful rhetoric: what is it about writing that is so threatening?  
 
One of the threats lies in writing‘s ability to disrupt the natural condition of language. 
According to Saussure, there is a natural connection between meaning and sound, ‗the 
natural and only authentic connection which links word and sound.‘ (1983: 26)  Humans, 
by nature, have the faculty of expressing themselves through sounds and this explains 
why he considered phonology (the study of sound) as the model for the science of 
linguistics. Implicit in Saussure‘s view is the assumption that the natural order of the 
world is one where humans in their natural state use language in the first instance to 
speak.  
 
But this claim on the way things are by nature is challenged by Derrida who asks: how 
can Saussure claim that there is a natural connection between the sounds humans produce 
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and the meanings in their minds, when he considers one of the achievements of his 
linguistics to be the non-natural connection between sounds and meanings? The thesis of 
the arbitrary nature of the sign gives an account of the relation between the signifier (the 
sound) and the signified (meaning) as a non-natural relation. These two claims – the 
natural and the arbitrary – are precisely the opposite of each other so it is strange to find 
them next to each other in Saussure‘s explanation of language. The thesis of the arbitrary 
nature of the sign has an important consequence for the alleged superiority of the spoken 
to the written: (a) if the spoken is superior to writing because it is natural and (b) if 
writing is inferior because it is unnatural, and (c) if all signs (spoken and written) are 
arbitrary, then (d) this disrupts the contrast between the natural and the unnatural, a 
contrast that Saussure wanted to retain.   
 
In addition, Saussure had also introduced the principle of difference to explain the 
identity of signs. What gives sounds an identity is not something inherent within the 
sound itself but its relationship to other signs within the linguistic system, a system 
constructed according to certain conventions of use. The basis of this claim is Saussure‘s 
view that the sign is fundamentally a psychic phenomenon as opposed to a material one: 
sounds are not defined by their physical manifestation but by the way they relate to other 
sounds.  
 
…it is impossible that sound, as a material element, should in itself be part of the language. Sound is 
merely something ancillary, a material the language uses….linguistic signals are not in essence phonetic. 
They are not physical in any way. They are constituted solely by differences which distinguish one such 
sound pattern from another. (1983: 116-117)  
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The evidence for the differential nature of sound could be seen in the way different 
people could pronounce sounds differently and yet still be understood. This showed that 
understanding could take place because it was not a question of the sound being related to 
the meaning, but a question of understanding sounds as different from others within the 
sound system. As Derrida one again points out, the differential nature of sounds 
contradicts Saussure‘s claim that there is a natural connection between sounds and 
meaning.  
 
Given that Saussure considered there to be a natural connection between sound and 
meaning, what is the danger posed by writing? The danger represented by writing is that 
it threatens the natural order of things. Writing has the potential to disrupt the way words 
are pronounced since different people can read the same words but pronounce them 
differently. These variations of pronunciation would eventually lead to modifications 
within the language itself and, as a result, the natural connection between the sound and 
meaning would be weakened. Derrida writes,  
 
This natural bond of the signified (concept or sense) to the phonic signifier would condition the natural 
relationship subordinating writing (visible image) to speech. It is this natural relationship that would have 
been inverted by the original sin of writing… (1976: 35) 
 
As Derrida points out, Saussure way of thinking conceptualises writing as a phenomena 
lying outside of language: since by nature language is a spoken medium, then writing is 
the non-natural, external other of language, posing a permanent threat to the natural order 
of things.  
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There is a further interesting twist to Derrida‘s reading of Saussure. The internal 
contradiction in Saussure‘s writing is apparent when, after having condemned writing so 
vigorously, he uses writing as a useful model to understand the functioning of language 
as a whole. ‗An identical state of affairs is to be found in that other system of signs, 
writing. Writing offers a useful comparison, which throws light upon the whole 
question.‘ (1983: 117) One would think that, having expressed so many reservations 
about writing, Saussure would have adopted some other model. Perhaps, as Derrida 
points out, he could not do otherwise.  
 
The problem for Saussure‘s account is that it had privileged speech at the expense of 
writing by prioritising sound, but the difference that enables a person to identify a sound 
is not a itself a sound. Difference or the ‗space‘ between sounds is what makes the 
identification of different sounds possible and it is also this ‗space‘ that makes meaning 
possible. As a result, the spoken word loses its privileged status since both the spoken 
and the written are generated by the same process of difference. 
 
By definition, difference is never in itself a sensible plenitude. Therefore, its necessity contradicts the 
allegation of a naturally phonic essence of language. It contests by the same token the professed natural 
dependence of the graphic signifier. (1976: 53) 
 
Saussure had placed writing in a secondary and derivative position on the grounds that it 
was a ‗signifier of a signifier,‘ but the principle of difference shows that all signs were 
signs of other signs. As it turns out, the feature that was identified so closely with writing 
is the same feature that can best explain the functioning of the linguistic system as a 
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whole. Perhaps, this is why Saussure increasingly turns to models and examples of 
writing as support for his linguistic theory. 
 
The implication of Saussure‘s use of writing as a model to explain all of language reveals 
that writing is not the external other of language, situated in a secondary and derivative 
position,  but rather always already within language. As it turns out, language is a form of 
writing. Derrida writes, ‗the alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, 
was possible only on one condition: that the ―original,‖ ―natural,‖ etc.  language had 
never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a 
writing.‘ (1976: 56) Derrida calls this generalised concept of writing ‗arche-writing‘ or 
‗originary writing‘ and his argument is that the characteristic that was attributed to 
writing – difference and absence – is the characteristic of language as a whole. ‗Writing 
is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs, which would be more profoundly 
true.‘ (1976: 43) And by broadening the concept of writing to arche-writing, other 
systems of meaning production (ideograms, hieroglyphics, and cybernetic systems) rather 
than just the written marks on a page can be explained. 
 
The re-definition of writing as a generalised writing, as arche-writing that includes both 
the spoken and the written word as signs of signs leads to a reversal of the speech-writing 
hierarchy and a re-construction of the concept  of writing. Although arche-writing is the 
condition for the possibility of both speech and writing, it should be noted that Derrida‘s 
notion of arche-writing does not function as a ‗master‘ concept positioned outside of a 
discourse. Although it is not a transcendental signified that provides a stable foundation 
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for discourse, it can be described, according to Gasche (1988), as ‗quasi-transcendental‘ 
in that it functions like a transcendental signified but operates within specific texts and 
discourses.  
 
Derrida‘s close textual reading undermines the strategies employed within the discourse 
of metaphysics to erase difference as it seeks to establish the presence of self-identity. 
Grammatology is the name Derrida uses for the new writing that reveals and revels in its 
resistance to metaphysics. It would seem that the easiest way of resisting the metaphysics 
of presence would be to reverse the speech-writing opposition by placing writing in the 
superior position. This would be a mistake for to do so would be to succumb once again 
to the logocentrism of western metaphysics. Resistance to the metaphysics of presence is 
not merely a simple reversal of opposites but rather a re-configuration of the terms to 
include both terms of the opposition. The terms Derrida introduces throughout his texts – 
differance, arche-writing, pharmakon, supplement and hymen among others – perform 
this function and in this sense they can be considered undecidables insofar as they resist 
the attempt to be straitjacketed into a single, determinate meaning. The two or more 
meanings of these terms undermine the binary oppositions that inform the discourse of 
metaphysics.  
 
3.0. Differance, traces. 
 
As I have already mentioned, Derrida agrees with the Saussurean model of language but 
develops it to its logical and radical conclusions. One consequence of his reading of 
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Saussure is that of the interrelated notions of ‗trace‘ and ‗differance‟. Derrida argues that 
the relation between signs is not merely one of proximity, where each sign is different 
from or opposed to the sign that is immediately next to it, but rather each sign is related 
to every other sign within the linguistic system. The presence and identity of a sign is 
also connected to other absent signs within the linguistic system and this means that the 
use of a sign entails other signs following in its ‗wake‘: each sign leaves a trace of itself 
on other signs. In Of Grammatology, Derrida writes,  
 
The (pure) trace is differance. It does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or 
graphic.  It is, on the contrary, the condition of such a plenitude. Although it does not exist, although it is 
never a being-present outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign 
(signified/signifier, content/expression, etc), concept or operation, motor or sensory. (1976: 62) 
 
An indication of what Derrida means by trace and differance can be found in Positions 
(1972) where he discusses the key Saussurean conceptual opposition between langue 
(system) and parole (event). Derrida highlights the paradoxical nature of this opposition 
for on the one hand, the presence of a sign is established by its difference from other 
signs within the system, but the system itself can only come about as a result of signs 
themselves having a meaning in the first place. The speech act (or event) depends upon 
the system (or langue), but the system itself is the product of speech acts
iv
. (1972: 28) To 
know the meaning of the sign ‗house‘ depends on its contrast with other forms of 
accommodation, but to be able to articulate the different types of accommodation you 
must have the sign (such as house) that enable the system to come into being. Derrida 
describes this process as a circular in that the speech event and the system depend or refer 
back to each other. What is needed is a way of explaining both, and the term differance is 
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used to explain the conditions that must be in place so as to account for the generation of 
meaning. 
 
The term differance is a neologism coined by Derrida to capture two characteristics of 
signs: difference and deferral. It is a combination of ‗to differ‘ (as when we say ‗a‘ is 
different from ‗b‘) and ‗to defer‘ (as in to postpone, put off). The connotations associated 
with difference and deferral are spatial and temporal respectively: signs are spatial 
because they are connected next to other signs within the linguistic network, and they are 
temporal because they are connected to other signs that are before or after them within 
the linguistic system.  
 
It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called ―present‖ 
element,  each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself thereby 
keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its 
relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is 
called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not:  
what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present. (1982: 13) 
 
When Derrida coined the term ‗differance‘ he pointed out that in French ‗different‘ and 
‗differant‘ sound the same and this might easily lead to some confusion. This confusion is 
dispelled when they are written, since their difference is apparent in the spelling. What 
this highlights is the important Derridean point that certain meanings can only be 
communicated through the written word.  
 
It should be emphasised that Derrida‘s differance is not merely the combination of two 
sets of meanings, but is ‗immediately and irreducibly polysemic‘ (1982: 8). The use of a 
sign has within it the potential to generate infinite meanings as a sign differs from another 
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sign that in turn differs from another in a chain of signification so that, given a different 
context, a different signification might (though not necessarily) be generated. Meaning is 
not fixed once and for all but is an on-going process, ‗the indefinite referral of signifier to 
signifier…which gives the signified meaning no respite…so that it always signifies again 
and differs…‘ (1978: 25) One way of showing Derrida‘s point is that if we look up the 
meaning of a signifier in a dictionary, we do not find any signifieds but more signifiers. 
Storey gives an example of this process of endless postponement or deferral of meaning: 
 
if we look at the signifier ‗letter‘ in the Collins Pocket Dictionary of the English Language, we discover it 
has five possible signifieds: a written or printed message, a character of the alphabet, the strict meaning of 
an agreement, precisely (as in ‗to the letter‘) and to write or mark letters on a sign. If we then look up one 
of the senses, the signified ‗[written or printed] message‘, we find that it too is a signifier producing four 
more signifieds: a communication from one person or group to another, an implicit meaning, as in a work 
of art, a religious or political belief that someone attempts to communicate to others, and to understand (as 
in ‗to get the message‘). (1993: 86) 
 
In Margins, Derrida describes differance as ‗the movement according to which language 
or any code, any system of reference in general is constituted ―historically‖ as a weave of 
differences.‘ (1982: 12). But by saying that differance is at the core of meaning and 
history (as their origin) it would seem that Derrida has returned to the language of 
metaphysics with its emphasis on foundations or first principles. This would re-enact a 
gesture typical of the tradition of western philosophy that locates a transcendental first 
principle to explain differences away. But for Derrida, the ‗originary trace‘ shows that 
there can never be a pure, first moment, an origin towards which meaning can return to. 
Unlike, Saussure who remained trapped within logocentrism by privileging the signified 
as that towards which signifiers (phonic or graphic) referred to, Derrida considers the 
signified as just another signifier.  
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Thus, although differance functions like a metaphysical principle it has no privileged 
foundational status: it is transcendental in the sense of the underlying presupposition or 
conditions that make something possible. In this sense, differance is the condition for the 
possibility of language and meaning without being situated in an anterior position to 
language and meaning. For Derrida, differance is inherent within or part of language and 
meaning and yet it makes language and meaning possible. ‗Differance is the non-full, 
non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus the name ‗origin‘ 
no longer suits it. (1982: 11) There can never be a pure origin or meaning that is 
independent of all signifiers since signifiers circulate within the linguistic system. 
 
As opposed to the idea of meaning as grounded in an origin or a goal, Derrida argues that 
signification is a process of dissemination where each sign substitutes the other in an 
infinite play of meaning. Consequently, there is no centre that can function as a presence 
to stabilise signs: on the contrary, the presence that logocentrism took as an unquestioned 
value is an effect of signification, an effect of the linguistic system. Differance 
undermines the metaphysics of presence. This Derridean position open up the space for a 
radical theory of interpretation that no longer claims to have access to things or meanings 
but that produces new interpretations that are in turn interpreted, giving rise to new 
interpretations, ad infinitum.  
 
In his elaboration of meaning as differance, Derrida replaces Saussure‘s static account of 
language with a dynamic and temporal one that takes into consideration the context/s 
within which language is used.  Whereas Saussure‘s account considered signs as 
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expressing a meaning that was already present within the linguistic system, Derrida‘s 
account considers meaning as always incomplete since understanding the meaning of a 
sign requires taking into account other signs within the linguistic system. 
 
4.0. Communication and Speech Act Theory. 
 
Traditional theories of communication assume a sender-message-receiver model of 
communication. On this account, the sender intends a meaning that is encoded 
(phonically or graphically) into a message, is transmitted to a receiver who decodes the 
message to understand what the speaker intends to mean. This model operates on the 
assumption that: (a) communication is the communication of intentions
iv
 with the 
presence of the speaker in oral communication and the absence of the speaker (as a 
deferred presence) in the case of written communication; (b) there is a strict dichotomy 
between the signified and the signifier with the signifier as the optional (but necessary) 
supplement - that enables the signified to be communicated. Interestingly the signified is 
favoured over the signifier (the meaning over the medium) and furthermore, is assumed 
to remain the same in each instance of communication. 
 
In ‗Signature Event Context‘ (1988) Derrida‘s critique of the traditional model of 
communication aims to demonstrate that the signified/signifier opposition is untenable. 
This opposition fails to take into account the logically necessary features of all signs – the 
possibility of their repetition or iteration. His critique opens (a) by identifying this 
necessary feature in writing, as it is in writing that it is most evident; and continues (b) by 
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showing that this feature belongs not only to written signs but to all signs; this is followed 
by (c) an application of this insight to the speech act theory of J.L. Austin. 
 
Derrida‘s starting point is a problematization of the concept of communication: 
 
Is it certain that to the word communication corresponds a concept that is unique, univocal, rigorously 
controllable, and transmittable: in a word, communicable? Thus, in accordance with a strange figure of 
discourse, one must first of all ask oneself whether or not the word or signifier ―communication‖ 
communicates a determinate content, an identifiable meaning, or a describable value. However, even to 
articulate and to propose this question I have had to anticipate the meaning of the word communication: I 
have been constrained to predeterminable communication as a vehicle, a means of transport or transitional 
medium of a meaning, and moreover a unified meaning. (1988: 1) 
 
Derrida‘s point is that the concept of communication is typically defined as the transfer of 
meaning such that the other senses or meanings of communication - such as the imparting 
of a non-linguistic force or the delivery of a paper at a conference - are considered as 
secondary. In offering to define ‗to communicate‘ most dictionaries would start by 
offering the literal sense and then add the figurative ones. But this method offers an 
inherent difficulty since as we are try to define communication the performative act of 
defining assumes we already accept that communication is the transfer of meaning. What 
dictionaries show that understanding or defining the meaning of a concept entails using 
other words so to start any discussion one must tentatively agree to use words in a certain 
way within a context. This is precisely the case with the concept of communication. 
 
Derrida starts his analysis of communication by focussing on written communication and 
his analysis focuses on Etienne Condillac‘s An Essay on the Origin of Human 
Knowledge, Being a supplement to Mr. Locke‟s Essay on the Human Understanding 
(1756), an essay explicitly written with the purpose of ‗filling‘ in certain features of 
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language that Locke had neglected in his work. Condillac‘s essay attempts to account for 
the origins of writing as an addition or supplement to speech: it serves the important 
function of enabling the communication of messages to take place over greater distances, 
distances that are out of range of the spoken word but that can bridged by writing. On 
Derrida‘s reading, Condillac justifies writing on the grounds that (a) men have to 
communicate; (b) they have to communicate the ideas or thoughts in their minds and (c) 
given that men are already able to communicate to themselves and to others, they invent a 
new means of communication, writing. (1988: 4)  
 
For Condillac the invention of writing is a progressive ‗evolution‘ of linguistic 
communication since, given that societies are no longer organised as communities using 
face-to-face communication, then the distancing of members from each other could be 
reduced through writing: ‗[m]en in a state of communicating their thoughts by means of 
sounds felt the necessity of imagining new signs capable of perpetuating those thoughts 
and of making them known to persons who are absent.‘ (in Derrida, 1988: 4) This, 
however, is not an accurate way of representing absence and Derrida points out that the 
absence of the receiver in Condillac‘s model is not really an absence but a ‗modification 
of presence‘. On Condillac‘s account, to write is to communicate with someone who is 
present but beyond the range of the spoken word, who, so to speak, is distantly present. 
Clearly, this view of writing is still dominated by the framework that thinks of the spoken 
word as present and immediate with the written word as a projection across space of the 
spoken word. On this account writing does not have any characteristics of its own and it 
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owes its relatively favourable status as a result of its ability to transport the presence of 
the spoken word. 
 
Derrida adds that a more complete understanding of writing as absence is one whereby 
the receiver is not merely distantly absent, but absolutely absent i.e., dead. The meaning 
of a piece of writing can still be understood if the receiver is dead, for to understand a 
written text there is no need to assume that there is a reader who will activate the text. It 
is possible to write a letter to someone who, unknown to you, has died before the letter 
arrived: it will still be possible to understand the letter despite the absence of the receiver. 
This view on the absence of the receiver applies equally to the sender or producer of the 
text: the author is not a necessary condition for understanding a text since we can 
understand a text even if the author is dead. Furthermore, it is also possible to understand 
a written text without needing to know what the author intended to mean. Given the 
removal of the sender and the receiver as the source or origin of the meaning, where does 
this meaning ‗reside‘? The short answer, for Derrida, is that meaning is found within the 
structure of language itself.  
 
If it is possible to understand a written text without the sender or receiver, then how is it 
possible for a written sign to function? For a written sign to function, it must have the 
possibility of being repeated: repetition or ‗iterability‘, as Derrida calls it, is a structural 
feature of writing and it enables the recognition of a unit of writing as the same despite 
being different. In other words, the power of iteration makes it possible to both identify a 
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string of words as the same and to generate a different meaning since it is being generated 
within a different context. 
 
For the structure of iteration---and this is another of its decisive traits---implies both identity and 
difference. Iteration in its ―purest‖ form---and it is always impure---contains in itself the discrepancy of a 
difference that constitutes it as iteration. The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even 
without taking into account the fact that this identity can only determine or delimit itself though differential 
relations to other elements and that it hence bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is 
differential, within each individual ―element‖ as well as between the ―elements,‖ because it splits each 
element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although 
indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence: it is a differential structure escaping the logic of 
presence or the (simple or dialectical) opposition of presence and absence …(1988: 53) 
 
At this stage it is useful to distinguish between Derrida‘s notion of a ‗generalised writing‘ 
with what I am calling ‗specific writing‘ (the written sign, writing in a narrow sense). 
Derrida points out that the traditional account of writing has certain features that pre-
figure his ‗generalised writing‘: these features are (a) that the written sign does not need 
to be associated with the present moment; (b) that it can be taken out of a context and 
inserted into another, a process of ‗grafting‘; and (c) it is situated at a distance from that 
which it refers to so that it can be used again to refer to another thing. (1988: 9-10). The 
absence that is central to ‗specific writing‘ overlaps with the absence that ‗generalised 
writing‘ is concerned with and this is why Derrida applies this insight to all signs: 
spoken, written, human and non-human. The use of any sign does not entail as a 
necessary pre-condition the presence of the sender or the receiver: the nature of the sign 
is that it can be used and reused, i.e., repeated. This notion of ‗generalised writing‘ as 
repetition is the condition that makes all communication possible: absence is an inherent 
feature of communication and the relatively permanent marks of ‗specific writing‘ 
become possible only as a result of this repetition. 
 
211 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
This structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or from the signified (hence from 
communication and from its context) seems to me to make every mark, including those which are oral, a 
grapheme in general; which is to say, as we have seen, the nonpresent remainder [restance] of a 
differential mark cut off from  its putative ―production‖ or origin. And I shall even extend this law to all 
―experience‖ in general if it is conceded that there is no experience consisting of pure presence but only of 
chains of differential marks. (1988: 10) 
 
The second part of Derrida‘s essay, ‗Parasites. Iter, of Writing: That It Perhaps Does Not 
Exist‘ is an engagement with the speech act theory of J.L. Austin. In How to do Things 
with Words (1975), Austin had argued that the use of language to describe or represent 
the world is only one way of understanding language, one that could be subsumed within 
a broader category of speech acts. A speech act is an utterance that performs an action: it 
is what we do when we talk so that when a couple say ‗I do‘, they are not describing a 
wedding but actually getting married. Since all utterances perform an action we can use 
language to promise, pray, declare, warn, threaten, joke, and describe etc. 
 
In order to explain these speech acts, Austin does not rely on the presence of the speaker 
who intends the utterance since one can think of many instances where the intention is 
not enough to guarantee the meaning of the speech act: a promise remains a promise even 
if the speaker doesn‘t intend to keep his promise. Promises can be explained in terms of 
the conventions governing their use, the ‗formula‘ used in uttering them, rather than the 
speaker‘s intentions. And this is why Austin proposes to explain speech acts by focussing 
on the conventional context of their production: if certain conditions are fulfilled or 
satisfied, then the speech act is judged as successful (if not, unsuccessful). These ‗felicity 
conditions‘ are: (a) the appropriate words must be uttered (one can only say ‗I do‘ when 
getting married); (b) they must be uttered in the right context (one can only say them in a 
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church for them to be effective as a Christian wedding); and (c) that the speaker is sincere 
in his/her in uttering them (saying them as a joke renders them null and void). These are 
the necessary conditions that guarantee the success of a speech act. 
 
A number of features attract Derrida to Austin‘s theory, namely (a) his explanation of 
communication in terms of speech acts; (b) his defining communication in terms of 
‗force‘; (c) his elaboration of the notion of force as transformative, as producing an 
effect; (d) his rejection of the true and the false as the values that are central to language.  
 
For these four reasons, at least, it might seem that Austin has shattered the concept of communication as a 
purely semiotic, linguistic, or symbolic concept. The performative is a ―communication‖ which is not 
limited strictly to the transference  of a semantic content that is already constituted and dominated by an  
orientation toward truth (be it the unveiling of what is in its being or the adequation-congruence between a 
judicative utterance and the thing itself). (1988: 13-14) 
 
But while the feature that attracts Derrida to Austin is the latter‘s attempt to account for 
meaning in terms of the context and the associated conventions of production, Austin 
himself retreats from this explanation when he re-introduces the speaker‘s intention. In 
order to account for the transformative power of a speech act, i.e. how an utterance does 
something to transform a situation, Austin realises that the grammatical structure is not 
enough to generate the illocutionary force: something else is needed and it is here that the 
speaker‘s intentions are re-introduced. Austin therefore distinguishes between the 
locutionary and the illocutionary aspect of an utterance: the locutionary aspect is 
explained in terms of the grammatical rules of a linguistic system, while the illocutionary 
aspect is explained with reference to the way the speaker uses the utterance, to the 
intentions. The utterance, ‗The bus is arriving‘ can be explained according to the 
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grammatical rules of the English language, i.e., its locutionary aspect, but also according 
to the way the utterance is used by the speaker: as a fact, as a warning to get back onto 
the pavement, as a remark on its punctuality. 
 
Speech act theory is Austin‘s attempt to explain the illocutionary force of utterances by 
identifying the presence of the speaker intending the speech act as a necessary feature of 
the illocutionary act. It is only (for example) because the speaker intends to keep the 
promise he/she is making that its counts as ‗genuine‘ speech act of promising. The 
speaker must be committed to the promises he/she is making and Austin calls the making 
of a promise that one has no intention of keeping an ‗insincerity‘ or an ‗abuse‘. It is 
evident is that speech act theory relies upon the presence of the speaker as a guarantor for 
the authenticity of his/her utterances.  
 
The critical point Derrida makes at this stage is that the intentionality and presence that 
Austin associates with speech acts is not necessary for the speech act to mean. It is 
perfectly possible that an utterance can be repeated in a different context from that within 
which it was originally uttered by the speaker. For a speech act to function it must derive 
its meaning independently of the speaker, it must, in other words,  belong to a system of 
conventions that are already in place prior to the speaker and that make it possible for the 
speech act to be repeated in a different context. 
 
This leads Derrida to make a further claim about Austin‘s theory of speech acts that has 
been strongly resisted by commentators sympathetic to speech act theory. If, according to 
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speech act theory, utterances require the presence of the speaker to guarantee their 
authenticity, what happens when someone makes a joke of something serious, when a 
promise or threat is uttered on stage or when the words of someone else are quoted?  
These speech acts pose a threat to the claims made by speech act theory since the 
speaker‘s intention to mean is being used in a way that undermines the value of 
intentionality. Austin considers it in the interest of speech act theory to separate 
performatives into two groups:  
 
a performative utterance will, for example be in a peculiar way hollow or void, if said by an actor on the 
stage, or introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every 
utterance---a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways---
intelligibly---used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use---ways which fall under the 
doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from consideration. Our performative 
utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances. (1975: 22) 
 
These utterances are ‗etiolated‘ or ‗parasitic‘ since these ‗thrive‘ upon everyday uses of 
language, they represent exceptions or aberrations from the norm. As a result, when  
Austin describes the ‗felicity‘ conditions that ensure the success of a speech act, he 
excludes those speech acts that are ‗non-serious‘ since these cannot even claim to 
function as genuine speech acts.  
 
It is this opposition between the ‗serious‘ and the ‗non-serious‘ that Derrida challenges, 
for by removing the ‗non-serious‘ from the equation, Austin commits an unjustified 
limitation upon the object of inquiry. If Austin wants to give an account of the way 
performatives function he must also be able to explain those that cannot function, and not 
just remove them as irrelevant to the study of speech acts. To account for the possibility 
of both serious and non-serious speech acts, Derrida introduces the notion of iteration: 
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‗what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, ―non-serious‖, citation (on a stage, in a 
poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general citationality – or rather, 
a general iterability – without which there would not even be a ―successful‖ 
performative?  (1988: 17) 
 
The condition that makes it possible for a speech act to be taken seriously is the same 
condition that makes it possible for it to be taken non-seriously. Miscommunication is 
inherent within the system of communication. Derrida‘s concept of iteration describes the 
fact that speech acts can be taken out of one context and used in another without the need 
to explain the meaning by referring to the speaker‘s presence in the act of intending-to-
mean. The metaphysics of presence that Derrida has detected in such diverse writers as 
Plato and Saussure, has also slipped into Austin‘s speech act theory since intentionality is 
not a necessary, ‗felicity‘ condition for the production of meaning; on the contrary, a 
better explanation for the production of meaning is Derrida‘s notion of arche-writing as 
differance since it is the condition that makes the ‗iterability‘ of language possible 
without the need to posit the speaker and his/her intentions. 
 
Derrida is insistent that a speech act is performed and has a meaning in a context. Its 
importance is such that it is usually taken for granted that to understand the meaning of a 
sign or signs, one should look at the context of their production. And in this sense, it is 
frequently accepted that the context is a kind of fixed or enclosed entity within which any 
ambiguity of meaning can be removed. However, various questions arise: does a text lead 
to the context or is it the context that allows us to understand the text? What are the 
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boundaries of a context? Who decides what is included and excluded from a context? 
Derrida is explicit: ‗I shall try to demonstrate why a context is never absolutely 
determinable, or rather, why its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated.‘ 
(1988: 3)  While meaning is always context-dependent, the context itself not a fixed and 
self-enclosed entity. Derrida claims that a context is ‗boundless‘ and this for two reasons: 
 
(a) the attempt to limit what can be included within a context serves to create another 
context: to say what should or shouldn‘t be included within a context has the paradoxical  
effect of creating another context: 
 
any attempt to codify context can always be grafted onto the context it sought to describe, yielding a new 
context which escapes the previous formulation. Attempts to describe limits always make possible a 
displacement of whose limits, so that Wittgenstein‘s suggestion that one cannot say ‗bububu‘ and mean ‗if 
it does not rain I shall go out for a walk,‘ has paradoxically, made it possible to do just that.‘ (Culler, 1988: 
124) 
 
(b) the addition of new information to the object under investigation in effect creates a 
new a new context for the object under investigation
iv
 . Using Derrida in a book on the 
philosophy of communication has created a new context for studies in deconstruction. 
 
any given context is open to further description. There is no limit in principle to what might be included in 
a given context, to what might be shown to be relevant to the performance of a particular speech act. This 
structural openness of context is essential to all disciplines: the scientist discovers that factors previously 
disregarded are relevant to the behaviour of certain objects; the historian brings new or reinterpreted data to 
bear on a particular event; the critic relates a passage or a text to a context that makes it appear in a new 
light…..meaning is determined by context and for that very reason is open to alteration when further 
possibilities are mobilized…. (Culler, 1982: 124) 
 
Despite Derrida‘s questioning of the limits and possibilities of the contextiv, it still retains 
an important role insofar as it imposes a limit on interpretation. Contrary to what many 
think, deconstruction does not advocate an ‗anything goes‘ with regard to interpretation 
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and the often quoted ‗there is nothing outside the text‘ is nothing more that a 
confirmation of the context as a limitation upon the text. The extent of these limits upon 
the text can be seen by Derrida‘s endorsement of what he calls ‗interpretive police‘ where 
a community establish the criteria for what count as good or bad, true or false 
interpretations: ‗within interpretive contexts…it should be possible to invoke rules of 
competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, 
and pedagogy.‘ (1988: 146) What Derrida shows is that the rules that govern an 
interpretation are not somehow  natural, but rather the product of a community that 
achieves a minimum of consensus as to what counts as a good or bad interpretation. It is 
the community that has the possibility of halting the re-contextualisation of speech acts, 
and that functions as an ‗interpretive police‘. When asked about whether the notion of 
‗interpretive police‘ implied a certain amount of repression, Derrida‘s responds by 
pointing out that while there are restrictions on what count as an interpretation, restriction 
should not be equated with repression just as a red traffic light is restrictive but not 
repressive (1988: 132).  
 
It should be recalled that Derrida is not denying that meaning is determined by context a 
as it is this very context that enables communication to take place. His argument that a 
context is open ended or under-determined does not imply that there is no meaning, that 
meaning is indeterminate. On the contrary, Derrida insists that ‗one cannot do anything, 
least of all speak, without determining (in a manner that is not only theoretical, but 
practical and performative) a context.‘ (1988: 136) 
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What Derrida has argued for in ‗Signature, Event, Context‟ is that an adequate account of 
any speech act theory must be able to explain both its successes and its failures. A case in 
point is that of ‗signatures‘. The function of a signature is that of acting as a guarantee of 
the identity of the person to whatever is being signed: it represents the speaker in his /her 
absence.  And signatures function because they have the possibility of being repeated – as 
when I sign different cheques – and therefore, as with other signs, a signature can be 
‗misused‘ or fail (as when someone counterfeits my signature on a cheque). The 
possibility of ‗misuse‘ or failure is the result of signatures belonging to the same system 
of iteration that makes ‗serious‘ or ‗successful‘ signatures possible. The example of the 
signature is an instance of the same structure that applies to all speech acts: (a) meaning 
is dependent upon both convention and context, but (b) these do not limit the range of use 
for speech acts. Speech act theory, in the hands of Austin, attempted to control meaning 
first by tying meaning down to contextual conventions and – when these seemed 
inadequate – by tying meaning to the speaker‘s intentions. 
 
It should be pointed out that Derrida rejects the view that authorial intention should be 
eliminated and replaced by iterability in the search for meaning. Rather the concept of 
iterability and the possibility of decontexualisation – both of which are inherent within 
the structure of language – are the conditions that make possible the author‘s intentions as 
one of several possible meanings for any speech act. So too, the author‘s intention to 
mean is not there ‗in our face‘ simply waiting to be read off the text. Rather, what counts 
as the author‘s intended meaning(s) is also the result of what the community of 
interpreters  operating within a context determine this meaning (s) to be.   
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On can surmise the benefits of deconstruction as twofold: (a) it demonstrates how 
meaning is not dependent upon the sender or the receiver of the message so that any 
question of intentionality is not exhausted by reducing meaning to subjects and (b) that 
neither is meaning so tied to the context that it becomes intelligible only in relation to a 
context; rather contexts are multiple and the nature of the sign is such that it can function 
in other contexts different from what which it ‗originated‘. This is why it is always 
possible to mean something differently from that which we intended to mean. 
 
In ‗Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida‘ (1977), Searle takes issue with 
Derrida accusing him of maliciously misreading Austin‘s work and of undermining the 
most obvious and common sense view of language as an instrument for communication.  
Not to be outdone, Derrida responds to Searle‘s arguments in ‗Limited Inc a b c…‘ 
(1977) by pitting the ‗playfulness‘ commonly associated with the Yale school of 
deconstruction against the ‗seriousness‘ associated with Searle and analytic philosophy. 
Perhaps the most blatant example of this ‗playfulness‘ is his quoting parts of Searle‘s text 
(and these quoted parts eventually make up all of Searle‘s text) within his own and using 
them out of context to undermine the idea that writing communicates what the author 
intended to mean despite his/her absence. Limited Inc (1988) reproduces both Searle‘s 
criticism and Derrida‘s response: 
 
(a) Searle argues that Derrida is mistaken in claiming that writing can only function in 
the absence of the receiver. 
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Writing makes it possible to communicate with an absent receiver, but it is not necessary for the receiver to 
be absent. Written communication can exist in the presence of the receiver, as for example, when I 
compose a shopping list for myself or pass notes to my companion during a concert or lecture. ( in Derrida, 
1988: 47) 
 
Derrida responds by claiming that he never said that the absence of the receiver is 
necessary for written communication to take place. As Dooley and Kavanagh (2007) 
point out, this would mean that when Derrida wrote a text, for the text to acquire a 
meaning he would have had to leave the room. And while the absence of the receiver is 
not a necessary condition for the text to have a meaning, it is still possible for it to have a 
meaning if the receiver is not there. A text will always function irrespective of whether 
the intended receiver is there or not. Iteration or the possibility of repetition is the 
condition of possibility for there being a text at all, 
 
The ‗shopping list for myself‘ would be neither producible nor utilizable, it would not be what it is nor 
could it even exist, were it not possible for it to function, from the very beginning, in the absence of sender 
and of receiver: that is, of determinate, actually present senders and receivers. And in fact the list cannot 
function unless these conditions are met. (1988: 49) 
 
 
(b) Searle thinks that Derrida has missed the whole point of Austin‘s argument by 
focussing on secondary aspects of language use:  
 
Austin‘s idea is simply this: if we want to know what it is to make a promise or to make statement we had 
better not start our investigation with promises made by actors on a stage in the course of a play or 
statements made in a novel by novelists about characters in the novel, because in a fairly obvious way such 
utterances are not standard case of promises and statements.  (in Derrida, 1988: 204-5) 
 
Derrida comments on the strangeness of Austin‘s claim since in his other writings he 
considered his theory as a ‗project of classifying and clarifying all possible ways and 
varieties of not exactly doing things…[it] has to be carried through if we are to 
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understand properly what doing things is…‘ (1979: 271) In addition, the whole point of 
How to Do Things with Words was to challenge the (then) dominant traditional view of 
language as the study of constative utterances (true or false statements).  So while 
traditional philosophy of language offered an inadequate theory of language by excluding 
performatives, Austin himself initiated a series of exclusions from his own theory, a 
theory that was supposed to explain all languages-uses, all speech acts. This is why 
Derrida challenges Searle‘s claim that Austin is merely suggesting a method for 
proceeding with the analysis of language since this claim is too restrictive in that it fails 
to explain the conditions that generate all utterances. 
 
On the question of the non-serious utterances Searle reads Derrida differently: the latter‘s 
concern with the value of ‗non-serious‘ utterances, is a sign, that Derrida is not interested 
in doing ‗serious‘ philosophy and it therefore explains why Derrida questions both the 
communicative function of language and the value of the context for understanding the 
meaning of an utterance. In fact, it would seem that Derrida, in Searle‘s eyes, is 
determined to challenge the everyday, commonplace assumptions of language use. In 
effect, Searle argues that the possibility of non-serious utterances, of pretending to make 
a promise or to get married, depends upon or is secondary to the possibility of making a 
promise or getting married in real life. Searle writes,   
 
The existence of the pretended form of the speech act is logically dependent on the possibility of the 
nonpretended speech acts in the same way that any pretended form of behaviour is dependent on 
nonpretended forms of behaviour, and in that sense the pretended forms are parasitical on the 
nonpretended forms ( in Derrida, 1988 : 205) 
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Derrida‘s reply is to challenge the notion of the dependency of the non-serious upon the 
serious by arguing that both of these classes require the repetition of conventionally 
agreed upon ‗formulas‘. According to Austin, the condition that makes promising 
possible is the following of a conventional procedure, a ‗code‘ or ‗formula‘ that is 
uttered. Derrida highlights the iteration of speech acts, when he writes,  
 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ―coded‖ or iterable utterance, or 
in other words if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, to launch a ship or a marriage were 
not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not thus identifiable in some way as 
‗citation‘? (1988: 18)  
 
And since the iterability of ‗formulas‘ is especially evident in non-serious contexts such 
as the stage, then Derrida  argues that the serious uses are a branch of the more general 
non-serious uses. Culler is exemplary in bringing out this point,  
 
This is a principle of considerable breadth. Something can be a signifying sequence only if it is iterable, 
only if it can be repeated in various serious and non-serious contexts, cited and parodied. Imitation is not an 
accident that befalls an original but its condition of possibility. There is such a thing as an original 
Hemmingway style only if it can be cited, imitated and parodied. For there to be such a style there must be 
recognisable features that characterise it and produce its distinctive effects; for features to be recognisable 
one must be able to isolate them as elements that could be repeated, and thus the iterability manifested in 
the inauthentic, the derivative, the imitative, the parodic, is what makes possible the original and the 
authentic. Or to take a more pertinent example, deconstruction exists only by virtue of iteration. One is 
tempted to speak of an original practice of deconstruction in  Derrida writings and to set aside as derivative 
the imitations of his admirers, but in fact these repetitions, parodies, ‗etiolations‘ or distortions are what 
brings a method into being and articulate, within Derrida‘s work itself, a practice of deconstruction. (Culler, 
1982: 120) 
 
In addition, there is also the question of the ‗parasitical‘ status of fictional discourse since 
Derrida denies that fiction is ‗parasitic‘ upon non-fiction. For Searle the relation of non-
fiction to fiction is one of logical dependency, with the latter dependent upon the former 
and which he describes, following Austin, as ‗parasitic‘. 
 
223 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Derrida responds by turning the tables onto Searle: if Searle‘s analysis is supposed to be 
objective by showing the logical dependence of one to the other, why is his analysis 
value-loaded relying as it does on pejorative value judgments?  
 
How is it possible to ignore that this axiology, in all of its systematic and dogmatic insistence, determines 
an object, the analysis of which is in essence not ―logical,‖ objective or impartial? The axiology involved in 
this analysis is not intrinsically determined by considerations that are merely logical. What logician, what 
theoretician in general, would have dared to say: B depends logically on A, therefore B is parasitic, 
nonserious, abnormal, etc? One can assert of anything whatsoever that it is ―logically dependent‖ without 
immediately qualifying it (as thought the judgment were analytical, or even tautological) with all those 
attributes, the lowest common denominator of which is evidently a pejorative value judgment (1988: 92)  
 
Derrida‘s argument is that Searle‘s thinking or logic is governed by certain ‗pre-logical 
possibilities‘ that reveal a hierarchical axiology at work so that certain concepts are 
privileged over others. This axiology operates in an exclusive ‗all or nothing‘ way so that 
speech and the serious are opposed to writing and the non-serious. But Derrida argues 
that the opposition of a concept to another does not entail that one excludes the other 
from the analysis for to outline or demarcate a concept is, in effect, to mark what it is 
from what it is not. (1988:123)   
 
To add insult to injury Searle concludes that Derrida does not believe in ‗rigorous and 
precise‘ distinctions for concepts. Derrida finds this criticism impossible to believe, 
 
What philosopher ever since there were philosophers, what logician ever since there were logicians, what 
theoretician ever renounced this axiom: in the order of concepts (for we are speaking here of concepts and 
not of the colors of clouds of the taste of certain chewing gums), when a distinction cannot be rigorous or 
precise, it is not a distinction at all. (1988: 123) 
 
(c) Searle argues that Derrida‘s distinction between the spoken and the written word is 
grounded in a confusion between the permanence of a text and the iterability of a text. 
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The relative permanence of a text distinguishes it from speech, but in both the spoken 
and the written word, it is the intention that grounds the meaning within a context. 
The fact that a written text is a permanent object is not the result of the possibility of 
its iterability or repetition since permanence and repetition are very different concepts 
 
[F]or the purpose of this discussion the most important distinguishing feature is the (relative) permanence 
of the written text over the spoken word…Now the first confusion that Derrida makes, and it is important 
for the argument that follows, is that he confuses iterability with the permanence of the text. He thinks the 
reason that I can read dead authors is because their works are repeatable or iterable. Well, no doubt the fact 
that different copies are made of their books makes it a lot easier, but the phenomenon of the survival of the 
text is not the same as the phenomenon of repeatability…this confusion of permanence with iterability lies 
at the heart of his argument…( in Derrida, 1998: 50-51) 
 
Derrida agrees that the survival of the text cannot be equated with repetition and this is 
because it is repetition or iterability that makes the survival of the text possible. When 
Searle talks of permanence, what he has in mind is the book as being the same book, as 
being a reproduction of the same. This is precisely what Derrida does not mean by 
iterability: iterability is repetition with the possibility of difference. It can be called a 
structural principle in the sense that it is the condition that makes both difference and 
sameness (or permanence) possible.  
 
(d) Searle‘s criticizes Derrida for denying that a written text can communicate an 
intention. The important point for Searle is that by understanding the intentions of the 
writer, by using the intentions as a kind of bench mark, one can resist the temptation 
to misinterpret the writer.  
 
The situation as regards intentionality is exactly the same for the written word as it is for the spoken: 
understanding the utterance consists in recognizing the illocutionary intentions of the author and these 
intentions may be more or less perfectly realized by the words uttered, whether written or spoken. (in 
Derrida, 1988: 26) 
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But this is not what Derrida claims: there is no question of denying the intentions of the 
speaker or the author but of whether these intentions can be completely accounted for in 
every context, since it is always possible for an intention to be interpreted otherwise. 
‗What the text questions is not intention or intentionality but their telos, which orients 
and organizes the movement and the possibility of a fulfillment, realization and 
actualization in a plenitude that would be present to and identical with itself‖ (1988: 56) 
Iterability is not opposed to intentionality but is rather the condition or the system that 
makes the communication of intentionality possible.  For Derrida the fact that language 
can function in different and unpredictable situations shows that an utterance can be 
understood without reference to the intentions of the person. There is a big difference, 
Derrida argues, between the assumption that readers need to posit some kind of 
hypothesis of intentionality to understand a text and a speech act theory that claims 
understanding necessitates the interpretation of an intended meaning. It is towards the 
latter that Derrida objects to.  
 
From Searle‘s point of view if one subscribes to the notion that communication is 
possible because humans have an innate competence to understand language then a 
written text can also draw upon the communicative competence of the reader to 
understand the intentions of the author as expressed in the text. 
 
Hearers are able to understand this infinite number of new things that can be communicated by speech acts 
because ―the speaker and hearers are masters of the sets of rules we call the rules of language, and these 
rules are recursive. They allow for the repeated application of the same rule‖ . (in Derrida, 1988: 27) 
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For Searle, it is these conventional rules of language that make it possible to retain the 
meaning intended despite the change of context. In other words, the repetitive power of 
language is what enables the illocutionary force (the intentions) to be ‗saved‘ even if the 
context of that utterance is different; this is why a text can be read for its intended 
conclusion even if the author is no longer alive.  
 
For Searle, ordinary language is the ideal medium for communicating the intentions of 
speakers or writers, with any possible obstacles to this communication as incidental. For 
Derrida it is the not a question of eliminating intentionality in the communication of 
meaning but rather a realisation that language itself as a medium has the potential to 
disrupt the speaker or writer‘s intentions. It becomes increasingly apparent from this 
exchange of ideas that the distance between the starting points of Searle as representative 
of the analytic practice of philosophy and Derrida as representative of the practice of 
deconstruction is further than imagined.  
 
Critical Remarks 
 
Derrida‘s challenge to western philosophy has not gone unnoticed. On the one hand, 
there are those (Rorty, Butler) who consider his undermining of the assumptions of 
western philosophy as a breath of fresh air, while, on the other hand, there are those 
(Searle, Quine, Chomsky) who consider him as nothing more than a charlatan. However, 
since the early reactions to Derrida there have been a number of re-evaluations of his 
work and though not all philosophers are persuaded by its value, an increasing number 
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are more sympathetic. A case in point is the publication by S.C. Wheeler called 
Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy (2000) and B. Stoker‘s Derrida on 
Deconstruction (2006) 
 
Since I have already described in detail Derrida‘s engagement with Searle on the 
questions of intentionality and communication, I will now present the views of Habermas 
and Gadamer. Habermas objects to Derrida‘s views insofar as they tend to dissolve the 
distinction between reason and rhetoric. Since, according to Derrida, there is no 
foundation (in the world or in the mind) to meaning then what makes a view or 
interpretation acceptable is its rhetorical force. Habermas counters this view by arguing 
that Derrida does not realise that there are different ways of using language: what 
Habermas has called, ‗the rationalisation of the lifeworld‘ (1987) entails the ability to 
recognise and use the different dimensions of language. Rather, Derrida confuses the 
descriptive or factual use with the poetic or disclosive use of language, in effect 
confusing philosophy with literature. In addition, Habermas (1988) also describes Derrida 
(and others) as a ‗young conservative‘ since by abandoning reason in favour of rhetoric, 
young conservatives renounce the possibility of improving things through rational 
argument and indirectly opening themselves up to manipulation.  
 
Gadamer‘s engagement with Derrida is not so much a confrontation but a rapprochement 
of hermeneutics with deconstruction. Gadamer‘s philosophical hermeneutics with its 
emphasis on dialogue and open-ness to the other requires a certain amount of good will, 
i.e., a willingness to reach out to understand others. Derrida is suspicious of the notion of 
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good will arguing that what is considered as good will is a disguised form of a good will 
to power, a will to appropriate others that is symptomatic of the western tradition. In line 
with his way of thinking about dialogue as the search for mutual ground, Gadamer 
modifies his claim that the understanding that philosophical hermeneutics seeks, is in 
fact, an understanding of that which is different and where the other can be right 
(Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989).   
 
Deconstruction has proved to be highly versatile offering insights into a number of 
subjects. In Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, (2000) Storey offers a deconstructive 
account of the film Dances with Wolves (1990). His starting point is that of highlighting 
the structures inherent within the film: East/West, civilization/savagery, and white/native 
Americans. The privileged term in all these oppositions is the one on the first and the film 
questions our assumptions of what is means to be civilised, for although the central figure 
in the film is a Lieutenant sent from the ‗civilised‘ East to the ‗savage‘ West, it turns out 
through the course of the film that the representatives of the civilised East (the U.S. 
cavalry) are more barbaric than the presumed ‗savage‘, Native Americans. However, 
what deconstruction does is not to merely reverse the priorities and suggest we start 
living in a natural Native American way; rather, it challenges or undermines the 
assumptions that we take on board when we describe our culture as ‗civilised‘. 
Deconstruction is a strategy of intervention for in the process of interpretation it does not 
leave the text and the concepts underpinning the text as they were; the process of reading 
a text in effect produces another one. 
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So too, Derrida‘s focus on writing has had the added benefit of inducing more scholars to 
re-thinking the value of writing, not merely as an ‗imitation‘ of speech, but as a form of 
communication that has greatly contributed to the development of western civilisation. 
Thompson (2003: 65-66), while acknowledging the work of Derrida, highlights the 
centrality of writing – in the narrow sense - in everyday life. When information is stored, 
its ‗permanence‘ acts as a ‗witness‘ to the possibility of (a) ‗inappropriate actions‘ taking 
place which acknowledges (b) a ‗failure to act‘ when, on the basis of that information, 
certain actions should have taken place and also to the possibility of (c) ‗complaints or 
litigation‘ where information that is incorrect can lead to legal action. 
 
In this chapter I have started (a) by examining Derrida theory of language and (b) 
proceeded to his discussion of the relation between the spoken and the written word as it 
is played out in a number of key texts. The next section (c) develops Derrida‘s views of 
language with the concept of differance and the final section (d) outlines Derrida‘s 
engagement with speech act theory and his discussion with John Searle.  
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What characterizes a dialogue, in contrast with the rigid form of statements that demand to be set down in 
writing, is precisely this: that in dialogue spoken language---in the process of question and answer, giving 
and taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each other‘s point---performs the communication of 
meaning that, with respect to the written tradition, is the task of hermeneutics. (1989: 368) 
 
 
Gadamer on Communication as Hermeneutics  
 
After a lengthy academic career Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) published Truth and 
Method (1989). It was the culmination of a lifetime‘s investigation into questions 
concerning interpretation. Theories of interpretation have been considered a peripheral 
area of study usually restricted to theology, law or literature departments. Since it is not 
always clear what certain texts or passages within these disciplines mean then the 
question of how to interpret them becomes a crucial one. Gadamer examines questions of 
textual interpretation in depth but this concern is ultimately connected to the view that 
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these questions help understand better the nature of human existence. His concern is 
ontological rather than epistemological. 
 
Questions concerning interpretation usually belong to the area known as hermeneutics
iv
: 
the word ‗hermeneutics‘ has an old history and its etymology is derived from the Greek 
word ‗hermeneium‘, meaning ‗to interpret‘. In classical mythology, Hermes was the 
messenger of the gods, and his function was that of bridging the world of the gods and 
the world of humanity since the language of the divine and the language of humanity 
differed radically. Irrespective of whether the gods told the truth or lied, Hermes would 
interpret and communicate their messages to humanity. His role was indispensable since 
it was the only way communication between the two separate worlds could be 
maintained.  
 
Gadamer‘s literary output is prolific, ranging from theoretical questions of interpretation 
to specific studies on philosophers such as Plato and Hegel, poets such as Celan. In this 
chapter I am focussing on the text that crowns Gadamer‘s academic career, Truth and 
Method (1989). Despite its title Gadamer has pointed out that the title is misleading for it 
suggests that the acquisition of truth is to be equated with the use of a particular method; 
it would have been better, he later suggests, to call it ‗truth against method‘ so as to show 
that there are other kinds of truth, truths that go beyond the narrow conception of truth as 
proposed by the methods of science
iv
. This explains why the first two sections of Truth 
and Method address questions of art and history respectively as central to his project in 
hermeneutics is the idea that truth also belongs to the domains of art and history. 
232 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
I open the chapter by (a) providing a lengthy overview of Gadamer‘s interpretation of the 
history of hermeneutics. This is followed by (b) his critique of science and (c) his 
retrieval of the concepts of prejudice and authority. The next sections examine (d) the 
centrality of understanding in hermeneutics and (e) the role of history in the constitution 
of the understanding together with the fusion of horizons. The last sections focus on 
Gadamer‘s concept of (f) dialogue and (g) language.  
 
1.0.The History of Hermeneutics. 
 
Gadamer‘s contribution to hermeneutics is not that of offering another theory of 
interpretation that is in competition with other rival theories of interpretation
iv
. 
Gadamer‘s hermeneutics is not just a technique for interpreting texts, but involves a much 
broader and therefore more philosophical account of human understanding. Hermeneutics 
is concerned with all human activities, from the sciences to the arts; these disciplines are 
concerned with the human attempt to understand the both world and humanity itself. And 
since all human understanding can only take place in language, the universality of 
language transforms hermeneutics into a philosophical discipline.  
 
For man‘s relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally verbal in nature, and hence intelligible. 
Thus, hermeneutics is, as we have seen a universal aspect of philosophy, and not just the methodological 
basis of the so-called human sciences. (1989: 475-6)  
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Given the importance of understanding to hermeneutics, Gadamer‘s point of departure is 
an interpretation of the history of hermeneutics so as to see the way understanding has 
been conceptualised.  
 
Before the nineteenth century, hermeneutics as a practice for the interpretation of texts 
was associated with Protestant theologians and their approach to the Sacred Scriptures. 
They were concerned with two problems: (a) for most of the time it was possible to 
understand the Scriptures without the need for hermeneutics, but there were times when 
hermeneutic procedures were necessary to prevent misunderstanding from taking place. 
Laying down guidelines for the correct interpretation of the Scriptures was considered 
important since it was believed that certain allegorical or vague passages in the Bible 
prevented the word of God from being correctly understood; (b) the true meaning of the 
Scriptures had been corrupted by the dogmas and the traditions of the Catholic Church. 
Protestant theologians argued that the meaning of the Sacred Scriptures could be 
understood on its own terms. This raised the further question that if the Scriptures could 
be read on their own, should they be read as a unified text, or as a number of texts written 
at different times with different goals in mind.  
 
Despite the differences in the methods of interpretation Protestant and Catholic 
theologians shared common round in that the whole point of interpretation is to focus 
attention on the truth claims made by the text. Protestant and Catholic interpreters were 
interested in the subject matter of the texts i.e., content, and not what they might tell us 
about their authors or about the historical context of their construction. Gadamer concurs 
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with this view as he is interested in what texts have to say to us, to teach us and the act of 
interpretation entails a conversation with the text itself, rather than the author. 
 
The first major shift in the history of hermeneutics occurs with Schleiermacher (1756-
1834) who broadened the concept of understanding from the interpretation of specific 
texts to interpretation in general. It was not a question of devising a specific hermeneutics 
for each of the disciplines, for biblical, legal or literary texts, but of creating a general 
hermeneutics, i.e., a theory of interpretation. ‗Hermeneutics as the art of understanding 
does not yet exist in a general manner, there are only several forms of specific 
hermeneutics‘ (in Lawn, 1998: 5). Hermeneutics as a discipline with its own identity and 
concerns was born.  
 
The starting point for Schleiermacher‘s general hermeneutics is that of centralizing 
misunderstanding in interpretation; misunderstanding is so frequent that it can even occur 
in those passages that do not seem to require interpretation. In this respect, he 
distinguished between two kinds of hermeneutical practice: the lax and the strict. The lax 
practice of hermeneutics is one where the basic assumption is that understanding is the 
norm so that hermeneutics is only necessary when misunderstanding takes place. The 
strict practice of hermeneutics assumes that misunderstanding is the norm: 
misunderstanding occurs because our prejudices or perspectives influence our 
interpretation. In this sense we misread the author by adding or excluding something that 
the author might have not intended. ‗For from now on we no longer consider the 
difficulties and failures of understanding as occasional but as integral elements that have 
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to be prevented in advance. Thus Schleiermacher even defines hermeneutics as ―the art of 
avoiding misunderstandings.‖ ‗(1989: 185)  
 
Although a theologian and translator of Plato, Schleiermacher was inspired by the 
Romanticist view that humanity needed to return to the emotional and religious sources 
of life; from a theological perspective, he wanted to return to the ‗special‘ feelings 
experienced by the early Christians as they received the gospel orally within their 
particular Hebraic context. To achieve this goal he meticulously studied the Greek texts 
of the New Testament to remove the layers of interpretations that had encrusted the 
original intentions of the author of the New Testament. What he discovered was that 
many rituals that were celebrated in the Roman cults of Christianity were not related to 
Jesus or to the Hebraic context, but to the Roman Empire. 
 
In order to reconstruct the original meaning of the text, Schleiermacher distinguished 
between the grammatical and psychological levels of the text. This distinction is 
necessary because there is a difference between the grammatical meaning (language) and 
the meaning the author intended (psychology) in the production of the text.  Since the 
author uses a language to communicate his/her thoughts, for the interpreter to understand 
him/her it is obvious that both must share the same language. In addition, since words in 
a language are interconnected and since one understands words and sentences in relation 
to other words and sentences, i.e. to the totality of language, the interpreter must not only 
understand the words used by the author, but also understand the way language as a 
whole was used at the time. Language pre-exists the thinker and conditions to a degree 
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his/her thoughts. The grammatical meaning can be understood through the rules of 
language, rules that are shared by a linguistic community. Understanding the grammatical 
meaning entails studying the language used at the time to uncover the historical 
sedimentation that that has accumulated on the text.  
 
On the other hand, a different approach is required to understand the psychology of the 
author.  Through his/her texts the author wants to communicate something different, a 
new thought that can be understood when placed in relation to the rest of his/her life. This 
level entails being able to understand the motivations and intentions of the author. This 
can be achieved through a process of empathy where one enters the mind of the author to 
be able to share the original experience that led him/her to produce their text. 
Understanding the psychology of the author means that one must also look at the life and 
times of the author, the historical context.  
 
Psychological interpretation involves a further distinction between discovering the 
thoughts of the author and examining the way these thoughts were expressed. The former 
is psychological while the latter is technical. To understand the subject-matter that the 
author is communicating it is necessary to see what it is about the subject that induced the 
author to think and write about it. Likewise, it is also necessary to see why the author 
selects a particular genre to communicate his/her thoughts together with the logical rules 
that connect the different thoughts of the author. Although the genres and logical rules 
are conventional they also contribute in helping to understand the thoughts of the author. 
The point in Schleiermacher‘s hermeneutics is that of entering the mind of the author; by 
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reconstructing the original context to discover the background elements of the author‘s 
life, Schleiermacher believed it was possible to understand the unique individuality of the 
author.  
 
The art of interpretation involves therefore the twin features of the grammatical and the 
psychological. Which of the two is given priority actually depends upon the interpreter: if 
the interpreter is interested in the way the language at the time influences the thoughts of 
the interpreter, then the emphasis will be upon the grammatical; if the interpreter is 
interested in the way the author uses language to communicate his/her thoughts, then the 
emphasis will be on the psychological. However, despite having more of an interest in 
one than in the other, the grammatical and the psychological cannot exclude each other 
completely.  
 
The hermeneutic circle or the part-whole relation of understanding is evident in 
Schleiermacher‘s account of the grammatical and the psychological.  
 
As the single word belongs in the total context of the sentence, so the single text belongs in the total context 
of a writer‘s work, and the latter within the whole of the particular literary genre or of literature. At the 
same time, however, the same text, as the manifestation of a creative moment, belongs to the whole of its 
author‘s inner life.  (1989: 291) 
 
Understanding an utterance depends upon understanding both the utterance in relation to 
the language as a whole and in relation to the author and his/her life as a whole (the social 
and historical context). But to know the whole it is necessary to know the parts (the 
utterances) that make up this whole: there is a to-and-fro movement between the parts 
and the whole. To know (for example)  the meaning of a text it is necessary to know the 
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culture within which the author lived; but to know the culture within which the author 
lived it is necessary to study the texts (including the author‘s) of that culture.  
 
Given the circular nature of understanding, the problem seems to be one of finding a way 
entering into this circle. Schleiermacher suggests that it is possible to enter the 
hermeneutic circle by first reading the text so as to get a rough idea of what it is about 
and with this rough idea subsequent readings serve to confirm and consolidate the main 
ideas. In short, the strategy is that of first going through the text to acquire familiarity 
with the ideas and then proceeding to the grammatical and psychological interpretations. 
The influence of Schleiermacher‘s hermeneutics was widespread but subsequent 
interpreters tended to emphasize the value of recreating the original creative moment of 
the author through the process of divination. The quest to enter the author‘s mind as the 
goal of interpretation led to the negation of the interpreter in the process of interpretation. 
 
Although Gadamer acknowledges the important role Schleiermacher played in the history 
of hermeneutics he takes issue with him on a number of points: (a) the emphasis on the 
author had the negative effect of ignoring the contribution of the interpreter to the extent 
that this contribution was considered problematic. In effect, the subjectivity of the 
interpreter was eliminated so that the subjectivity of the author could be highlighted; (b) 
Schleiermacher neglects the contribution of the text itself in the production of meaning: 
the language used in the text presents a vision of life and the world. The interpretation of 
a text is the result of the world view presented by the text in its interaction with the 
reader; (c) Schleiermacher‘s attempt to eliminate the gap between the past and the present 
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is solved by negating the present so as to return to the past; it is the distance between the 
past and the present that constitutes the problem for interpretation. Gadamer argues that 
this conception of hermeneutics is fundamentally flawed since it is this temporal distance 
that generates the interpretation. It is a mistake to think of a past ‗in itself‘, a past as it 
actually happened, a past that can be understood without the filter of the present. The idea 
that there is a past that can be faithfully reproduced and that can be returned to through 
the hermeneutic process is a relic of Romanticism that longed for a return to a golden 
past; (d) Gadamer is also critical of Schleiermacher‘s negative assessment of 
misunderstanding. He had argued that the task of hermeneutics was that of avoiding 
misunderstanding in order to let the original meaning and intention appear. Gadamer does 
not consider misunderstanding entirely in negative terms arguing instead that 
misunderstanding can also be productive in the sense that the misunderstanding of texts 
has also generated other interpretations. 
 
Gadamer sums up the problem with Schliermacher‘s hermeneutics as one that replaces 
the communication of truth with the communication of subjectivity: 
 
Schleiermacher‘s formula, as he understands it, no longer pertains to the subject matter under discussion; 
rather, he views the statement a text makes as a free production, and disregards its content as knowledge. 
Accordingly he organizes hermeneutics, which for him is concerned with understanding everything cast in 
language, according to the normative example of language itself. The discourse of the individual is in fact a 
free creative activity, however much its possibilities are limited by the fixed forms that language has taken. 
Language is an expressive field, and its primacy in the field of hermeneutics means, for Schleiermacher, 
that as an interpreter he regards the texts independently of their claim to truth, as purely expressive 
phenomena. (1989: 196) 
  
After Schleiermacher, the next major development in the history of hermeneutics came 
with the Historical School characterised by Ranke and Mommsen. These applied the 
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insights of Schleiermacher‘s hermeneutics to the study of history but this study was 
broadened to include not only texts but also artefacts and monuments. The Historical 
School was a reaction to the Hegelian interpretation of history as the unfolding of the 
Absolute Spirit; such metaphysical speculations were rejected outright and replaced by 
the view that historical texts should be read on their own terms. Objectivity was the 
desired goal and this entailed, according to Ranke, ignoring the present moment – with 
the beliefs, values and ideas of the time – to capture the spirit of the past. 
 
Following the Historical School, Gadamer turns to another leading figure in the history of 
hermeneutics, Dilthey (1833-1911). Dilthey was explicitly concerned with establishing 
the scientific and objective credentials of hermeneutics. He read the history of 
hermeneutics as the history of the progressive development of hermeneutics towards 
scientific objectivity and, with his hermeneutics he hoped to provide a method equivalent 
to the methods used in the natural sciences. The question he set himself mirrored the 
question asked by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. Just as Kant asked about the 
conditions that make objective scientific knowledge possible, likewise Dilthey wanted to 
know what the conditions that made objective knowledge of the human sciences possible. 
 
Dilthey distinguished between the knowledge derived from the natural sciences 
(chemistry, physics, biology, etc) and the knowledge derived from the human sciences 
i.e., the human spirit (philosophy, theology, sociology, politics, psychology, history and 
economics). The difference between these two sciences is grounded in terms of their 
goals: the natural sciences seek to explain, while the human sciences seek to understand. 
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The basis for the explanations of the natural sciences is that of causality. To say one 
knows something in the natural sciences means that one can establish a causal relation 
between the phenomena one is studying. This means that the study of science involves 
bringing these phenomena under laws. On the other hand, to know something in the 
human sciences requires understanding and this entails eliminating the interpreter from 
the process of the interpretation; objectivity in the human sciences requires that the 
historical situation of the interpreter be removed and that the object that is being studied 
is studied according to the spirit of its own age. Human life cannot be explained with the 
categories used in the natural sciences, since understanding human life requires an 
interpretation of the intentions, motivations and behaviour of humans: it is in this respect 
that Dilthey argues that hermeneutics was the method of the human sciences. However, 
despite the different methods used, Dilthey believed that the ultimate goal for both the 
natural and the social sciences was the same: objectivity. 
 
Gadamer considers Dilthey‘s hermeneutics as an advance upon Schleiermacher‘s 
hermeneutics since Dilthey replaces the psychology of the author with the category of life 
or lived experience. To understand life or lived experience in the present moment, 
Dilthey argued that it was necessary to understand the past as there was a continuity 
between both moments. The idea of life as a dynamic and ongoing force that lies at the 
basis of human culture was popular in the nineteenth century. Dilthey was explicit that 
his account of life should not be construed in strict biological terms but rather one that 
demonstrates the interconnection between the part and the whole, so that just as the part 
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is an expression of the whole of life, in a reciprocal manner, the whole determines the 
significance of the part. Gadamer writes,  
 
Like the coherence of a text, the structural coherence of life is defined as a relation between the whole and 
the parts. Every part expresses something of the whole of life ---i.e., has significance for the whole---just as 
its own significance is determined by the whole. It is the old hermeneutical principle of textual 
interpretation, and it applies to the coherence of life insofar as life presupposes a unity of meaning that is 
expressed in all its parts. (1989: 223-4) 
 
The present is the result of what happened before and the connection between the present 
and the past is mediated by the texts we have inherited. We can go back in time through 
the various interpretations of texts since interpretations of the present are the result of the 
interpretations that have preceded them i.e., through earlier interpretations. It should be 
pointed out that hermeneutics was not only concerned with literary texts but with all 
expressions of life – monuments, works of art, customs - as they are manifested. 
 
Gadamer objects to Dilthey‘s hermeneutics on the grounds that (a) if hermeneutics is the  
‗special‘ method that enables understanding in the human sciences, then this creates a gap 
between the understanding used in hermeneutics, and the understanding used in everyday 
life, as though understanding was not also a component of day to day living; (b) although 
the natural and the human sciences were both, according to Dilthey, concerned with 
attaining objectivity, the goals of the two disciplines are not the same since the human 
sciences are concerned with the motivation behind particular events whereas the natural 
sciences are concerned with universal or general laws. As a result, when Dilthey 
contrasted cultural understanding with scientific explanation, since the latter was 
privileged as the model for knowledge, cultural understanding was relegated to a 
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secondary and inferior position. What Dilthey failed to realise is that understanding is 
central to human existence and therefore takes place within a historical context. As a 
result, understanding at a particular moment entails the assumptions of the tradition to 
which a person belongs. 
 
Despite his criticism, Gadamer considers the principle of lived historical experience that 
underlies Dilthey‘s thought as a vitally important component for hermeneutics; from this 
principle he derived two notions, namely that human understanding is limited and finite, 
and that understanding can never be absolute in the same way as that of the natural 
sciences. 
 
The writings of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and especially, Being and Time (1962) 
play a central role in the development of Gadamer‘s philosophical hermeneutics. 
Heidegger transformed hermeneutics by shifting its emphasis from that of theorizing 
about interpretation to interpretation itself as the central feature of human life. 
Understanding and interpretation are not incidental features of human life but constitute 
the very nature of human existence. Heidegger is concerned with the way humans strive 
to understand the world through their interpretative activities. Instead of human 
existence, Heidegger introduces the term Dasein, translated as ‗being-there‘ and it 
captures the sense of human life as inextricably situated within the world: ‗[t]he 
phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, 
here it designates the business of interpreting.‘ (1962: 62) 
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Since the existence of Dasein unfolds within the world, it is therefore temporal and by 
this Heidegger includes both the past and the future: human existence is a ‗thrown 
projection‘ because Dasein is born into a world that is already there with its structures of 
significance and because it looks to the future with certain expectations. The 
understanding that Dasein can achieve is grounded in what Heidegger calls the ‗fore-
structures‘ of understanding i.e. a context of value and expectations. The fore-structures 
of understanding are what we inherit from the past and are born into, and given the world 
that Dasein is born into, certain possibilities for their future are available. Ultimately the 
understanding that Dasein seeks to find in life is also an understanding of itself because it 
concerns its own future possibilities.  
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger develops the notion of the hermeneutic circle (1962: 194-
5), and the circularity of understanding involved in everyday life. Since understanding is 
defined in terms of the projections of possibilities what Heidegger is offering is an 
existential account of understanding rather than a cognitive one.  Heidegger brings out 
three characteristics of the fore-structures of understanding: (a) as fore-having which 
means that we born into a world where objects already have significance. A hammer, to 
use Heidegger‘s example, shows that it has a significance within the world of the 
workshop prior to our existence; (b) as fore-sight where we understand something from a 
certain point of view, such as the need to fix the chair; and (c) as fore-conceptions where 
the hammer is interpreted as a tool that is used for the sake of something. In being used, 
the hammer stands out from its context of equipment even though it has significance 
within that context: when I see an object ‗as‘ a hammer, ‗[t]he ‗as‘ makes up the structure 
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of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation.‘ 
(1962: 189) The concept of fore-structures is crucial as it demonstrates first that there is 
no such thing as ‗pure‘ perception since perception is always already an interpretation, 
and second that there is a close connection between understanding and interpretation. 
 
The relationship between understanding and interpretation can be more clearly explicated 
in terms of Dasein‘s possibilities and actualizations. The mode of existence of Dasein is 
that of understanding its environment or world as a number of significant possibilities: in 
its everyday life Dasein encounters a number of possibilities so that (for example) a 
student has the possibility of going to class, to the library, to the bar, or just sitting idly 
only campus. This is why Heidegger writes that Dasein understands itself in terms of its 
projected possibilities: by project he does not mean having a plan in one‘s head but the 
world as a number of possibilities that are projected into the future. The concept of 
interpretation presupposes the concept of the understanding for while understanding 
relates to the environment as a whole, interpretation is specific. Thus, I interpret that 
building as a library because I already understand what the world of the university as an 
institution entails: lecture halls, the canteen, exams, friends, lecturers, computer labs and 
the library etc.  
 
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak throw a ‗signification‘ over some naked thing which is present-at-
hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing 
in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this 
involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation. (1962: 190-191) 
 
In Section 33 of Being and Time, Heidegger goes on to examine the movement from 
interpretation to assertion. Insofar as Dasein is involved in its everyday life, its relation to 
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objects is practical so that the student uses the library in order to research his 
assignments. In a situation where a student answers that he/she goes to the library to 
borrow books the student is now sharing his /her view of the library as a place with 
certain characteristics: it is an assertion. A transformation has taken place for instead of 
the library actually being used, it has now become an object of thought and is present to 
the person as having certain characteristics. Heidegger comments that the mode of being 
captured by the assertion has superseded the practical mode of being that participates in 
the world. 
 
Dasein is involved with and participates in the world that it interprets; it is no passive 
observer of the world. It is only because Dasein is a temporal being that has a past - is 
thrown - and has a future - projects possibilities – that Dasein can have the kind of 
existence it does. The point is that there is no such thing as pre-supposition less data of 
perception: I don‘t see a building as stones and concrete but as the library. The idea that 
perception is neutral is a chimera of modern science that hoped to acquire knowledge that 
was free of pre-judgments. This is an important point because it is here that Heidegger 
shows the mistake in thinking that knowledge and understanding is free of all contexts, or 
objective. But, although there is no such thing as purely objective knowledge in the 
modern scientific sense of non-prejudiced, this does not mean that Heidegger excludes all 
forms of objectivity. Rather interpretation is a process that follows the hermeneutic circle 
where ones presuppositions are challenged in the light of new information so that 
understanding is more thorough. It is ‗objective‘ in this sense.  
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Gadamer acknowledges the Heideggerian centrality of interpretation and expectation for 
human existence. The philosophical project of hermeneutics involves ‗working out 
appropriate projections anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed ―by the things themselves‖ 
(1989: 267). The search for meaning that Gadamer understood to be central to the 
hermeneutic project was always necessarily incomplete for two reasons: (a) the fact of 
human finitude or the limitations of human existence, and (b) the linguistic aspect of 
human existence. 
 
So too Gadamer agrees with Heidegger‘s opposition to Dilthey‘s notion of hermeneutics 
as the search for a method appropriate to the human sciences. Underlying this view is the 
assumption that the appropriate method will lead to objective interpretations. Heidegger 
and Gadamer both consider Dilthey‘s project a vestige of the Cartesian view of 
knowledge as objective. However, despite the rejection of objectivity, both argue that the 
interpretation of history, art, or of texts led to a form of understanding that was no less 
valid than that of the sciences.  
 
2.0. Science and Method. 
 
Gadamer‘s critique of science is directed at the idea that the truths of science do not 
represent the whole truth of the world and neither are they the only truths that one should 
look for. His analysis of the historical conditions that gave rise to the scientific method 
shows that there was another tradition that did not emphasize the methodology of science 
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but instead focussed on the tradition of history and culture. The domination of the 
scientific method resulted in the human sciences denying their own historical nature.  
 
Gadamer – following Heidegger and Husserl – rejects the modern Cartesian view that 
knowledge can only be obtained by eliminating all traces of subjective and cultural 
influences in order to find a ‗pure‘ starting point for knowledge. The Cartesian strategy is 
transcendental in the sense that it seeks to establish an ahistorical standpoint from which 
to operate. In a twist that shows the inherent contradiction of historicism, Gadamer 
argues that the desire to find an absolute standpoint for knowledge is itself the product of 
a particular historical situation. While the historicists of the nineteenth century recognised 
the historical foundations of all human life and knowledge, they still attempted to ground 
the human sciences in an epistemological method that would yield absolute knowledge. 
Gadamer points out that this is an impossible quest: we can only understand and acquire 
knowledge from where we are positioned at the moment.  
 
The general thrust of Gadamer‘s thinking is to encourage a return to humanistic concepts 
in education. The concepts of rhetoric, justice, common sense and taste are no longer 
considered part of a person‘s education because these are deemed to be subjective and 
therefore unable to provide any valid contribution to knowledge. There does not seem to 
be any place for these subjects in the contemporary world and are excluded from a 
person‘s education. In his attempt to reverse this way of thinking about education, 
Gadamer re-thinks the goal of education as bringing about cultural understanding.  
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3.0. Prejudice and Tradition 
 
The starting point for Gadamer‘s hermeneutics is the revival of the concept of prejudice 
which he defends against attempts to discredit it by the Enlightenment. For the 
Enlightenment, the only acceptable form of knowledge, of a belief, or of a practice was 
that which passed the standard of reason. Enlightenment thinking valorised rationality 
and opposed reason to the authority of the tradition and of the person.  
 
Gadamer‘s concept of prejudice is used in the sense of Heidegger‘s ‗fore-structures‘ or 
pre-judgements that are already ‗in place‘ before a judgment can be passed. Whenever 
understanding takes place there are prejudices in the background as part of the tradition 
within which we belong. It might seem that his use of the word prejudice to replace 
Heidegger‘s ‗fore-structure of understanding‘ is not such a good one as the word in 
English has several negative connotations so that a racist or sexist is a prejudiced person 
in that they judge others on the basis of their race or gender.  
 
But Gadamer is not using the concept of prejudice in this sense and to argue his case for 
the rehabilitation of the term, he reveals how the negative connotations have been 
historically derived. These negative connotations started with the Enlightenment when 
(Enlightenment) reason was opposed to (traditional) authority on the grounds that the 
latter passed judgements and maintained certain claims to knowledge and truth that could 
not be justified on rational grounds. In addition, Enlightenment thinkers favoured the 
superiority of present in the search for knowledge over the inherited wisdom of the past 
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that they considered unreliable. The authority of tradition had no rational justification and 
consequently, it was prejudiced to accept the wisdom of traditional authority. 
Paradoxically, this negatively evaluation was continued by the Romantics who - in 
reaction to the Enlightenment - were prejudiced in favour of the past over the present. But 
by simply reversing the polarities, they still remained within the same framework of 
thinking of that attributed negative connotations to prejudice. 
 
Gadamer‘s rehabilitates of prejudice and tradition consists of re-establishing their role in 
the understanding.  In defence of the authority of tradition against the Enlightenment, 
Gadamer argues that the contents of a tradition, having survived over time, prove 
themselves to be of value, and therefore provide a source of legitimate prejudices. This 
does not mean that what is of value in a tradition will remain so forever since it is always 
possible that the truths embodied in the tradition change. But these changes will in turn 
further the growth of the tradition. What this shows is that tradition preserves what is best 
and this explains why Gadamer thinks that the past still has something to teach us. So too, 
it shows that understanding is not something subjective occurring only in the mind of a 
person, but something that is shared: ‗[u]nderstanding is to be thought of less as a 
subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in 
which past and present are constantly mediated.‘ (1989: 290) 
 
In response to the Enlightenment mistrust of authority Gadamer argues that this is also 
mistaken for it assumes that authority is always oppressive. The Enlightenment 
conception of authority was one of blind obedience to a command, and in this sense it is 
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opposed to reason and freedom. But this is a corrupt version of authority. According to 
Gadamer, authority is not the expression of an irrationality, but rather the recognition of a 
person‘s capabilities.  When (for example) we are unwell we go to the authority in 
medicine, the doctor, to ask for help. In this situation, we recognise the doctor as the 
person who is superior to me in judgment and therefore overrides my judgement. There is 
therefore no contrast between reason and authority because seeking the authority is, in 
fact, the rational thing to do.  
 
Since we all belong to a particular context, we all inevitably carry with us a certain 
amount of cultural ‗baggage‘ or prejudices (our values, systems of belief and language) 
that make it possible for us to understand anything at all. These prejudices can be both 
conscious and unconscious, the latter operating without us being aware of their influence. 
We can, however become aware of their influence and transfer our unconscious 
prejudices into the domain of reflective consciousness. Since these prejudices are the 
product of our social and cultural education as part of our belonging to a society, it is 
evident that they are an inherent part of us, constituting our being. Gadamer writes, ‗That 
is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgements, constitute the 
historical reality of his being.‘ (1989: 276-7) The prejudices that are the result of our 
historical situation are not an obstacle to understanding but prepare the way for it.  
 
In everyday life, Gadamer accepts Husserl‘s claim that perception is never neutral but 
always involves the projection of a meaning, a meaning that is strictly speaking not found 
in the perception, ‗Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially 
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reduce phenomena. Perception always includes meaning.‘(1989: 92) The same occurs in 
textual interpretation: to be able to understand a text involves projecting its meaning on 
the basis of the evidence that one has, so that, for example, the title and the author 
indicate (as a starting point) what the text is about. The expectations of meaning a reader 
has of the text are the necessary preconditions or prejudices that enable him/her to read 
the text; obviously, the reader‘s understanding of the text can change as the reader 
proceeds through the text.  The encounter with the text therefore entails the projection or 
expectation of meaning, which (upon detailed examination) either confirms or highlights 
the need to revise one‘s prejudices.  
 
Gadamer‘s concept of prejudice can be seen in the process of interpreting texts where the 
hermeneutic circle operates since when we read, we project a meaning onto the parts that 
are in turn related to the whole. The assumption behind this way of thinking is that the 
text forms an internal unity that Gadamer calls the ―fore-conception of completeness‖. 
This functions as a regulative ideal that guides our reading by setting a standard by which 
we can accept or reject an interpretation. The standard implicit in the interpretation of a 
text is the standard of truth and coherence. It is only because we assume that a text is true 
that the prejudices we carry with us can be challenged. ‗It is impossible to make 
ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed, but only when it 
is, so to speak, provoked.‘ (1989: 299) 
 
Dropping this standard exposes the interpreter to the impossible situation of not knowing 
whether it is the text itself that is inconsistent or whether it is the interpreter who is 
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unable to understand the text. Gadamer‘s position is that since the text has something to 
teach us it should be given precedence over the interpreter: the text is the ‗authority‘ of a 
subject, offering something different to say to its readers. If the text did not have this 
priority, then interpretation would merely consist in confirming the reader‘s view, a view 
that is could possibly be mistaken.  
 
There can be no question of eliminating one‘s prejudices, but rather a recognition of their 
presence. This recognition necessitates realising that the starting point of interpretation is 
self-interpretation. By recognising that we are prejudiced, it becomes possible to 
understand the subject matter in relation to oneself. This is an important step in that it 
serves as a limit to the always present possibility that our prejudices are mistaken. The 
consequences of realising the prejudicial nature of our understanding is that: (a) our 
prejudices are subjected to a critical analysis that will allow the text to disclose its truth; 
and (b) there can never be a total elimination of prejudices that would enable the ‗pure‘ 
meaning to shine out. Just as the understanding of a word takes place because it is located 
within the larger sentence, likewise, the understanding of a text takes place because the 
text can be located within the context of a tradition. Since the tradition includes all the 
interpretations that have been generated and transmitted over time, then a crucial feature 
of the interpretation of a text also includes all the previous interpretations of the text. In 
the relation between the interpreter and the text, Gadamer argues that the tradition offers 
a standard of truth. In the interaction between the interpreter and the tradition it might be 
happen that some feature of the tradition is changed or re-valued and what was 
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considered important loses its stature: the tradition - while providing a standard - is 
dynamic and ongoing. 
 
It is often the case that we take our prejudices for granted considering them to be the right 
ones. This is a mistaken assumption that Gadamer seeks to highlight: the goal of his 
philosophical hermeneutics is to find a way of distinguishing between legitimate and 
illegitimate prejudices. The one possible help in assessing the prejudices of our 
predecessors is what Gadamer calls ‗temporal distance‘. With the passage of time we can 
look back at the past and identify those prejudices that were legitimate from those that 
were illegitimate. ‗Often temporal distance that can solve the question of critique in 
hermeneutics namely, how to distinguish the true prejudices, by which we understand, 
from the false ones, by which we misunderstand.‘ (1989: 298-299) In the distance 
between the text and the present other interpreters have been at work and through their 
work understand why a work has value.  By way of example, Schmidt writes that 
‗changes in our understanding of the world may allow Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics to 
be read with greater insight today that in the Middle Ages. ‗(2006:104) 
 
4.0. Understanding  
 
One could say that the starting point for Gadamer‘s concept of understanding is a 
retrieval of the Pre-Romantic views of hermeneutic theorists such as Spinoza and 
Chaldenius who considered the content of certain texts – the Sacred Scriptures – to be 
communicating the truth. To understand these texts is to understand the truth of their 
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content just as (for example) understanding Euclidean geometry involves understanding 
the truths of geometry
iv
. This view is very different from that of the Romantic theorists 
who argued that understanding a text was a question of understanding the creative genius 
of the author which led to a search for the authors‘ intentions: ‗understanding means, 
primarily, to understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to isolate and 
understand another‘s meaning as such.‘ (1989: 294) Understanding and truth are 
interconnected in that to understand a text is to agree on the content and this agreement is 
what Gadamer considers the truth. 
 
By focussing upon the truth claims of the text, Gadamer is able to displace the emphasis 
of hermeneutics away from understanding meaning in terms of what the author intended. 
This latter view is the source of much controversy since understanding the meaning of a 
text entails that one must ‗exit‘ the text to discover the author‘s intentions or the reasons 
as to why he/she wrote what he/she did. This procedure usually involves examining the 
biographical, psychological or historical conditions that constitute the background of the 
author. This view assumes that because the reader cannot see the point of what the author 
is saying, then the only way to understand this text is by referring to the circumstances 
surrounding the author‘s life. Gadamer rejects what he calls the ‗genetic‘ explanation of 
meaning, arguing that this explanation only comes about when the attempt to understand 
the content fails: ‗[i]t is only when the attempt to accept what is said as true fails that we 
try to ―understand‖ the text, psychologically or historically, as another‘s opinion.‘ 
(1989:294)  
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Understanding the meaning of a text is not the possession of either the writer or the 
reader but a mutual process in which both participate in since they both share the same 
language of the text. To highlight this point, Gadamer compares the process of 
understanding with that of playing games. When a person plays a game, he/she enters the 
world of the game: his/her private goals and purposes are set aside so as to follow the 
rules that enable the game to be played. The game takes over the person‘s life so that it, 
so to speak, allows itself to be played: ‗The real subject of the game (this is shown in 
precisely those experiences in which there is only a single player) is not the player but the 
game itself.‘ (1989: 106). The importance of this point is that the game imposes its rules 
on the players and this means that it imposes its authority on the players. And just as a 
game follows rules, language is governed by rules that are socially formulated so there 
can be no communication and understanding that does not abide by these rules. The 
process of understanding texts is similar in that the texts belong to a tradition that 
imposes its authority upon the interpreter by making certain claims. In arguing for the 
predominance of the tradition over the person, Gadamer is reiterating his critique of 
subjectivism in interpretation since understanding and interpretation are not something 
solitary that take place in the subject but constitute the participation within the tradition. 
 
A crucial aspect of Gadamer‘s account of the concept of understanding is that all 
understanding is situated. This means that the position of the interpreter must be taken 
into consideration.  Understanding something depends upon the interests and focus of the 
interpreter, an interest that might not have been the concern of either the author or of his 
contemporary reading public. Warnke points out,  
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My understanding of Shakespeare‘s Hamlet may be connected to my understanding of psychological issues 
and existential themes. These may not be issues or themes that motivated Shakespeare himself; neither are 
they ones of which his public was necessarily aware or of ones that will necessarily always orient the 
understanding of the play. Nevertheless these issues and themes help determine both the meaning the play 
can have for me and, indeed, the way in which I understand Shakespeare‘s intentions. (1987: 74) 
 
There is a further broadening of Gadamer‘s account of understanding. When the 
nineteenth century emphasized the value of method, it had created a distinction between 
understanding and application. The goal of nineteenth century hermeneutics was that of 
understanding a meaning ‗in itself‘, with this understanding has subsequently applied to 
particular situations. In the field of jurisprudence an attempt was made to first understand 
the law, and then to apply it to the case at hand; or in the field of theology when an 
attempt was first made to understand the meaning of a passage from the Scriptures, and 
later this was applied to the situation at hand.  
 
Gadamer argues that the distinction between understanding and application is untenable: 
understanding always involves application since the attempt to understand something 
entails applying a meaning to our context. When we try to understand something, we are 
part of the equation, carrying ourselves along in the flow of meaning. The concept of 
application is important since it is what enables the interpreter to project the meaning of 
the text; it is because one applies the text to one‘s situation that one is able to project a 
meaning to the text in the first place. Application is an inherent part of the process of 
understanding not an optional and additional extra, ‗Application does not mean first 
understanding a given universal in itself and then afterward applying it to a concrete case.  
It is the very understanding of the universal – the text – itself‘ (1989: 341). 
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Understanding involves the application of a universal to a particular situation, to the 
horizon of the interpreter. But it is not a question of having a pre-given universal and then 
applying it to a text: it is in the application itself that the universal is realised so that the 
meaning of the text is realised in the fusion between the interpreter and the text.  
 
The model that Gadamer uses (1989: 317-324) to describe the process of application is 
the one proposed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics who shows how universal 
ethical norms require deliberation so that they can be applied to concrete and particular 
situations. The Aristotelian model shows that it is not enough to have abstract guiding 
principles in ethics without a consideration of how these principles connect with practical 
life. When it comes to the concepts of courage or of right, it is not enough to understand 
what these concepts mean but rather a question of seeing how they can be relevant or are 
applicable to the particular situation. This highlights the fundamental difference between 
Plato and Aristotle: Plato sought a theoretical understanding of the Form of the Good, 
whereas Aristotle asked what the good was for man within a context. Understanding 
norms without knowing how to use them is useless; it is not enough to know that in 
principle one should be good to others; it is more important to know when to be good to 
specific people in specific situations
iv
.  
 
To summarize, if we relate Aristotle‘s description of the ethical phenomenon and especially the virtue of 
moral knowledge to our own investigation, we find that his analysis in fact offers a kind of model of the 
problems of hermeneutics. We too determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an 
occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning. 
Here too application did not consist in relating some pregiven universal to the particular situation. The 
interpreter dealing with a traditionary text tries to apply it to himself. (1989: 324) 
 
259 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
There are three points that Gadamer‘s textual practice derives from Aristotle: (a) the 
application of the text to the particular situation is part of, and brings out, the potential 
meaning of the text; in interpreting a text from the past the new circumstances could not 
have been imagined by the author and yet the interpreter projects the meaning of the legal 
text to the new circumstances; (b) the application of the text to the contemporary situation 
is not one that can be predicted in the manner of a law-like deduction; the interpreter 
must apply what the original author said to the present situation even though the original 
author did not know the future possible applications of the text; (c) the application of the 
text to the new circumstances should be guided by a principle of charity whereby the best 
of what the text has to say is brought out.  
 
Gadamer demonstrates his arguments on the importance of application by offering as 
examples (1989: 324-341) the process involved in the interpretation of legal or 
theological texts. From legal hermeneutics he describes the position of the judge and the 
legal historian: in the case of the judge, when he passes a judgement, he must apply the 
‗old‘ law to the present situation even if the lawgiver had not considered the current 
situation in formulating the law. In the case of the legal historian, in the process of 
understanding the ‗old‘ law, it is not enough to understand the original situation when the 
law was created because an essential part of understanding the law involves 
understanding how the law has been applied and how it has developed over time. These 
developments are part of the potential meaning of the law. It is the same with the 
interpretation of the scriptures: the priest who reads the Sacred Scriptures to prepare his 
homely must take into account his contemporary audience. The homily must be relevant 
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to the lives of the listening audience so that the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures 
includes its application to the current situation. 
 
The importance of Gadamer‘s identification of understanding with application is apparent 
in that it explains the relationship between truth and the interpreter. The truth that the 
tradition communicates is not a timeless truth that one blindly accepts but is, rather, a 
truth applied to the situation of the interpreter. The tradition is the framework or a 
standard with which to approach the text, a framework or standard that enables the 
interpreter to distinguish interpretations from misinterpretations. Warnke describes this 
process: 
 
…whether we are familiar with the literature on Shakespeare‘s work or not we approach his work in a way 
influenced by a tradition of Shakespeare interpretation so that we assume its excellence, importance and so 
on. But, just as we cannot apply ethical norms categorically we cannot adhere to a tradition of interpretation 
dogmatically. Rather, in approaching Shakespeare from the perspective of changed historical 
circumstances, we necessarily modify and extend the traditional way in which the excellence and 
importance of his work has been understood. (1987: 96) 
 
5.0. Effective History and the Fusion of horizons 
 
In order to explain the importance of tradition upon the interpreter Gadamer introduces 
the concept of effective history. Effective history has a dual structure:  on the one hand it 
involves the effects of history upon the interpreter i.e., the prejudices that influence 
him/her consciously or unconsciously, while on the other hand, it also includes the 
awareness of the interpreter that there are historical forces influencing him/her, 
‗Understanding proves to be a kind of effect and knows itself as such. (1989: 341) 
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The concept of effective history also shows why there can never be an understanding of 
the past ‗in itself‘. Any understanding of the past - whether as an event or a text - entails 
understanding the effects upon the interpreter. For Gadamer, these effects are not 
something external to the phenomena being studied but an essential aspect of it, so much 
so, that it is these effects that reveal or disclose its true significance. Whereas events in 
the natural world are causally connected, understanding an event or a text requires 
interpretation. But understanding an event or text involves understanding the history of 
their interpretations. This highlights the embedded situation of the interpreter since he/she 
is not neutral or detached from the context but a part of it. The tradition of a text is the 
history of its interpretations; our interpretation of a text is therefore conditioned by the 
prejudices that we have inherited from the tradition.  
 
The ‗power‘ of effective history is such that although we are aware of its influence on our 
understanding, we can never grasp or master it completely.  When the historicist school 
in nineteenth century attempted to eliminate all traces of the interpreter‘s historical 
context so as to produce objectivity in history, they failed to realise that this same attempt 
was a product of their own historical situation.  
 
Even in those masterworks of historical scholarship that seem to be the very consummation of the 
extinguishing of the individual demanded by Ranke, it is still an unquestioned principle of our scientific 
experience that we can classify these works with unfailing accuracy in terms of the political tendencies of 
the time in which they were written. When we read Mommsen‘s History of Rome, we know who alone 
could have written it, that is, we can identify the political situation in which this historian organized the 
voices of the past in a meaningful way. (Gadamer, 1976: 6) 
 
The effect of history upon the reality of human existence is always greater than our 
consciousness; and even if we recognise the power of effective history, this power is in 
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no way diminished and this explains why it is always possible to subject an interpretation 
to revision. 
 
The centrality of the concept of effective history in Gadamer‘s writings is such that it 
would be mistaken to think of it as relevant only to the philosophy of history or to the 
study of the past; this would only suggest that we are conscious of our historical situation 
as we read the past. Gadamer‘s account is deeper in that all understanding is affected by 
history because history takes place within the broader context of the tradition within 
which we are situated
iv
. This is why he emphatically writes, ‗[u]nderstanding is, 
essentially, a historically effected event.‘ (1989: 300).  
 
Central to Gadamer‘s concept of understanding is the concept of horizon, a concept 
derived from the Husserlian account of perception but transformed into an account of 
understanding that is re-located to the broader context of horizons of significance. The 
horizon (or lifeworld) is the world within which we live and it encompasses the values, 
systems of belief, customs, social practices, and rituals of a culture. A horizon offers a 
perspective of the world viewed from a particular point. The concept of horizon is a 
fruitful way of describing the complete set of prejudices that constitute the world of the 
individual. A language is such a horizon and different cultures with their different 
languages offer different horizons. And just as a physical perspective excludes certain 
features of the terrain from its range, likewise a language or a horizon allows certain 
things to be revealed while other things remain hidden. Revelation and limitation are the 
characteristics of both a language and a horizon.  
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Interpretation involves the twin horizons of the interpreter and of the text. The mistake of 
the nineteenth century historicists was that of ignoring the horizon of the interpreter 
which was judged as having no contribution to make toward the production of meaning. 
The idea was that to understand the past it was necessary to leave behind one‘s horizon 
(with the issues and prejudices that constitute it) and enter the horizon of the past. But 
eliminating the interpreter would only result in adopting what the author has said rather 
than agreeing with the truth content of the text.  And even if we wished to eliminate the 
interpreter from the process of understanding this would be an impossible task because 
the horizon of the interpreter is not something that just happens to be there, something 
incidental that can be removed. Horizons are an essential part of the interpreter‘s identity 
because it is the prejudices of the interpreter that make any understanding possible. 
Finally, the horizon of the interpreter is important because the text communicates or has 
something to say to the interpreter now, in the present world.   
 
In the interpretative process, an encounter occurs between the horizon of a text and the 
horizon of the interpreter. ‗Understanding is always inevitable for a subject as much as it 
is of some object…‘ (West, 1996: 108) Gadamer‘s expression ‗fusion of horizons‘ is 
intended to capture this ongoing process in the production of meaning: he calls the 
interaction between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter an event of 
understanding that enables communication to take place. Although the interpreter 
anticipates the meaning of the text on the basis of his/her prejudices, the encounter with 
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the prejudices of the text generates a new interpretation, ‗understanding is always the 
fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.‘ (1989: 306)  
 
The fusion of horizons is also one way of reacting to the claim made by relativists that 
each horizon is a self-enclosed world with no possibility of contact and communication. 
Gadamer argues that just because understanding takes place within a horizon, this does 
not exclude the possibility - as Rorty does - of understanding between horizons taking 
place. The ‗borderline‘ between horizons is not rigid but allows for movement between 
them: while we realise that there are differences between horizons, mutual understanding 
involves merging these differences rather than abandoning them.  
 
Given that the fusion of horizons involves the horizon of the interpreter and the horizon 
of the text Gadamer argues that there is no standard that enables one to judge an 
interpretation as better or worse. Rather, understanding can only be considered as 
different: understanding a text involves understanding what the text has to say, and what 
it has to say to me in my particular situation. However, the emphasis on the application to 
the particular situation should not be interpreted as implying a subjectivist or private 
concept of the understanding since Gadamer considers understanding to be something 
public, an event that belongs to the happening of the tradition. The truths that texts 
communicate are not truths in-themselves, truths that eternally represent an unchanging 
object, but rather they are true to a community of interpreters, true from the point of view 
of the community of interpreters rather than the individual.  
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The concepts of effective history and the fusion of horizons go hand in hand.  In the 
encounter between the horizon of the interpreter and the horizon of the text, the 
consciousness of the effects of history by the interpreter helps in the formation of critical 
judgements and in maintaining or eliminating prejudices. Clearly, the interpreter is not a 
passive recipient locked in his/her horizon of prejudices. The text - with its horizon - has 
the potential to disrupt the prejudices of the interpreter. What is taken for granted can be 
challenged and subsequently modified or rejected. But whether prejudices are modified 
or not, the new interpretation is the product of the fusion of horizons and with it the 
tradition continues to reproduce itself. 
 
6.0. Dialogue. 
 
The model for the understanding that takes place in the fusion of horizons is that of a 
dialogue or conversation where the goal is to understand the truth of the subject-matter or 
the content that the text is communicating. It is not a conversation that is intended to find 
something about the psychology of the other person or the context of the other, but to 
agree on the subject-matter. This agreement on the subject-matter is an agreement that is 
concerned with truth.  
 
Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true conversation that 
each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transpose himself in the 
other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to be 
grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one with each other on the subject. 
(1989: 385) 
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In the understanding or dialogue that takes place between the interpreter and the text, it is 
not the case of an interpreter projecting a meaning onto a (now) meaningless past, but on 
the contrary, of the past speaking to the present through the text. The fusion of horizons 
describes the process whereby the horizon of the text speaks to the horizon of the 
interpreter. While the horizon of the past imposes itself and communicates its truth to the 
interpreter, since the horizon of the interpreter changes with different historical periods, 
there can never a final objective meaning. The emphasis is on ‗different‘: for Gadamer, 
the successive interpretations cannot be called ‗better‘ because different historical 
situations can only produce varied interpretations. There is no point outside history from 
which to judge whether one interpretation is better than another. Those interpretations 
that are false have not withstood the text of time. Tradition as the preservation and 
transmission of what is true eliminates those prejudices that are false or illegitimate. 
Although there is no in-itself of meaning of a text, the opposite conclusion – that each 
meaning is subjective or that each interpretation is a misinterpretation – is likewise 
mistaken. For Gadamer, each interpretation belongs to the potential interpretations of a 
text, ‗the verbal explicitness that understanding achieves through interpretation does not 
create a second sense apart from that which is understood and interpreted.‘ (1989: 398) 
 
The otherness of the text puts into sharp relief our assumptions and prejudices by 
challenging them. It is the difference in time between the production of a text and the 
world of the interpreter that enables a new interpretation is generated. The point of the 
interpretation is not that of travelling to the past world when the text was produced, but to 
learn from the text, to discover the truths that the tradition has to communicate. And as 
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the tradition unfolds new insights are discovered; the text reveals or discloses new 
meanings that would not have been previously noticed. The distance in time between the 
production of the text and its reception by the interpreter is one of the means that enables 
one to judge between legitimate and illegitimate prejudices. Warnke writes, 
 
…our understanding of Mark Twain‘s Huckleberry Finn may differ from Twain‘s understanding of it or the 
understanding of it by his immediate public. Because of our heightened awareness of racial stereotyping we 
may find the portrait of Jim more problematic that people did at the time that the book appeared and this 
may affect our understanding of the content of the book as a whole. ...Understanding is primarily an 
understanding of the claim a work of art imposes on us and this means that we understand a work in its 
relevance to our own situation. That situation does not affect simply the significance of a work but rather 
enters into the interpretation of meaning itself, into what is shocking, what is unclear and into what the 
work ―really‖ says. (1987: 68) 
 
Gadamer describes the process of understanding and application by using the model of 
dialogue defined in terms of question and answer. The meaning we are trying to 
understand is the answer to our question and the process of interpretation and 
understanding is formulated in terms of a dialogical situation, ‗[F]or the dialectic of 
question and answer that we demonstrated makes understanding appear to be a reciprocal 
relationship of the same kind as conversation.‘ (1989: 377) Some might argue that in 
dialogue we exert out ‗power‘ over the other, seeking to dominate or criticize them. This 
is not Gadamer‘s view for rather than confrontation Gadamer seeks mutual 
understanding. This is why he distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic dialogue. 
Authentic dialogue is concerned with listening to what the other has to say while 
inauthentic dialogue is concerned with being right, with ‗winning‘.  
 
In everyday life, a conversation has a life of its own with no pre-established objective that 
the conversation must arrive at. The interesting feature of the nature of dialogue is that a 
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dialogue always has a temporary ending: it can be picked up and continued another day. 
So too, dialogues are not structured conversations in the sense that topics should follow a 
rigidly scripted sequence. Gadamer‘s description of a dialogue as something that happens 
to us is brought home when we recall conversations over the phone with our friends. 
Many times we are amazed at the range of topics that we have spontaneously spoken 
about changing from a serious point to a silly one with ease.  
 
But the central issue for Gadamer is the conversation itself rather than the subjectivity of 
the participants. In our conversations with the other, the subject matter comes more fully 
into the forefront, and as a result, a better understanding of it takes place. ‗What emerges 
in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and hence so far transcends the 
interlocutors‘ subjective opinions that even the person leading the conversation knows 
that he does not know.‘ (1989: 368) In a conversation both participants belong to the 
bigger issue of the subject that is being spoken about, something that escapes their 
possession and which opens them up to each other. 
 
There are parallels between the conversations we have in everyday life and the 
interpretations of texts. In the case of both, we are mistaken if we think that the 
participants are either in control of the conversation with each other or in control of the 
meaning of the text. The difference between them is that with texts it is through the 
interpreter that the voice of text is made brought out  
 
Only through him [the interpreter] are the written marks changed back into meaning. Nevertheless, in being 
changed back by understanding, the subject matter of which the text speaks itself finds expression. It is like 
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a real conversation in that the common subject matter is what binds the two partners, the text and the 
interpreter, to each other. (1989: 387-8) 
 
To explain the dynamics involved in the interpretation of texts, Gadamer approves of the 
method suggested by R.G. Collingwood who is credited with introducing the expression 
‗the logic of question and answer‘. He used this expression to argue that understanding a 
text is not the result of assessing its internal logic, but rather as an answer to a question. 
Collingwood argued that the ‗context‘ surrounding the text should be acknowledged: the 
motivations, concerns and historical issues within which the author is situated contribute 
to the meaning of the text. While it is not possible to enter the author‘s mind, it is 
necessary to understand the background context within which he/she worked. By 
understanding the issues that were at stake it is possible to achieve a more complete 
understanding of the text. Interpretation involves retrieving the questions that made the 
text possible as an answer to certain questions. 
 
However, while Gadamer considered Collingwood‘s position as an advance upon 
previous attempts that judged texts merely according to the binary logic of true and false 
values, Collingwood failed to realize that the other pole in interpretation is that of the 
interpreter, who is also a product of a historical situation. What this means is that the 
interpreter must also be taken into consideration since the questions asked of the text are 
relevant to the present day situation of the interpreter. As a result of the dynamic 
interaction between the interpreter and the text both the questions and answers change. 
The text is not a passive, ‗dead‘ object with a meaning waiting to be discovered by the 
interpreter, and neither is the text merely the projected meaning of the interpreter. Rather, 
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the process of question and answer is mutual: the text also confronts or questions the 
interpreter while the interpreter also directs questions towards the text in the search for 
answers 
 
There are two questions
iv
 that one might ask initially but these two questions merge into 
each other. In the first case, it is the interpreter who is asked a question: ‗[t]he voice that 
speaks to us from the past – whether text, work, trace – itself poses a question and places 
our meaning in openness.‘ (1989: 374). Something from the past speaks to the interpreter 
who turns to the text to see what it has to say about the subject. But to answer the 
question that the text poses to the interpreter, the interpreter needs to look for the question 
that the text itself is an answer to. In the process of reconstructing this question, the other 
interpretations of the text that belong to the tradition cannot be ignored; the interpreter is 
aware of these as he/she formulates the question from the context he/she is situated in. as 
we have already see, understanding a text involves its application to the interpreter:  
‗reconstructing the question to which the meaning of a text is understood as an answer 
merges with out own questioning. For the text must be understood as an answer to a real 
question.‘ (1989: 374) The two questions merge into one and the fusion of questions is a 
re-statement of the fusions of horizons. Understanding is ‗the interplay of the movement 
of tradition and the movement of the interpreter.‘ (1989: 103). Schmidt describes this 
movement, 
 
One example of the movement of tradition is the different ways that Plato‘s Republic has been found to 
have something illuminating to say in the course of its preservation within tradition. The movement of the 
interpreter includes not only the reading of the original text but also an examination of that reading in light 
of other interpretations of Plato and the goal of establishing a unity of meaning for the text. The tradition, 
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as inherited language, provides for the anticipation of meaning, while the interpreter, through her critical 
judgement, continues to form tradition. (2006: 103) 
 
This explains why different periods and different individuals find different answers to 
their questions. Again, the idea that there are ‗different‘ interpretations might easily lead 
some to think that an interpretation is purely subjective. This is not Gadamer‘s position: 
even when we think that an interpretation is completely our own i.e., that we decide what 
the text means because we are in control of its meaning, there is a historical process 
always already affecting us. Before we start to interpret, the tradition pre-exists us: others 
have already been engaged in a dialogue with it and our interpretations are continuations 
of that dialogue, which we modify, elaborate or reject. In turn, our interpretations become 
an ongoing part and continuation of the tradition itself. The dialogical process that takes 
place with the tradition within which we belong enables us to become aware of our 
prejudices i.e., out assumptions and value-judgements. Although these operate, so to 
speak, ‗behind our backs‘ they can be made known to us and they therefore are a valuable 
and positive contribution to understanding and self-understanding 
 
For Gadamer, it is the spoken word that must be re-vitalised. In the dialogue with the text 
the written word must speak again. However, although Gadamer favours the spoken word 
he is not (pace Derrida) trying to reinstate the ‗metaphysics of presence‘ that Derrida 
claims is the founding error of western philosophy. The nature of writing is that it is 
‗alienated‘: writing is alienated from speech and the task of hermeneutics is to transform 
it back to a living dialogue. The way to do this is not to think of the text as having a 
‗fixed‘ and stable meaning but rather as the product of a dialogue between reader and 
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text. Meaning is always tentative and successive generations will produce different 
interpretations of the same text. Or better still, the text will speak differently to different 
generations. This is why although understanding can be complete, it can never be final 
since there will always be the changing horizon of the interpreter in dialogue with the 
text. The difference between the spoken word and the written word is that the latter has 
broken free of the limitations of the space and time of its production and acquired a 
relative permanence within the tradition. The subject matter or what the text is about is 
the common element between the text and the interpreter so that the task of the interpreter 
is to make the text speak again.  
 
The difference between an actual dialogue and a textual dialogue is that in the case of the 
latter the interpreter must bring the text to communicate what it has to say, its truth 
claims. When the interpreter interacts dialogically with the text, he/she listens to what the 
text has to say using the principle of charity to adopt and develop the claims made by the 
text to see if they challenge his/her prejudices. To understand what the text has to say 
involves the interpreter applying his/her own understanding through the medium of 
language to the language of the text. Just as language is the medium through which 
humans understand each other, understanding a text replicates the dialogical model of 
mutual understanding. It is with and through language that the text can speak to the 
interpreter so that an understanding about the subject matter can be agreed upon. An 
illuminating way of understanding Gadamer‘s hermeneutic enterprise is that of 
translation where a speaker must translate what the other has said into his/her own 
language: to understand what the other has said it is necessary to apply what the other has 
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said to the speaker‘s own language. Translation involves understanding as application 
and the speaker has understood what the other has said when they agree on the content 
that they have been communicating.  
 
The relationship between the interpreter and the text can be characterised in three 
possible ways (1989: 358-360): (a) as an object that can be subsumed under general laws 
and that therefore can be predicted: this is the method associated with the natural sciences 
where the interpreter can objectively describe what the text says; (b) as a person, but with 
the qualification that the interpreter can understand the author better than the author could 
understand him/herself; (c) as an Other that speaks to me: the text as part of a tradition 
has something to say to the interpreter who is open to what the text has to say. Being 
open does not mean passively agreeing with everything, but realising that there are some 
things we must accept even if we don‘t agree with them. This position describes the 
hermeneutic experience, for, in the act of interpretation, the interpreter experiences the 
truth of something new in the interaction with the tradition. 
 
The importance of the dialogical model is that it reveals the attempt to understand both 
oneself and the world as the shared experience of humanity, rather than the experience of 
an isolated consciousness. Dialogue is described as a consensus because it goes beyond 
the original views of the participants and takes into consideration the possible objections 
and counter examples of the other. In a nutshell, consensus can be reached by agreeing to 
disagree, but what is crucial is that both have a greater understanding of the issues, have 
‗raised‘ the dialogue to a higher and more informed level.  
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At the conclusion of a conversation, the initial positions of all participants can be seen to be inadequate 
positions on their own and are integrated within a richer, more comprehensive view. For hermeneutic 
understanding it follows that we are not limited to the premises of our tradition but rather continually revise 
them in the encounters with and discussion we have of them. In confronting other cultures, other prejudices 
and, indeed, the implications that others draw from our own traditions we learn to reflect of both our 
assumptions and our ideas of reason and to amend them in the direction of a better account. (Warnke, 1987: 
170)  
 
7.0. Language and Truth 
 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer subscribes to the view that a human being‘s relation to 
the world is that of making sense of it, of attempting to understand a world that exists 
before them and that comes to them always already interpreted. The world humans are 
born into is constituted by tradition and the vehicle for the transmission and preservation 
of tradition is language: language precedes man and makes possible human experience 
and thought. It makes human experience possible both in terms of understanding others 
and in terms of understanding oneself. 
 
Gadamer‘s valorisation of language is encapsulated in the following key sentences: ‗the 
fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of 
language.‘ (1989: 378) and ‗Being that can be understood is language‘. (1989: 474) It is 
only through language that humans have a world at all. Clearly, language is not an 
optional or incidental feature of human existence, but an essential one for the world 
discloses itself though language and language comes into being by disclosing the world. 
The relationship between language and the world is one of complimentarity rather than 
opposition with language on one side and the world on the other. Language ‗is not just 
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one of man‘s possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man has a world 
at all. The world as world exists for man as for no other creature that is in the world. But 
this world is verbal in nature.‘ (1989: 443).  
 
The place of language in Gadamer‘s hermeneutics cannot be underestimated and it is one 
of those domains (together with history and art) that make the experience of truth 
possible. However, while Gadamer considers language as the source of truth, he distances 
himself from correspondence or representational theories of truth. According to these 
theories, language represents facts about the world and communicates their truth-value. 
Gadamer‘s criticism of this view lies in its assumption that one can treat language as an 
object of analysis, studying the way it corresponds to the world. This view of language 
suggests that one can step outside language to examine the relationship between 
propositions and the world. But it is evident that there is no position outside language 
with which to evaluate the relation between propositions and the world; the study of this 
relationship can only take place from within language itself. The criticism of 
propositional logic is part of Gadamer‘s ongoing criticism of the use of method in the 
human sciences. When we talk about method in the natural sciences, we are talking about 
the control of objects that are isolated, manipulated and repeated. In the case of the 
human sciences, understanding is not merely the ability to isolate a meaning, but that of 
belonging to, and participating in a tradition. It is this notion of understanding as 
participation that Gadamer contrasts with understanding as making things or meanings at 
our disposal. 
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Gadamer‘s analysis takes as its starting point one of the first texts in western culture that 
examines language. In the Cratylus the question that Plato attempts to answer concerns 
the relationship between language and the world: is this relation a conventional one with 
the community agreeing upon the words used to name objects or is the relationship one 
where words naturally represent objects?  The answer in the Cratylus favours the 
conventional argument with language described as a system of signs. However, Gadamer 
points out that both theories mistakenly assume that objects exist and can be known 
without any intervention of language. Gadamer rejects this arguing that language is 
disclosive, by which he means that it is language that brings the world into being; it is 
only after this disclosure that language can function so as to represent the world.  
 
In his discussion of the historical development of language, the work of Humboldt plays 
an important role in the development of Gadamer‘s thinking on language. Humboldt had 
argued that each language expresses a vision of reality or a way of life. The differences 
between languages could be accounted for in relation to the different linguistic structures 
of a particular language. However, Gadamer does not merely appropriate Humboldt‘s 
claim, but argues that the vision of life that each language presents is not a question of its 
formal or structural features but a question of the content that that language expresses: 
‗[i]f every language is a view of the world, it is so not primarily because it is a particular 
type of language (in the way that linguists view language) but because of what is said or 
handed down in this language.‘ (1989: 441) The language of a community communicates 
the ‗form of life‘ of the community: without their language the world of a particular 
community - with their shared values, beliefs, and norms - would not exist.  
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Gadamer‘s account retrieves the original sense of communication by identifying 
communication with the expressivist theory of language: originally the meaning of the 
concept of communication was closely tied to that of community but in the twentieth 
century the meaning was narrowed down to the transmission of information.  On 
Gadamer‘s hermeneutic analysis of language, the concept of communication is re-defined 
as the expression of the values, beliefs, customs and social practices of the community, 
i.e., the world of the community and the community‘s experience of the world. 
 
The centrality of language in Gadamer‘s philosophy is highlighted in the distinction 
between ‗world‘ and ‗environment‘. All living things have an environment, but it is only 
humans that have a world, i.e., having an orientation towards the world. The difference is 
that while living things depend upon environment, human beings have attitudes, relate to 
and behave in certain ways toward the world. To have a world means that humans can 
stand back from the world whereas other living things are ‗absorbed‘ into the 
environment. It is in this sense that they are free from their environment.  
 
Animals can leave their environment and move over the whole earth without severing their environmental 
dependence. For man, however, rising above the environment means rising to “world” itself, to true 
environment. This does not mean that he leaves his habitat but that he has another posture toward it---a 
free, distanced orientation---that is always realized in language (1989: 444-445) 
 
While all humans interact in a particular environment they are not passive in relation to it, 
but can think about it and attempt to understand it through their language. As a result they 
transform their world. Different cultures have coped with their environment in different 
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ways and have therefore developed different concepts. The linguistic heritage of the 
community – its linguistic tradition – encapsulates the experiences of the community.  
 
This raises the question of whether – given that each community has its own language 
and therefore its own linguistically constructed world – it is possible that there is a world 
in itself, an extra-linguistic world that can be contrasted to the linguistic world. Gadamer 
argues that although each language is a perspectival vision of the world, this does not 
mean that there is a position outside language from which one can compare language to 
the world in itself. Just as Husserl‘s account of perception had demonstrated that each 
perception is a partial perspective of the world and that the world in itself is nothing more 
that the totality of perspectives, Gadamer argues that each language is a perspective of 
the world and the world in itself is nothing more that the totality of linguistic 
perspectives. The important difference between Husserl‘s account of perception and 
Gadamer‘s account of language is that a language (unlike a perception) can assimilate the 
views of another language. And, while a language can assimilate the experiences of 
another language, no one language can ever attain the status of describing the world as it 
really is: ‗the infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world means that, 
whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing anything but an ever more 
extended aspect, a ‗view‘ of the world‘ (1989: 447). And just because we enter another 
linguistic world, this does not mean that we abandon ours: when we learn another 
language we do not forget the world where we come from. 
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The sense of Gadamer‘s views on language is a strong one since language is said to 
construct the world. The concept of linguistic construction here does not just refer to the 
organising or structuring of nature, of giving form to an unformed environment. Rather, 
the disclosure of the world by language is a disclosure of something, of some subject-
matter. And this is why Gadamer considers the primary mode of being of language to be 
dialogue which he defines as the coming to an understanding or an agreement about a 
subject. But this view of language should not be interpreted in terms of purposes with the 
sole purpose of language being that of achieving understanding. This would reduce 
language to the status of a medium or tool at the disposal and control of the participants 
rather than enabling the world to appear as a world. 
 
But while language discloses the world, it is unable to dominate it. The world overflows 
the categories of language. This insight explains why unexpected experiences can 
overwhelm us to the extent that we fail to find the words to describe them. As a result of 
his analysis, Gadamer argues that language both discloses the world but also hides it. 
This double-edged quality of language can be seen in the distinction between the said and 
the unsaid. While a proposition is ―the said‖ by virtue of communicating a content, the 
―unsaid‖ is the background of the proposition. The ―unsaid‖ is the ‗more‘ that frames the 
proposition or the text; it is the question to which the proposition is the answer, ‗[t]he 
hermeneutic task is to uncover and lay bare the unsaid by drawing it into an explicit 
dialogue with the said.‘ (Lawn, 2006: 84) 
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The hermeneutic structure of language parallels the hermeneutic structure of human 
experience.  Just as an experience is the result of the interaction between the background 
of the unfamiliar and the familiar, likewise, a sentence can be understood against a 
background of social and cultural conventions. The hermeneutic parallelism between the 
structure of experience and the structure of language is no coincidence since 
understanding an experience requires language for this understanding to be 
communicated. It is only through language that our understanding of a personal 
experience, a work of art, or social institution can be communicated. And language itself 
is a tradition since it transmits the experiences and knowledge that have been acquired 
over time. 
 
Gadamer distinguishes between two senses of experience: empiricist accounts of 
experience tend to consider an experience as something that can be repeated, as 
something that can be verified through a process of experimentation. Rather than pointing 
to something new, the sense of experience is that which conforms or repeats what has 
already happened. On the other hand, Gadamer argues for a broader sense of experience 
that includes both its unexpectedness and novelty: experience, for Gadamer, means that 
one is open to future. And although one is always open to future experiences, what 
experience teaches us is that there are limits to what humans can achieve with their life. 
Even with the impressive advances in science and technology life can never be 
completely controlled or mastered. This is why experience is self-experience: ultimately 
what we learn is always about ourselves in our capacity as human beings. ‗The 
experienced man knows that all foresight is limited and all plans uncertain. In him is 
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realised the truth value of experience.‘ (1989: 357) The emphasis here lies with the 
concept of experience as something primary, as something that happens to us, as 
something we have undergone.  
 
The hermeneutic element in Gadamer‘s account of experience is the interplay between 
the part and the whole or the new and the old. It is the background of the ‗old‘ that makes 
what is ‗new‘ an experience of truth: the true is produced in the dynamic that takes place 
between the part and the whole. And while the experience of something as ‗new‘ lies in 
its ‗conflict‘ with the ‗old‘ background, it is the background that gives meaning to the 
experience. The experience of truth in Gadamer is an ‗eye-opener‘: Lawn describes this 
from the perspective of literature,  
 
no matter how many times a poem or novel are read they always manage to open up new lines of enquiry, 
new possibilities. The written text does not change but the interpretive possibilities that is, for Gadamer, the 
truth possibilities do, as they are endless. (Lawn, 2006: 62) 
 
Gadamer‘s model of dialogue helps us understand his concept of truth.  In a dialogue 
something is revealed or disclosed about the participants: we are surprised by the truth 
that has been expressed. What we take for granted is disrupted and we see ourselves and 
the world differently. Likewise, in our dialogical exchanges the assumptions or 
prejudices we carry with us can be challenged such that we learn something about 
ourselves. Although language is never value-free since it always embodies the prejudices 
of a culture this does not mean that we are forever trapped within the tradition from 
which we speak. 
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In textual interpretation, the relation between the interpreter and the tradition is bridged 
by the language that both share. It is through language that the content of the tradition is 
communicated: the question posed to the interpreter enables the potential meanings of the 
tradition to be actualised. The interpreter translates the question posed to him/her by the 
tradition into a new interpretation since something new is disclosed by language. And, 
this in turn perpetuates the tradition. Because we belong to a tradition that precedes us 
and since tradition is communicated linguistically, Gadamer argues that the tradition 
takes precedence over us:  
 
The mode of being of tradition is, of course, not sensible immediacy. It is language, and in interpreting its 
texts, the hearer who understands it relates its truth to his own linguistic orientation to the world. This 
linguistic communication between present and tradition is, as we have shown, the event that takes place in 
all understanding. (1989: 463) 
 
This is why the idea of interpretation as subjective with the subject enacting complete 
control over the text is mistaken; in fact, the subject is acted upon by language and 
tradition. When Gadamer writes that ‗the content of tradition itself is the sole criterion 
and it expresses itself in language‘ (1989: 472-3) he is arguing that it is the tradition that 
provides the standard for interpretation. This is not to say that the tradition is always right 
or provides the correct interpretation but that it is the tradition that ‗decides‘ if an 
interpretation continues to belong to that tradition or is dismissed and forgotten.   
 
In his discussion of the realisations of the different interpretations that are inherent within 
the text, Gadamer introduces the notion of ‗speculation‘. Each interpretation is a 
speculative event in the sense that each interpretation is different and yet it is part of the 
same subject; (for example) the different interpretations of a play all belong to the same 
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subject. It is not that there is one subject and this manifests itself in different 
presentations but that the presentations are the different ways the subject presents itself. 
Being is one but it manifests itself as many:  
 
Every appropriation of tradition is historically different: each is the experience of an ―aspect‖ of the thing 
itself… That paradox that is true of all traditionary material, namely of being one and the same and yet of 
being different, proves that all interpretation is, in fact, speculative‘ (1989: 473) 
 
Critical Remarks 
 
When Gadamer died, he was considered one of the key contributors to hermeneutical 
theory, and while he is perhaps better known on the Continent, his work is steadily 
attracting the increasing attention of Anglo-American philosophers. However, the 
hermeneutic vision that Gadamer offers has not been without its detractors. Gorner 
(2000) points to a number of problems with Gadamer‘s account: (a) the dialogue or 
conversation that takes place between individuals and which culminates in an 
understanding of the thing itself seems to take place ‗behind‘ the back of individuals 
given that the individuals belong or participate in a tradition that both pre-exists them and 
‗uses‘ them to communicate its truths; (b) the dialogical structure of the question and 
answer that is central to Gadamer‘s concept of the understanding is used mostly as a 
model for the interpretation of texts so that it is strained to see the way the relationship 
between the reader and a text is a model for the relationship between two persons. It 
seems that one can apply the dialogical structure of the understanding  to the general field 
of hermeneutics only in a secondary sense; (c) one consequence of the concept of 
effective history is that we would not understand something that happened in the past if it 
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had no effect i.e., no subsequent interpretation. This would entail the false view that we 
would not be able to understand Aztec culture since we have no effective historical 
connection with it.  
 
In ―A Review of Gadamer‘s Truth and Method‖ (1986) Habermas has critically engaged 
the work of Gadamer on a number of counts but perhaps his most pertinent criticism is 
that Gadamerian hermeneutics miscalculates the force of ideology at work within society. 
It is not enough to equate the prejudices that hermeneutics uncovers with ideology for 
ideology is also at work in those situations that are ‗normal‘ and that in fact are 
constituted by ideology with the consequence that it would be difficult to recognise them 
at work. It is in this respect that Habermas considers hermeneutics as lacking a ―reference 
system‖ i.e., a theory of society that would enable it to go beyond the surface to the 
deeper level within which ideology operates. 
 
Finally, given the centrality of language in hermeneutics several commentators thought 
that Gadamer had collapsed everything into language, that he was advocating a sort of 
linguistic idealism. But to understand Gadamer‘s thesis it must be remembered that his 
philosophy is a phenomenological analysis of the act of understanding, an act that does 
not reduce understanding either to a subjectivist or an epistemological function. His view 
is that something can only be understood through language; language is the necessary 
condition for understanding to take place. Language transforms understanding into an 
event. Against his critics, it is possible to formulate two lines of defence: (a) they fail to 
understand the target of Gadamer‘s assertion of the centrality of language. This assertion 
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is directed against the entrenched view of propositional logic that dominates western 
philosophy. Dialogue replaces propositional logic in that the propositions of logic are 
themselves embedded within a context of dialogue; propositional logic does not exist on 
its own but falls within the ambit of speakers and their motivations; (b) within a genuine 
conversation, things crop up in the minds of participants; it is not a question of the 
speaker‘s intention to reveal things, but a question of common understanding that is 
achieved by speakers
iv. Clearly, Gadamer‘s hermeneutics is not subjectivist, since 
understanding is not the exclusive ‗private‘ domain of the subject but it incorporates the 
other with whom the conversation is taking place. Dialogue is a key term in Gadamer‘s 
vocabulary because it is the model with which understanding between persons and texts 
within a tradition takes place. 
 
In this chapter I have (a) started by outlining Gadamer‘s reading of the history of 
hermeneutics, so as to prepare the way for (b) his critique of the claims of science, (c) a 
critique that retrieves the concepts of prejudice and tradition. This is followed by (d) an 
analysis of the kind of understanding that belongs to the social or human sciences, an 
analysis that (e) brings to life the notion of effective history as the foundation of 
understanding together with an elaboration upon the way understanding involves an 
interaction between a fusion of horizons that is (f) modelled upon a dialogue of question 
and answer. The chapter ends with (g) an overview of Gadamer‘s account of language. 
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‗The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort we 
are engaged in elucidating‘ (1975: 147) 
 
 
J. L. Austin: on Speech Act Theory 
 
J.L. Austin (1911-1960) inaugurated a branch in the philosophy of language that 
subsequently came to be known as Ordinary Language Philosophy. Unlike those 
philosophers who focussed on the construction of formal or idealised languages, he 
studied the workings of everyday natural language as it is used in different situations of 
communication. As a result, the emphasis of his study shifted towards the role of the 
speaker, listener and context within which communication takes place. The emphasis 
upon the context reveals that the study of communicative processes entails not only an 
examination of the actual utterances, but crucially of the conventions that underlie such 
utterances. 
 
Although Austin did not publish much during his lifetime his writings have been 
published posthumously and these include the Philosophical Papers (1961), Sense and 
Sensibilia (1975) and How to Do Things with Words (1975). In these writings Austin 
examines various philosophical problems and his innovative approach to the way they 
should be analysed has guaranteed his legacy. 
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In this chapter I will first (a) outline Austin‘s suggestions on the methodology of ordinary 
language philosophy and (b) follow this with an examination of distinction between 
constative and performative utterances. The next section (c) focuses on Austin‘s analysis 
of performatives that leads to (d) the development of speech act theory. The last section 
(e) shows how Austin‘s insights have been put to use by Butler‘s in her analysis of hate-
speech.  
 
1.0. The Method of Linguistic Analysis 
 
In ‗A Plea for Excuses‘ (1979: 175-204) Austin outlines his particular method of 
linguistic analysis as a way of proceeding from ordinary, everyday language ‗by 
examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should man by it.‘ (207: 
181). He justifies this method on the following grounds:  
 
(a) to avoid being misled: ‗words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean 
tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm 
ourselves against the traps that language sets us.‘ (1979: 181-182) 
 
(b) to learn more about the world:  
 
words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the 
world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, 
and can re-look at the world without blinkers.  (1979: 182) 
 
(c) to avoid specialisation or technical jargon: 
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[O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the 
connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to 
be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and 
more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to 
think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon – the most favoured alternative method. (1979: 182) 
 
After having elaborated the reasons for his choice of method, Austin offers some more 
suggestions on the method with which he conducts his philosophical analysis of the 
concept of excuses  in ‗A Plea For Excuses‘ (1979: 175-204) 
 
(a) the use of the dictionary: using the dictionary to find the relevant definitions must be 
‗thorough‘ and there are two ways in which the dictionary can be used (i) by listing 
all the relevant words and looking them up and (b) selecting a large number of 
relevant words, looking up the definition and carefully noting other relevant words 
that are in turn also looked up. Eventually repetitions will occur.  ‗This method has 
the advantage of grouping the terms into convenient clusters---but of course a good 
deal will depend upon the comprehensiveness of our initial selection.‘ (1979: 187) 
 
(b) the use of textbooks: in the case of ‗excuses‘ Austin considers the resources of the 
law and those of psychology as invaluable. ‗With these sources, and with the aid of 
the imagination, it will go hard if we cannot arrive at the meanings of large numbers 
of expressions and at the understanding and classification of large numbers of 
‗actions‘.‘ (1979: 189) 
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Elsewhere, in ‗Three Ways of Spilling Ink‘ (1979: 272-287) Austin suggests starting his 
philosophical analysis by considering 
  
(c) ‗imagined or actual cases‘: by this, he means that one either selects an actual 
conversation for analysis to see what is appropriate to use in a particular situation, or 
to reconstruct imaginatively a possible conversation to see  what should be said in a 
particular situation. Having collected the ‗data‘, one must then proceed to explain it, 
and he suggests that the use of ‗such methods as ‗Agreement‘ and ‗Difference‘: [to 
show] what is in fact present in the cases where we do use, say, ‗deliberately‘, and 
what is absent when we don‘t‘ (1979: 274) It is by using this method of comparison 
and contrast that what is specific to each expression can be highlighted. 
 
(d) ‗the ‗grammar‘, ‗etymology‘, and so forth of the words‘ (1979: 274). The point of 
examining both the grammar and the etymology is that over time, the grammar and 
morphology that has ‗survived‘ will teach us a lot about the meaning of the 
expression. (1979:282) 
 
An essential part of Austin philosophical‘s practice required a conscientious involvement 
with minute details concerning idioms and expressions. There are a number of instances 
in the Philosophical Papers (1979) that demonstrate this concern: he looks for the 
difference between knowing that a bird is a gold finch from its red head and knowing that 
it is a gold finch because it has a red head (1979: 84); or, the difference between acting 
deliberately, acting intentionally and acting on purpose (1979: 275). And, in ‗How to do 
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Things with words‘, (1975) Austin distinguishes between what I do in saying something 
and what I do by saying something (1975: 121-131). 
 
This scrupulous attention to detail raises an important question: Are these details 
philosophically important or are they merely the historical variations of a language that 
offer interesting insights, but seem philosophically trivial? Austin‘s position is that if 
there is a difference then there is a rational explanation for this difference and this implies 
that it is not just an unimportant coincidence but something that should be looked into. 
The difference might not be evident, but the point of linguistic analysis is to find the 
difference that makes the difference.  
 
Austin justifies his belief in the value of ordinary language on the grounds that it has 
evolved into its current usage, and that it therefore represents the best there is. Given that 
the language available - ordinary language - embodies all the necessary features for our 
understanding, why should this be replaced by a jargon that creates more confusion than 
clarity? The general thrust of Austin‘s philosophical method is to leave everything as it 
is, to describe what the ‗plain man‘ says, without trying to improve upon it.  
 
2.0. Constatives and Performatives. 
 
One of the movements that dominated the western philosophical tradition for a relatively 
brief period of time was that of Logical Positivism. The Logical Positivists devised what 
came to be known as the Verification Principle which stated that for a statement to 
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meaningful it must be verified either as true or false; if there was no way of verifying it, 
then the statement was ‗condemned‘ to meaningless-ness. This theory faced two 
fundamental difficulties: the first one was that the Verification Principle itself was 
impossible to verify and should therefore also be considered as meaningless; the second 
difficulty was that a large number of things we talk about – beauty, morality, religion – 
cannot be verified so that these utterances would be considered meaningless. However, 
although meaningless, the Logical Positivists did not advocate eliminating such 
utterances from our everyday discourse. They explained these utterances as expressions 
of subjectivity, so that (for example) the utterance ‗the cake is good‘ is another way of 
saying ‗I like the cake‘. 
 
It is against this background that Austin can be read. Throughout his writings, Austin 
resists the fairly common idea that the primary function of language is that of describing 
reality. To this end he coined the phrase ‗descriptive fallacy‘. In his posthumously 
published work, How to Do Things with Words (1975) Austin declares that his goal is to 
demonstrate that the truth-conditional theory of meaning is not central to the study of 
language. Austin introduces the terminology of ‗constatives‘ to discuss the use of 
statements whose function it is to ‗constate‘ something of  the world, something that is 
true or false (1975: 3). According to this view, we have language on one side and the 
world on the other and when a statement represents the world we consider it to be true, 
and when it does not we consider it false. However it is evident that there are many other 
uses of language that have been largely neglected by formal semantic theorists. In 
particular, attention should be paid to the use of language from the point of view of the 
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speakers and Austin coins the term ‗performative‘ to describe the way speakers use 
language to perform actions. He offers the following examples:  
 
(E.a) ‗I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)‘ – as uttered in the course of the marriage 
ceremony. 
(E.b.) ‗I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth‟- as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem. 
(E.c.) ‗I give and bequeath my watch to my brother‘ – as occurring in a will. 
(E.d.) ‗I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.‘ (1975: .5). 
 
These utterances cannot be assessed in terms of the true and the false, but by uttering 
them one is, in fact, performing an action. Utterances such as, ‗I bet you sixpence it will 
rain tomorrow‘, or ‗I hereby christen this ship the Queen Elizabeth‘ are not the sort of 
utterances that one says true or false to. It would just not make sense to answer, ‗I hereby 
christen this ship‘ with ‗false‘. The point of these utterances is not to describe facts, or 
states of affairs, but crucially, to do things. With the prime minister utters ‗I declare war 
on Zanzibar‘ he/she is going to war, with the various issues that such an utterance 
involves, i.e., listening to the military, persuading the nation, etc. After war has been 
declared, the world is not the same place for something has happened:  the words uttered 
have transformed the world. Likewise, when a person says ‗I do‘ (within the context of a 
wedding ceremony) the person is not describing his/her wedding ceremony but getting 
married; the couple‘s life is different from the life they enjoyed before they got married.  
 
These are the characteristics of performatives,  
 
A. they do not ‗describe‘ or ‗report‘ or constate anything at all, are not ‗true or false‘; and 
B. they uttering of the sentences is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be 
described as saying something. (1975: 5)  
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But Austin is at pains to show that getting married is not a question of ‗just‘ uttering a 
few words (1975: 8) since these words acquire their performativity through the 
established conventions of a particular society. He offers an analysis of the conventions 
that need to be fulfilled for the utterance to perform its function: 
 
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that 
procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
 
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked. 
 
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and  
 
(B.2) completely. 
 
(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or 
for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the 
participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further 
 
(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (1975: 14-15) 
 
In the case of A. (i) by saying ‗I do‘ one is in effect, getting married, as long as (ii) there 
are witnesses, a priest or magistrate and none of the couple is already or still married. In 
the case of B. the whole procedure of getting married must be enacted (i) correctly so that 
the right words must be uttered: in response to the question of whether the bride wants to 
take the bridegroom, the performative would fail if she answers ‗maybe‘. With (ii) what 
is meant by completion is that the utterance  is acknowledged, so that, if (for example) 
one makes a bet, the other person must acknowledge that s/he is taking part in a bet, by 
shaking hands and saying , ‗you‘re on‘. Austin calls this acknowledgement, ‗uptake‘. In 
the case of C. (i) we are in the domain of the sincerity with which the speaker expresses 
his intentions: to accuse someone of something that the speaker knows is not the case is a 
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violation of C. (i), just as it is a violation of C. (ii) if one promises to do something that 
one has no intention of keeping.  
 
The early Austin distinguished between performatives and constatives identifying the 
different characteristics of each. While constatives are descriptive utterances that can be 
either true or false, the values associated with performatives are those of success or 
failure. Austin introduces the terminology of ‗happy‘ and ‗unhappy‘ to describe the 
success or failure of performatives through the fulfilment of certain conditions, that he 
calls the ‗felicity conditions.‘ While performatives might not be true or false, they might 
succeed or fail and it is always possible for them to go wrong. Austin calls failed 
performatives, ‗infelicitous‘. 
 
In the doctrine of Infelicities, Austin outlines the ways in which performatives can fail 
(1975: 14-44): 
 
(a) they ‗misfire‘ when there is no conventional procedure in a particular context. If I say, 
‗I order you to chop wood‘ in a context where there is no conventional system for 
ordering or accepting orders then the order has misfired; or when someone doesn‘t follow 
the procedure completely as when I write a will saying ‗I leave everything to my son‘ and 
inadvertently forget to sign it;  
 
(b) they can be ‗abusive‘: these are the more serious of the unhappy performatives for 
they are associated with the insincerity of the speaker. If I say ‗I promise to return the 
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money tomorrow‘ when I have no intention of returning the money, this is not merely a 
case of the conventional procedures failing, but of an abuse of the conventional 
procedures; another abuse occurs when I apologise but do not mean it: in this case my 
apology is an insincere one.  
 
Although both misfires and abuses are instances of performative failure, Austin 
differentiates between them on the grounds that abuses involve an act of deception and 
are therefore more serious than misfires.  
 
Another way of differentiating between performatives and constatives is that of showing 
the different ways in which they relate to the world:  
 
…in ordinary cases, for example running, it is the fact that he is running which makes the statement that he 
is running true; or again, that the truth of the constative utterance ‗he is running‘ depends on his being 
running. Whereas in our case it is the happiness of the performative ‗I apologize‘ which makes it the fact 
that I am apologizing: and my success in apologizing depends on the happiness of the performative 
utterance ‗I apologize‘. This is one way in which we might justify the ‗performative-constative‘ distinction-
--as a distinction between doing and saying. (1975: 47) 
 
The emphasis here is on the relation between the speaker and the world: in the case of the 
constative it is a question of whether the statement matches or fails to match the world. In 
the case of performatives, the world is changed by virtue of the performative being 
uttered: to say ‗I do‘ successfully is to change the world since it is now a different place 
i.e., one in which I am married. 
 
3.0. The Analysis of Performatives 
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Since Austin places so much emphasis on the performative-constative distinction his next 
step is to identify the specific characteristics of the performatives so as to find out why 
they constitute a class of their own. Austin asks, ‗is the use of the first person singular 
and of the present indicative active, so called, essential to a performative utterance?‘ 
(1975: 57). Despite being couched as a question, it seems that these are the characteristics 
of a performative utterance, and they are justified on the grounds that since the speaker is 
doing the action through the act of uttering it, it would necessarily involve the first 
person.  
 
Before conducting his analysis, Austin pre-empts two possible objections to his use of the 
grammatical form to identity performatives:  
 
(a) the first objection is that they constitute an incidental feature of language and cannot 
really be the identifying sign of a performative. But Austin points out that if a 
performative is the doing of something, it must something that is done by an agent, and 
this agent is the speaker.  The use of the grammatical form of the first person shows 
precisely this. 
 
(b) the second objection is that the grammatical form can also be used with constatives 
(for example, ‗I want to have a drink‘). Austin responds by pointing to a fundamental 
asymmetry between constatives and performatives: performatives are asymmetrical while 
constatives are symmetrical. Austin gives us the following example, 
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…an anxious parent when his child has been asked to do something may say ‗he promises, don‘t you 
Willy?‘ but little Willy must still himself say ‗I promise‘ if he is really to have promised. Now this sort of 
asymmetry does not arise at all in general with verbs that are not used as explicit performatives. For 
example, there is no such asymmetry between ‗I run‘ and ‗He runs‘. (1975: 63)  
 
Despite this defence of the grammatical form, Austin still finds a number of faults with 
them.  
 
(a)  the use of the first person in the active voice is not necessary since a performative 
can be uttered in the passive voice, so that ‗You are hereby authorised to pay…‘ and 
‗Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only.‘ (1975: 57) are both 
performatives (1975: 57).  
 
(b) there are even more serious challenges to the criterion (1) of the present tense: instead 
of using the present tense, ‗I find you guilty‘ I might say ‗you did it‘;  and (2) of the 
indicative mood: instead of the indicative mood, ‗I order you to turn right‘ I might say 
‗Turn right‘iv (1975: 58).  
 
(c) there is also the problem that the first person can be also used to describe routine 
actions rather than the doing of things: 
 
The first person singular present indicative active may be used to describe how I habitually behave: ‗I 
bet him (every morning) sixpence that it will rain‘ or ‗I promise only when I intend to keep my word.‘ 
(1975: 64) 
 
(d) while the first person in the present tense differs from that of the continuous tense, the 
latter can be used at times in a performative manner 
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…I can say ‗Don‘t bother me at the moment; I will see you later;  I am marrying‘ at any moment 
during the ceremony when I am not having to say other words such as ‗I do‘; here the utterance of the 
performative is not the whole of the performance, which is protracted and contains diverse elements. 
Or I can say ‗I am protesting‘ when performing the act by, in this case, means other than saying ‗I  
protest‘, for example by chaining myself to park railings.‘ (1975: 64)iv 
 
The attempt to establish characteristics that identify performatives faces increasing 
difficulties. There are some utterances that have the requisite grammatical form but 
which we would not want to allow into the class of performatives as it would broaden the 
class of performatives excessively: ‗ ‗I state that‘ seems to conform to our grammatical or 
quasi-grammatical requirements: but do we want it in? Our criterion, such as it is, seems 
in danger of letting in non-performatives.‘ (1975: 68). So too, Austin points out, the use 
of the grammatical form as a criterion for performativity can be too narrow: by telling 
someone ‗I insult you‘, I am not doing anything, I am not insulting the person. The 
grammatical form does not indicate the presence of a performative and are misleading 
(1975: 68) 
 
Another problem with the performative-constative distinction is the class of utterances 
that do not seem to fit within either of the two, where it is unclear whether the utterance 
is a performative or a constative. It is evident that when we say ‗I feel repentant‘ we are 
describing our state and are therefore issuing a constative. Likewise, when we say ‗I 
apologise‘ we are doing something i.e., apologizing and therefore issuing a performative. 
But some utterances are dubious: ‗I am sorry‘ and ‗I am grateful‘ can be considered both 
as performatives and constatives. (1975: 79). 
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In his analysis of performatives, Austin introduces a further distinction between primary 
performatives and explicit performatives:   
 
‗I shall oppose it [explicit performative] to ‗primary performative‘ (rather than to inexplicit or implicit 
performative). We gave as an example: 
 
(1) primary utterance: ‗I shall be there‘, 
(2) explicit performative: ‗I promise that I shall be there‘, and we said that the latter formula made explicit  
what action it is that is being performed in issuing the utterance: i.e.,  ‗I shall be there‘. If someone 
says ‗I shall be there‘, we might ask: ‗Is that a promise?‘ We may receive the answer ‗Yes‘, or ‗Yes, I 
promise it‘ (or ‗that…‘ or ‗to…‘), whereas the answer might have been only ‗No, but I do intend to be‘ 
(expressing or announcing an intention), or ‗No, but I can foresee that, knowing my weaknesses, I 
(probably) shall be there‘.‘ (1975: 69) 
 
The point is that without the explicit formula the first utterance can be understood in 
different ways, for example, as the expression of an intention or as a hopeful desire. The 
function of the ‗explicit‘ is parallel to certain non-linguistic actions: Austin describes the 
convention of bowing and saying ‗Salaam‘ at the same time. If I say ‗Salaam‘ as I bow 
before you, I am performing the action of greeting you and not examining your shoes. By 
bowing, and saying ‗Salaam‘ I am making explicit my greetings to you. In a similar 
fashion, explicit performatives ‗make plain how the action is to be taken or understood, 
what action it is.‘  (1975: 70) 
 
Austin also realises that although performatives are explicit since they are unambiguous 
or specific ways of saying what one is doing, there are other indirect ways of saying that 
achieve the same results. These are (a) the mood so that instead  of saying ‗I order you to 
shut it‘, I say, ‗Shut it‘; (b) the intonation: where one uses a different tone of voice to 
express ‗it‘s going to charge‘ either as a warning or a question; (c) the use of adverbs 
where instead of saying ‗I promise I‘ll be there‘ one says ‗I‘ll be there without fail; (d) 
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connecting particles where instead of saying ‗I conclude that X‘ one says ‗therefore X‘; 
(e) non-verbal accompaniments such as frowns, pointing and so on; (f) the context where 
for example,  the health of the speaker influences the way the utterance ‗I shall die some 
day‘  is understood (1975: 73-77). What this list shows is that primary performatives can 
perform the same function, or do the same things as explicit ones; in other words, to 
perform an action it is not necessary to have the grammatical form of the explicit 
performatives.  
 
Austin‘s inability to identify performatives shifts his analysis toward a questioning of the 
strict dichotomy that separated performatives from constatives. He points out that: 
 
(a) they are not mutually exclusive. The utterance ‗I warn you the bull will charge‘ is 
performing an act of warning, but it can also be judged as true or false. In a similar vein, 
there is no reason why a constative could not be described as true or false and in addition, 
also perform an action.  
 
‗I warn you that the bull is about to charge‘ is the fact, if it is one, that the bull is about to charge: if the bull 
is not, then indeed the utterance ‗I warn you that the bull is about to charge‘ is open to criticism---but not in 
any of the ways we have hitherto characterized as varieties of unhappiness. We should not in this case say 
the warning was void---i.e., that he did not warn but only went through a form of warning---nor that it was 
insincere: we should feel much more inclined to say the warning was false or (better) mistaken, as with a 
statement. So that considerations of the happiness or unhappiness type may infect statements (or some 
statements) and considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some 
performatives). (1975: 55) 
 
(b) there are features common to both performatives and constatives that Austin calls 
‗presupposition‘ so that both constatives and performative can fail if certain 
presuppositions are not in  place. For instance, if a person says, ‗when I die you will 
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inherit my Caravaggio‘, without having any Caravaggio paintings then the utterance is a 
failure because it is stating things that should not be assumed in the first place. Similarly 
with performatives: if I advise you to join the French Foreign Legion without knowing 
anything about the military, I fail to give you good advice.  
 
…what is to be said of the statement that ‗John‘s children are all bald‘ if made when John has no children? 
It is usual now to say that it is not false because it is devoid of reference; reference is necessary for either 
truth or falsehood…People say ‗the question does not arise‘. Here I shall say ‗the utterance is void‘.  
Compare this with our infelicity when we say ‗I name…‘ but some of the conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are 
not satisfied…we might have used the presuppose formula: we might say that the formula ‗I do‘ 
presupposes lots of things: if these are not satisfied the formula is unhappy, void: if it does not succeed in 
being a contract when the reference fails (or even when it is ambiguous) any more than the other succeeds 
in being a statement.‘ (1975: 50-51) 
 
(c) Furthermore, the distinction between the performative and the constative is 
undermined by observing the sincerity of the speaker. Sincerity is not only related to 
performatives but also to constatives so that a promise must be uttered sincerely for it to 
succeed just as a description requires the sincerity of the speaker to establish its truth 
claim (the earth revolves around the sun but I don‘t believe it). 
 
The insincerity of an assertion is the same as the insincerity of a promise, since both promising and 
asserting are procedures intended for use by persons having certain thoughts. ‗I promise but do not intend‘ 
is parallel to ‗it is the case but I do not believe it‘; to say ‗I promise‘, without intending, is parallel to saying 
‗it is the case‘ without believing. (1975: 50) 
 
It might be objected that the difference between constatives and performatives could lie 
in the area of their respective values: while performatives admit of degrees of success and 
failure, in the domain of constatives there are no degrees of truth and falsity. A 
performative can be more or less successful, while a constative is either true or false. 
Austin questions this claim arguing that there are many constative utterances that are not 
formulated with a strict demarcation of their truth. The utterance ‗France is hexagonal‘ is 
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not the description of the precise shape of France, but a rough estimate which is not 
meant to be the answered as either true or false (1975: 143). 
 
4.0. Speech Act Theory 
 
By the second half of How to do Things With Words, Austin gives up on his goal of 
identifying the specific features of performatives, and broadens his inquiry into an 
analysis of how saying something is also doing something. It is the study of language as a 
whole that is being now considered. However, despite abandoning his early performative-
constative distinction, Austin realises that although the insight that some utterances 
perform actions was correct, the way this insight was generalised was mistaken. As a 
result Austin proposes a new theory that subsumed within it the insights that were learnt 
from the performative-constative distinction.  This new theory is called the Theory of 
Speech Acts and its central thesis was that all utterances – whether performative or 
constative – involved the doing of an action. In ‗Performative Utterances‘, Austin writes,  
 
besides the question that has been very much studied in the past as  to what a certain utterance means, there 
is a further question distinct from this as to what was the force, as we call it, of the utterance. We may be 
quite clear what ‗Shut the door‘ means, but not yet at all clear on the further point as to whether as uttered 
at a certain time, it was an order, an entreaty or whatnot. (1979: 251) 
 
Before elaborating upon the details of Austin‘s theory of speech acts, it might be fruitful 
to examine the sense in which speech can be said to constitute an action. There is the act 
of producing a sound, of producing sounds in a sequence to form a sentence, and of 
producing sentences that have a meaning. These three features are called the phonetic, the 
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phatic and the rhetic respectively: the phonetic is the basic level of sound production 
through the use of the vocal chords; the phatic involves the use of sounds that have been 
transformed into words and that are stringed together according to the rules of grammar 
to generate sentences; and the rhetic aspect is that involving the meaning of sentences 
i.e., sentences with a sense and reference.  
 
The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noise. The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables 
or words, i.e., noises of certain types, belonging to and as belong  to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to 
an as conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables 
with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference. Thus ‗He said ―The cat is on the mat‖‘, reports a 
phatic act, whereas ‗He said that the cat was on the mat‘ reports a rhetic act. (1975: 95)  
 
Taken together these constitute what Austin calls the locutionary aspect and distinguishes 
it from the illocutionary and perlocutionary act. These are the differences between them: 
 
(a) the locutionary act: this is the basic and fundamental level of a speech act because it 
literally involves doing something: when we speak we produce sounds  that are words 
which are combined into sentences to generate a meaning.  
 
(b) the illocutionary act: although it is evident that someone has said something it is not 
necessarily evident what the force of that utterance is. Austin uses the example of ‗it‘s 
going to charge‘: should this be understood as a warning or a statement? (1975: 98) 
The illocutionary force can take different forms, such as making promises, praying, 
joking, ordering, and crucially within speech act theory, making a statement; so too 
the illocutionary force involves taking into consideration the speaker and the 
intentions with which he/she communicates. The illocutionary act is a form  of saying 
that qualifies as doing  something  and Austin cites a number  of examples: 
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‗asking or answering a question, 
giving some information or an assurance  or a warning, 
announcing a verdict or an intention, 
pronouncing sentence,  
making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, 
making an identification or giving a description‘ (1975: 98-99) 
 
(c) the perlocutionary act: the saying of something can also effect another person. In this 
sense, our saying is also a doing: we did something to the other person i.e., convince 
them, make them laugh: ‗[s]aying something will often or even normally, produce 
certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, 
or the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or 
purpose of them‘ (1975: 101) 
 
 
At the start of Lecture IX, Austin reviews the terms introduced in his speech act theory: 
 
We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by 
saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a 
certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to ‗meaning‘ in the traditional sense. 
Second, we said that we also perform illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, 
&c., i.e., utterances which have a certain (conventional) force.  Thirdly, we may also perform 
perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading 
deterring, and even, say, surprising  or misleading.‘ (1975: 108) 
 
However, Austin is chiefly interested in the illocutionary aspect of the speech act and his 
working method consists in comparing it with the locutionary and perlocutionary acts. In 
relation to this he examined  
 
(a) the difference between an illocutionary and a perlocutionary act? According to 
Austin, while perlocutionary utterances are the subject of empirical investigation since 
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they can be verified, illocutionary utterances are the subject of an a priori philosophical 
analysis. Austin maintained that any utterance can produce a perlocutionary act, so what 
is required is an empirical analysis of which utterances produced a certain effect. In the 
case of illocutionary utterances, it is not an empirical examination that will tell us 
whether the utterance is illocutionary or not. 
 
However, there is a further and, perhaps, more significant way of bringing out the 
difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts revolving around the question of 
‗effect‘: ‗the performance of an illocutionary act involves securing of uptake‘ (1975: 
117). In the case of illocutionary acts all that is required is that the listeners understand 
the utterance, while with perlocutionary acts, the listener not only understands but 
changes his/her views or behaviour.  
 
For an action to count as an illocution it is enough that the listener understand the speaker‘s intention, for it 
to count as a perlocution the listener‘s attitudes, his beliefs – what, for want of a better expression, we may 
call roughly his ‗mental state‘ – must be affected in some way (Friggieri, 1991: 206) 
iv
 
 
Given this identification of illocutionary acts as not having consequences, then, Austin‘s 
claim that they are the a priori material for philosophical investigation might be justified.  
Austin also took great interest in the conflicts and misunderstanding that arise between 
the illocutionary force of the utterance and its perlocutionary effects. The locutionary act 
‗shoot her‘ has the illocutionary force of urging or advising or commanding, with the 
perlocutionary effect that of persuading me to shoot her. In this case, the intention as 
expressed by the speaker is understood by the hearer. But the relationship between the 
speaker‘s intention and the hearer‘s response are not necessarily synchronized: the hearer 
306 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
could be frightened by the speaker‘s utterance and object to the speaker‘s utterance in the 
first place as dangerous or unwarranted. The perlocutionary effect is unpredictable and 
context-dependent (Levinson, 1983:  236-7)
iv
. 
 
(b) The difference between the locutionary and the illocutionary acts. This is an important 
question because if we take the locutionary act to be the production of a meaningful 
utterance, then what is the scope of the illocutionary act? Austin insisted that this was an 
aspect of the philosophy of language that was of crucial importance (1975: 100), but his 
difficulty lay in how to formulate the nature of illocutionary acts. On the one hand, he 
had to prevent illocutionary acts from being ‗reduced‘ to locutionary acts (meaning) 
while at the same time he had to show that they were different from perlocutionary acts 
as these are subject to empirically verification. Austin‘s difficulty lay in carving out the 
specific domain of illocutionary acts.  
 
Austin starts by claiming, ‗To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also 
an eo ipso to perform and illocutionary act…‘ (1975: 98). Here he is bringing home the 
point that by virtue of uttering something I am producing a sentence with a meaning 
(locutionary act) and simultaneously doing something else such as asking, commanding, 
promising (illocutionary act). They are not two separate actions but one. 
 
However, Austin clearly distinguishes between the meaning of the locutionary utterance 
and the force of the illocutionary utterance. The meaning of the locutionary utterance 
should be understood in the sense of Frege‘s distinction between the sense and reference 
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of an utterance, while the force of the illocutionary should be understood in the sense of 
what we do, or how we use the locutionary (1975: 100). One can understand what is 
meant by ‗The bull is about to charge‘ but not understand if it was meant as a warning, or 
a statement. (Friggieri, 1991: 189) 
 
(c) The question of whether it is possible to identify an illocutionary act through its 
grammatical form. Austin offers these examples: ‗He said ―get out‖‘, ‗He told me to get 
out‘,  [and] ‗He said ―Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?‖‘; ‗He asked whether it was in 
Oxford or Cambridge‘. (1975: 95) From these examples Austin concludes that ‗tell‘ and 
‗ask‘ are the illocutionary acts of ordering and asking respectively. Given that there is no 
indication of the context of their production, it would seem that there is a grammatical 
form that enables us to identity illocutionary utterances: in these examples, they are the 
grammatical forms of the imperative and the interrogative. Perhaps, this is why Austin 
insisted that illocutionary acts are conventional, i.e., because the followed conventional 
grammatical forms.  
 
Speaking of the ‗use  of ―language‖ for arguing or warning‘ looks like speaking of ‗the use of ―language‖ 
for persuading, rousing, alarming‘; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be conventional, in 
the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not.‘ 
(1975: 103; also, 105, 118) 
 
The problem with this view is that while there are certain grammatical forms for asking 
and telling, there are no grammatical forms for warning, toasting, or making an appeal. 
Clearly the grammatical form is not applicable to all illocutionary utterances and Austin 
goes on to suggest another possibility for identifying illocutionary utterances. When 
talking about illocutionary utterances it should also be possible to say, ‗he meant it as…‘ 
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(1975: 100), highlighting the point that it is what the speaker intends to mean by his/her 
utterance that is important. And if the illocutionary force is not communicated then this is 
a failing of the speaker. 
 
However, the emphasis on speaker intentionality is not entirely successfully. For a start, it 
is difficult to maintain the view of illocutionary acts as conventional and intentional at the 
same time. Austin himself acknowledged this when he wrote that the illocutionary ‗act is 
constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by convention…‘ (1975: 128). It 
would seem that Austin favours the conventional at the expense of the intentional, so if 
an utterance is understood as an order or a warning it is because of the conditions of 
ordering and warning, and not because of the way the speaker used the utterance (as an 
order or a warning). And it is also possible to perform an illocutionary act without 
intending to: to overlook and to neglect are cases of illocutionary acts that are 
performative without the relevant intention. 
 
A third possibility suggested by Graham (1977) (the other two being the conventional 
grammatical form and the speaker intention) is that of highlighting the context of 
communication. This is something Austin advises us to always keeping in mind: ‗the 
occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to 
be ‗explained‘ by the ‗context‘ in which they are designed to be or have actually been 
spoken in linguistic interchange‘. (1975: 100). Austin‘s point is that the contextual 
situation of the speaker and the listener, coupled with the grammatical conventions 
appropriate to that context, can explain illocutionary acts. 
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But the emphasis on the context also has certain difficulties for while some explicit 
contexts explain illocutionary acts, it is possible to use an illocutionary act without a 
specific social context. Consider the difference between these two situations: within a 
military context the lieutenant might warn his troops to dispel any notion of surrendering. 
But when I warn you that the bull is about to charge the situation is different for there is 
no specific context for the utterance to count as a warning.  
 
With Austin, a whole new dimension to the study of language has been introduced. The 
value of his studies on language has been picked up by others who have used his 
conceptual tools in their respective studies. One can mention J. Hillis Miller‘s Speech 
Acts in Literature (2001) and Judith Butler‘s Excitable Speech (1997) as cases in point. In 
the next section I will focus on Judith Butler and the way she uses Austin in her analysis 
of hate-speech.  
 
5.0. Applied Austin: Butler’s analysis of ‘excitable speech’ 
 
Butler opens Excitable Speech (1997) with a number of questions: 
 
When we claim to have been injured by language, what kind of claim do we make? We ascribe an agency 
to language, a power to injure, and position ourselves as the objects of its injurious trajectory. We claim 
that language acts, and acts against us, and the claim we make is a further instance of language, on which 
seeks to arrest the force of the prior instance. Thus, we exercise the force of language even as we seek to 
counter its force, caught up in a bind that no act of censorship can undo. (1997: 1) 
 
310 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
In this citation, the issues that concern Butler - language, censorship, politics and agency 
- are thematized and, while focusing principally upon the writings of J.L. Austin and L. 
Althusser, her theoretical background is informed by both M. Foucault‘s account of 
power and J. Derrida‘s account of context and iteration. Interestingly, the word 
‗excitable‘ in the title of her book refers to the legal term ‗excitable speech‘ a term that 
refers to speech considered beyond the control of the speaker because it is uttered under 
duress. Butler will argue that in a sense all speech is excitable (1997: 15).  
 
Within democratic societies, the value of freedom of speech is unquestioned; the free 
exchange of ideas is considered an essential ingredient that characterizes western 
democratic cultures. But freedom of speech also raises the problem of whether it should 
include all speech? Should offensive speech – racist or sexist discourse – be also 
permitted? Do these situations justify censorship? 
 
Several theorists have in fact argued in favor of state intervention by censoring racist or 
sexist discourses. In the 1980s, feminist anti-pornographers and critical race theorists 
argued (a) that pornography and racial speech should no longer be protected by the First 
Amendment of the American Constitution (the First Amendment protects freedom of 
speech) and furthermore, (b) the active intervention by the state to censor such discourses 
was justified in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment (the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees equality and respect for all citizens).  
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Butler positions herself against those legal theorists and scholars who support the 
introduction of censorship. This is not to say that she condones offensive speech or that 
she is unaware of the possible injury that such speech can cause. But she views the 
question of censorship by situating it within the framework of democratic politics, with 
the possibility of the subject contesting such speech without recourse to state censorship.  
 
The First Amendment of the US Constitution concerns the protection of free speech: all 
ideas have the right to be expressed and the freedom to express them should be protected. 
There are exceptions to the First Amendment (for example) speech that is defamatory, 
libelous, plagiaristic, threatening (to an officer of the law) and false advertising. But what 
is known as hate-speech - sexist or racist discourse - is also protected by the First 
Amendment since it belongs to the marketplace of ideas and while we might find these 
ideas reprehensible and disagree strongly with them, this does not justify their exclusion. 
Hate-speech is not harmful but merely represents the point of view of a person or groups 
of persons who are expressing their opinion and such opinions can be countered with 
other ideas. 
 
This is where the issue of censorship has its origins. Those seeking to regulate hate 
speech argue that such speech is, in fact, harmful: it is not a question of ‗just words‘, but 
rather of words that actually hurt the people they are addressed to. Matsuda writes about 
the ‗―deadly violence that accompanies the persistent verbal degradation of those 
subordinated…‖ and later remarks that ―Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and 
disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group.‖ ‗(in Butler, 1997: 166) 
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Butler disagrees with the notion that the state should intervene to prevent such speech: it 
is not that Butler denies that hate speech can injure and hurt those towards whom it is 
directed but rather a question of strategy. Her view is that leaving hate-speech within the 
public domain provides a better way of dealing with it for the conditions that make hate 
speech possible are also those that make ‗defiant‘ speech possible. It is defiant speech 
that can challenge and defuse the harm of hate speech. 
 
Proponents of state censorship claim that hate-speech is harmful, that the person toward 
whom it is directed undergoes an injury.  This raises a number of questions: how does 
language have this force to injure others? Where did this force come from? To answer 
this question Butler turns to Austin‘s theory of speech acts where she sums up the 
difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as follows:  
 
the former are speech acts that, in saying do what they say, and do it in the moment of that saying; the latter 
are speech acts that produce certain effects as their consequence; by saying something, a certain effect 
follows. (1997: 3) 
 
Butler‘s argument centers upon the temporal difference between them: while 
illocutionary acts are immediate and their happening instantaneous, perlocutionary acts 
occur later, their effect taking place at a different temporal moment.  
 
But while the illocutionary act takes place at the moment of its utterance, its force is 
derived from elsewhere. Following Austin‘s analysis, the power that gives illocutionary 
utterances their force is derived from the institutional framework that specifies the words 
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or formula that is to be uttered, the persons who can utter them and the circumstances 
within which they can be uttered. If a speech act derives its force from previously 
established conventions, then it is much harder to identify what Austin calls the ‗total 
speech situation‘ that he claimed was necessary for an understanding the speech acts.  
 
Butler argues that if the difference between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act is 
one of time – the former occurring immediately and the latter happening later – then, 
(given that illocutionary acts are the result of conventions or what she calls ‗historicity‘), 
it is not the case that there is a direct and immediate effect between speech and conduct. 
The force that gives illocutionary acts their power is accumulated over time. The 
performative act ‗echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the 
repetition or citation of prior and authoritative set of practices.‘ (1997: 51) 
 
Whereas Austin thought that to understand a speech act one needs to examine the ‗total 
speech situation‘, it turns out that there is more to the total speech situation than he had in 
mind. Butler‘s introduction of the ‗historicity‘ that gives the illocutionary act its force 
transforms the present moment of the speech act to include both the past and the future. 
The historical derivation of the force shows that there is a space between the 
(illocutionary) act and conduct. As a result, the distinction between the illocutionary and 
the perlocutionary cannot be maintained since both can be construed as ‗effects‘, the 
former of its (vertical) historical development, the latter of its (horizontal) temporal 
recognition. And this constellation of past, present and future gives signs their potential 
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for unexpected meanings; an utterance has the potential to transcend ‗the moment it 
occasions.‘ (1997: 14) 
 
In the case of hate-speech, it is the use and repetition of injurious names that constitutes 
their historicity. Injurious names carry their history with them, a history that 
 
has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name: the 
sedimentation of its usages as they have become part of the very name, a sedimentation, a repetition that 
congeals, that gives the name its force. (1997: 36)  
 
And it is because such hate speech has been used before in an offensive manner that we 
now know that it is offensive. It is by being used and re-used that it succeeds in acquiring 
its effects.  
 
The next step in Butler‘s strategy is to show that the censoring of hate-speech is mistaken 
because it is grounded in the belief that the illocutionary act always and necessarily 
succeeds in hurting the other.  Hate-speech theorists assume that the illocutionary act is 
always successful, that it efficiently achieves its effect of hurting the other: ‗a speech act 
is said to act – as efficacious, unilateral, transitive, generative.‘ (1997: 74). It is towards 
this assumption that Butler applies Austin‘s doctrine of infelicities to show that an 
illocution does not necessarily achieve its goal: as Austin pointed out, one feature of 
performatives is that they are vulnerable to ‗misfires‘ and ‗abuses‘. If this is the case, if 
hate-speech always has the possibility of failing to achieve its goal, of failing to hurt, then 
perhaps censorship is not the best way to counter hate-speech. 
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Paradoxically hate-speech theorists who attempt to censor certain terms fail to realize that 
in the process of taking these words out of their context they are creating new contexts 
through the process of repeating these words. And by repeating these words in different 
contexts, they are taking the ‗sting‘ out of them: they are using these words not to hurt, 
but to exemplify, to educate, or to seek legal redress. In other words, they are deflating 
hate-speech and it is this, rather than censorship, that Butler thinks is a more productive 
approach to hate-speech. The way a sign can be defused through a process of re-
signification can be seen (for example) in the way the word ‗nigger‘ was appropriated by 
the black community and used as an expression of identity rather than humiliation. 
 
Butler‘s critique of hate-speech theorists is further developed in her critique of the 
subject. It would seem that hate-speech posits a subject as the origin of hate-speech who 
in turn uses it to hurt the other. It should be recalled that while Butler is critical of the 
notion of the sovereign subject, this does not absolve users of hate-speech from their 
responsibility. Care should be taken not to equate responsibility with sovereignty: the 
speaker is responsible for the language he/she uses even if it is language that transforms 
the speaker in into a subject.   
 
Her argument against the sovereignty of the subject relies on the work of Althusser and 
his concept of interpellation. According to Butler, the use of speech by a figure of 
authority inaugurates the subject, so it is language that constitutes the subject. Although 
this view contrasts with that of Austin who assumes that the subject is prior to the speech 
act that he/she uses, Butler argues that for hate-speech to have its injurious effects, it 
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must be necessary to take on Althusser‘s account of interpellation of the subject, for if 
there is no subject then how can words hurt anyone? As a result, Althusser‘s account of 
the interpellation of the subject, ‗appears to constitute the prior condition of those 
subject-centered speech acts that dominate Austin‘s domain of analysis‘ (1997: 24) 
 
According to Althusser, a person becomes an ideological subject as a result of his/her 
response to the voice of authority hailing him/her. His example is that of a police officer 
who calls out to a person with ‗Hey you there‘ and the person, recognizing that he/she is 
being address is transformed or constituted into a subject.  This enables Althusser and 
Butler to argue that the subject is linguistically constituted, is an effect of, rather than 
being positioned outside of, or prior to language. But Butler‘s further point is that while it 
might seem that the police officer is a sovereign power, he is actually citing or repeating 
formulas that are already in existence. For the citational address to be effective the 
policeman must rely upon the context and convention of address: ‗the police cite the 
convention of hailing‘ (1997: 33) using a language that pre-exists them and of which they 
are not in control. 
 
Butler adds to the Althusserain analysis by arguing that (a) the subject can be 
interpellated without consciously knowing it; (b) the person is subjectivised even when 
he/she resists, refuses or counters the terms that are being addressed to him/her; (c) 
interpellation does not require an actual person, such as the policeman in Althusser‘s 
example, but can be the system itself that interpellates with its bureaucratic forms, 
adoption papers, etc. Here we can see the parallels between interpellation and 
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illocutionary speech acts: both rely upon established conventions; for interpellative and 
illocutionary acts to work, they must belong to a conventional system that pre-exists the 
subject. 
 
The Althusserian model of interpellation makes it possible to explain hate-speech. 
Through the act of calling the other with a hurtful name, the other is transformed into a 
social being. Butler generalizes this argument to include non-harmful interpellations: 
these are also injurious because the act of constituting persons as social subjects creates 
certain possibilities and denies others. When the doctor utters ‗it‘s a girl‘, the child is 
being interpellated or constituted as a female subject with all the possibilities (or lack of) 
that this entails. 
 
Contrary to the popular view of the subject as the originator or author of his/her 
discourse, Butler argues that the subject is produced as an effect of discourse. As the 
subject uses offensive language, he/she is produced as a racist or sexist subject at the 
same time as he/she transforms others into ‗sexualised‘ or ‗raced‘ beings. The racist or 
sexist subject is produced because of the ‗long string of injurious interpellations‘ that pre-
exist him/her and that are already used in a sexist or racist manner: the subject is not at 
the origin of the discourse but rather an effect of it: the „subject who “cites” the 
performative is temporarily produced as the belated and fictive origin of the performative 
itself‟ (1997: 49)  
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Although Butler does admit that there are times when hate-speech should be prosecuted 
she does not offer a detailed account of when this should occur. The reason for this lack 
is that her focus is directed mainly towards the institutionalization of hate-speech as 
opposed to the individual one-on-one interaction that underlies the claims of 
responsibility made by hate-speech theorists. Thus, while racists and sexists are 
responsible for their utterances, Butler‘s point is that the language they are using is not 
their responsibility but rather an inherited language, although this does not justify their 
using it. 
  
Butler promotes counter-speech as a form of resistance to hate-speech:  
 
the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a 
theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relentless search for legal remedy. The 
interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition and resignification of the utterance 
possible, but shows how words might, through time, become disjointed by their power to injure and 
recontextualized in more affirmative modes. (1997: 15).  
 
While Butler‘s critical analysis is directed at the concept of the subject as a sovereign in 
control and able to calculate the effects of his/her utterances, this does not entail an 
elimination of agency. Rather, it is the elimination of the subject as traditionally 
conceptualized that makes possible her radical views of agency and resistance. Using the 
Derridean critique of the context and the related notion of iteration, Butler argues that 
agency is possible because hate-speech can be appropriated and made to re-signify: the 
agent can transform hate-speech into a tool of political subversion and used to challenge 
those that attempt to injure. Butler writes, ‗Such reappropriations illustrate the 
vulnerability of these sullied terms to an unexpected innocence; such terms are not 
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property; they assume a life and a purpose for which they were never intended.‘ (1997: 
161) 
 
In her critique of the censoring of hate-speech by state, Butler elaborates what it is about 
the state and its exercise of power (through the courts) that she considers a hindrance to a 
more democratic politics. She claims that 
 
(a) the state is arbitrary in the operation of power: Butler reaches this conclusion after 
examining the decisions taken by the American Supreme Court with particular 
reference to R.A.V vs. St. Paul. She contends that in their decision on racist hate-
speech the Supreme Court made it harder to prosecute those who burnt a cross in 
front of an African American home, (racist hate-speech) while making it easier to 
prosecute obscene hate-speech, i.e., declaring oneself to be homosexual in the 
military was tantamount to being obscene and therefore liable to prosecution. Clearly, 
the courts were not neutral in their judgments. 
 
(b)  The state increases its power by being allowed to adjudicate on hate-speech. 
Allowing the state to decide (through the courts) which type of speech is permitted 
and which type is forbidden is another way of entrusting it with more power. It is, 
after all, the courts that decide what is to count as ‗hate-speech‘ in the first place, and 
while there is a difference between the Courts‘ judgments on racist and sexist 
discourse and the state‘s decision on what constitutes the content of hate-speech, 
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Butler‘s argues that attempts to challenge the state  have tended to result in 
discrimination against the very groups it was supposed to protect (1997: 97-98). 
 
(c) State regulation decreases the possibility for re-signification within the public 
domain. Butler argues that state censorship has the effect of diminishing the potential 
for re-signification by dictating what can and cannot be said. Her vision of an 
alternative democratic practice is one where there is no state involvement with the 
result that the threat of hate-speech can be challenged, undermined or used to 
empower in the process of re-signification within the public domain. (1997: 108) 
 
Butler‘s disagreement with the notion that the state should intervene to prevent such 
speech is based on her radical vision of democratic politics. It should be pointed out that 
question of resignification has been challenged by Salih who argues that just because a 
person ignores or resignifies an abusive term, it still depends upon the abuser to 
recognize that he/she has been ignored or that the term is not being used in the same way.  
If the abuser fails to recognize this then nothing much seems to have happened, in the 
same way as the meaning of a word doesn‘t depend upon what one person decides to 
make it mean. It seems that some kind of ‗semantic consensus‘ is needed for 
resignification to be effective (2002:  115).   
 
Critical Remarks 
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Austin has been subjected to a number of critical comments both with regard to his 
philosophical method and in relation to his theory of speech acts. Hanfling (2003:26-37) 
points out that Austin did not help reject the charge that his contributions were ‗merely 
verbal‘ which would imply that his method did not contribute to the resolution of 
philosophical problems. So too, Austin claims that his analysis is not the ‗last word‘ but 
rather the ‗first word‘ for the analysis of philosophical problems. However, Hanfling 
points out that the words that Austin examines are the ones that are currently in use, so as 
it turns out the ‗end‘ and the ‗beginning of philosophical analysis revolve around the 
same words.  A more serious criticism of Austin‘s method of focussing upon words is the 
view that words and the world are two separate entities with words representing the world 
so that an examination of words should reveal a better understanding of the world
iv
. 
Hanfling asks: if this is the case then why not look at the world directly so that the 
‗inadequacies and arbitrariness‘ of words can be avoided? Take Austin‘s examination of 
the difference between ‗succumb to temptation‘ and ‗losing control of oneself‘;  here he 
was clarifying the different uses of these words to describe differ forms of behaviour, but 
to bring out the differences between them it is not necessary to contrast them against a 
non-verbal world.  
 
In relation to the details of Austin‘s analysis of language, Friggieri (1991: 155-158, 161-
2) raises two important points: (a) the distinction between primary or implicit 
performatives and explicit performatives misled Austin. The similarity of the 
grammatical form  (the first person singular in the present perfect tense) led him to think 
that they both belonged to the same category, whereas they belong to different categories: 
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(a.1) the reference of the primary performative is an object or name (the reference of ‗I 
name this ship...‘ is the ship) while the reference of the explicit performative is the 
content of the sentence (in the utterance ‗I warn you that the bull is about to charge‘ the 
reference of ‗I warn you‘ is ‗the bull is about to charge‘ i.e., it makes explicit the force of 
the primary utterance)
iv; (a.2) Austin‘s primary performatives had been conceptualised 
within the framework of non-linguistic or institutional conventions, whereas the explicit 
performatives were not bound by these non-linguistic or institutional conventions, so the 
‗mishaps‘ that were characteristic of the former were not surprisingly inapplicable to the 
latter;  (b) so too, Austin is mistaken in thinking that the use of verbs to make an action 
explicit do not themselves describe that action: on this account, the emphasis of ‗I 
promise to come tomorrow‘ is not on the act of promising, but on the content i.e. ‗that I 
will come tomorrow‘. Friggieri (166-168) points out that in these utterances the speaker 
is also saying what he/she is doing (promising) but the emphasis is on what is said 
through the act of promising
iv
. 
 
Graham (1977: 108-9) points out that the interesting question that Austin‘s work raises 
for other disciplines concerns the degree to which one can achieve an accurate translation 
of their texts. Take (for example) intercultural communication, history or the social 
sciences: while it might seem that to understand the past, another culture or another 
people, the requisite is that one can get to the core meaning of their texts, i.e., in Austin‘s 
terminology the locutionary content, what he demonstrates is that the illocutionary force 
of utterances in other cultures is not necessarily the same as ours. Problems with 
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interpretation are common enough with utterances in one‘s own culture, so one can 
imagine how these problems increase with distances of space and time. 
 
In this chapter I have first (a) outlined the method that Austin used in the analysis of 
philosophical problems. The second section (b) introduces the key distinction between 
constative and performative utterances, and the next section (c) describes Austin‘s 
criticism with the performative class, a criticism that leads (d) to his re-configuring this 
distinction into the new speech act theory. The last section (e) broadens the study of 
speech acts to the domain of social analysis.  
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...in cases where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, we 
tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would 
be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit in 
with some purpose he obviously has (e.g. a man who calls for a ―pump‖ at a fire would not want a bicycle 
pump). Nonlinguistic parallels are obvious: context is a criterion in settling the question of why a man who 
has just put a cigarette in his mouth has put his hand in his pocket; relevance to an obvious end is a 
criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull. (1989: 222) 
 
Grice: On The Theory of Conversation 
 
The primary contribution of H.P. Grice (1913-1988) to the philosophy of communication 
can be found in his theory of conversation which focuses on the analysis of language in 
everyday contexts of interaction and the implications that arise in its usage. He was the 
first who directed attention towards the value of inference in communication, a view that 
was adopted by later pragmatists. The kinds of inferences Grice was interested in were 
those that cannot be deduced from the actual content of an utterance but belong to the 
complete process that enables comprehension between participants to take place. 
 
Grice can be situated within the debate in the philosophy of language on whether 
meaning should be understood in terms of formal linguistic rules or formal semantics 
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(Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, Chomsky) or in terms of context of use and 
participants (the later Wittgenstein, Austin). The debate between the two approaches to 
linguistic meaning can be understood in the difference between what people say and what 
they mean since it frequently happens that these two do not coincide. This disjunction 
between what is said and what is intended poses the problem of how to study language. 
The first group of philosophers think that since everyday language can lead to such 
difficulties, it would be best to study it at a formal level: it is therefore the logical 
meaning and not the everyday meaning that should be emphasised. Using deductive 
inferences, logic studies the transition from premises to conclusions that are 
automatically generated. This view of what constitutes the study of language is associated 
with Russell who dismisses ordinary, everyday language as such a ‗messy‘ affair that it 
cannot be considered a proper field of study. On the other hand, philosophers such as the 
later Wittgenstein did not consider everyday language as flawed in any way, but rather, 
argued that the question of meaning should be grounded in the way language is used in 
the contexts of everyday life; to focus on the logical meaning of language is to abstract it 
from such contexts. 
 
Grice‘s position in the debate is singular in that while he rejects the idea of language as 
dependent upon truth-conditions, i.e., the formal semantic view, he was not wholly 
persuaded by the idea that the use of language in everyday life was the best way to 
understand meanings. Although a member of the ordinary language philosophy 
movement, Grice still thought that logic could help with explaining conversational 
meaning.  
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Throughout his career Grice wrote a number of essays that have been collected into a 
volume entitled ‗Studies in the Way of Words‘ (1989) and it is this volume that I shall be 
referring to when I examine his writings. In the first section (a) I focus on the relationship 
between intention and meaning and follow this (b) with an analysis of conversational 
interactions concerning perceptual statements that reveal the way these could be true, but 
misleading. The next section examines (c) Grice‘s theory of conversation followed by (d) 
the relationship between the tools of logic and implicatures that can be raised within 
conversational settings. The final section (d) describes a number of areas within which 
Grice‘s work has been fruitfully applied. 
 
1.0. Meaning and Intention 
 
Although Grice was clearly influenced by the work of J.L. Austin there are a number of 
differences between them: (a) Grice agreed with Austin on the value of ordinary 
language, but he considered Austin‘s approach, with its reliance on particular linguistic 
examples, as failing to differentiate between what is philosophically important from what 
is philosophically trivial. Grice himself attempted Austin‘s method of going through the 
dictionary to analyse the language of emotions but gave up at the end of the letter B when 
he realised that the verb ‗to feel‘ could also be used with ‗Byzantine‘; (b) while Austin 
favoured remaining at the level of describing linguistic uses Grice wanted to put together 
these descriptions to formulate a general theoretical account; (c) Grice also retained the 
327 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinction between the meaning of words and the way words are used, while Austin 
emphasised use at the expense of sentence meaning. 
 
In ‗Meaning‘ (1989: 213-224), Grice‘s central thesis is that an account of meaning must 
be offered within the explanatory framework of the speaker‘s intention to mean 
something when he/she is communicating ‗...the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to 
be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular 
occasions...‘ (1989: 217) The analysis of meaning is seconded to the use of language for 
communicating intentions. 
 
Grice applies the method of ordinary language philosophy to analyse the concept of 
meaning to see the different ways it is used. He concludes by grouping the different uses 
into two sets. The first set is that of natural meaning where we find sentences such as 
‗those spots mean measles‘ and ‗the recent budget means that we shall have a hard year‘. 
Natural meaning explains events that are symptomatic so that it is natural that the spots 
on a patient mean that he/she has measles and that the slashes in the budget mean that we 
will not have much money spend next year. The second set is that of non-natural meaning 
(or meaningNN) where we find sentences such as ‗[t]hose three rings on the bell (of the 
bus) mean that ‗the bus is full‘ and ‗[t]hat remark, ‗Smith couldn‘t get on without his 
trouble and strife‘ meant that Smith found his wife indispensable‘. (1989: 214) In this 
case non-natural meaning is linguistic meaning where something is meant by being 
uttered; the speaker means something with the utterance so that when he/she utters ‗the 
patient has measles‘ there is no natural relation between the patient and the measles.  
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When the expressions ―means,‖ ―means something,‖ ―means that‖ are used in the kind of way in which 
they are used in the first set of sentences, I shall speak of the sense, or senses, in which they are used, as the 
natural sense, or senses, of the expression in question. When the expressions are used in the kind of way in 
which they are used in the second set of sentences, I shall speak of the sense, or senses, in which they are 
used, as the nonnatural sense, or senses, of the expressions in question. I shall use the abbreviation ―means 
nn‖ to distinguish the nonnatural sense or senses. (1989: 214) 
 
The differences between these two sets are specified as follows: 
 
(a) in the first set, the sentence entails the truth of what is said. This, however, is not the 
case with the second set for while it does not make sense to say ‗[t]hose spots mean 
measles but he hasn‘t got measles‘, (the first set) it is perfectly possible to say ‗[t]hose 
three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full‘…. ‗[b]ut the bus isn‘t in fact 
full ---the conductor has made a mistake.‘(1989: 213-214)  
 
(b) it would seem strange to say that the speaker who uttered ‗those spots mean measles‘ 
intended to communicate something more by the spots. There is no question of trying to 
further understand the intentions of the speaker. On the other hand, with the second class 
of examples it would not be strange to say that the speakers intended to mean something 
more by their utterance: the ‗rings on the bell‘ mean or communicate that there is no 
more place on the bus; likewise, the speaker – remarking about Smith – intended to 
communicate Smith‘s dependence on his wife.  
 
(c) finally, it is only with the second set of examples that we can add ‗mean‘ followed by 
quotation marks: ‗those three rings on the bell ‗mean‘ the bus is full‘ but we cannot say 
‗those spots ‗mean‘ measles‘.  
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It should be pointed out that although the difference between these two classes is 
characterised by Grice as a difference between natural and non-natural meaning or 
meaningNN‘ the latter it is not restricted to linguistic meaning. Grice uses ‗utterance‘ in a 
broad sense such that it includes non-linguist meaning: human behaviour which is used to 
communicate something to someone on a particular occasion is also an utterance
iv
. In the 
later ‗Utterer‘s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning‘ (1989: 117-137) this 
view is specified: ‗I use the term ―utter‖ (together with ―utterance‖) in an artificially wide 
sense, to cover any case of doing x or producing x by the performance of which U meant 
that so-and-so.‘ (1989: 118) 
 
In his analysis of meaningNN, Grice considers causal explanations of meaning as similar 
to behaviourist accounts of meaning, an account that he firmly rejects. The causal 
explanation of meaning was suggested by C.L. Stevenson, and although Stevenson did 
not favour a strict behaviourist account of meaning on the ground that it was too 
simplistic, he did assume a causal model when explaining linguistic meaning. Stevenson 
had argued in Ethics and Language (1944) that a sentence such as, ‗John is a remarkable 
athlete‘ causes in the listener the effect of associating ‗athlete‘ with ‗tallness‘. This is 
obviously not a linguistic rule but an association that the sentence suggests: ‗we should 
not ordinarily say that it ‗meant‘ anything about tallness, even though it ‗suggested it‘ (in 
Chapman 2005: 65). Grice‘s reply is that it is possible to talk about ‗non-tall athletes‘ 
without contradicting oneself. The trouble with Strawson‘s account, as Grice shows, is 
that given the notion of suggestion, all forms of behaviour might be considered as 
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communication, including those forms of behaviour that we would not normally consider 
as communication. For example, putting on a tailcoat might lead to the belief that one is 
about to go dancing because we conventionally associate tailcoats with dancing. But just 
because we conventionally associate wearing tailcoats with dancing, it does not meanNN 
that this is what is being communicated.  
 
....the causal theory ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of 
what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions; and so the latter notion, which is 
unexplained by the causal theory, in fact the fundamental one. (1989: 217) 
 
This explains why the concept of intention is crucial to the Gricean account of meaning. 
Intentionality provides the framework for understanding communication by shifting the 
emphasis away from conventional behaviour. It is the intention to mean rather than the 
convention that explains what is meant through the act of communication.  
 
It seems that another major influence upon Grice‘s paper is that of Peirce (Chapman, 
2005: 71-72). The starting point of Grice‘s analysis concerns Peirce‘s use of the term 
‗sign‘ that he equates with ‗means‘: by using ‗means‘ Grice is able to bring out the 
similarities as well as differences with Peirce‘s concepts of ‗index‘ and ‗symbol‘. Using 
the following sentence, ‗the position of the weathercock meant that the wind was North 
East‘ to analyse the category of index, Grice brings out two important points: (a) that it 
truly was a north east wind; and (b) that there was a causal connection between the wind 
and the weathercock.  
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However, if instead of ‗means‘ one says ‗the position of the weathercock was an 
indication that the wind was North East, but it was actually South East‘, it is clear that 
‗was an indication‘ cannot be used interchangeably with ‗means‘: ‗indication‘ does not 
entail the truth of what is said. Likewise, the word ‗mean‘ does not necessarily imply a 
causal relation: if one says ‗the position of the weathercock meant that the wind was 
North East‘ then, in this case, there is a causal relation between the weathercock and the 
North East wind. But if during a conversation at a bus stop one says, ‗those three rings of 
the bell meant that the bus was full‘, there is no causal connection since one might ask 
‗was it full?‘ By applying the method of ordinary language philosophy, Grice concludes 
that the way Peirce uses the term ‗sign‘ is not consistent with everyday usage. 
 
Grice introduces a distinction between the ‗timeless meaning of an utterance‘ and what 
speakers mean to communicate with these utterances i.e., the ‗utterer‘s occasion 
meaning‘. Although Grice seems undecided on whether meaning is something stable (or 
‗timeless‘) or whether it depends upon the speaker, he eventually places greater emphasis 
on different levels of intentionality and communication.  
 
This account of intentionality is further developed since it is realized that it is not only the 
speaker‘s intention that is important, but equally important is the hearer‘s recognition of 
that intention. When a speaker wants to produce a certain effect or a belief in a hearer the 
speaker both intends to communicate meaningNN and he/she intends that his/her 
intention be recognised by the hearer as the communication of certain information. It is 
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the recognition of this intention that causes the speaker to accept or change his/her 
beliefs. His analysis here concerns descriptive sentences:   
 
―A meantNN something by x‖ is (roughly) equivalent to ―A intended the utterance of x to produce some 
effect in an audience by means of the recognition of that intention‖; and we may add that to ask what A 
meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect...(1989: 220) 
 
Grice‘s main contribution to understanding what is entailed by the concept of 
communication is the recognition of the speaker‘s intentions by the hearer. He introduces 
a number of examples that highlight the pivotal role of intentionality and its recognition 
in communication: the difference between ‗I show Mr X a photograph of Mr Y 
displaying undue familiarity to Mrs X‘ and ‗I draw a picture of Mr Y behaving in this 
manner and show it to Mr X,‘ is that in the former, the effect upon Mr Y (surprise, anger) 
would still take place irrespective of the intention to communicate the meaningNN: 
seeing the photo is enough. In the case of the latter, it is the intention to communicate that 
characterises the example: the art of drawing is my way of communicating my intentions 
to reveal or expose Mr Y‘s behaviour, and it is this that would normally be considered as 
communication.  
 
Likewise, intentionality plays an important role in the types of communication that 
influence the actions of others. Take Grice‘s example of the policeman who stops the car 
by standing in front of it: the action of stopping the car will take place whether the 
motorist recognises the policeman‘s intention or not. On the other hand, when the 
policeman waves the car to stop, an act of communication has taken place because this 
depends upon the motorists‘ recognition of the wave as an act intended to communicate 
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the message of stopping. Grice identifies two levels of meaningNN: first, and primarily, 
in the relation between the speaker, the listener and the context where intentions are 
communicated and recognised; second, and derived from the first, is the meaningNN of 
words and phrases. 
 
However, despite conventional meaning being secondary to intentional meaning, Grice 
adds that the way some intentions are recognised cannot be included as part of the 
meaningNN: ‗if (say) I intend to get as man to do something by giving him some 
information, it cannot be regarded as relevant to the meaningNN of my utterance to 
describe what I intend him to do.‘ (1989: 221) As Grice points out, the actual explicit 
formulation of the intention is ‗comparatively rare‘ but, should there be any doubt about 
the intention, the context serves as a useful way of understanding it: 
 
Again, in case where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, 
we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternative 
would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit 
in with some purpose he obviously has (e.g. a man who calls for a ―pump‖ at a fire would not want a 
bicycle pump). (1989: 222) 
 
2.0 Conversational statements:  ‘true but misleading.’ 
 
A clue to the development of Grice‘s theory of language can be seen in his paper ‗The 
Causal Theory of Perception‘ (1989: 224-247) where he offers a defence of the causal 
nature of perception. Traditional empirical theory maintains that if our knowledge is 
derived from our senses, then it is this sense-data that we are immediately aware of. 
While it has been presumed that the material world is the cause of the sense data, there is 
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no way of proving with certainty the existence of the material world since all we have 
access to is the sense-data and not the material world. Grice defends this scepticism of the 
material world arguing that it is a challenge that should not be dismissed out of hand, but 
listened to.  
 
However, the value of the discussion on sense data is that of offering insights on 
language-use: when one utters the sentence ‗so and so‘ looks Q [red] to me‘ one is 
assuming that the notion of sense data is relevant otherwise there  is no way of explaining 
the subjectivity of the experience. Grice calls such statements ‗L-statements‘, and his 
general argument is that if I perceive a red object, then this objects causes me to ‗seem to 
see something red‘: he claims that L-statements are ‗true whenever a perceptual statement 
is true‘ (989: 227) since the perceptual statement entails the L-statement. 
 
When someone makes such a remark as ―It looks red to me,‖ a certain implication is carried, an implication 
which is disjunctive in form. It is implied either that the object referred to is known or believed by the 
speaker not to be red, or that it has been denied by someone else to be red, or that the speaker is doubtful 
whether it is red, or that someone else has expressed doubt whether it is red, or that the situation is such 
that though no doubt has actually been expressed and no denial has actually been made, some person or 
other might feel inclined toward denial or doubt if he were to address himself to the question whether the 
object is actually red. (1989:227) 
 
L-statements make sense only if one is doubting or denying the sense-data: when a 
speaker says ‗it looks red to me‘ this utterance can only be construed as an answer to a 
query on the colour and Grice points out to the strangeness of the speaker ‗saying ―that 
looks red to me‖ (not as a joke) when I am confronted by a British pillar box in normal 
daylight at a range of a few feet.‘ (1989: 227) The speaker would only say ‗it looks red to 
me‘ if someone else was doubting or denying the colour. 
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But, the conditions of doubt and denial are not part of the meaning of L-statements and 
this is why the implication of L-statements is ‗canceallable‘. This point can illustrated 
with another of Grice‘s examples from a non-perceptual angleiv: when a tutor is asked to 
write a report on the standard of philosophy of his student and his response only mentions 
the student‘s excellent use of English and regular attendance at tutorials, it is evident that 
he is implying that the standard of the student‘s philosophical ability is not worthy of 
note. However, if the tutor goes on to say, ‗I do not of course mean to imply that he is no 
good at philosophy‘, then clearly the implication is cancelled with the qualification. In 
the case of L-statements, and the aforementioned example, Grice shows the way a 
statement might be true, even if misleading.  
 
To explain this use of language, Grice offers both a weaker and a stronger account: in the 
weaker case, if there is no doubting or denial involved, then the sentence demonstrates a 
plain misuse of language. In the stronger case, if there is no doubt or denial and Q has the 
relevant property (red) this use is misleading even if true. Grice resolves the question in 
favour of the second case as it seems more applicable to language in general. He 
formulates a general principle of language-use as the ‗preference to the making of a 
stronger rather than a weaker statement in the absence of a reason for not doing so.‘ 
(1989: 236) The difference between perceptual statements and L-statements is that 
perceptual statements are stronger since they entail L-statements while L-statements do 
not entail perceptual statements. To utter an L-statement when one could utter the 
stronger perceptual statement is misleading even though, as such, the L-statement is not 
untrue. On the causal theory of perception, L-statements are always true, even though 
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using them in everyday contexts of communication is misleading. In his later writings on 
the maxims of conversation, Grice replaces the principle of the stronger and the weaker 
with the maxim of relevancy.  
 
Chapman (2005: 96) describes the benefit of the principle of the ‗stronger‘ as twofold (a) 
it is prescriptive  in that it recommends the way language should be used and (b) it allows 
for reasonable exceptions since in terms of Grice‘s overall project the principle would 
provide an explanatory account of language rather than merely provide a list of linguistic 
rules. Grice‘s conclusion regarding the use of the language of sense data is that it is 
legitimate to use such statements because they are true irrespective of whether one is in a 
condition of doubt or denial, and, although true, people tend to avoid using them because 
they are misleading.  
 
3.0. The Theory of Conversation 
 
In the 1960s Grice‘s research focused on the difference between speaker and sentence 
meaning paying special attention to the context of speaker meaning:  
 
Philosophers often say that context is very important. Let us take this remark seriously. Surely, if we do, we 
shall want to consider this remark not merely in its relation to this or that problem, i.e., in context, but also 
in itself, i.e., out of context. If we are to take this seriously, we must be systematic, that is thorough and 
orderly. If we are to be orderly we must start with what is relatively simple. Here, though not of course 
everywhere, to be simple is to be as abstract as possible; by this I mean merely that we want, to being with, 
to have as few cards on the table as we can. Orderliness will then consist in seeing first what we can do 
with the cards we have; and when we think that we have exhausted this investigation, we put another card 
on the table, and see what that enables us to do. (in Chapman, 2005: 96) 
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From the aforementioned passage Grice emphasises the values of systematicity and order 
as a counterweight to the tendency of some ordinary language philosophers – Austin, 
being a case in point - to produce open-ended lists without some form of generalization.  
 
Grice‘s operating strategy for the analysis of context consisted in narrowing it to 
linguistic contexts i.e., to conversational situations with two persons in the changing roles 
of speakers and hearers. The model of conversation adopted by Grice is one whereby 
meaning is communicated by one speaker to one listener with the aim of producing some 
effect on that listener. It seems that on Grice‘s account the goal of communication can be 
defined in terms of the values of success and effectiveness. (Cosenza, 2001: 20) 
However, while Grice acknowledges the position of the hearer in the process of 
conversation, his account is structured in terms of the contributions of the speaker‘s 
intention to communicate a meaning to a hearer. In this respect, the hearer‘s contribution 
to the conversation is limited to the recognition of the speaker‘s intentionsiv: 
 
 A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows: ―He has 
said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative 
Principle; he could not be doing this unless the thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he 
knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me 
thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has 
implicated that q‖. (1989: 31)  
 
Although Grice restricts the concept of context to conversational exchanges, he does use 
some ideas from non-linguistic situations: in the situation of two persons passing through 
a gate it is expected of the first person to hold or leave it open for the second. Should the 
first person shut the door without any good reason then this would be considered rude. 
Just as helpfulness is a normal expectation in human behaviour, so too, helpfulness is part 
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of our conversational behaviour, especially since conversations are joint, collaborative 
ventures between partners: both partners share a mutual goal and therefore help each 
other in achieving this goal.  
 
Grice later changes the terminology of ‗helpful‘ to that of ‗co-operative‘: in trying to 
understand the nature of this co-operative activity, Grice uses the terms ‗object‘ and 
‗desiderata‘ to describe the principles that regulate the behaviour within a conversation. 
There are two desiderata (a) of candour where speakers should, as a rule, make the 
strongest possible statements with the qualification that they do not attempt to mislead; 
(b) of clarity where speakers should contribute to the conversation by speaking clearly 
and by providing relevant information to the conversation. Other principles that formed 
part of the conversational setting are (i) the principle of Conversational Benevolence 
where contributions to a conversation are geared towards the agreed principle of 
conversation and (ii) the principle of self-love where the participants will not go to 
unnecessary trouble towards their contribution. These principles will later be renamed 
Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner where this loose assemblage of principles are 
united into a generalised schema.  
 
Grice‘s theory of conversation mapped out a new area of study in the philosophy of 
language. As such, he preferred using the term ‗conversation‘ rather than that of 
‗communication‘ and it was only subsequent critics who labelled his work as a attempt at 
elaborating a theory of communication (Cosenza, 2001: 20). Although studies in the 
philosophy of language were divided into a concern with either the formal analysis of 
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language or towards speaker meaning and intention, Grice argued that both could be 
subsumed under a broad principle that explained all human behaviour (linguistic and non-
linguistic behaviour) as directed towards a goal. In ‗Logic and Conversation‘ he develops 
this theme and introduces the Cooperative Principle: ‗Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.‘ (1989: 26). When people 
communicate they expect to achieve certain purposes and in order to achieve them they 
follow a number of principles or maxims. For Grice, conversation implies co-operation 
between participants and he lists four maxims that they should follow in the pursuit of 
understanding: 
 
The category of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the 
following maxims:  
 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative that is required. 
 
…. Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim---―try to make your contribution one that is true‖---
and two more specific maxims: 
 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 
Under the category of Relation I place a single maxim, namely, ―Be relevant.‖ Though the maxim itself is 
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what 
different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how 
to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on.  
 
…under the category of Manner, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is 
said, but rather, to how what is said is to be said, I include the supermaxim---―Be perspicuous‖---and 
various maxims such as:  
 
1. Avoid ambiguity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4. Be orderly. 
 
And one might need others. (1989: 26-27): 
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Grice offers some examples of the aforementioned maxims: 
 
1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more 
nor less that is required. If, for example, at a particular state I need four screws, i expect you 
to hand me four, rather than two or six. 
2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an 
ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt; if I 
need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber. 
3. Relation. I expect a partner‘s contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at each 
stage of the transaction. If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a 
good book or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later 
stage). 
4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making and to execute his 
performance with reasonable dispatch.  (1989: 28) 
 
The difference between what is said (the literal meaning)  and what is meant (or as Grice 
says ‗implicated‘) can both be explained and resolved by an appeal to the principle of co-
operation: listeners can and do re-interpret literal sentences to achieve the goal of 
successful communication. It is by integrating these principles of language use that Grice 
hoped to create a broad philosophical theory of language.  
 
While Grice favours the analysis of language in a particular context, he is critical of the 
notion that sentence or conventional meaning has one ‗meaning‘. The concept of 
sentence meaning is analysed as  
 
a) the ‗what is said‘, where the speaker is committed to the truth of what is said. 
 
b) the conventional implicature where it is not the speaker intention but the words that 
generate the implicature. If we compare the following sets of examples: (i) Set A: 
‗she was poor but honest‘ and ‗he is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave‘ with (ii) 
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Set B: ‗she is poor and honest‘, and ‗he is an Englishman and brave‘.  The meaning of 
the Set A is not the same as the meaning of Set B since it is only in Set A that the idea 
of contrast and consequence are introduced. As a result we would not say the 
sentences in the Set A are false, though we would consider them to be misleading. 
With conventional implicatures Grice shows how it is the conventional meanings of 
words that can implicate. 
 
c) conversational implicatures are those implicatures that result from the fact that 
something is being said. With conversational implicatures participants in a 
conversation ‗add‘ to the actual utterance so as to achieve understanding. One can say 
the participants go beyond the ‗surface‘ of the utterance to fill in what has been 
implicated. For example, ‗A says ‗Smith doesn‘t seem to have a girlfriend these days‘ 
and B replies, ‗He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately‘. B‘s reply does 
not seem relevant to A‘s remark but the relevant connection can be made because B is 
conversationally implicating that A has a girlfriend in New York.  
 
The opposition between ‗conventional implicature‘ and ‗conversational implicature‘ is 
fundamental. In the case of conventional implicature, it is the meaning of the words that 
determines the implicature, but in the case of the conversational implicature, the meaning 
is inferred from the context and the observation of the principle of co-operation. With 
conversational implicatures, it is not what is said that is the goal of the conversation but 
what is meant and conversational implicatures are generated when a maxim is not 
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fulfilled. There is therefore a close connection between the principle of co-operation, 
maxims and conversational implicature. 
 
Grice lists the different ways in which a maxim can fail to be fulfilled: 
 
a) a maxim can be ‗violated‘ deliberately: this is the situation of people who don‘t say 
what they mean but pretend to be open and transparent. The list includes liars, con-
artists, grifters, tricksters. Although they violate the maxims uncooperatively they still 
have reasons for their behaviour. 
 
b) a participant can ‗opt out‘ by not following the relevant maxim, ‗He may say, for 
example, I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.‘ (1983: 30). Again, the participant 
has reasons for not saying what he/she means and therefore opts out of cooperating in 
the conversation. 
 
c) a participant might be faced with a ‗clash‘ of maxims so that to fulfil one maxim 
entails a clash with another one. So the maxim of quantity (be informative) is in 
conflict with the maxim of quality (have adequate evidence for what you say).  
 
d) a participant may ‗flout‘ a maxim where he/she blatantly fails to fulfil it without 
however trying to deceive, opt out or resolve a clash of maxims. In this case, the 
participant does not say what he/she means but hints at it in such a way that the hearer 
understands what the speaker means. It is these ‗floutings‘ of the maxim that are 
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typical of conversational implicatures and it is these that Grice focuses on by offering 
a number of examples that demonstrate that ‗though some maxim is violated at the 
level of what is said, the hearer is entitled to assume that that maxim, or at least the 
overall Cooperative Principle, is observed at the level of what is implicated.‘ (1989: 
33) In these conversations the speaker is un-cooperative at the level of what is said. 
Again the example of the Professor‘s reference for the student who has applied for a 
job in philosophy: ‗Dear Sir, Mr X‘s command of English is excellent, and his 
attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.‘ (1989:33) This example shows 
that that co-operation is not taking place at the level of what is said, but at the level of 
what is implicated: the maxim of quantity is flouted by not giving enough information 
and therefore producing the implicature in which the professor is indirectly saying or 
implying that the student is not good at philosophy  
 
For the hearer to figure out the conversational implicature a number of features must be 
taken into account. These include: the conventional meanings of the words; the principle 
of co-operation and its maxims; the linguistic and non-linguistic context; any background 
information; and that the participants are aware of the aforementioned features (a-d). 
 
4.0. Logic and Conversational Implicatures. 
 
In ‗Indicative Conditionals‘ (1989: 58-85) Grice discusses the relationship between logic 
and natural language arguing that no ‗such divergence exists‘ while focussing primarily 
on conditionals (although he does discuss other logical constants to a lesser degree). 
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Chapman suggests (2005: 106-107) that the target of Grice‘s paper is P. Strawson who in 
Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) states that the logical implication ‗p>q‘, is very 
different from the way it is used in ordinary everyday language. The use of ‗if, then‘ in 
ordinary language suggests a causal connection between the antecedent and the 
consequent: when we say ‗if it rains, then the party will be a failure‘ the suggestion seems 
to be that one is causally connected to the other. There is the further possibility, 
according to Strawson, that when the ‗if, then‘ formula is used in everyday life the 
speaker is expressing some doubt about the ‗if…‘ or he/she knows that it is false. As a 
result Strawson concludes that while the ordinary language use of ‗if, then‘ entails its 
logical counterpart, the contrary is not the case: there is more to ordinary language usage 
than can be accounted for by the logical form.  
 
Grice disagrees with Strawson and he introduces the ‗Indirectness Condition‘ to describe 
the causal connection between p and q. For Grice, (Chapman, 2005: 107) the literal 
meaning of ‗if p then q‘, of the ‗what is said‘ on any particular occasion of utterance, is 
simply equivalent to the logical meaning of ‗p>q‘. He argues that the casual connection is 
a conversational implicature and can therefore be cancelled out by the context or by 
denial.  
 
To say ―If Smith is in the library, he is working‖ would normally carry the implication of the Indirectness 
Condition; but I might say (opting out) ―I know just where Smith is and what he is doing, but all I will tell 
you is that if he is in the library he is working.‖ No one would be surprised if it turned out that my basis for 
saying this was that I had just looked in the library and found him working. The implication is also 
contextually concealable, that is, I can find contexts which, if known to participants in a talk-exchange, 
would make an explicit cancellation unnecessary.‘ (1989: 59) 
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The question Grice tackles concerns how implicatures produce the indirect condition. His 
first answer refers to the maxim of Quantity which enjoins us to use the stronger or more 
informative statement in our conversations. In this case, the more informative statement 
would be ‗p and q‘ rather than ‗if p then q‘. In the weaker case, there is no definite 
information about the truth values of p and q the use of ‗if p then q‘ leads (unless 
cancelled by the context) to conversational implicature. The same argument apples to 
other logical forms: (for example) ‗p or q‘ has common features with the logical form ‗p 
v q‘ but the ordinary language-use leads to conversational implicatures. The 
conversational implicature arises because it seems strange to use ‗p or q‘ if both p and q 
are known to be true. While the truth conditional meaning of the logical form ‗p v q‘ 
states that at least one of the propositions should be true, in the conversational use of ‗p 
or q‘ it is implied that not both are true. If both were true it would, within a 
conversational setting, be better to offer ‗p and q‘ since this would be providing more 
information.  
 
Grice‘s second answer to the question of how conversational implicatures are produced is 
the way they contribute to everyday human interaction. The use of conditionals enables 
people to understand the choices available to them, though these uses depend upon the 
context: it does not make sense to say on a hot sunny day, ‗if it is hot and sunny, I shall 
go to the beach‘? Likewise, the use of disjunctions helps people in everyday life to think 
about alternatives: this or this other possibility. it would not ( for example)make sense to 
say at 4.30 pm, ‗which show shall we go to? The 3.00 pm or the 6.00 pm show?‘  
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In ‗Presupposition and Conversational Implicature‘ (1989: 269-282), Grice returns to the 
question of expressions that refer to non-existing things picking up the debate between 
Russell and Strawson. Here, Grice applies once again his theory of conversation to 
traditional philosophical problems retaining the overlap between logic and language-use 
rather than their opposition. Chapman (2005) points out that when this paper is read 
within the larger context of Grice‘s writings it can be seen as part of a study of the way 
language refers to the world with the question of reference as pivotal to the philosophy of 
language.  
 
In the theory of descriptions Russell had argued that in  
 
(a) ‗the King of France is bald‘, the sentence entails that there is one unique person (the 
king of France) and this unique person is bald. 
 
(b) ‗the King of France is not bald‘, it is possible to deny that there is one unique person 
(i.e., there is no King of France) and that this unique person (who does  not exist) is not 
bald. According to Russell, this sentence is ambiguous. 
 
Strawson challenges the supposed ‗ambiguity‘ that Russell claims, on the grounds that in 
everyday language-use, ‗the King of France is not bald‘ means that there is a King of 
France who is not bald: speakers are committing themselves to the existence of the King 
of France while denying his baldness. The ambiguity of the kind Russell claims rarely 
crops up in everyday conversation,  
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when one is asked such a question as whether the king of France is, or is not, bald, one does not feel 
inclined to give an answer; one does not feel very much inclined to say either that it is true that he is bald or 
that it is false that he is bald, but rather to say things like The question does not arise or He neither is nor is 
not bald, etc.‘ (1989: 269) 
 
Grice‘s response and defence of Russell focuses on the different types of commitment by 
speakers to ‗the existence of the King of France‘ and to his ‗baldness‘.  These, Grice 
argues, do not necessarily involve the same kind of commitment. Grice‘s defence 
involves pointing out the distinction between (a) the use of negation when applied to the 
whole sentence (it is not the case that the King of France is bald): in this sentence there is 
no commitment to the King of France or to the baldness; and (b) the use of negation 
when applied to the latter part of the sentence (‗the king of France is not bald‘): in this 
sentence, there is no commitment to the baldness. Russell‘s theory of descriptions allows 
for two sentences that entail a commitment to the existence of the King of France: (a) the 
positive assertion (the king of France is bald) and (b) the sentence that denies only his 
baldness (the king of France is not bald). 
 
But, Grice points out, ‗without waiting for disambiguation, people understand an 
utterance of ―The king of France is not bald‖ as implying (in some fashion) the unique 
existence of the king of France (1989: 272)‘. The denial of the commitment to the 
existence of the King of France only occurs in the denial of the whole sentence. Such a 
denial, Grice argues, is not the result of logical entailment, but rather the result of 
conversational interaction. The implicature arises on account of the form or way that the 
speaker formulates his/her utterance: it belongs therefore to the category of Manner. 
However, Grice adds a new element when he says, ‗―Frame whatever you say in the form 
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most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate‘; or, ―Facilitate in your 
form of expression the appropriate reply.‖‘ (1989: 273) The point here is that 
participation in conversation should take into account the range of possible responses. 
This further reinforces Grice‘s defence of Russell against Strawson since it can be argued 
that the speaker did not frame the utterance in such a way that allows for a possible reply. 
Strawson had argued that upon hearing ‗the King of France is bald,‘ the hearer would not 
say false but be nonplussed as to what you were talking about. But when the speaker 
utters ‗the King of France is bald‘ one of the possible replies does not include denying the 
existence of the King of France because information or knowledge that is commonly 
shared is not usually denied.  
 
This leads Grice to distinguish between common knowledge and controversial 
information: 
 
[f]or instance, it is quite natural to say to somebody, when we are discussing some concert, My aunt‟s 
cousin went to that concert, when we know perfectly well that the person we are talking to is very likely 
not even to know that we have an aunt, let alone know that our aunt has a cousin. So the supposition must 
be not that it is common knowledge but rather that it is noncontroversial, in the sense that it is something 
that we would expect the hearer to take from us (if he does not already know). That is to say, I do not 
expect, when I tell someone that my aunt‘s cousin went to a concert, to be questioned whether I have an 
aunt and, if so, whether my aunt has a cousin. This is the sort of thing that I would expect him to take from 
me, that is, to take my word for. (1989:274) 
 
In both the positive and negative sentences, it is not the existence of the King of France 
that is being challenged or considered controversial but the baldness.  
 
5.0. Applied Grice 
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One area in which Grice‘s analysis seems especially amenable to is that of popular 
culture and what makes plays, TV shows, films interesting to watch occurs as a result of 
the violating, infringing and opting out of the maxims of conversation. While the ideal of 
clarity in the everyday use of language is important for mutual understanding, within 
popular culture the use of language with the ideal of clarity would lead to boredom. It is 
not difficult to recall situations in films where the protagonist needs to convince the 
addressee to reveal what they know so as to save (for example) someone else or the 
environment. The participant fails because the addressee refuses to cooperate by saying 
nothing i.e. by opting out; or the addressee misleads the protagonist by shifting attention 
to something else (rather than communicating the information he/she knows): this is a 
violation of the maxim of quantity. 
 
In Logic, Laughter and Laughter-Provocation (2006) Cassar examines, among other 
issues, the way laughter is generated. She suggests that although one way of explaining 
laughter-provocation could be that of examining what Grice calls ‗utterer-meaning‘,  this 
might not be a fruitful approach, as the question of meaning itself is broader than the way 
Grice conceptualised it. As a result,  
 
It follows that the first imperative task that has to be carried out in order to determine the meaning of 
laughter-provocation is to establish what laughter is, since only then can the investigation of the 
mechanisms, logical or otherwise, which connect provocation and response be undertaken, taking into 
account the diversities of both ends of the operation. (2006: 13) 
 
In other words, it is not enough to examine Grice‘s codes or maxims and argue that 
laughter-provocation is the result of inverting these codes because these codes are framed 
as ways of achieving effective communication. Merely inverting them would only result 
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in restricting our understanding of the way laughter can be provoked without any 
guarantee that this would be successful: (for example) by breaking Grice‘s maxim ‗Be 
relevant‘ one does not necessarily produce laughter. Cassar concludes by pointing out 
that an account of laughter provocation is limited if it focuses on Gricean codes as such 
an account fails to take into consideration the temporal process underlying the generation 
of laughter. 
 
Critical Remarks 
Although Grice is remembered mostly for his theory of conversation it should be added 
that his contributions to philosophy were wide ranging, offering solutions to problems in 
the fields of epistemology, perception, and ethics. However, while he applied his theory 
of conversation to these fields, he never used actual conversations in his analysis of 
language-use. Over time Grice realised that rationality plays in important part in his 
theory of conversation: by following the Co-operative Principle a person was behaving 
rationally by pursuing the goals of a conversation. It was this rational activity that 
constituted the very essence of human life that Grice tried to explain. And this is why the 
criticism that Grice‘s theory of conversation - as failing to take into account the 
conflictual nature of actual conversations - might be misplaced: as a rationalist, he was 
attempting to outline the conditions that allow for the production of meaning and 
effective communication, rather than an empirical description of actual conversations. 
 
Hanfling (2000: 186-8) argues that although Grice champions the cause of ordinary 
language in the analysis of philosophical problems, as it turns out, the analysis 
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undermines ordinary language. In his account of perception and L-statements, he 
supports his arguments with a number of ingenious examples but the result is that he 
employs a very non-ordinary use of everyday language. In this case, the meanings that 
are attributed to certain words such as ‗seem‘ or ‗see‘ deviate from their everyday 
ordinary use. So too, the principle that the stronger statement should be adopted over the 
weaker one is challenged: according to the theory, one should not say that ‗Grice is in 
England‘ if I knew ‗Grice is in Oxford‘ but if both contribute equally to the 
conversational exchange then – unless one had a point for doing so – there is no inherent 
reason for choosing the stronger statement and not the weaker one. 
 
Grice also argues in favour of thesis that to understand the meaning of an utterance one 
must understand what the speaker intended by that utterance and in so doing eliminating 
the class of locutionary acts; in other words, he reduces the sense of the utterance to the 
force or the way that it is used. Again, Friggieri points out (1991: 199-204) that 
understanding the way the speaker intends to use the sentence, presupposes an 
understanding of what the sentence means so that to understand the utterance ‗You‘re 
standing on my foot‘ as a request to get off my foot, you must first understand the 
meaning of the sentence.  
 
Chapman (2005: 191) points to a number of criticisms with Grice‘s account of language: 
(i) his failure to define conversation, taking it to mean language used in a context i.e. a 
number of sentences following each other without any empirical data; (ii) the theory of 
conversation was supposed to explain a number of traditional philosophical problems but 
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the casual conversations used seem to develop a life of their own with the point of their 
original introduction forgotten; (iii) on the one hand, Grice generalises from particular 
conversations, a generalization that is the result of describing what participants bring to 
the conversation, but on the other hand, he considers his maxims as rules that prescribe 
the way language should be used; (iv) Grice‘s conversations are between persons of equal 
social status and mutually interested in the exchange of information. However, not all 
conversations are of this kind and within different context (for example a university) 
participants resort to different maxims. 
 
The influence of Grice‘s writings has been chiefly achieved through the papers on 
‗Meaning‘ and ‗Logic and Conversation‘ and this success has been recognised by 
philosophers of language and linguistics. It is not uncommon to come across the term 
Gricean pragmatics even though he never used the term himself. It could be said that 
Grice‘s contribution to the debate between formal semanticists and pragmatists on the 
issue of literal meaning and speaker meaning is that of bridging the two through the 
Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims. In addition, the concept of 
conversational implicatures – a concept that includes the possibility of alluding, implying 
or insinuating something – highlights the difference between what speakers literally say 
and what they mean i.e.,  implicate. One way of evaluating Grice‘s place within the 
philosophy of language is by contrasting his views on language with those of Chomsky: 
Chomsky had argued that to understand linguistic meaning there was no need to take into 
consideration the use of language to communicate, arguing that it was not even necessary 
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to consider communication as the primary function of language. For Grice the opposite is 
the case:  the only way to explain language is from the point of view of communication. 
 
In this chapter I have outlined (a) the concepts of intention and meaning in Grice‘s 
philosophy of communication, followed by (b) his analysis of statements that are true but 
misleading within conversational settings. The next sections discuss (c) his theory of 
conversation and (d) the relation between the procedures of logic and conversational 
implicatures and (e) ending with a brief look at the way his ideas have been applied. 
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My claim that language is partly constitutive of institutional facts amounts to the claim that institutional 
facts essentially contain some symbolic elements in this sense of ―symbolic‖: there are words, symbols, or 
other conventional devices that mean something or express something or represent or symbolize something 
beyond themselves, in a way that is publicly understandable.  (Searle 1995: 60-61) 
 
 
Searle on The Intentionality of Speech Acts 
 
Throughout his career John Searle (1932- ) has focussed on a number of philosophical 
problems but he is chiefly known for his innovative contributions to three areas of 
philosophy: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of 
society. In this chapter, I am focussing mostly upon Searle‘s early studies of speech acts 
though I touch upon his philosophy of mind and of society when they overlap with 
language. Searle‘s theory of speech acts is an attempt to develop further the insights 
made by Austin with his groundbreaking work on speech act theory.  This development 
involves a description of the structure and processes that allow communication to take 
place.  
 
The tradition Searle draws inspiration from is that of analytic philosophy where an 
emphasis on detail is part and parcel of the practice of these philosophers. Searle 
however, differs from the typical analytic philosopher in that while analytic philosophers 
tend to avoid putting together their detailed arguments into larger wholes, Searle has no 
qualms about synthesizing his arguments into a ‗big picture‘. In the process of creating a 
synthetic philosophy Searle also incorporates the views of others and this has resulted in 
criticisms from many different quarters.   
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In this chapter, I start (a) by looking at the foundations of Searle‘s analysis of speech acts 
(intentionality and rules), followed by (b) an analysis of the structure of the speech act 
(reference and predication). The next section (c) outlines the conditions for the generation 
of speech acts and (d) his elaborate taxonomy that highlights the differences between 
speech acts which (e) culminates in a re-vamping of Austin‘s classification of speech 
acts; other (f) speech acts such as double and indirect speech acts are also examined.  The 
chapter ends with an examination (g) of the important concept of context and (h) an 
overview of the relation between language and society.  
 
1.0. Speech Acts: Intentions and Rules 
 
The starting point for Searle‘s analysis of linguistic communication is the speech act 
rather than the word or the sentence; for a speech act to count as an act of linguistic 
communication, ‗it must be produced with certain kinds of intentions.‘ (1969:16) 
Intentionality in communication marks the difference between linguistic communication 
and an emotional or non-verbal reaction. Saying ‗ouch‘ after bumping one‘s head is not 
an act of communication since one didn‘t intend to say it. The importance of intention 
within linguistic communication can be re-stated as follows: even if a squiggle and a 
sound were identical to a spoken or written word, unless there is an intention motivating 
the squiggle or word, then they cannot be considered acts of linguistic communication. In 
addition, the intentionality that characterizes speech acts is of a particular sort. There is a 
difference between understanding a speech act and understanding the arrangement of 
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furniture in a room: both entail understanding intentional behaviour, but of different sorts 
of intentions.  
 
The analysis of the intentions that are expressed through speech acts is a bit complex 
because intentions are, so to speak, multi-layered.   If, for example, I tell Peter ‗the movie 
starts at 9.00pm‘, there are a number of intentions taking place for not only do I intend to 
inform Peter about the time the movie starts, but I also intend Peter to recognise my 
intention. The recognition of my second intention is important because if I only intend to 
inform Peter about the actual time the movie starts, then I cannot be blamed if he thinks I 
am hurrying him up (it is not my intention to hurry him up). The third intention is 
connected to the rules of language: meaning is communicated by the rules of language 
and for communication to take place, Peter must understand the intentions expressed 
through the rules of the English language. This is why understanding a foreign language 
also entails understanding the intentions expressed through the rules of that language. If 
the rules were not recognised as an intention to communicate, then the fact that a message 
was communicated and understood would only be a fluke. 
 
Searle is aware of the distinction between what we say and what we mean. This is 
frequently labelled as the difference between speaker and sentence meaning. There are 
many situations where we know what the sentence means but, we still ask ourselves, 
what did the speaker intend by it? When Peter tells David ‗it‘s beautiful today‘ does he 
intend to describe the weather? Or suggest that they spend the day outdoors? Or both?  Or 
none? To resolve this issue Searle introduces the Principle of Expressibility whereby 
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‗whatever can be meant can be said‘iv. (1969: 19) The value of this principle is that the 
speaker, if need be, can help the hearer understand his intention by expressing it in a 
more direct way: the sentence can be re-stated so that speaker meaning and sentence 
meaning become one. 
 
We might express this principle by saying that for any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means 
(intends to convey wishes to communicate in an utterance, etc) X then it is possible that there is some 
expression E such that E is an exact expression of or formulation of X. (1969: 20) 
 
In addition, the principle of Expressibility shows that even in those cases where I cannot 
say exactly what I mean, it is always possible for me to do so either by –  if no term exists 
–  introducing it, or by learning more about the language. The importance of the principle 
for Searle is that it aligns the rules for performing speech acts with the rules for using 
certain linguistic units. He points out (for example) that studying the speech act of 
promising involves studying those sentences that are the literal and correct performance 
of a promise. (1969: 21) 
 
In his analysis of intentionality, Searle takes issue with Grice who considered the 
speaker‘s meaning as the intention the speaker has in producing an effect upon the hearer 
by getting the hearer to recognize that intention, ‗when i say ―hello‖, I intend  to produce 
in a hearer the knowledge that he is being greeted. If he recognizes it as my intention to 
produce in him that knowledge, then he thereby acquires that knowledge.‘ (1969: 43) 
Searle disagrees with this analysis offering two counter arguments: 
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The first counter-argument states that an account of speech acts must also take into 
account the rules and conventions of language. While Grice‘s account of intentionality 
and speaker meaning is useful as a starting point, it does not offer a complete picture of 
what is entailed as an act of communication. To illustrate his criticism, Searle offers the 
story of an American soldier captured by Italian troops in the Second World War In order 
to persuade his Italian captors that he is in fact German, the American soldier repeats the 
only sentence he knows in German, ‗Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen bluhen?‘ 
(1969: 44) His intention is to produce in his captors – as an effect of his utterance – the 
belief that he is German. But Searle asks, does uttering this sentence mean ―I am a 
German soldier?‖‘ (1969:44). The German sentence does not mean I am a German 
soldier even if that is what the speaker intends by it; what the words mean is also dictated 
by the language and the sentence uttered by the soldier means ‗ ―Knowest thou the land 
where the lemon trees bloom?‖ ‘ (1969:45) Searle elaborates, 
 
Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of convention. One might 
say that on Grice‘s account it would seem that any sentence can be uttered with any meaning whatever, 
given that the circumstances make possible the appropriate intentions….In the performance of an 
illocutionary act in the literal utterance of a sentence, the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by 
means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect; and furthermore, if he is using 
words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the 
expressions he utters associate the expression with the production of that effect. It is this combination of 
elements which we shall need to express in our analysis of the illocutionary act. (1969: 45) 
 
The second counter argument states that the focus upon the effects of the intention 
confuses perlocutionary acts with illocutionary ones: 
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--- many utterances have no perlocutionary effects. When one says ‗hello‘ to someone 
else, no action is being expected from the hearer except that he understands that what is 
said to him counts as a greeting. 
 
--- Grice‘s account is limited in that it applies to certain utterances, such as ―Get out‖ 
where there is a perlocutionary effect expected of the hearer, but fails to explain the 
differences between ‗I promise‘, ‗I predict‘ and ―I intend‘. 
 
--- I might say something and produce an effect without intending to produce that effect. I 
might say and mean ‗poverty is immoral‘ without the least interest in producing any 
effect upon the hearer. 
 
--- Telling someone to believe what I say because it is my intention to make him/her 
believe it does not qualify as a reason for believing it.  
 
Searle concludes: ‗the ‗effect‘ on the hearer is not a belief or response, it consists simply 
in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker. It is this effect that I have been 
calling the illocutionary effect.‘ (1969: 47) Strictly speaking, the perlocutionary effect 
should not be considered part of the speech act because the speech act has been 
completely executed.  
 
Given that language plays a crucial role in generating the meaning that is part of the 
communicative act, Searle proceeds with his analysis of language by defining it a ‗rule-
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governed form of behaviour.‘ (1969: 41) To belong to a linguistic community is to share 
in the rules that make linguistic meaning and communication possible. By learning the 
same rules, speakers of a language can communicate a message and have it understood 
by hearers. In his analysis of the rule governed nature of language, Searle distinguishes 
between regulative and constitutive rules.  
 
Regulative rules are those which regulate actions that already exist. The human action of 
eating exists independently of the rules, and yet there are rules that guide our eating 
habits; so too our interpersonal relations exist independently but there are rules of 
etiquette that guide our behaviour.  
 
Regulative rules characteristically take the form or can be paraphrased as imperatives, e.g., ―When cutting 
food, hold the knife in the right hand‖, or ―Officers must wear ties at dinner‖….Regulative rules 
characteristically have the form or can be comfortably paraphrased in the form ―Do X‖ or ―If Y do X‖. 
(1969:34) 
 
Constitutive rules differ in that with these rules we are creating the actual forms of 
behaviour out of nothing. One of the prime examples of constitutive rules is the playing 
of games: without the rules of football there would be no game as it is the rules that bring 
the game into existence. Without the rules there would be twenty-two men running 
around a field chasing a ball. The ‗formula‘ that captures constitutive rules is ―X counts 
as Y in context C‖ (1969: 35). There are two points that need to be kept in mind when 
understanding constitutive rules. The first is that the rules usually are a system of rules: it 
might be the case that one rule does not have the ―counts as‘ formula but when this rule is 
seen as part of the whole system, then it is the whole system that constitutes the ―counts 
as‖. ‗Thus, though rule 1 of basketball---the game is played with five players to a side---
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does not lend itself to this form, acting in accordance with all or a sufficiently large 
subset of the rules does count as playing basketball.‘ (1969: 36) The second point is that 
the Y term in the ―counts as‖ formulation is not a neutral term in the sense that it usually 
describes consequences: ‗―offside‖, ―homerun‖, ‗touchdown‖ ―checkmate‖ are not mere 
labels for the state of affairs that is specified by the X term, but they introduce further 
consequences, by way of, e.g. penalties, points, and winning and losing.‘ (1969: 36) 
 
Having established the importance of constative rules in understanding both games and 
language, Searle still needs to tackle the question of why and how it is that speech acts 
generate illocutionary force. How is it possible that the speech act of promising – which 
is fundamentally an act composed of words following the rules of language - creates an 
obligation? To answer this question Searle forwards these claims: 
 
(a) languages are conventional: to use a language is to use the conventions of that specific 
language, whether it is English or Swahili. 
 
(b) illocutionary acts are rule-governed: while there are some illocutionary acts that can 
be performed ‗naturally‘ by getting the viewer to recognise the intentions through the 
person‘s behaviour, this does not eliminate the fact that many perlocutionary acts cannot 
be performed without language. Not only would it be impossible learn complex issues, 
(an account of the computer systems of the space shuttle) but so too, Searle adds, ‗I wish 
to argue, some system of rule governed elements is necessary for there to be certain types 
of speech acts, such as promising or asserting.‘ (1969: 38-39). To highlight the difference 
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between the rule-governed nature of illocutionary acts and ‗natural‘ forms of behaviour, 
Searle points out that the rules for making a promise or asserting etc cannot produce a 
natural effect. To state, ―I have a headache‖ is very different from actually having a 
headache as I can have a headache whether I state it or not. 
 
(c) languages are rule-governed. While particular languages use their own conventions, 
each language follows the ―same‖ underlying rules, ‗The fact that in French one can 
make a promise by say ―je promets‖ and in English one can make it by saying ―I 
promise‖ is a matter of convention. But the fact that an utterance of a promising device 
(under appropriate conditions) counts as the undertaking of an obligation is a matter of 
rules and not a matter of the conventions of French or English.‘ (1969: 39-40) 
 
2.0. Referring and Predicating 
 
A speech act has two components: reference and predication. In ‗Sam smokes habitually‘ 
(1969: 22) the speech act refers to, or is about ―Sam‖ and it predicates ―smoking‖ of him. 
Together, referring and predicating constitute a Propositional Act i.e., what we are talking 
about. On its own the Propositional act fails to show its communicative value so that an 
account of communications must include an account of what the speaker intends to do 
with his speech act.  This is why the Propositional Act is coupled with an Illocutionary 
Force Indicating Act: the latter tells us what type of speech act the sentence is, i.e., 
whether it is a question or an assertion, or a request. Together, the illocutionary force 
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indicating act and the propositional act form the basis for the process of verbal 
communication. 
 
In both his analysis of reference and predication, Searle‘s introduces a number of 
conditions that bring out their respective features.  In the case of reference some 
preliminaries should be noted: referring requires that the normal input and output 
conditions are in place so that to refer requires that the speaker can vocalise the words 
and that the hearer can hear them; so too, referring belongs to a larger speech act since 
the act of referring takes place as we are communicating. The conditions outlined by 
Searle that enable reference are: 
 
(a) the first condition is the axiom of existence and it states that proper referring entails 
that the object referred to exists. So when talking to my friends about my new plasma 
television set I am referring to a specific object that we are both admiring. If I do not own 
a plasma television set, then a condition for referring successfully has failed. 
 
(b) the second condition is the principle of identification and it refers to the way an object 
can be re-described. Thus, to talk or refer to an object, we can use the demonstrative 
‗that‘ and point to it, ‗that (pointing to the television set) is mine‘. Or, we can also 
describe the object so that it stands out from other objects in the room saying, ‗the flat 
screened, 30 inch thing hanging on the wall is mine‘. Both conditions (a) and (b) enable 
us to pick out objects during the course of our communication. 
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(c) the third condition for successful referring is that of intentionality. The speakers must 
(i) intend to use words and sentences that point to an object and (ii) want the hearer to 
recognise both the intention to refer to the object and the intention that the speaker has in 
referring to the object. This recognition is achieved through the rules of language that 
both speaker and hearer share in common. Searle, in explaining this point, asks us to 
imagine this situation, ‗I may call my hearer‘s attention to an object by throwing it at 
him, or hitting him over the head with it. But such cases are not in general cases of 
referring, because the intended effect is not achieved by recognition on his part of my 
intentions.‘ (1969: 95) 
 
A question that has drawn considerable attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of 
language is the problem of proper names. Some, Searle notes (1969: 162-164), have 
argued that a name functions as a label so that although it is attached to a person, it does 
not have any sense attached to it.  If this is the case, then how does it refer or point to 
persons who no long exist or who live far away? Searle responds to the problem posed by 
proper names by invoking the principle of identification. If we ask ‗who is Richard 
Nixon?‘, we answer by offering a number of descriptions that are attributed to that 
person. ‗…was a president of the United States‘, ‗…resigned on account of the Watergate 
scandal‘, etc. The benefit of Searle‘s account is that it enables a person to be described in 
many ways and yet these different descriptions still refer to the same person. 
 
Searle‘s analysis of predicating ties up with his account of referring. He adds three 
further conditions to those already mentioned:  
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(a) the first condition states that it is necessary to satisfy the condition for referring before 
we can predicate. This is obvious enough for we cannot predicate if what one is 
predicating does not exist. I cannot predicate successfully of the tiger that ‗it sure looks 
hungry‘ if there is no tiger.  
 
(b) the second condition describes the application of predicates. When I predicate a 
quality of an object, that predicate must be relevant to the object. It makes no sense to say 
‗the rock has died‘: to be able to predicate reveals that we know a lot about the world. 
 
(c) the third condition describes the application of the values true and false to all 
utterances. Searle‘s point is to show that not only assertions can be judged for their truth 
or falsity, but also requests, commands, promise etc. Whatever forms a predicate might 
have (as requests, promises, commands, etc) the values of truth and falsity still apply. 
When the general commands his troops, ‗attack the bunker‘, it is true that they have not 
yet attacked and it will be true once they do. This is an important point for Searle who 
shows how truth values apply to all uses of language and not merely one type.  
 
It should be noted that though predicates are important in that they bring content to the 
speech act, i.e., what the speech act is about, they still depend upon the way we talk about 
that content. In other words, it is the illocutionary force   that conditions the way the 
predicate is used (as an assertion or as a question or as a command). This highlights the 
difference between predicates and reference for although referring is also about part of a 
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speech act, what is referred to is independent of the speech act. To sum up, understanding 
predicates involves both understanding the content and the illocutionary force.  
 
3.0. Conditions for Speech Acts 
 
Given that Searle accepts Austin‘s view that speech acts are used not only to describe 
facts but to do things, he considers it fundamental for the study of speech acts to outline 
the conditions that are necessary for the understanding of speech acts. Although Searle 
offers a number of conditions, these can be reduced to four main ones:  
 
(a) the propositional content condition: this condition focuses upon the content of the 
speech act, on what it is about. It is the content that must satisfy certain conditions for 
it to be successful: promises (for example) must be future oriented, while apologises 
look to the past since we apologise for the things we have done. 
 
(b) the preparatory condition: these conditions vary, ranging across the different social, 
mental and physical states of the speaker and the hearer, and they must be in place  
before the speech act can be issued correctly. If you congratulate someone, something 
positive must have happened (although we can be sarcastic in our congratulations); 
and for the general‘s command to take effect, it must be directed at his inferiors not 
his superiors. 
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(c) the sincerity condition: this condition describes the speaker‘s relation to his or her 
utterance. A promise is sincere if I intend to keep it; a command is sincere if the 
general wants the soldier to do what he commands.  The sincerity condition can be 
satisfied in different ways and the conditions of satisfaction depend upon the type of 
speech act: promises and commands differ in their respective conditions of 
satisfaction. However, we are all familiar with people saying ‗I didn‘t mean it‘ as 
though that negates or justifies not keeping their promises. Searle disagrees arguing 
that a promise is a promise and the speaker who promises but fails to keep it is 
insincere.  
 
(d) The essential condition: the essential condition of a speech act is that it is intended. A 
promise is intended as a promise, and it therefore places the speaker under an 
obligation to do something; a command places the hearer under an obligation to 
follow some action. With the essential condition the speech act is intended to fulfil 
something linguistically. Searle considers this condition as the most important one. 
 
An analysis of speech acts must take into account what Searle describes as normal input 
and output conditions. Thus, (for example) for any speech act to take place both the 
speaker and the hearer must understand the same language, know what they are saying, 
do not suffer from any speaking or hearing impediment, etc. These do not actually 
contribute to the analysis of the various speech acts but are necessary for any speech act 
to take place. 
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Searle (1969: 66) offers a schema of the different types of illocutionary acts using the 
rules or conditions described above. I am here reproducing part of his schema. 
 
 
 
 
 Type of Rule  Request     Assert, state (that), affirm 
 
 
 Propositional Future act A of H    Any proposition of p. 
 Content 
 
 
Preparatory 1. H is able to do A. S believe  1. S has evidence (reasons, etc) for            
       is able to do A.            the truth of p. 
   2. It is not obvious to both S and H  2. It is not obvious to both S and h 
that H will do A in the normal that H knows (does not need to   
course of events of his own accord. be reminded of, etc.) p.  
 
 
 Sincerity S wants H to do A   S believes p. 
 
 
 Essential Counts as an attempt to get H to  Counts as an undertaking to the  
   do A.     effect that p represents an actual  
        state of affairs. 
 
Comment             Order and command have the addi-  Unlike argue these do not seem 
   tional preparatory rule that S must  to be essentially tied to  
   be in a position of authority over H. attempting to convince. 
   Command probably does not have  Thus ―I am simply stating 
   the ‗pragmatic‘  condition requiring  that p and am not attempting to 
   non-obviousness. Furthermore in  convince you‖ is acceptable, 
   both, the authority relationship   but ― I am arguing that p and 
infects the essential condition   not attempting to convince 
because the utterance counts as an   you‖ sounds inconsistent. 
attempt to get H to do A in virtue  
of the authority of S over H. 
 
 
4.0. Differences between Speech Acts 
 
Searle continues to develop the ideas he introduced in Speech Acts in a number of essays 
that comprise the book Expression and meaning (1985). In ‗A taxonomy of illocutionary 
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acts‘ (1985: 1-29) he provides a list of twelve ways in which these differences between 
speech acts can be generated, though some of these ways overlap with the conditions 
made in the earlier analysis of speech acts. The taxonomy accounts for the way speech 
acts can differ from each other. 
 
1) the point or purpose of the speech act.  
 
The point or purpose of an order can be specified by saying that it is an attempt to get the hearer to do 
something. The point or purpose of a description is that it is a representation (true or false, accurate or 
inaccurate) of how something is. The point or purpose of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an 
obligation by the speaker to do something. (1985: 2) 
 
This aspect is similar to the earlier essential conditions and the idea is that the speech act 
has an illocutionary point or purpose:  thus, (for example) in a promise, the speaker 
commits himself to what he has promised. Again Searle distinguishes between the 
illocutionary point and the illocutionary force. The latter is the broader term that includes 
within it the illocutionary point together with the other dimensions of speech acts. The 
illocutionary point concerns the effect of the speech act:  both a command and a request 
want the hearer to do something, but the way this is done, the ‗force‘ used to get the 
hearer to do what the speaker wants is different.  
 
2) the ‗direction of fit‘: the ‗direction of fit‘ describes the relation between the word and 
the world.  
 
Some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly, their propositional 
content) to match the world, others to get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the former 
category, promises and requests are in the latter. (1985: 3) 
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When the speech act fits or corresponds to the way the world is, then it has succeeded in 
describing the world: when I say ‗the door is shut‘ and the door is indeed shut, the 
direction of fit is word-to-world. There is also however, a ‗direction of fit‘ that goes in 
the opposite direction, the world-to-word. In this case the world must be changed to fit 
the word: if the door is open when I say ‗shut the door‘ then by shutting the door the 
world changes to match my utterance. Other possibilities include no direction of fit and a 
dual direct of fit.  
 
3) the psychological dimension. 
 
A man who states, explains, asserts or claims that p expresses the belief that p; a man who promises, vows, 
threatens or pledges to do a expresses an intention to do a; a man who orders, commands, requests H to do 
A expresses a desire (want, wish) that H do A; a man who apologizes for doing A expresses regret at 
having done A; etc (1985: 4) 
 
This dimension repeats Searle‘s earlier concern with the speaker‘s sincerity in expressing 
his/her utterances. The person who utters a belief, a promise or request must be sincere in 
his belief, promise or request: to fail to do so is not only inappropriate but abusive.  
 
4) the strength of the speech act. ‗Both, ―I suggest we go to the movies‖ and ―I insist that 
we go to the movies‖ have the same illocutionary point, but it is presented with different 
strengths.‘ (1985: 5) The strength or force of a speech act may vary - I might speak 
loudly or softly - but the illocutionary point remains the same. It still remains a promise 
whether I shout or utter it quietly. 
 
5) The status of speakers and hearers.  
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If the general asks the private to clean up the room, that is in all likelihood a command or an order. If the 
private asks the general to clean up the room, that is likely to be a suggestion or proposal or request but not 
an order or command. (1985: 5-6) 
 
Speech acts differ according to who is uttering them; this point concerns the social 
standings of the person so the utterances of the general differ from those of the private, 
etc.  
 
6) the interests of the speaker and hearer. ‗Consider, for example, the differences between 
boasts and laments, between congratulations and condolences.‘ (1985: 6) The speech act 
varies according to the situation of the speaker and hearer, so if a person gets a promotion 
then congratulations are in order, if a person is in mourning, condolences are appropriate. 
 
7) the utterance within the discourse. ‗Consider, for e.g. ―I reply‖, ―I deduce‖, ―I 
conclude‖, and ―I object‖. These expressions serve to relate utterances to other utterances 
and to the surrounding context.‘ (1985: 6) Certain speech acts are part of a larger set of 
speech acts or discourse. If I say, ‗I conclude‘ it is fairly obvious that other things have 
already been said. 
 
8) differences in propositional content. Speech acts are generated by devices that tell us 
the content of what is being uttered. ‗The differences, for example, between a report and 
a prediction involve the fact that a prediction must be about the future whereas a report 
can be about the past or present.‘ (1985: 6) Certain devices, such as verbs, can indicate 
whether the content refers to the future or the past  
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9) public and non-public issuing of speech acts. 
 
For example, one may classify things by saying ―I classify this as an A and this as a B‖. But, one need not 
say anything at all in order to be classifying; one may simply throw all the As in the A box and all the Bs in 
the B box. (1985: 6) 
 
Although some speech acts can start or end with ‗I classify this‘ or ‗I conclude that‘, this 
does not mean that what follows must be publicly stated. We can classify or conclude 
whatever we like without saying what is that we are classifying or concluding. On the 
other hand, it makes no sense to say ‗I promise‘ without publicly saying what it is we are 
promising; or issuing a command without publicly saying what the command is. 
 
10) institutional contexts: ‗[t]here are a large number of illocutionary acts that require an 
extra-linguistic institution, and generally, a special position by the speaker and the hearer 
within that institution in order for the act to be performed.‘ (1985: 7) Some speech acts 
require non-linguistic institutions to acquire their force. Excommunication requires the 
institution of the church; marriage requires either the church or the state. It is useful to 
keep in mind that language is also an institution, albeit different from non-linguistic 
institutions: a promise functions as a speech act on account of the institution of language 
that regulates what counts as particular kinds of speech acts.  
 
11) differences in illocutionary verbs having a performative use and not others.  Most 
illocutionary verbs have a performative use (stating, concluding, and pleading) but ‗one 
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cannot perform acts of, e.g., boasting or threatening, by saying ―I hereby boast‖ or ‗I 
hereby threaten.‖ Not all illocutionary verbs are performative verbs.‘ (1985: 7) 
 
12) differences of style in performance: the way the speech act is delivered can vary even 
though there might be no differences in the illocutionary point. ‗[t]hus, the difference 
between for example announcing and confiding need not involve any difference in 
illocutionary point or propositional content but one in the style of performance of the 
illocutionary act.‘ (1985: 8) Other stylistic differences are those between speaking and 
writing, or an academic use of language and ordinary language. 
 
5.0. The Classification of Speech Acts 
 
There is, however, more to the study of speech acts. It might seem that the study of 
speech acts is open-ended in the sense that there are an infinite number of speech acts 
without any order to them. Austin himself, towards the end of How to do Things With 
Words (1975) had suspected that despite the vast array of speech acts, it was possible to 
classify them into certain basic types. He proposed a tentative classification but died 
before this classificatory system could be established. In ‗A Taxonomy of Illocutionary 
Acts‘ (1985) Searle takes up and refines Austin‘s task. 
 
Searle is critical of Austin‘s attempt at classifying speech acts by concentrating on verbs 
in the first person, such as ‗I promise‘ or ‗I state‘ because in so doing, the difference 
between these speech acts is lost. By way of contrast, Searle‘s proposed list of 
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dimensions of speech acts brings out the differences between ‗I announce‘ and ‗I 
promise‘: ‗[a]nnouncing…is not the name of a type of illocutionary act, but of the way in 
which some illocutionary act is performed‘ (Searle 1985: 9). When we say ‗I announce‘ 
we are invoking the 12
th
 dimension because of the way we perform the speech act, its 
means of presentation.  
 
An examination of Austin‘s classification shows that it has no order to it but bounces 
around from one dimension to another. Searle demonstrates this confusion with his 
classification: 
 
(a) Commissives: Austin considers them a basic and fundamental category and he defines 
them as committing the speaker to a certain course of action. (1975: 157) It is as though 
by saying ‗I intend to go to the party‘ we are promising or committing ourselves. But, 
Searle rejects this, arguing that ‗I intend‘ is not a commissive but rather a description of 
what the speaker has in mind; it is a report of what he intends to do.  
 
(b) Expositives: according to Austin, expositives ‗are used in acts of exposition involving 
the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and 
of references.‘ (1975: 161) But what Austin calls expositives belong to Searle‘s 7th 
dimension where a speech act is part of a larger discourse.  
 
(c) Executives: Austin defines executives as ‗the giving of a decision in favour or against 
a certain course of action, or advocacy of it.‘ (1975: 155) Searle argues that these speech 
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acts can be explained by looking at the social status of the speaker and hearer(5
th
 
dimension), and also by locating them within an extra-linguistic institution (10
th
 
dimension). 
 
(d) Behabitives: according to Austin, ‗Behabitives include the notion of reaction to other 
people‘s behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes or an expression of attitudes to 
somebody else‘s past conduct or imminent conduct.‘ (1975: 160) Searle finds the 
behabitives ill-defined, arguing that they can be better explained with reference to the 
interests of the speaker or the hearer (6
th
 dimension), plus the expression of the 
psychological states of the participants (3
rd
 dimension). 
 
(e) Verdictives: ‗Verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, 
upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable. A 
verdictive is a judicial act as distinct from legislative or executive acts, which are both 
exercitives.‘ (1975: 153) Although Searle does not comment, Notion has commented that 
‗it should be clear that verdictives involve appeals to the 7th dimension (differences in 
relations to the rest of the discourse), the 10
th
 dimension (requiring extra-linguistic 
institutions) and perhaps the 5
th
 dimension (status of speaker and hearer).‘ (2000: 46) 
 
Searle‘s review of Austin‘s taxonomy shows its failings and the need for a more 
systematic account of speech acts. ‗What I propose to do is take illocutionary point, and 
its corollaries, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions as the basis for 
constructing a classification.‘ (1985: 12) He is critical of Austin‘s attempt at classifying 
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speech acts on the grounds that they are disorganised since there is no principle of 
explanation that tells us how to separate the different types of speech acts. Searle is not 
simply presenting a new taxonomy of speech act types but, and it is of fundamental 
importance, presenting a method that explains why one type is more fundamental than the 
other. Out of Austin‘s original list he only retains the commissives. 
 
(a) Commissives are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (again 
in varying degrees) to some future course of action.‘ (Searle 1985: 14) Searle agrees with 
Austin that commissives are the basic type of speech act because they are oriented 
towards what he has already emphasized as the point or purpose. However, there is more 
to Searle‘s account of commissives and he introduces the notion of the ‗direction of fit‘. 
A commissive has a world-to-word direction of fit so that the world changes to fit the 
words. By uttering and fulfilling a promise the world has changed to match the words.  
This can be schematised as follows: (C) represents the commitment, the arrow upwards 
the world-to-word direction of fit, and (I) the sincerity condition (of Intent), while (S does 
A) refers to the propositional content (in the future). 
 
C ↑   I (S does A) 
 
Commissives are the basic category because a number of dimensions apply to them, such 
as the point of the speech act, the direction of fit and the sincerity condition. Other 
dimensions can also play a secondary role, so that within the rubric of commissives 
variations (vows, swearing) can take place.  
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(b) Assertives:  ‗The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit 
the speaker (in varying degrees) to something‘s being the case, to the truth of the 
expressed proposition. All of the members of the assertive class are assessable on the 
dimension of assessment which includes ‗true and false.‘ (1985: 12). This can be 
schematized as: ├ represents the assertion, the downward pointing arrow describes the 
word-to-world direction of fit, (B) represents the sincerity condition (of belief) and p 
represents the propositional content: 
 
    ├ ↓ B (p) 
 
Like the commissives, the assertive category has a number of variations so that a number 
of other speech acts fit the assertive model. To say ‗I state‘ or ‗I affirm‘ is both to say that 
something corresponds to the world and also that the speaker believes in what he/she is 
saying. Variations take place if the speaker is unsure of what he/she says (the dimension 
of strength of point) or the speaker can complain about losing something (the dimension 
of interest to the speaker) or the speaker can be saying something that is part of a larger 
discourse (the dimension  of the rest of the discourse). 
 
(c) Directives: ‗The illocutionary point of these consists in the fact that they are attempts 
(of varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are determinates of the determinable 
which includes attempting) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.‘ (1985: 13). 
Directives can be schematised as follows: the exclamation mark (!) represents the 
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illocutionary point of getting the hearer to do something, the direction of fit is world-to-
word (↑), the sincerity condition W (of wanting action A to get done) and the 
propositional content showing it is the hearer who should do it (H does A). 
 
    ! ↑ W (H does A) 
 
Once again other secondary dimensions can come into play and these make variations 
possible. One, for example, can ask for something aggressively or politely (the fourth 
dimension) or one can ask something in virtue of one‘s institutionally defined status (the 
fifth dimension). 
 
(d) Expressives: ‗The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state 
specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional 
content‘ (1985:15). Other examples of expressives are, to thank, to congratulate, to 
apologise, to condole, to deplore, and to welcome. Searle‘s analysis of expressives is a 
subtle one in that it does not involve what we typically consider as responses to our 
emotions. Weeping with joy at having won the national lottery is not considered by 
Searle an expressive act of communication. Nor do expressives include saying what one 
did, as when I tell you how angry I was yesterday. This is a description or a report of an 
action. Expressive speech acts are those where linguistically one implies that one has had 
a certain emotion: to say ‗Good Morning‘ implies that the speaker has a positive, cheerful 
emotion, just as saying ‗I‘m sorry‘ implies that I have the emotion of sorrow. These are 
legitimate speech acts that can be schematized according as follows: (E) represents the 
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illocutionary point of expressives,  (Ø) represents the fact that there is no direction of fit 
for expressives, (P) represents the various psychological states and the propositional 
content is represented by (S/H + property) 
 
    E (Ø)    (P) (S/H + property) 
 
There are variations, as usual, in relation to the dimensions used: for example, winning 
the lottery and grieving at the loss of a close relative require different expressives: clearly 
the propositional content (the 8
th
dimension) and the interests of the speaker (the 6
th
 
dimension) come into play. Other variations can be produced with the 4
th
 dimension 
describing the strength of the illocutionary point. The strength of an apology can vary: 
there is a difference between brushing with someone in a corridor and crashing into 
someone else‘s car through neglect. 
 
(e) Declaratives:  
 
It is the defining characteristic of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings 
about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees 
that the propositional content corresponds to the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you 
chairman, then you are chairman; if I successfully perform the act of nominating you as candidate, then you 
are candidate; if I successfully perform the act of declaring a state of war, then war is on; if I successfully 
perform the act of marrying you, then you are married. (1985: 16-17) 
 
Declaratives are a unique type of utterance because once uttered they have the power to 
change things: when the couple are declared man and wife, in effect, they are married. 
Just by being uttered, the speech act changes the status or condition of the hearer. 
Declaratives are also unique in that they include both directions of fit: by uttering them, 
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one is bringing abut a change in the world and simultaneously the world is changing or 
‗adapting‘ to one‘s utterance. The schema for declaratives is as follows: (D) represents 
the illocutionary point of declaratives, the double arrow (↕) shows that the direction of fit 
is two-way (from world-to-word and vice versa at the same time); the symbol (P) 
represents the propositional content and the (Ø) represents the lack of sincerity condition.  
 
    D   ↕   (Ø) (P) 
 
The variations of the declaratives depend upon specific dimensions but probably the most 
important dimension concerns non-linguistic institutions as described by the 10
th
 
dimension. To declare war or to excommunicate someone requires that the relevant 
speech acts be embedded within an institutional framework such as the state or the 
church. Other variations on declaratives emerge relative to the social position of the 
speaker (the 5
th
 dimension) so that (for example) only the queen can knight certain 
personages.  
 
Searle‘s classification of speech acts accomplishes two goals: on the one hand it is broad 
enough to show the multiplicity of speech acts that can be found within natural language, 
and yet, on the other hand, it also creates an order or a system out of this multiplicity. The 
different speech acts – promising, requesting, baptizing, commanding, etc – can be 
grouped systematically with reasons offered as to why each speech act should be within 
its respective category.  
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The most important conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is this. There are not, as Wittgenstein (on 
one possible interpretation) and many others have claimed, an infinite or indefinite number of language 
games or uses of language. Rather, the illusion of limitless uses of language is engendered by an enormous 
unclarity about what constitutes the criteria for delimiting one language game or use of language from 
another. If we adopt the illocutionary point as the basis notion on which to classify uses of language, then 
there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try 
to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we 
bring about changes through our utterances. Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same 
utterance. (1985: 29) 
 
6.0. Complex Speech Acts: Double Speech acts and Indirect speech acts 
 
In his analysis of speech acts, Searle stated that he will follow the strategy of starting by 
examining straightforward speech acts to establish a basis for his theory while leaving 
complex speech acts to be dealt with later. In ‗Taxonomy‘ he began to examine non-
standard speech acts such as assertive declaratives: these are single speech acts that 
function doubly. By way of example, Searle describes the failed attempt by the runner to 
reach another base when the empire calls ‗You‘re Out‘ (1985: 19-20). This speech act is 
both an assertive since the umpire has passed the judgement that the ball reached the 
second base before the runner, but it is also a declaration since the status of the runner has 
changed from being in the game to out of the game. Assertive declarations can be 
schematised as follows:  
 
    D ↓ ↕ (B) p 
 
While (D) represents the declaratives, (B) represents the sincerity condition (of belief that 
characterises assertions), the arrow downwards represents the assertive direction of fit 
and the double arrow the declarative direction of fit.  
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In „Indirect speech acts‟ (1985: 30-57) Searle uses his theory of speech acts and his 
classification of speech acts to elaborate on the much used linguistic phenomenon of 
indirect speech acts. ‗The problem posed by indirect speech acts is the problem of how it 
is possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something 
else.‘ (1985: 31) When a person tells you, ‗You‘re standing on my foot‘, then he/she is 
not merely providing information that can be judged as true or false, but indirectly telling 
you to take your foot off theirs. In other words, they are issuing a directive even though at 
face value, the utterance is an assertive
iv
.  
 
What needs to be examined is the way indirect speech acts actually operate and how they 
can be explained within the framework of speech act theory. Searle offers the example of 
a dinner conversation between Dr. Phixum, an orthopaedic surgeon and his patient. When 
Dr Phixum asks ‗can you pass the salt?‘, is he asking about his patient‘s ability to literally 
lift the salt off the table?  If this were the case, then the patient would reply with 
something of the sort, ‗Yes today I can, though 3 days ago it would not have been 
possible‘. The patient‘s reply would consist of a series of assertives. However, if Dr 
Phixum actually wants to add salt to his food then maybe uttering an assertive (‗here you 
are‘), or just passing the salt silently would be sufficient. The conversational sequence in 
this example is that of a directive followed by an assertive should the patient respond 
verbally, with another directive involved if the salt is passed. 
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The following is a detailed and complex analysis by Searle of the ‗Can you pass the salt?‘ 
example. 
 
Step 1: Y has asked me a question as to whether I have the ability to pass the salt (fact about the 
conversation). 
Step 2: I assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his utterance has some aim or 
point (principles of conversational cooperation). 
Step 3: The conversational setting is not such as to indicate a theoretical interest in my salt passing ability 
(factual background information). 
Step 4: Furthermore, he probably already knows that the answer to the question is yes (factual background 
information). (This step facilitates the move to Step 5, but is not essential). 
Step 5: Therefore, his utterance is probably not just a question. It probably has some ulterior illocutionary 
point (inference from Steps 1, 2, 3 and 4). What can it be? 
Step 6: A preparatory condition for any directive illocutionary act is the ability of H to perform the act 
predicated in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts). 
Step 7: Therefore, Y has asked me a question the affirmative answer to which would entail that the 
preparatory condition for requesting me to pass the salt is satisfied (inference from Steps 1 and 6). 
Step 8: We are now at dinner and people normally use salt at dinner; they pass it back and forth, try to get 
others to pass it back and forth, etc. (background information). 
Step 9: He has therefore alluded to the satisfaction of a preparatory condition for a request whose obedience 
conditions it is quite likely he wants me to bring about (inference from Steps 7 and 8). 
Step 10: Therefore, in the absence of any other plausible illocutionary point, he is probably requesting me 
to pass the salt (inference from Steps 5 and 9). (1985: 46-7) 
 
Although Searle‘s rather elaborate breakdown of the speech act seems long it must be 
remembered that this takes place in an instant: just as behavioural acts can be broken 
down and re-described in terms of smaller acts that constitute one large act, the same 
applies to speech acts.  
 
However, some important considerations are introduced by Searle as he develops his 
account of indirect speech acts.  
 
a. An indirect speech act is a literal utterance. It is not a question of ambiguity since if it 
were ambiguous the hearer would ask for clarification. Rather it is (directly) a 
question about whether the hearer can pass the salt (his arm might be broken, there 
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might be no salt on the table, the salt container might be empty) and (indirectly) a 
directive to pass the salt. This explains why the hearer might respond to Phixum‘s 
question by saying ‗I cannot as my arm is broken‘; in this case he is responding to a 
question about his ability. Should he be able to physically lift the salt off the table, 
then (if he wants) he can also oblige Dr. Phixum and pass him the salt. What this 
shows is that indirect speech acts are indebted to speech act theory: for the indirect 
speech act to work what is directly uttered and indirectly implemented must be 
connected to certain preparatory conditions such as the speaker or hearer‘s abilities, 
wants, or social setting, or to the propositional content so that what is directly uttered 
can be connected to the indirect aspect of the speech act.  
 
b. In everyday life, indirect speech acts do not cause too much trouble since their 
frequency has given them an idiomatic status. Idioms are like formulas that listeners 
have no trouble identifying as conventional uses of language.  
 
c. Searle acknowledges the work of P. Grice who pointed out that the conversational 
setting required the co-operation of participants. In this case, the hearer co-operates 
with the speaker by understanding the indirect speech act; this is important because 
without the assumption of co-operation, it would be difficult to explain how speech 
acts worked.  
 
d. The broad picture Searle gives of indirect speech acts is that they are a polite way of 
talking rather, than the perhaps abrupt way a directive sounds. When (for example) 
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you want the hearer to leave your apartment there is a difference between saying ‗it‘s 
getting late now‘ and the harsh sounding, ‗Get out‘. The problem is that politeness 
makes it possible for the hearer to non-comply since he/she might reply ‗Yes it‘s late, 
but the movie‘s really good‘. Politeness works because it offers a choice, even 
though, the speaker really doesn‘t want the hearer to choose.  
 
The benefit of Searle‘s analysis of double speech acts shows that his classification can 
handle more sophisticated uses of language.  
 
7.0. Contexts. 
 
Unlike indirect speech acts where speaker and sentence meaning can be distinguished 
separately, literal speech does the opposite by bringing them together. The sentence says 
what the speaker means it to say and this applies to any of the speech act types listed in 
Searle‘s taxonomy: commissives, directives, etc. In literal sentences it is often claimed 
that the meaning of the sentence is independent of any contextual concerns, a view that 
has been called the ―zero or null context view‖. In ‗Literal Meaning‘ (1985 117:136) 
Searle explicitly rejects this view:  
 
I shall argue that for a large class of sentences there is no such thing as the zero or null context for the 
interpretation of sentences, and that as far as our semantic competence is concerned we understand the 
meaning of such sentences only against a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which the 
sentence could be appropriately uttered. (1985: 117)  
 
In his early writings, Searle‘s notion of preparatory conditions already indicated the 
importance of contextual considerations for the realisation of successful speech acts: thus, 
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to excommunicate someone requires a social and institutional context where the speaker 
has the authority to excommunicate; to promise something assumes that the speaker can 
fulfil the promise, that it is future oriented; to make assertive claims the speaker must 
provide some evidence.  
 
However, in ‗Literal Meaning‘ Searle is, making a further and stronger claim, a claim 
that describes the context independently of the preparatory conditions and beyond the use 
of reference.  
 
For a large class of unambiguous sentences such as ―The cat is on the mat‖, the notion of literal meaning of 
the sentence only has application relative to a set of background assumptions. The truth conditions of the 
sentence will vary with variations in these background assumptions; and given the absence or presence of 
some background assumptions the sentence does not have determinate truth conditions. These variations 
have nothing to do with indexicality, change of meaning, ambiguity, conversational implication, vagueness 
or presupposition as these notions are standardly discussed in the philosophical and linguistic literature. 
(1985: 125) 
 
When one says ‗The cat is on the mat‘ this sentence might seem context-free since it can 
be understood without needing to know anything about the context of its utterance. Searle 
wants to say that even if we ignore the referential aspects (this cat and this mat) and if we 
ignore the preparatory conditions of the speaker, there is still an underlying context 
playing its part in the sentence. This can be seen by the ‗on‘ in the sentence: by saying 
‗The cat is on the mat‘ we are assuming the existence of a gravity-conditioned world 
where cats can be on mats precisely because the laws of gravity are in operation. We also 
assume that the mat remains rigid on the floor even though it isn‘t rigid, and that the cat 
doesn‘t transform itself into another creature from minute to minute. Perhaps to avoid 
confusion or for the sake of clarity, it might be useful to add these taken for granted 
contextual features into the sentence itself. This, would be, however, an extremely 
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daunting task as (a) it would transform simple sentences into long and complicated ones 
and (b) each new sentence we bring would itself have a context and this would entail 
elaborating these other contexts ad infinitum.  
 
Searle re-enforces his argument concerning the implicit contextual assumptions operating 
and conditioning our speech acts with an example of a directive: the request for a 
hamburger with relish and mustard, etc carries with it a large amount of information 
related to ‗institutions of restaurants and money and exchanging prepared foods for 
money‘ (1985: 127). But the presence of the context can be brought out even in contexts 
that are not explicitly institutional,   
 
Suppose for example that hamburger is brought to me encased in a cubic yard of solid Lucite plastic so 
rigid that it takes a jackhammer to bust it open, or suppose the hamburger is a mile wide and is ―delivered‖ 
to me by smashing down the wall of the restaurant and sliding the edge of it in. Has my order ―give me a 
hamburger medium rare, with ketchup and mustard, but easy on the relish‖‘ been fulfilled or obeyed in 
these cases? My inclination is to say no, it has not been fulfilled or obeyed because that is not what I meant 
in my literal utterance of the sentence (1985: 127) 
 
The point about Searle‘s example is that we take it for granted that hamburgers are served 
in ways that allow them to be eaten. We never think of reminding the waiter that the 
hamburger should fit into the plate so that we can eat it.  
 
In Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983), Searle introduces a further 
distinction between the context as Network and the context as Background. Speech acts 
and mental states are not isolated, individual entities but part of, or connected to, other 
speech acts and mental states. Searle uses the example of a person deciding to run for 
political office: to do so and for us to understand what he/she is doing, it is necessary that 
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he/she does a number of things, such as announce his/her candidacy, is aware of the rules 
of eligibility, has the approval of a number of party members and so on. In other words, 
taking part in politics is part of a set of practices that have been elaborated upon by the 
political institutions of the land. The network, therefore involves an awareness of social 
and institutional conditions.  
 
Although the line separating the Network from the Background is not rigid, a useful way 
of distinguishing between the two is to say that the utterances related to the Network 
possess Intentionality, while those of the Background are pre-Intentional. The question 
Searle‘s analysis raises concerns our knowledge of the background: if it is pre-
Intentional, how do we know about it?  To answer this question Searle introduces the 
distinction between knowing that and knowing how arguing that it is the latter know-how 
that points to the background:  
 
The Background is a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that enable all representing to take place. 
Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, and thus only are the states that they 
are, against a Background of abilities that are not themselves Intentional states. In order that I can now have 
Intentional states that I do I must have certain kinds of know-how: I must know how things are and I must 
know how to do things, but the kinds of ―know-how‖ in question are not, in these case forms of ―knowing 
that‖. (1983:143) 
 
We look at a table and know that it is a table just as we know that a table is a solid object. 
Accompanying this belief is the knowledge of how we can use tables – to read, eat, place 
laptops, books or television upon. We know how to deal with or use tables because we 
know that is it solid: the know how is the background knowledge that we carry about 
with us and we become aware of it through a secondary reaction, as when something that 
we usually take for granted is questioned.  
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Searle illustrates the way the Network and the Background are the conditions that enable 
the following speech acts to succeed:  
 
(a) The chairman opened the meeting 
(b) The artillery opened fire. 
(c) Bill opened a restaurant. 
 
With sentences (a) to (c) the meaning of ‗opened‘ is the same and it is literal in each case: 
if it were not, then the meaning of ‗opened‘ would be multiplied indefinitely. To 
understand the use of ‗opened‘ in each sentence, it is necessary to refer to the Network 
and Background of each sentence, since different assumptions are brought to bear upon 
them. By examining the Network and Background we can answer the question of whether 
they are true or false. On the other hand, the following sentences are grammatically 
correct but leave us perplexed as how to interpret them 
 
(d) Bill opened the mountain 
(e) Sally opened the grass 
(f) Sam opened the sun. 
 
Searle explains the difference between the two sets of sentences 
 
Each of the sentences in the first group is understood within a Network of Intentional states and against a 
Background of capacities and social practices. We know how to open doors, books, eyes, wounds and 
walls; and the differences in the Network and in the Background of practices produce different 
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understandings of the same verb. Furthermore, we simply have no common practices of opening 
mountains, grass or suns.  It would be easy to invent a Background, i.e., to imagine a practice, that would 
give a clear sense to the idea of opening mountains, grass and suns, but we have no such common 
Background at present. (1983:147) 
 
All this talk of Background and Network raises the question of where they are located. 
Are they metaphysical entities existing out there, independently of us or are they mental, 
psychological entities existing in our heads? Searle favours the latter mental view 
because the background and network ‗spring‘ into being or ‗capture‘ our awareness as a 
reaction to them. Although the assumptions that constitute the background concern things 
in the world, it is the way people are disposed towards them that counts: (for example) 
we assume that broken glass is sharp so we are disposed not to walk on it barefoot or we 
assume that sofas are heavy so we are not able to lift them on our own. It is because of 
our reactions towards these assumptions that Searle considers the Background as mental. 
But, this does not entail that the Backgrounds vary for each and every person such that 
communication becomes impossible with every person inhabiting a world on his/her own. 
This view – solipsism – is rejected on the grounds that the world we share is a common 
one and it includes gravity hard pavements, and global warming. 
 
Searle also broadens his study of language from its internal workings to an account of the 
relationship between language and the mind. In Intentionality, he shifts his focus to 
language as being ‗directed‘ towards something and as it turns out, the concept of 
Intention plays a crucial role in explaining both language and the mind: ‗Intentionality is 
that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or 
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of objects and states of affairs in the world.‘ (1983: 1). There are two features that should 
be further explained:  
 
(a) an intentional state has two components: a psychological aspect (the mental states of 
belief, desire, etc) and a content (what the beliefs, desires are about). Both the 
psychological aspect and the content are directed towards something or someone, so that 
when a speaker says ‗I believe that Gandhi was courageous‘ the belief is not about the 
content but about Gandhi. As can be deduced from Searle‘s earlier writings on language, 
Intentional states have a direction of fit: obviously, the direction of fit depends upon the 
psychological mode of the speaker: a belief about the world implies a mind-world 
direction so, for example, if I believe it is sunny,  then my mental state matches the 
world. But if I wish that tomorrow will be sunny, then since I am wishing that the world 
(tomorrow) matches my wish, then the direction of fit is world-to-mind.  
 
(b) intentional states are tied to conditions of satisfaction or success. When a belief is 
satisfactory, then this belief turns out to be true and when an intention is satisfactory then 
what is intended is performed. Searle argues that there is a striking similarity between his 
speech act theory and his theory of the Intentionality of the mind: illocutionary forces are 
similar to psychological states. Both speech acts and intentional states have a content, are 
about or directed towards objects, and have a direction of fit: both require conditions of 
satisfaction. However, Searle qualifies this distinction by arguing that the Intentionality 
of the mind is the foundation upon which the intentionality of language depends: in other 
words, language depends upon the mind but not vice-versa.  
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Since sentences - the sounds that come out of one‘s mouth or the marks that one makes on paper – are, 
considered  in one way, just objects in the world like any other objects,  their capacity to represent is not 
intrinsic but is derived  from the Intentionality of the mind. The Intentionality of mental states, on the other 
hand, is not derived from some more prior forms of Intentionality but is intrinsic to the states themselves. 
An agent uses a sentence to make a statement or ask a question, but he does not in that way use his beliefs 
and desires, he simply has them. A sentence is syntactical object on which representational capacities are 
imposed: beliefs and desires and other Intentional states are not, as such, syntactical objects (though they 
may be and usually are expressed in sentences), and their representational capacities are not imposed but 
are intrinsic.  (1983: vii-viii). 
 
By saying that Intentional states are foundational Searle is arguing that the mind‘s 
Intentionality is projected onto the world through language: both mental states and 
language are directed towards the world but while language has meaning, mental states 
do not: it is through language that mental states are expressed. The Intentionality of the 
mind uses language to express its psychological states with the conditions of success 
revealing whether that psychological state has been successfully expressed or not.  
 
An overview of Searle‘s concept of intentionality reveals its importance in two senses: 
 
(a) in the narrow sense that every speech act involves some kind of intentionality since it 
enables us to describe a particular state of mind. In describing the hot and humid weather 
I intend to express my belief that it is hot and humid; likewise, when the general issues a 
command his intention is to order his troops into battle. 
 
(b) in the broad sense, language is configured or directed towards the world: our language 
is about the world so in talking about the weather my language is directed towards the 
world. This notion of Intention (written in capitals to distinguish it from the other sense) 
captures the way language and the mind hinge onto the world. 
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8.0. Language and Social Life 
 
The social dimension of language has already been alluded to since many speech acts 
would not be successful unless they had the appropriate social background. Thus, for a 
command to be successful, it must be uttered by the General to the Lieutenant within a 
military system that is organised hierarchically. Searle develops his account of social 
reality using ideas from his earlier accounts of language and mind but also introduces 
new ones.  
 
In The Construction of Social Reality (1996) Searle uses the concept of constitutive rules 
to show the extent to which the institutions of society can be said to be constructed. It 
should be pointed out, however, that when he uses the concept of institutions what he has 
in mind is a much broader concept than that which we usually understand by an 
institution (such as the military or educational institutions) which we tend to associate 
with certain buildings. For Searle, it is only within an institution that his formula (X) 
counts as (Y) in (C) can only be meaningful. Take (for example) the game of chess: when 
the King is checked we are faced with an institutional fact because the constitutive rules 
of chess make it so. The game of chess is therefore also an institution and institutions are 
composed of a number of interrelated constitutive rules. Clearly, given the way Searle 
explains institutions in terms of constitutive rules, there are a very large number of 
institutions that cover most social practices, including perhaps, the most fundamental 
institution with society - language.  
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To demonstrate the way social reality is created, Searle asks us to imagine what goes on 
when a person invents a game (he offers a detailed example of the invention of Chaos). 
The first and obvious step in this process involves establishing the rules of the game and 
to do so, this person uses Searle‘s formula: X (the first to cross the line) counts as Y (5 
points) in C (when played on a certain field, watched by certain officials). The concept of 
collective intentionality plays an important part in the acceptance of rules and social 
reality. Since there is a tendency to associate intentions with a person, the concept of 
collective intentionality has an aura of mystery about it because it suggests that over and 
above our individual intentions, there is a kind of ‗super‘ or ‗mega‘ intentionality. Searle 
wants to dispel this ‗aura‘ associated with collective intentionality but retains the concept 
to show how frequently it is used within our social lives. By accepting the rules of the 
game of Chaos, the players and coaches are together intending to play according to the 
rules. Collective intentions are we-intentions: just because we think of intentions as 
taking place in an individual mind, this does not mean that it is not possible to have group 
intentions. The importance of this concept in Searle‘s account of social reality is that it 
allows for the introduction of social facts: collective intentionality makes social facts 
possible.  
 
In addition, while observing the game is subjective, understanding it is objective or 
independent of the person, since to understand it means knowing the rules of the game. 
Both the spectators and the players know the rules of the game and both teams – by 
playing against each other - agree to play by the rules. This agreement highlights a crucial 
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feature of Searle‘s account of social reality: unlike natural reality, social reality is self-
referential which means that humans are aware of, or can be made aware of what they are 
socially describing.  Talking about social life includes necessarily accepting it for what it 
is since there is always a human component or attitude towards it.  
 
Something can be a mountain even if no one believes it is a mountain; something can be a molecule even if 
no one thinks anything at all about it. But for social facts, the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon 
is partly constitutive of the phenomenon. If, for example, we give a big cocktail party, and invite everyone 
in Paris, and if things get out of hand, and it turns out that the casualty rate is greater than the Battle of 
Austerlitz – all the same, it is not a war; it is just one amazing cocktail party. Part of being a cocktail party 
is being thought to be a cocktail party; part of being a war is being thought to be a war. This is a remarkable 
feature of social facts; it has no analogue among physical facts (1996: 33-34) 
 
An interesting and pertinent question concerns the way constitutive rules create forms of 
behaviour from nowhere: how do constitutive rules create institutional facts? The answer 
involves the normative aspect of constitutive rules: if we see the constitutive rules of 
games it is evident that the goal or point of the game is to win. The constitutive rules of 
the game prescribe the purpose of the game and they therefore prescribe the norms that 
the players of both sides set out to follow. Do these normative features of constitutive 
rules also apply to other domains of social life? How do they translate into a marriage 
ceremony? Applying the formula of constitutive rules to a wedding, to say ‗I do‘ (X) 
counts as getting married (Y) within a church with a priest, witnesses, etc (C).  
 
The normative features of getting married entails knowing the rules of marriage and, 
because getting married is a serious event, these rules are repeated during the ceremony. 
Once the rules are clear then the normative feature is implied: if one gets married one 
should behave in a certain way i.e., one has, in effect, changed their life style. 
Furthermore, all those taking part in the ceremony – the officials, the couple, the 
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witnesses, and the best man – show their approval of marriage as an institution and of the 
specific marriage taking place. All the individuals attending the wedding ceremony 
express their intentions (we-intentions) by participating in the ceremony, even though 
they might not know all the rules associated with getting married.  
 
What Searle has shown, in effect, is the way the institutional fact of getting married has 
been generated: the two persons have changed their status and this is an objective fact 
since all the rules for getting married have been followed. The sophisticated nature of 
social life is highlighted by two further points: (a) an institutional fact is not a solitary 
fact, but usually interconnected with other institutional facts. Using money to go 
shopping (one institutional fact) is connected to the wider system of exchange (another 
institutional fact); (b) institutional facts involved a degree of repetition: the act of getting 
married involves the multiple repetitions of constitutive rules by the couple, the officials, 
and the witnesses within a specific context. Searle‘s argument applies not only to games 
and marriage but constitutes the very fabric of social life.  
 
The issue that seems troubling concerns the appearance (or not) of the constitutive rules. 
It seems that most of the time the constitutive rules operate despite remaining hidden. 
When I go shopping the institutional fact of purchasing new items takes place on account 
of the constitutive rules that make up the institution of money and the institution of 
exchange. I go about the business of shopping without reminding myself of the relevant 
constitutive rules. Probably, the best example of the unconscious operations of 
constitutive rules is the institution of language which I use without knowing why I use it 
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the way I do. Most people use language without knowing the grammatical rules that 
allow them to use it. How can, Searle wonders, I be said to follow the constitutive rules 
(knowing how), if I do not even know them (know that)? Searle‘s solution to this puzzle 
is formulated in the terminology of ‗sensitivity‘: 
 
[one] doesn‘t need to know the rules of the institution and to follow them in order to conform to the rules; 
rather, he is just disposed to behave in a certain way, but he has acquired those unconscious dispositions 
and capacities in a way that is sensitive to the rule structure of the institution. To tie this down to a concrete 
case, we should not say that the experienced baseball player runs to first base because he wants to follow 
the rules of baseball, but we should say that because the rules require that he run to first base, he acquires a 
set of background habits, skills, dispositions that are such that when he hits the ball, he runs to first base 
(1996:144) 
 
In the case of games, therefore, one plays without consciously knowing the rules because 
they have become second nature to the player who performs the role habitually and 
routinely: it is an unconscious way of behaviour. This explanation makes sense for games 
where one first learns the rules and, having learnt how to play the game over a period of 
time, one no longer refers to the rules. But what about language where the rules are not 
specifically learnt by most speakers but only by a minority, such as philosophers of 
language and linguists? How does Searle explain the use of language without the 
knowledge of the rules that are necessary for its use?  
 
I am saying that if you understand the complexity of the causation involved, you can see that often a person 
who behaves in a skilful way within an institution behaves as if he were following the rules, but not 
because he is following the rules unconsciously nor because his behaviour is caused by an undifferentiated 
mechanism that happens to look as if it were rule structure, but rather because the mechanism has evolved 
precisely so that it will be sensitive to the rules. The mechanism explains the behaviour and the mechanism 
is explained by the system of rules, but the mechanism need not itself be a system of rules. (1996: 146) 
 
Searle claims that humans have evolved a neural system that permits a system of rules to 
operate; clearly, the neural system is the machinery that makes the rules possible but it is 
not identical to the rules. This answer explains how, given that both adults and children 
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have a neural system, when adults speak (and therefore follow implicitly the rules of 
language), the neural mechanism of the children is activated into using the same rules. 
 
Searle‘s analysis of social reality concerns the functional nature of both institutions and 
language. In the case of institutions it is their function that explains their actions: the 
institution of marriage has the function of protecting and raising children (among other 
things), the judiciary has the function of adjudicating between competing claims of 
innocence and guilt. Social life is dominated by different institutions with their own 
specific functions. These with functions can be divided into two groups: non-agentive 
functions are those without intentionality, such as the heart‘s pumping blood throughout 
the body. Agentive functions are those involving human inputting intentionality into an 
object or process or institution. Language belongs to the function of the agent insofar as 
humans impose meaning onto sounds: they do this intentionally with the goal of 
communicating with others who in turn communicate with them. The importance of 
language is however, not only restricted to this ‗horizontal‘ function of mutual 
communication: rather, language and communication have enabled humans to create 
other functional objects. Through the transmission of information enough knowledge has 
been accumulated to transform society into an advanced society with cars, mobile phones 
and pacemakers. 
 
Critical Remarks 
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Searle‘s elaboration of speech act theory has raised considerable interest that in turn has 
raised a number of questions. Fotion, for example, argues that Searle‘s account of 
politeness as an explanation of indirect speech acts is too narrow. Indirect speech acts are 
frequently performed for utilitarian purposes rather than out of politeness: when you say 
‗there is a large rattle snake near you left elbow‘ you are providing information and 
indirectly telling the hearer to both move away and why they should do so. In addition, 
Fotion points out that we use indirect speech acts precisely because we want to be 
impolite. To the driver who is told ‗Can‘t you see you are blocking the road?‘, the force 
of this indirect speech act is ‗aggressive‘ and further insults can be added to it, such as 
‗you -----fool, can you see you are blocking the road?‘iv.  
 
Although Searle is clearly indebted to Austin‘s account of speech acts, he considers the 
distinction between the locutionary and the illocutionary act to be redundant and retains 
only the latter. On Searle‘s account, the meaning the utterance is established by 
examining the intentions of the speaker in the act of communicating. His argument is that 
every literal sentence has within it, as part of its meaning, force indicators so that there is 
no need to establish the locutionary act as a separate class. This view is challenged by 
Friggieri (1991: 195-198) who defends the distinction between the two as established by 
Austin. If there were force indicators within every speech act then it should be possible to 
identify them, but one can assert something without knowing what the illocutionary force 
is. Friggieri offers an example: the utterance  ‗I am waiting for Joseph‘ can be used in a 
number of ways -  as a warning, a refusal to go to the cinema, as a hint, as a secret, etc -  
and there is nothing within the sentence that tells us what the speaker intended to achieve. 
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We can always understand the utterance as an assertion without necessarily 
understanding the speaker‘s intentions in uttering itiv.  
 
In this chapter I have (a) outlined the pivotal role that both intention and rules play in 
speech act theory; this is followed by (b) an analysis of the reference-predication 
distinction and (c) the conditions that enable an understanding of speech acts to take 
place. Having outlined these conditions, I then (d) highlight Searle‘s account of the 
differences between speech acts (e) his classification of the speech acts into types or 
classes. The next section (f) on complex speech acts is possible given that Searle has 
established a foundation for them and the sections deal with Searle‘s analysis of speech 
acts in relation to (g) the context and (h) society.  
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If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its 
members and that this coordination has to  be established through communication—and in certain central 
spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement---then the reproduction of the species also 
requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action. (1987a: 397) 
 
Habermas on Communication and Social Theory 
 
Jurgen Habermas (1929- ) is a leading exponent of the Frankfurt School and has been 
instrumental in reviving its influence. The Frankfurt School offer a new and up-dated 
version of Marxism that is intended to retain the critical and emancipatory dimension of 
Marxism within the context of the developments that have characterised the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Orthodox Marxist theory of the nineteenth century was situated in 
the Industrial Age and it articulated social phenomena in terms of a materialistic outlook. 
On the other hand, the technological innovations of the twentieth and the twenty-first 
centuries have radically transformed society into what is described as an ‗information 
society‘. Habermas has ‗upgraded‘ Marxist theory to account for these social changes. 
 
Habermas‘ intellectual background draws upon a wide number of influences from the 
Continental tradition, but quite unusually, he is one of the first to exploit the resources of 
the analytic or Anglo-American tradition of philosophy. Within the tradition of twentieth 
century western philosophy, analytic philosophers have shifted their focus upon the study 
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of language and in so doing replacing the focus upon consciousness that had 
characterised modern philosophy since Descartes. This shift toward language had the 
advantage that, unlike consciousness, it was more conducive for analysis and study. 
However, the interest in language and communication should be situated within his 
concern with social questions, questions concerning social order and co-operation. This 
qualification is necessary as his critics have pointed out that his writings on linguistic 
communication might at times seem to be overstretched. But given the question of how 
social order is indeed possible in a society composed of a large number of individuals, 
Habermas‘s writings on language and communication provide an answer to this question.  
 
In this chapter, I will start (a) by developing in detail Habermas‘ theory of 
communication and continue in the next section (b) with an examination of his concept of 
validity claims. Following this, I shall (c) place Habermas‘ theory of communicative 
action within the broader picture of society and (d) outline his analysis of contemporary 
society from the perspective of the lifeworld and the system. The chapter ends with an 
overview of (e) Habermas‘ contribution to ethics within the framework of this theory of 
communication.  
 
1.0. Communication 
 
The cornerstone of Habermas‘s project for the revival of critical theory involves an 
analysis of the way language is used in communication. Habermas has written widely on 
linguistic communication with a number of his well known essays brought together in On 
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the Pragmatics of Communication (2002). In addition, his Theory of Communicative 
Action (1987) demonstrates the way his pragmatic account of language ties in with his 
theory of society: by reconstructing the competences of speakers in their everyday life 
within society Habermas‘ theorisations can be considered a reconstructive science that 
explains the way society operates. 
 
A central question to the study of communication is the question of what it is a person 
understands when something is being communicated. The answer to this question 
necessarily entails an examination of the concept of meaning since communication is the 
communication of meaning (as opposed to noise0. In the case of linguistic 
communication we might ask: what it is that we know or understand when we know or 
understand the meaning of a sentence? Is the meaning in the sentence itself or in the way 
the speaker uses that sentence? 
 
According to the account of those theorists interested in what is known as ‗formal 
semantics‘ (Frege, the early Wittgenstein and Dummett) a person knows the meaning of a 
sentence when he/she knows the conditions that would make it true or false. Their claim 
is not that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to understand its truth, since it is 
possible to understand a sentence that is false (‗the earth is the centre of the universe‘). 
Rather, they claim that to know the meaning a sentence one would have to understand 
what sort of evidence would be required for it to be true or false. Given that there is a 
clear correlation or correspondence between the meaning of a sentence and the way that 
sentence is verified, formal semantic theorists consider the primary use of language as 
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that of stating facts about the world, events or people. Cooke summarises Habermas‘ 
critique of the formal semanticists approach to language 
 
Traditional formal-semantic approaches to meaning have been guilty of three kinds of abstractive fallacies: 
a semanticist abstraction, a cognitivist abstraction, and an objectivist one. The semanticist abstraction is the 
view that the analysis of linguistic meaning can confine itself to the analysis of sentences, abstracting from 
the pragmatic contexts of the use of sentences in utterances. The cognitivist abstraction is the view that all 
meaning can be traced back to the propositional content of utterances, thus indirectly reducing meaning to 
the meaning of assertoric sentences. The objectivist abstraction is the view that meaning is to be defined in 
terms of objectively ascertainable truth conditions, as opposed to the knowledge the truth conditions that 
can be imputed to speakers or hearers. (2002: 6) 
 
Habermas considers the pragmatic approach to meaning as offering a more fruitful 
approach to the study of communication: (a) it focuses on utterances i.e. on usage, rather 
than sentences, (b) it focuses on the many difference kinds of utterances that can be 
communicated though a language (promises, requests, and orders etc) rather than 
narrowing the domain of language to descriptive sentences; (c) it focuses on the relation 
between the utterance and the social conventions within which they are embedded. 
Utterances are used within a framework of human interaction so that, within a specific 
context, certain uses of language will be employed and considered meaningful, while 
other uses within the same context will be meaningless. If (for example) I am in a 
restaurant I can ask the waiter for a glass of water, but if I ask for permission to practice 
my knife throwing skills he will either laugh me off or ask me to leave. 
 
Despite Habermas‘ preference for pragmatic theories of meaning there is, in his view, a 
defect with the way they have restricted truth to context. For pragmatic theorists who 
have adopted the meaning as use of the later Wittgenstein, meaning is relative to the local 
context or the way of life of the community. Habermas hopes to rectify this by 
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explicating a theory of meaning that is context-independent such that the validity of an 
utterance is something that transcends the local context.  
 
In his early writings, he uses the label of ‗Universal Pragmatics‘ to describe his project, 
while in his later writings he changes the title to ‗formal pragmatics‘. There are two 
major differences between the pragmatics of Habermas and the pragmatics that interests 
linguists and philosophers of language. While the study of pragmatics has tended to focus 
on language-use within specific contexts, and therefore fragmented into a series of 
smaller contexts of use, the pragmatics of Habermas is broader in the sense that it is 
concerned with the use of language by all speakers. Unlike, for example, sociolinguists 
who collect empirical data to examine particular situations of language-use, universal 
pragmatics is a generalised study of the presuppositions involved in speech. It is a 
concern with the conditions that are necessary for any speaker to be able to communicate 
and this is why Habermas describes his pragmatics as universal. In addition, Habermas is 
not interested in pragmatics per se but in relating pragmatics to his larger concern with 
social and political theory.  His project of reviving critical theory entails an investigation 
into what it is that constitutes the fabric of society and since language-use enables social 
integration, the study of pragmatics is a necessary first step.  
 
In his pragmatics, Habermas carefully observes the work of Noam Chomsky who, as a 
linguist, was interested in uncovering the rules that every speaker of a language – 
irrespective of the particular language – must have to be able to generate a sentence. In 
other words, Chomsky studies the ‗deep rules‘ of language that a speaker must have so as 
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to be competent in his/her language, such as the ability to form grammatically correct and 
meaningful sentences, and to recognise when others do not form them correctly. The 
interesting thing is that the speaker uses these rules even if they are not able to articulate 
them; they use them ‗unconsciously‘ in the sense that being competent in a language is a 
question of ‗know how‘, as opposed to knowing the rules of the language, which would  
consist in ‗knowing that‘. The fundamental difference between Chomsky and Habermas 
is that while Chomsky is interested in the rules that generate sentences, i.e., assertions, 
Habermas is interested in the rules that generate utterances, i.e., speech acts. This 
difference brings out the point that Habermas develops: language is an intersubjective 
affair, connecting people together. The social dimension of language establishes relations 
between people since a speech act is uttered by someone (the speaker), to someone else 
(the listener), to do something, within a particular context.  
 
The influence of the later Wittgenstein is also evident in Habermas‘ account of language 
and society where he develops Wittgenstein‘s analogy between language and games. 
According to Wittgenstein, although there are many varied games all of them are 
characterised by the following of certain rules: it is the rules that define the particular 
game and a competent player is one who follows the rules of the game. Again, like the 
rules of language, the player need not consciously know the rules of the game in their 
detail to be able to play it; playing is a question of ability rather than being able to list the 
rules. And the ability to play entails using the rules even in situations that one has not 
encountered before; different situations arise during a game of football or chess that the 
capable player reacts to. There is a parallel with language in that a competent speaker can 
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both understand sentences that he/she had never heard before and can also construct a 
sentence that he/she never uttered before.   
 
Given language is a rule-governed activity Wittgenstein concludes that (a) language 
cannot be explained in terms of the solitary speaker, in terms of a private language who 
alone understands the meaning of what he/she is saying: the use of rules necessitates a 
community of speakers who can confirm whether those rules have been used correctly or 
not; without the community to provide a standard of communication, we could never 
know if the words we used today were the same as those we used yesterday; (b) the 
nature of the rules inherent within language shift the question of meaning away from the 
relationship between language and the world towards the way speakers follow rules 
within specific social contexts. Given that there are different contexts, the way a speech 
act is used will vary according to its context: the rules governing the way a speaker asks a 
question within the context of religion is different from the rules governing the discourse 
of science. Different contexts or language games generate different sets of rules to the 
extent that there might be no compatibility between the language games. 
 
Habermas objects to the relativistic implications of Wittgenstein‘s reduction of language 
to contexts and ways of life. On this account the many different uses of language have 
nothing in common so that language is merely a series of disconnected games the study 
of which would be to clarify the confusion that results when ‗language goes on holiday‘. 
The problem with Wittgenstein‘s approach is that (a) it fails to realise the degree with 
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which competent speakers relate to each other and (b) it underrates the importance of the 
cognitive use of language.  (1971: 56-65) 
 
As opposed to the potential slide toward relativism implied by Wittgenstein‘s language 
games, Habermas proposes the project of universal pragmatics as the rational 
reconstruction of the competencies that every speaker must have in order to be able to 
communicate at all. The analysis of communication presupposes that both speaker and 
hearer always already have this competence. The early programme of universal 
pragmatics had the goal of establishing the dynamics of communication as an essential 
component for the maintenance and reproduction of society.  
 
Speech act theory is the starting point for Habermas‘ analysis of society because it clearly 
demonstrates the intimacy between language and social life. The writings of J.L. Austin 
provide Habermas with the theoretical framework for his analysis of interpersonal 
linguistic communication. It was from Austin that Habermas derives both the concept of 
the utterance (as opposed to the sentence) and the notion of the illocutionary force of the 
utterance where by uttering something, a speaker is doing something. The weakness of 
Austin‘s account is that he separates the force of the utterance from its meaning so that 
the force is found in the illocutionary act, while the meaning belongs to the sentence 
uttered. Habermas rejects this distinction because (a) the meaning of an utterance is 
different from the meaning of a sentence used in that utterance; (b) the separation 
proposed by Austin is connected to his concern with establishing criteria for 
differentiating between constatives and performatives with the result being that only 
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constatives can be subjected to validity claims; (c) Austin‘s concept of illocutionary force 
lacks a rational foundation
iv
 (Cooke, 2002: 7).  
 
Habermas‘ analysis of the utterance reveals that it is composed of two components, or a 
‗dual structure‘:  these are the performative aspect (or illocutionary aspect) and the 
propositional content.  
 
I would distinguish (i) the level of intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, 
establish the relations that permit them to come up to an understanding with one another, and (ii) the level 
of propositional content about which they wish to reach understanding in the communicative function 
specified in (i). Corresponding to the relational and the content aspects, from the point of view of which 
every utterance can be analyzed, there are (in the standard form) the illocutionary and the propositional 
components of the speech act. The illocutionary act fixes the sense in which the propositional content is 
employed, and the act-complement determines the content that is understood ―as something...‖ in the 
communicative function specified. (2002: 64) 
 
The propositional content of an utterance is what the sentence is about i.e., what it refers 
to. The performative aspect concerns the use or what can be done with the propositional 
content and it is this pragmatic use of utterances that interests Habermas. The sentence 
‗the sun is shining‘ does not float around independent of people who use it; it is 
embedded within a context of usage with the meaning of this sentence conditioned by the 
way it is being used. The question here concerns the illocutionary force with which 
utterances are used. According to the context, one can ask: Is it an invitation to go to the 
beach? Is it a warning to use a suntan lotion? Is it a confirmation of the weather report? 
Habermas  is explicit: ‗One simply would not know what it is to understand the meaning 
of a linguistic expression if one did not know how one could make use of it in order to 
reach understanding with someone about something.‘ (2002: 228)  
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The dual structure of linguistic communication shows that an utterance is a combination 
of both the illocutionary force and the propositional content, a combination that involves 
both the doing of something with words and the saying something about the world. The 
communicative act takes place when the intention of the speaker is understood in the 
process of communicating some content. The content can be cognitive or non-cognitive 
so that with cognitive utterances the emphasis is upon the world and further disagreement 
will concern the truth or falsity of the content, with the social dimension taking secondary 
place. If (for example) I say, ‗the sun is shining‘ the emphasis of my utterance is on the 
cognitive side, informing you about the world, with the social aspect (although present) 
as secondary since I might be casually talking to a friend. If (for example)I say, ‗let‘s go 
swimming‘ the emphasis is on the social angle since what is primary is my suggestion, 
while the cognitive side is secondary (‗the sea is lovely today‘). There is therefore always 
a social dimension to language use: communication entails an intersubjective element of 
understanding of both the content and the intention of the speaker since the content must 
be understood as something specific, i.e., as a fact, an invitation, promise, commands, etc. 
Whatever type of utterance I use, a social relation is always involved:  
 
Both the illocutionary aspect and the propositional aspect can be re-used in several ways. 
The propositional content ‗the sun is shining‘ can be added to several different illocutions 
that bring out the social angle: I can warn you that the sun is shining, I can inform you 
that the sun is shining, I can pretend to you that the sun is shining. Likewise, the same 
illocution can be used with different propositional content: I promise that the sun is 
shining, I promise to take you out to dinner, and I promise to start eating more fruit. 
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Habermas formulates his universal pragmatics by delineating the conditions that must be 
met for linguistic communication to take place. This use of language entails (a) 
grammatical competence (b) a relation to an external reality (the objective world); (c) an 
inner reality (the speaker‘s relationship with his/her own utterances, i.e., his/her 
intentions)  and (d) a normative reality (the values, norms and rules of society). 
 
(a) Speakers and listeners must share the same rules that allow them to generate 
sentences. Participants in communication must be competent in the language such that 
they understand the sense of what is being communicated. The communicative class 
involves the uttering something that is understandable or intelligible: 
 
The first class of speech acts, which I want to call communicative, serves to express different aspects of the 
very purpose of speech. It explicates the meaning of engagements via engagements. Each instance of 
speech presupposes an actual preconception of what it means to communicate in a language, to understand 
and misunderstand the engagements, to bring about a consensus, to dissent: in general, to know how to deal 
with language. 
 
examples: say, express, speak, talk, ask, answer, respond, reply, agree, contradict, object,  admit, mention, 
repeat, quote, etc. (in Horster, 1992: 28) 
 
 
(b) Speakers can communicate their representations of the external world. It is the 
cognitive use of language insofar as it informs us about the external world. The 
constative class involves the imparting of something about the world that needs to be 
understood: 
 
the second class of speech acts, which I want to call constative, serves to express the purpose of the 
cognitive use of sentences. It explicates the meaning of engagements through engagements. In the 
prototypical word for the assertoric modes, in ―assert‖ two instances are united that appear separately in the 
two subclasses of these speech acts. On the one hand, ―assert‖ belongs to the following group of examples:  
describe, report inform, tell, elucidate remark, set forth explain, predict, etc. These examples stand for the 
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assertoric use of engagements. On the other hand, ―assert‖ belongs to the following group of examples: 
assure, protest, affirm, deny, dispute, doubt. These examples elucidate the pragmatic purpose, especially of 
the truth claim of engagements. (in Horster, 1992: 28-29) 
 
(c) Speakers can communicate their intentions and it is important that these intentions are 
understood. It could happen that when the speaker is communicating he/she is lying or 
being sarcastic so that failing to recognise these intentions can result in the collapse of the 
communicative interaction. Questions of sincerity arise since the utterance is used to 
express the speaker‘s intentions and whether the speaker was sincere when he/she 
expressed his/her intentions. The representative class involves making oneself 
understood; it involves the expression of the subjectivity of the speaker:  
 
The third class of speech acts, which I want to call representative (expressive) serves to express the 
pragmatic purpose of the self-portrayal of a speaker before an audience. It explicates the purpose of the 
speaker‘s engagement of intentions, views and experiences. The dependent clause of propositional content 
and intentional clauses with verbs like know, think, mean, hope, hear, love,  hate, like, wish, want decide, 
etc. Examples are: expose, reveal, divulge, admit, express, conceal, veil, pretend, obscure hide, keep secret, 
deny. (These speech acts appear in negated form: ‗I am not hiding from you that…‖) (cited in Horster, 
1992: 29) 
 
(d) Speakers communicate according to the norms of behaviour within society. It is a 
question of the appropriateness or the right of the speaker to communicate. Within the 
context of a lecture, it is usually assumed that a student has the right to ask the lecturer 
clarification on some point made during the lecture, but not about the lecturer‘s hobbies. 
At issue are the respective roles of the speaker and the hearer, roles that are normatively 
conditioned. Clearly, what and where something is said - the context and the conventions 
– are an important feature of the communicative act: 
 
The fourth class of speech acts, which I want to call regulative, serves to express the normative purpose of 
the established interpersonal relation. It explicates the meaning of the relation that the speaker/listener has 
with respect to behavioural norms. Examples are: command, ask, request, demand, warn, forbid, allow, 
suggest, refuse, oppose, obligate oneself, promise, agree, accept responsibility, confirm, support, vouch for, 
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terminate, excuse, pardon, suggest, reject, recommend, assume, advise, warn, encourage, etc. (cited in 
Horster, 1992: 29) 
 
The four classes are frequently referred to as the domains of (a) meaning or 
comprehension, (b) truth, (c) truthfulness and (d) rightness. In his later writings, 
Habermas leaves out (a) as the other three depend upon it. The possibility of saying the 
truth, being truthful and having the right to say something are all predicated on the 
possibility of language-use. 
 
Although Habermas is clearly indebted to the speech act theory of J.L. Austin, he finds 
that the latter‘s analysis of speech acts is directed chiefly upon those speech acts that are 
institutionally framed, i.e., in terms of the institutions that set the rules or conditions for 
their successful performance (of a marriage, or baptism). Habermas‘ theory is less reliant 
on the institutional context of speech acts and in this respect, his work is much closer to 
that of John Searle who elaborated the conditions that must be met for the success of any 
speech act.  For Habermas, the non-institutional success of communicative actions is 
grounded upon the ability of the listener to challenge the speech act: it is here that the 
notion of validity claims comes into force, ‗In the final analysis, the speaker can 
illocutionarily influence the hearer, and vice-versa, because speech-act-typical 
obligations are connected with cognitively testable validity claims---that is, because the 
reciprocal binding and bonding relationship has a rational basis.‘ (2002: 85) 
 
2.0. Discourse and Validity Claims 
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Although communication is defined as achieving an understanding between the speaker 
and the hearer this definition is not restricted to understanding the meaning of an 
utterance, but also includes reaching an agreement on the utterance:
 ‗reaching 
understanding aims at consensus formation (2002: 294). From the way Habermas 
articulates the concept of understanding it is evident that it is employed to carry a fairly 
large load ranging from the everyday use of understanding the linguistic aspects of an 
utterance, to the more specialised use of understanding in the broad sense
iv
 of including 
the reasons that enable a consensus to be reached. The possibility of arriving at consensus 
is an inbuilt feature of language. On Habermas‘ account, communication always entails a 
relation between understanding and agreement and in the early universal pragmatics this 
is expressed as: 
 
The aim of reaching understanding (Verständigung) is to bring about an agreement (Einverständnis) that 
terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal comprehension, shared knowledge, mutual trust, 
and accord with one another. Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of 
comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness.‘ (2002: 23) 
 
And this is stressed again in The Theory of Communicative Action: ‗We understand a 
speech act, when we know what makes it acceptable.‘ (1987a: 297).  The point that 
Habermas wants to establish is that to understand the meaning of an utterance is to 
understand and accept the reasons for that utterance. This is why he considers his account 
to be consensual or pragmatic since the ‗internal connection‘ between meaning and 
understanding is based upon speakers and hearers communicating and offering reasons 
for their utterances.  
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In everyday life communicative interaction continues undisturbed and in this interaction a 
number of things are taken for granted: by uttering something the speaker makes a 
number of claims with regard to (a) the meaningfulness of the utterance  (it follows the 
syntax of the language), (b) its truth (it says something about the world), (c) its 
appropriateness (the speaker has the right to say what he/she is saying) and (d) its being 
truthful (the speaker is consistent in what he /she says and does). But all these features of 
the utterance can be challenged: the hearer might question each of the implicit or explicit 
claims made and the onus lies on the speaker to provide reasons for what he/she is 
claiming.  
 
Habermas calls the providing of reasons that are acceptable ‗validity claims‘ and these 
claims describe the conditions that enable successful communication to take place: when 
(for example) the speaker tells the person who has just turned up at his/her office, ‗I am 
going for a coffee‘ the speech act follows the rules of English, assumes that the coffee 
shop is open, assumes you understand that I have the right to go on break (its ten o‘clock) 
and that I am sincere (that I am not inventing excuses to avoid you). These four 
dimensions of communication are taken for granted in everyday interaction and are 
therefore never questioned. But should they be questioned or challenged, Habermas - as a 
rationalist - argues that genuine communication entails the possibility of providing 
reasons for one‘s utterances; the speaker should be able to defend him/herself and it 
belongs to the very nature of communication that participants can offer reasons for their 
‗validity claims‘.  
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Given that every act of communication involves all the validity claims, it is not necessary 
to challenge each validity claim. While one validity claim might be explicitly challenged, 
the other validity claims are implicitly maintained and could in turn also be challenged.  
Habermas writes that 
 
We have seen that communication in language can take place only when the participants, in communicating 
with one another about something, simultaneously enter two levels of communication---the level of 
intersubjectivity on which they take up interpersonal relations and the level of propositional contents. 
However, in speaking, we can make either the interpersonal relation of the propositional content more 
centrally thematic; in so doing, we make a more interactive or a more cognitive use of our language. In the 
interactive use of language, we thematize the relations into which a speaker and hearer enter---as a 
warning, promise, request---while we merely mention the propositional content of the utterances. In the 
cognitive use of language, by contrast we, thematize the content of the utterance as a statement about 
something that is happening the in the world, (or that could be the case). While we express the 
interpersonal relation only indirectly‘ (2002: 75-76) 
 
In listening to the meteorologist, the explicit claim he/she is making concerns the truth of 
the content (that a tornado is approaching our town), while implicitly it is assumed that 
the meteorologist is the appropriate person to tell us this information (we should take the 
advice of moving to a safer area), and that he/she is being sincere (and therefore someone 
we should trust). 
 
Discourse is that process that occurs when communication is suspended and utterances 
are challenged; it is the process that asks for the reasons that justify the utterance.  Of the 
four validity claims informing a communicative act, each has a different mode of what 
Habermas calls ‗redemption‘. The validity claims can be grouped into two different sets 
as there is a fundamental difference between them: one set includes the validity claims of 
comprehension and sincerity and the other set includes the validity claims of truth and 
correctness.  The difference between the two sets is that it is only the second set that can 
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be redeemed in discourse. In the case of comprehension, when an utterance is challenged 
with regards to its meaning, the speaker can always use other words to convey the 
meaning and in the case of sincerity, the validity claim is redeemed if the actions of the 
speaker conform to his/her intentions (such as keeping a promise). On the other hand, the 
validity claims of truth and correctness involve discursive argumentation: whether it is a 
question of establishing the truth of a statement or the correctness of a norm, the speaker 
must defend his claims by offering reasons or justifications.  
 
Habermas has narrowed down his account of validity claims to three such that speech 
acts (a) relate to the external world; (b) relate to the subjective world of the speaker; and 
(c) relate to others, to the domain of interpersonal relations. (1987a: 308) These speech 
acts can be challenged respectively on the question of (a) their factual status: they are 
judged according to whether they are true or false; (b) their value system: they are judged 
according to whether the speaker is sincere or not; (c) their normative rightness:  they are 
judged according to  whether they are right or not right. Habermas offers as an example 
of the professor who asks a student to get him a glass of water. The student can challenge 
the professor (a) on factual grounds since there is no water nearby; (b) with regards to his 
sincerity since the professor might be testing the student to see his reaction in front of the 
other students; and (c) on normative grounds since the student might object that it is not 
right or appropriate to ask this of a student.  
 
What we have shown in connection with this example [of the professor] is true for all speech acts oriented 
to reaching understanding. In contexts of communicative action, speech acts can always be rejected under 
each of the three aspects: the aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for his action in relation to a 
normative context (or, indirectly, for these norms themselves); the truthfulness that the speaker claims for 
the expression of subjective experiences which he has privileged access; finally, the truth that the speaker, 
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with his utterance, claims for a statement (or for the existential presuppositions of a nominalised 
proposition). (1987a: 307) 
 
The benefit of showing the internal connection between rational justification and 
communication is that the domain of reason is now expanded to areas that have for some 
time been considered outside its legitimate domain. Rational justification can be offered 
not only for the domain of facts and objectivity, but also for the domains of 
morality/norms and subjective experiences. In the case of morality, one‘s actions can be 
rationally examined in the light of legitimate moral principles, or if those principles are 
challenged they can be defended or rejected through reasoned argumentation. With the 
world of subjective experience, Habermas includes the expression of evaluations and 
desires: contrary to what many think, this is not so personal that it lies beyond rational 
justification. When one passes an aesthetic judgement calling it ‗good‘ (or beautiful) one 
is not just expressing one‘s taste but can offer reasons for their judgment; and reasons are 
subject to agreement or disagreement. Habermas gives an example of friends discussing a 
film with the person who claims that the film is good being expected to offer reasons for 
his/her assessment: ‗In this context [of art] reasons have the peculiar function of bringing 
us to see a work or performance in such a way that it can be perceived as an authentic 
expression of an exemplary experience, in general as the embodiment of a claim to 
authenticity.‘ (1987a: 20) 
 
With the concept of discourse, Habermas offers an account of the processes that take 
place when validity claims are challenged: discourse is a meta-communicative process 
since it is involves a suspension of everyday communication that in turn requires more 
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communication to resume the communication. Communication breakdowns can only be 
resolved through further communication. This is where the notion of ‗illocutionary force‘ 
is particularly relevant for Habermas‘ account since the communicative act is more than 
the minimalist notion of involving two persons, but a relationship grounded in reasons 
and their acceptance. The hearer wants to know the reasons for what the speaker is saying 
and therefore challenges him/her. However, it is not enough to just offer reasons since the 
reasons must be acceptable to the hearers: there is a big difference between being asked 
to close the window because there is a cold draught and being asked to close it because 
ghosts might enter the room and possess everyone
iv
. Once the hearer satisfied with the 
speaker‘s reasons then the process of everyday communication resumes. James Gordon 
Finlayson offers a narrative that describes this process,  
 
Suppose you ask me not to smoke in my office when you are present, and I demur at your request because I 
know that you too are a smoker. I ask you for the reasons behind your request. You may reply that you 
have recently given up smoking and do not wish to be tempted back into the habit. At this point, I might 
accept your reason and put my cigarettes away. On Habermas‘s view, we have entered into discourse 
(however briefly), and reached a rationally motivated consensus (this phrase is the accepted English 
translation of rationales Einverstandnis), and returned smoothly to the context of action.  (2005: 41) 
 
Habermas discusses the logic of discursive argumentation because he is concerned with 
the logic of speech acts that are used in rational argumentation (rather than deductive 
logic which is concerned with the relation between sentences) since the purpose of these 
arguments is with the strengthening or weakening of a validity claim. The logic of 
discursive argumentation applies to the domains of truth and of norms and these are 
respectively called ‗theoretical-empirical‘ discourses and ‗practical‘ discourses. The 
difference between the two is that while ‗theoretical-empirical‘ discourse demand an 
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explanation, practical discourse demands a justification. The arguments for the respective 
discourses are listed by Habermas (in Held, 1980: 342).  
 
 
   Theoretic-empirical   Practical 
   Discourse    Discourse 
 
Conclusions   Statements    percepts/evaluations 
 
Controversial  
Validity Claim  Truth     correctness/properiety 
 
Demanded from 
opponent  Explanations    Justifications 
 
Data   causes (of Events)   Grounds 
   Motives (of actions) 
 
Warrant   Empirical Uniformity   behavioural/Evaluative 
   Hypothetical Laws   norms or principles 
 
Backing   observations, results of   Interpretation of 
surveys, factual  accounts   needs (values), inferences 
etc   secondary implications, etc 
 
    
It is clear from the schema that both the statements of the ‗theoretical-empirical 
discourses‘ and the evaluations of ‗practical discourse‘ belong to an interconnected set of 
concepts that form a hierarchical arrangement within arguments
iv
: 
 
the conclusion that is to be grounded (particular statements in theoretical discourse, commands or 
evaluations in practical discourse); the data that is submitted as pertinent (causes, grounds); the warrant 
which establishes the link between data and conclusions (general laws, moral principles), and the backing 
which makes this link plausible (observation reports, considerations of secondary implications of following 
a particular norm). (Held, 1980: 342) 
 
The standard by which one judges where an argument is acceptable or not is called by 
Habermas in his later writings, ‗the persuasive force of the better argument‘ (1990: 158-
9) and it is reason that adjudicates as to whether to accept or reject a validity claim. This 
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is understandable because Habermas equates the use of arguments and the offering of 
more reasons as an increase in the freedom of reflection.
iv
  
 
When a discursive argument ends the presumably satisfied participants return to everyday 
communication, and, on Habermas‘ account, their agreement has arrived at the truth of 
the matter. However, a discourse cannot challenge all validity claims simultaneously: a 
discourse is grounded in an actual way of life so that rational argumentation takes place 
within a background context of values and beliefs. When a truth or a value is challenged, 
other truths and norms remain in the background and taken for granted. It is impossible to 
challenge the whole background of truths and values at once. So too, what is accepted at 
any moment might – given the availability of new evidence – need to be revised. As a 
result the truths or values that a discourse establishes are temporary and open-ended: it is 
always possible that in the future they would be subject to investigation.  
 
It should be pointed out that the concept of discourse describes the practice that takes 
place in the course of everyday life by ordinary people in the attempt at arriving at 
rational agreements about their disagreements.  This should immediately show that it is 
not the exclusive domain of philosophers or linguists but occupies a central position in 
modern societies as the mechanism that deals with conflict resolution. The importance of 
Habermas‘s analysis of discourse is that it ties his pragmatic account of meaning with his 
broader concern with social theory. It is important to his social theory because it shows 
the way social order can be maintained despite conflict. After the validity claim of a 
speech act is challenged in discourse, its acceptance or rejection leads to the re-
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establishment of communicative interaction between members of society. The function of 
validity claims in Habermas‘s theory of communicative action is fundamental to his 
restoration of reason. By showing that reason is inherent in the course of everyday 
language, Habermas is able to offer a form of social analysis that places reason at its 
centre.  
 
3.0. Communicative, Strategic and Instrumental Action. 
 
As part of his social analysis, Habermas introduces a distinction between communicative 
action and strategic action. Both types of action are goal oriented but the way these goals 
are achieved differs greatly: communicative action relies on consent while strategic 
action relies on influence. Communicative action is that way of interacting whereby 
meaningful relations are established between members of society either through physical 
actions or through verbal actions (speech acts). One attempts to achieve one‘s goals by 
co-ordinating one‘s actions with others: at times, physical actions are accompanied by 
language or can be re-described with language and when communication fails or breaks 
down, then more language is used to re-establish communication. On the other hand, it is 
also possible to obtain one‘s goals through influencing others: rather than trying to 
achieve one‘s goals by agreeing with others, strategies are used to persuade others to do 
things that are (for example) in one‘s own interest. ‗In strategic action, linguistic 
processes of reaching understanding are (generally) not used as a mechanism of action 
coordination‘ (2002: 203) 
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The goal of communicative action is to reach agreement and consent between participants 
on what is being communicated and this is made possible by the ‗common knowledge‘ of 
shared convictions that can be rationally challenged and redeemed. It is because humans 
live in a shared world – of facts, or norms – that agreement and disagreement are 
possible. ‗I call knowledge common if it constitutes consent whereas consent relies on the 
intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims.‘ (in Sutton, 2003: 53) In this 
sense, Habermas opposes ‗common knowledge‘ to a shared body of similar opinions or to 
convictions that are resulting from sacred or secular authorities: in these cases, the 
question of validity does not arise. 
 
To support his claim that an analysis of modern society necessitates prioritising the role 
of communicative action in the everyday world, Habermas utilises the distinction 
between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of a speech act. While the 
illocutionary aspect involves the speaker communicating his/her intentions so as to bring 
about a consensus with the listener in a rational and voluntary way, the perlocutionary 
effect of a speech act involves the attempt to influence others. The point of this 
distinction is that in the case of illocutionary acts the purpose of my uttering the speech 
act is clear so that the listener understands my intention when I utter it. With 
perlocutionary acts, however,  this intention is not manifest since there is a gap between 
what I intend and what is understood: listeners ‗can understand what I am saying but 
have no idea what I am really doing with the utterance, since the perlocutionary aim of 
my utterances is not open to view.‘ (Findalyson, 2005: 50).  Habermas considers the 
illocutionary aspect to be fundamental and primary because it is transparent, with the 
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speaker‘s intentions evident and open. The perlocutionary aspect, on the other hand, is 
secondary or ‗parasitic‘ since the possibility of manipulating others depends upon them 
first understanding what one is saying.  The success of strategic action involves hiding 
one‘s intentions: 
  
I term those effects strategically motivated that come about only if they are not declared or if they are 
brought about by deceptive speech acts that merely pretend to be valid. Perlocutionary effects of this type 
indicate that the use of language oriented toward reaching understanding has been put at the service of 
strategic interactions. (2002: 202) 
 
Communicative actions require understanding the reasons for one‘s actions while 
strategic actions require hiding the reasons for one‘s actions so as to get the other to do 
what one wants. By ‗understanding‘ Habermas does not merely mean drawing up a list of 
reasons for accepting a proposition but a process of participation in where agents evaluate 
the reasons given for the claim. The participant judges whether the reasons offered are 
acceptable or not and similarly, the participant can defend his/her own reasons for the 
evaluation if challenged. On the other hand, strategic action operates differently: to 
achieve his/her goals, the agent uses a number of strategies ranging from bribery, threats 
of violence or blackmail. Words are transformed into tools used to influence others and 
no attempt is made to hide the fact that they are not being used for understanding and 
consent. There are also more subtle means of persuasion in the use of emotional language 
where the speaker plays on the emotional vulnerability of the other person to mask the 
defects of his/her arguments.   
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The goal of strategic action is to control and manipulate others without their agreement or 
consent; it is success oriented and the only interest of the person is that of achieving their 
goals irrespective of the other. The other is reduced to the status of an object so that the 
relationship is a causal one with language used to bring about the desired effects. 
Strategic action is evidenced in game playing: players in the game of chess hide their 
intentions from each other so as to win. The players try to predict the way the other will 
react to their moves; they try to establish a causal relation between their moves and the 
effect it will have on the other player. And this is why one can play chess with a 
computer rather than another person. The relation between the players is therefore not 
one of communication since they are not trying to understand each other but rather a 
question of strategic action since success in chess is predicated upon the ability to hide 
one‘s intentions.  
 
The emphasis on causality shows that there is a similarity between strategic action and 
instrumental action. However, Habermas differentiates between them since strategic 
action is a form of social action while instrumental action is concerned with the natural 
world and not with people. The difference between communicative action and 
instrumental action is that while communicative action entails reaching an agreement on 
the validity claims in the course of communication, instrumental action entails both (a) 
the choice of a goal that is independent of the means used to reach it and (b) a causal 
explanation of the relationship of the means to attain the goal. Unlike instrumental 
reasoning, communicative reasoning is not independent of its goal: if the goal is to 
achieve understanding and acceptance of the validity claims, this can only be achieved 
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through the process of communication itself.  There is therefore no separation of the 
means to attain the goals from the goals themselves. So too, the reaching of goals in 
communication is through participation and interaction, and not the result of a causal 
relationship: understanding persons is not the same as understanding the processes of 
nature.  
 
In terms of his theory of society, the benefit of this analysis is that it enables Habermas to 
argue that the understanding of society entails accepting communicative action as the 
‗gel‘ that keeps society together; on the other hand, strategic action offers a vision of 
society as composed of solitary individuals, each working on their own and treating each 
other as means to their own ends.  
 
4.0. The Lifeworld and the System 
 
In his analysis of contemporary society, Habermas remarks on the widespread mistrust of 
reason for dealing with human problems. Though there are historical reasons for the 
decline of reason, a more pertinent explanation is the way it has been conceptualised in 
terms of efficiency: reason establishes the most efficient means for achieving a particular 
goal. This use of reason is known as ‗instrumental reason‘ and its success is due to the 
assumption that there are causal relations between the means and the ends. Scientific 
thinking follows the model of instrumental reason and it has been credited with solving 
problems in the natural world. So too, instrumental reason is dominant in the way its 
applications have spread throughout contemporary society, as can been seen with the 
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constant innovations of technology. However, Habermas argues that while instrumental 
reason has its place, it is not the only way that reason can be used.  
 
Historically, it was Weber (1864-1920) who had offered an analysis of instrumental 
reason identifying it as the dominant - though not the only - mode of reasoning in the 
capitalist world. While the scientific application of instrumental reasoning had succeeded 
in resolving a number of problems in the natural world, Weber argued that it was being 
used in an ever-increasing manner in the human world, in the functioning of government 
and bureaucracies. The analysis of instrumental reason in terms of means and goals takes 
the following pattern: (a) the means for attaining the goals must be rationally chosen; (b) 
the goals that are chosen must conform to a person‘s value system (and therefore making 
these choices rational); (c) these values and their rational exercise are transformed into 
principles so that they apply completely to a person‘s life situation. For Weber, 
Calvinism offered a model of rationality in its choice of means, of goals and in the 
pursuit of actions according to principles. The ordering and prioritizing of a person‘s 
goals enables the person to give their lives a stable direction since it would be an absurd 
life if one changed goals every day.  
 
It is the conclusion of Weber‘s analysis that leads to serious difficulties:  
 
(a) Since instrumental reason is only concerned with the means of attaining certain goals 
efficiently, then the emphasis upon the application of reason ignores the status of the 
goals or values themselves. The value of tradition, as the basis within which to live our 
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lives, is discounted in the modern world, a view eloquently captured by Weber‘s phrase 
‗the disenchantment of the world‘. As a result, traditional meanings and values are 
replaced by whatever succeeds. There is a further consequence: if the only way of 
thinking permitted within a modern-capitalist society is that of instrumental reason, then 
the value system of a person as a whole could not be rationally justified. The ends are not 
anchored in something bigger than the individual (the tradition) but are chosen by the 
individual in a subjective manner. In other words, there are no criteria that justify the 
lifestyle one chooses: one chooses from the many different values and goals that are 
offered to them. There is no rational standard from which one can judge another person‘s 
choice of ends as mistaken. 
 
(b) Weber had also argued that the rationalisation of modern society had led to the 
fragmentation of society into different value spheres or domains with each of these 
following their own inner logic:  
 
one of the features of Western rationalism is the creation in Europe of expert cultures that deal with cultural 
traditions reflectively and in so doing isolate the cognitive, aesthetic-expressive, and moral-practical 
components from one another....into what Weber calls ―spheres of value‖(i.e., scientific production, art and 
art criticism, and law and morality). (Habermas, 1990: 107) 
 
Since Weber conceptualized reason instrumentally there was no standard for assessing 
these competing value schemes. This generated a sense of fragmentation that left people 
feeling ‗lost‘ or ‗confused‘ with the typical reaction to these ‗feelings‘ being the rejection 
of reason itself.  
 
Habermas responds to these claims by arguing that:  
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(a) successfully achieving an action is not a sufficient condition for claiming that the 
nature of reason is necessarily goal-oriented; one might successfully achieve something 
purely by chance, such as  ‗choosing‘ the right winning lottery ticket. This is why one of 
Habermas‘ fundamental concerns throughout his writings is the transformation of reason 
into the broader category of communicative reason such that the rational reflection upon 
goals can be re-inserted as a legitimate domain. 
 
(b) the instrumental model of rationality does not explain the rational choice of goals. 
The instrumental model assumes that the goal is arbitrary and is therefore opposed to a 
rational choice that can be challenged. To overcome the limitations of Weber‘s analysis, 
Habermas argues that the externalisation of a person‘s actions must be taken into account. 
A person who acts in the world so as to achieve his/her desired goals holds an implicit 
view of the world, a certain way of understanding of reality. In going about to attain these 
goals, the person might be questioned by someone else about the reasons for his/her 
actions and the response would involve an elaboration of the implied world-view. The 
elaboration and its subsequent justification could then be assessed by both participants in 
the discussion. It is clear that the strength of Habermas‘ argument lies in the ability to 
offer reasons in the defence of one‘s actions, just as reasons can also be offered to explain 
actions that fail.  
 
(c) the fragmentation of society can be interpreted in another way: unlike Weber who 
interpreted the consequence of fragmentation within modern society as the cause of 
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continuous struggles between the different domains, Habermas interprets modern society 
as the space where a number of ‗voices‘ have the possibility of communicating with each 
other. This communication takes place both at the level of argumentation and at the level 
of everyday life. The problems that people encounter in contemporary society – the loss 
of freedom and meaning – are not problems about the value of reason but rather about the 
need to restructure reason to certain domains of society. ‗Communicative reason finds its 
criteria in the argumentative procedures for directly or indirectly redeeming claims to 
propositional truth, normative rightness, subjective truthfulness, and aesthetic harmony.‘ 
(1987c:314) It is not reason that is problematic but its misapplication in contemporary 
society. As a defender of the Enlightenment, Habermas re-inserts reason in human life 
and rejects the ‗decisionism‘ or subjectivism that dominates contemporary moral and 
cultural theory. 
 
Given the centrality of communication in modern society, Habermas is able to claim that 
‗[t]he theory of communicative action can make good the weaknesses we found in 
Weber‘s action theory, to the extent that it does not remain fixated on purposive 
rationality as the only aspect under which action can be criticised and improved.‘ (2002: 
170) The dialogic or communicative dimension of reason dispenses with the solipsistic 
idea of the subject replacing it with an intersubjective account that Habermas calls 
communicative reason. The intersubjective dimension guarantees that the world is shared 
by people engaged in a conversation while providing reasons so that agreement can be 
established.  
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In ‗Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions and Lifeworld‘ (2002: 
215-255), Habermas specifies the importance of the relation between communicative 
action and the lifeworld: 
 
The concept of communicative action must prove its worth within the sociological theory of action. The 
latter is supposed to explain how social order is possible. In this respect, the analysis of the presuppositions 
of communicative action may be helpful. It opens us the dimension of the background of the lifeworld, 
which enmeshes and stabilizes interactions to form higher-level aggregates. (2002: 227) 
 
As a social theorist Habermas re-formulates the question of the possibility of social order 
in terms of communicative action. The question of social order is central to social theory 
in that it seeks to establish how it is possible that a society composed of distinct persons - 
each with their goals, ambitions, etc, - are able to live together.  In the early Legitimation 
Crisis (1988), he theorised modern society in terms of a distinction between the lifeworld 
and the system, a distinction that parallels the distinction between communicative action 
and instrumental or strategic action. Communicative action is the medium of the 
lifeworld while instrumental and strategic actions are typical of the system. So too, 
Habermas introduces the distinction between social integration and systems integration so 
as to explain the different ways in which social order is possible.  
 
The concept of the lifeworld is originally derived from Husserl who had introduced it to 
explore ‗the forgotten foundations of meaning underlying everyday life-practices and 
world experience.‘ (2002: 237) Husserl described the world of everyday life, a world that 
is shared by members of a community and opposed to the world of the scientist. The 
latter is, in effect, a spectator onto the world, objectifying and quantifying it, rather than 
living in it. For Husserl the world of the scientist was parasitic upon the world of 
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everyday life since the scientist depends upon the meanings and interpretations found in 
the everyday world, before he could even start his own work. As a result, the traditional 
privilege accorded to science as the primary mode of access to the world was overstated.  
 
The difference between Habermas and Husserl is that whereas Husserl focussed on the 
lifeworld in terms of the way a person structures his/her perceptual experiences of the 
world, Habermas focuses on the lifeworld as the world of meanings that are linguistically 
maintained and challenged. The lifeworld consists of the shared stock of knowledge, 
values, assumptions and beliefs that makes understanding and consensus possible: 
‗Communicative action takes place within a lifeworld that remains at the backs of 
participants in communication. It is present to them only in the prereflective form of 
taken-for-granted background assumptions and naively mastered skills.‘ (2002: 172) 
Clearly it is a social concept since the world we share includes both the meanings and 
understandings that permit communication with others: the function of the lifeworld is 
that of making social integration possible since the use of general communicative 
competence is entwined with the cultural competence of members of the lifeworld.  
 
Since communication is the lifeline of the lifeworld, it is evident that language plays a 
pivotal role in the transmission of communication and in repairing any disruption to the 
communicative process. The possibility of breakdown in communication takes place 
because the lifeworld operates, so to speak, ‗behind our backs.‘ Most of the time 
communication takes place without any feature of the lifeworld being questioned but at 
times disagreement and dissent occur and this continues until consensus is once again 
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achieved through discourse. It is therefore the lifeworld which provides both the 
conditions for social integration and for critical discussion. To illustrate his point, 
Habermas offers a story: at a construction site a new foreign worker is asked by one of 
the older workers to fetch some beer for the morning break. This request can be 
challenged by the younger worker on a number of grounds: the validity claim to 
intelligibility (perhaps the young worker is foreign and does not understand German 
well); the validity claim to appropriateness (the young worker does not think it is part of 
his duties to fetch beer and not right of the older worker to ask him); the validity claim to 
factual assumptions (there are no shops selling beer near the construction site); and the 
validity claim to sincerity (the young worker thinks that the older worker is trying to 
humiliate him in front of the other workers). What Habermas wants to illustrate is not 
only the possibility of challenging claims (the general communicative competence of 
participants) but the further point that communication also entails participants bringing 
their cultural competence and assumptions (their lifeworld) into the situation. In this 
story, the lifeworld of the foreign worker is different from that of the older worker and 
this explains why the young worker might think it odd that beer is drunk during the 
morning break; he might not recognise that there is an informal hierarchy at the 
construction site that allows the older worker to ‗order‘ the younger one. When there is a 
problem it is not the lifeworld as a whole that is subjected to discussion, but rather a 
specific topic such as the timing of the morning break or whether all must drink beer: 
‗Single elements, specific taken-for-granteds, are, however, mobilized in the form of 
consensual and yet problematizable knowledge only when they become relevant to a 
situation.‘ (1987b: 124) 
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But following a breakdown in communication a new consensus is achieved and this new 
consensus feeds into the lifeworld. Habermas‘s concept of the lifeworld is therefore a 
dynamic one in that the lifeworld enables communication between members of society to 
take place and in turn communication enhances the dynamics and growth of the 
lifeworld: ‗... the reproduction of the lifeworld is nourished through the contributions of 
communicative action, while the later simultaneously is nourished through the resources 
of the lifeworld.‘ (2002: 191) This is why communication is not only a force for social 
integration, but contributes to the reproduction of society: through the medium of 
communication the identity of a society – its symbolic and cultural features - is revised, 
revitalised and transmitted to the younger members of society in so doing perpetuating 
that society. In his analysis of modern society, Habermas notes that as society has 
evolved,  
 
traditionally customary contexts of action oriented to mutual understanding get shoved out into the 
environments of systems. Using this criterion, we can locate the boundaries between system and lifeworld 
in a rough and ready way, such that the subsystems of the economy and the bureaucratic state 
administration are on one side, while on the other side we find private spheres of life (connected with 
family, neighbourhood, voluntary associations) as well as public spheres (for both private persons and 
citizens). (1987b: 310) 
 
Habermas describes the system in terms of the abstract structures that regulate life in 
modern societies. He calls them the ‗non-symbolic steering media‘ and these include the 
sub-systems of money and power. These sub-systems enable modern societies to 
maintain themselves by generating the necessary material goods and services. Money is 
the force that ‗steers‘ the capitalist economy, while power - as the mechanism that directs 
the country - is manifested in the administration of the state (the civil service, the 
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judiciary, the military) and through the officially recognised political parties. Habermas 
points out that although both money and power operate to integrate society, they do so in 
different ways: money functions along a horizontal axis since it integrates society by 
bringing people together, while power is vertical in that it functions by ordering society 
into different hierarchies.  
 
The lifeworld, which is grounded in communicative action, is opposed to the system 
which functions either instrumentally or strategically: just as instrumental and strategic 
actions are parasitical upon communicative action, likewise, the system is parasitic upon 
the lifeworld. While the lifeworld is self-sustaining since communication is beneficial for 
the lifeworld itself, the system, on the other hand, depends upon the resources of meaning 
that it finds in the lifeworld. So too in terms of social interaction, while communicative 
action in the lifeworld requires competent persons to co-ordinate their actions in 
accordance with each other, i.e., mutual understanding, the system requires the co-
ordination of action in terms of the consequences without the need for the persons to 
know what these actions mean.  
 
Through the use of money and power, the system does not require communication i.e., 
understanding the reasons for what one does, but the mere fulfilling of one‘s role. This is 
precisely the crucial feature of the non-symbolic steering media: for them to function 
they must rely on automated or predictable responses. When (for example) I pay the bill 
at a restaurant, the waiter is not interested in where I got my money from, or if perhaps I 
should have saved it to go on holiday instead. Likewise, with power, a soldier is part of a 
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hierarchical military system that follows a chain of command: the soldier must follow the 
commands of his superior whether he agrees with them or not. For the system to function 
such that a number of people co-ordinate their actions, what it requires is a few simple 
rules that are consistent with each other so that there will be no conflicts between the 
persons following them. As a result, the system itself tends to gravitate towards a status 
quo; it is conservative in that it does not encourage change. 
 
The advances of modernisation and industrialisation have made the twin tasks of 
managing the economy and the administration of power as functions that are too complex 
to remain at the level of the lifeworld: it has therefore fallen upon the system to co-
ordinate these activities. In the past it was the lifeworld that provided the backdrop for 
meaningful interaction between members of a community: social interaction was 
maintained through the medium of language and the communicative competences of 
participants. This situation has changed with the growth of modern societies and the need 
to maintain social order over large populations. By co-ordinating the economy and the 
state the system makes complex tasks possible: ‘system integration‘ is the name of the 
process that co-ordinates people within sophisticated networks. In the case of money, it is 
possible to purchase goods from all over the world (you can buy coffee from Brazil 
without going there) so your action of buying is tied to the network that eventually 
arrives at the coffee producer. Likewise, power co-ordinates a number of people from 
different spheres to pool their resources to build dams, organise armies etc. Performing 
these large scale tasks cannot be managed with the communication resources available in 
the lifeworld: system integration requires that each member of the system performs his 
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role mechanically without the need for communication. It is the predictability of 
responses that enables the system to function as a means for organising society: (for 
example) I can go to the library and borrow a book without needing to know anything 
about the librarian just as he or she does not need to know anything about me (except see 
my library card). Strategic action can be used in a non-manipulative manner and 
Habermas develops this theme in relation to his study of social systems and the way 
people interact within them. In the course of our everyday life, a large amount of 
interaction does not take place at the level of the mutual understanding and agreement 
through communicative action: most of the time we live our lives in agreement with 
others without raising validity-claims. Social interaction in modern society involves 
being able to predict how others would react without the need to challenge them. 
 
In an advanced, modern society there is no escape from the system as it is an integral part 
of the way these societies are organised and essential to their functioning. This is the 
positive aspect of system integration: by relieving the lifeworld of the twin burdens of 
managing the economy and the administration of power, the system has made it possible 
for the lifeworld to focus on the task of social integration. Social integration is grounded 
in communication where co-ordination between members of society is produced through 
meaningful communication with the possibility of asking questions and offering answers 
providing the context for social interaction.  On the other hand, system integration does 
not rely upon communication but upon the predictability of actions so that persons 
interact with each other as though they were machines that function automatically. 
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Despite the necessity of the system in modern societies, Habermas describes the tendency 
inherent in the system to both dislocate itself from the lifeworld and then attempt to take 
over it. He calls this process the  ‗colonisation of the lifeworld‘: ‗the imperatives of 
autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from the outside---like 
colonial masters coming into a tribal society---and force a process of assimilation upon 
it.‘ (1987b: 355) The systemic imperatives of economics and bureaucratic administration 
intrude upon the lifeworld so that communicative action is increasingly replaced with 
instrumental action. This can be seen in the way both economic factors and the 
intervention of the state dominate the way society is maintained. The evolution of society 
into complex forms of social organisation has developed systems that enable actions to be 
coordinated.  But, problematically, these systems have developed a life of their own such 
that their functioning impose restrictions upon the freedom of persons: since it is the 
nature of the system to structure the pattern of action that a person is obliged to follow, 
then it ‗limits‘ the possibilities of freedom. As a result, market forces dictate economics 
and the structures of power dictate one‘s behaviour. In the case of money (for example) 
freedom is restricted because (a) what we purchase is limited to the amount of money we 
have and (b) the economics of money operates independently of symbolic institutions: a 
company that produces pharmaceutical products for HIV is not interested in whether they 
should be making a profit over something that is needed by suffering people. It is beyond 
the purpose of the pharmaceutical company to ask such questions as they operate within 
market economies concerned with profits rather than people. 
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The problem of colonisation is exacerbated when the system imposes its own values on 
the lifeworld. This can be seen when the system enters the domains of the family and 
culture; or when it takes over the domains of the public sphere such as the mass media. 
The markets or the specialists take over areas that previously belonged to agents in the 
lifeworld and who are now no longer in a position to assess or contribute to decisions that 
are taken for them. If the characteristic of the system is instrumental thinking and 
efficiency in the attainment of ends, when instrumental thinking is applied to human life, 
humans are transformed into objects, subject to calculation and quantification. When (for 
example) a hospital is interested in the numbers of patients, rather than the quality of the 
nursing provided, it is difficult for an individual nurse to provide the care required since 
the whole system is working against him/her. In effect, the system seems to develop a 
world of its own, a world that follows its own laws that are external to and beyond human 
agency, and imposes it upon the lifeworld. An inversion occurs since instead of the 
system serving the lifeworld the system becomes an end in itself with the lifeworld 
transformed into a subsystem operating along instrumental values. 
 
The degree with the system has succeeded in colonising the lifeworld is such that 
challenging the system itself through the resources of communication becomes a difficult 
task: it is hard work - though not impossible – resisting the notion that efficiency and 
money are not necessarily the ones conducive to a person‘s happiness. Everyday 
language provides a sign of this increasingly dominant view where one hears people 
talking about ‗retail therapy‘ as the quick fix to happiness. The encroachment of the 
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system upon the lifeworld has produced a number of social pathologies such as ‗loss of 
meaning, anomie, and mental illness (psychopathology). (1987b: 142) 
 
5.0. Discourse Ethics 
 
In his later writings on discourse, Habermas broadens the discussion away from the 
narrow conceptual concern with ‗objectivity‘ and ‗facts‘ to the broader domain of ethical 
issues. In a sense this was implied in this earlier writings since one of the validity claims 
of the theory of communicative action involved the rightness or appropriateness of what 
the speaker says. It covered, in other words, the ethical relation between participants in 
communication. When disagreements arise concerning questions of norms, ordinary 
communication is temporarily suspended and discussion or argumentation takes place 
enabling the speaker to defend himself against the challenges directed towards the 
rightness or appropriateness of his normative utterances.  
 
In his account of discourse ethics Habermas develops the program outlined in his theory 
of communicative action but here he is interested in the kind of argumentation that leads 
to valid answers concerning moral questions that are generated out of the interaction 
between people in the lifeworld. The purpose of such argumentation is that of achieving 
consensus in norms: this might be difficult because new situations have arisen and the 
‗old‘ norms are no longer valid ways of coping with these new situations. New norms are 
required that need to be validated so that persons can adjust to the new situation that life 
has presented.  
441 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
In today‘s world there seems to be a widespread tendency to view moral issues as 
subjective ones: ‗emotivism‘ is the idea that moral questions can only be at best 
expressions of subjective opinion.  Habermas strongly disagrees with this view of 
morality as a private domain, positioning himself as a cognitivist: his argument is that the 
criterion for deciding the rightness of some normative issue is also that of rationality. His 
theory of discourse ethics is formulated along the same lines as his theory of 
communicative rationality since both are cognitively grounded. Moral actions and 
choices can be defended by an appeal to moral principles and, if these principles are 
challenged, then they can be defended. In his work on ethics, Habermas shows the 
parallelism between moral statements and factual statements since both presuppose the 
use of reason. When a person asks about the legitimacy of a norm, he/she is actually 
asking about its ‗rightness‘ or ‗correctness‘, and although many people think that this 
question can only be answered with reference to the psychological motivation of  the 
speaker, such an answer is inadequate as it fails to take into consideration the rationality 
of the norm. When we communicate our values, we can offer reasons for why we hold 
them, reasons that others in a similar context would concur with. Habermas‘ account of 
communicative rationality shows that subjectivity in ethical issues is not the last word. A 
subjective evaluation can always be re-evaluated after the reasons for accepting another 
evaluation proves to be better. 
 
And since normative utterances are evaluated rationally they can be also considered 
objective. This claim needs to be qualified as there is a major difference between 
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normative and epistemological utterances: whereas a statement can be true or false of the 
world (it is not the world that is true or false), the validity of a norm is not dependent 
upon the way the world is. Rather, a norm is an expression of how a speaker or others 
should act in the world. It is evident that the objectivity we find in epistemological 
utterances is not the same as that of normative ones, but this does not mean that norms 
have no objectivity. On the contrary, Habermas defends the objectivity of norms by 
pointing to a ‗weaker‘ version of what has been traditionally considered objective:  
 
Owing to the fact that normative validity claims are built into the universe of norms, the latter reveals a 
peculiar kind of objectivity vis-a-vis regulative speck acts, an objectivity that the universe of facts does not 
possess vis-a-vis constative speech acts....norms are dependent upon the continual reestablishment of 
legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships....Normative claims to validity, then, mediate a mutual 
dependence of language and the social world that does not exist for the relation of language to the objective 
world. (1990:61) 
 
There is therefore, an objectivity of the natural world and an objectivity of the social 
world; epistemological validity claims belong to the former, and normative validity 
claims to the latter.  
 
But despite the objectivity of normative validity claims what is the ‗force‘ generated by 
normative utterances such that one feels obliged to accept it?  The use of ‗ought‘ in 
normative discourse is such that it brings together participants who have agreed upon, 
and who co-operate in following such norms. A norm is followed when a consensus is 
achieved as a result of the co-operation of each participant: normative propositions 
depend upon the offering of reasons that justify not only one‘s behaviour, but also that of 
others. On this account, there is a big difference between accepting a norm on the 
grounds that it has been agreed upon, as opposed to following a norm out of obedience or 
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conformity. Debates or discussions concerning norms stimulate questions on behavioural 
expectations, so that achieving a consensus on norms is a process that is informed by a 
willingness to undergo rational critique. What gives a discourse its power is that it 
expresses a common interest in its search for consensus; a discourse is universal in the 
sense that the interests it expresses are not particularised but generalizable involving 
shared participation. 
 
Before any discussion of normative validity can begin, Habermas outlines certain 
presupposition or rules of discourse.  These rules are connected to the competence of 
those participating in the discourse and all participants must accept these rules for 
validity of the discussion. The rules are:  
 
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. 
2. (a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
(b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
(c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. 
3.  No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising their  rights as 
laid down in 1 and 2 (1990: 89) 
 
 
The legitimacy of a discourse presupposes a situation where participants understand each 
other, where every participant has the possibility of using any speech act (raising 
questions, express doubts), where no one is excluded from the discussion, and where no 
one is forced to accept any opinion. It must be possible to challenge an opinion and if a 
participant cannot defend his opinion rationally then he/she is obliged to modify or reject 
it. It is only in this way that a justified consensus can be achieved since it would be the 
result of the ‗force of the better argument‘ (1990: 158-9). The challenge to a claim can 
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only be defended if the participants have the possibility of freely entering and moving 
between the different levels of discourse. Findalyson describes the ideal speech situation 
as follows,  
 
…the rules of discourse are idealizing in that they direct participants towards the ideal of rationally 
motivated consensus. A discourse in which the voices of all concerned are listened to, in which no 
argument is arbitrarily excluded from consideration and in which only the force of the better argument 
prevails, will, if successful, result in a consensus on the basis of reasons acceptable to all. (2005: 44) 
 
Habermas elaborates upon the two fundamental principles that are at stake in the program 
of discourse ethics:  
 
(a) The principle of universalisation (U) is formulated in the following way: ‗All 
affected can accept the consequences and the side-effects of its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone‟s interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities 
for regulation).‘ (1990: 65) 
 
(b) The principle of discourse (D) is formulated in the following way: ‗Only those 
norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all 
affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.‘ (1990: 66)  
 
Taken together the two principles constitute a powerful basis for establishing the validity 
of moral norms. Those who participate in the process of argumentation are implicitly 
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accepting the idea that a valid moral norm has universal applicability i.e., that it applies 
not just to oneself, but also to others. It would be a strange moral norm if it applied to you 
(‗do not steal‘) but not to me. We expect moral norms to be binding on everybody and 
this is what the principle of universalisation caters for. But the principle of 
universalisation on its own is not enough since one could use other non-moral ways of 
bringing about universal consensus (threats, intimidation or through the prevention of 
certain topics). Habermas argues that establishing the validity of norms requires a certain 
type of reasoning: moral principles need to form a bridge between the logical techniques 
of argumentation and the data that arises from the social world. This is why both 
deduction and induction are tools in the formation of norms. The principle of discourse 
ensures that the solution to moral problems entails reasoning with others and that any 
agreement or consensus reached must have been subjected to a process of open and free 
rational debate. The two principles are in effect a combination of Kantian universality 
and public participation: a norm is valid only if it is recognised by all those affected by it 
and if it is validated by participants engaged in a rational debate. 
 
…the categorical imperative needs to be reformulated as follows: ―Rather than ascribing as valid to all 
others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for the 
purposes of discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will 
without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm.‖ (1990: 
67) 
 
The necessary involvement of others in moral discourse shows the extent of Habermas‘ 
differences with the views of John Rawls. In his attempt to formulate the grounds for a 
principle of justice, Rawls hypothesizes a fictional, ‗original position‘ where each person 
imagines himself without the trappings of social class, wealth, or capabilities. Since 
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nobody knows how his/her life would turn out, it is in the person‘s own interest to make 
sure that all material resources were equally and fairly distributed since the person 
him/herself might be the one who needs it most. While for Rawls, this imaginary return 
to an ‗original position‘ ensures that justice is operating in society, for Habermas, this 
position neglects the very important point that morality takes place in the real world, in 
particular contexts. The solutions to moral problems are not discovered in the solitary 
world of the theorist speculating in his/her office, but in co-operation with others: persons 
argue to reach an agreement or consensus on the issues at hand.  
 
Habermas‘s discourse ethics emphasizes the role of intersubjectivity in moral discourse. 
This role had been neglected in earlier moral theories (Kantianism or utilitarianism) as it 
was assumed that without some objective grounding or foundation there would be no 
basis for their moral principles. So as to achieve an objective moral position the views or 
perspectives of the speaker and of the participants were removed from the discourse. But 
Habermas points out that  removing one‘s point of view or the point of view of others 
does not lead to objectivity:  rather, it is by taking into account all points of view that a 
valid moral position can be reached. As Habermas puts it, moral questions are questions 
in the first person plural involving the use of ‗we‘ or ‗us‘ rather than ‗I‘ or ‗you‘. 
 
The possibility of formulating universal moral statements is one that pits Habermas 
against many contemporary philosophers who have questioned the traditional role of 
philosophy as the discipline concerned with the search for universal truths.  And if this 
contemporary view is accepted, when applied to morality it would lead to a renunciation 
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of universalism in morality. For many philosophers influenced by postmodernism, the 
attempt to universalise morality is a projection of western values onto the rest of the 
world, an attempt that is outdated and Eurocentric. Habermas needs to demonstrate that 
this charge is unfounded, for otherwise his whole project for the renewal of critical theory 
collapses. His strategy for countering the anti-universal bias of contemporary western 
thought relies upon the work of Karl Otto Apel who argues that the person who denies 
the possibility of moral discourse is in actual fact engaging in it. There is no position 
outside morality just as there is no position outside language: we can only talk about 
morality by expressing a moral point of view, just as we can only talk about language by 
using language. Denying any of these entails a performative self-contradiction and the 
fact that one cannot engage in moral discourse from a position outside morality is called 
the ‗transcendental presupposition of argumentation‘: in other words, we have to accept 
that it is possible to argue about moral issues that concern everybody, for the 
conversation on morality to continue. Habermas uses this insight to claim that all moral 
argumentation presupposes a universal basis; since it is not possible to talk about 
morality from a position outside morality, then this is the universal precondition for the 
production of all discourse on morality. 
 
Given that moral judgments are the result of rational argumentation between participants 
in every society, Habermas rejects the claim that morality is context-bound or specific, as 
in fact, moral relativists claim. It is the ‗force of the better argument‘ rather than the 
values and beliefs that social agents bring to the discussion that validate a moral norm. 
One would think that if moral norms are universal then they always were universal: this 
448 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
is however not the case and Habermas argues that the process of testing moral norms for 
their rationality is a historical achievement: it is only found in what he calls ‗post-
conventional‘ societies.  This implies, paradoxically, that the whole notion of a universal 
ethics is conditioned by a historical context. Habermas is aware of the paradox but 
considers the acceptance of a universal ethics as a sign of the progressive evolution of 
that society
iv
.   
 
The practice of discourse ethics involves a negotiation between members of a 
community. A person belongs to a community – a lifeworld – within which he/she shares 
values and beliefs: these shared values and beliefs enable the person to understand others 
and him/herself.  It is through this community that person acquires social and personal 
identity. But given that changes take place as communities evolve, the values and norms 
of the community are no longer acceptable: while the community can be a source of 
solidarity providing support and a sense of belonging to its members, it can also be 
oppressive: western societies have – at various moment in their history – oppressed 
persons on the basis of their race, gender or social status. This is where the utility of 
discourse ethics as a critical tool comes in: it enables persons to challenge those norms or 
values that they find unacceptable. Rather than blind acceptance and conformity, 
discourse ethics is the medium where the values and norms of a community are either re-
vitalised or discarded. When this critical challenge occurs, it does not take place 
wholesale i.e., not the entire value system is challenged since this would lead to the 
collapse of the community. Instead, it is specific norms and values that are challenged. 
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Given that universal ethics has evolved historically as part of a post-conventional society, 
there is also the possibility that it would evolve in the future in other ways, ways that 
might be repressive. Habermas attempts to solve this paradox by describing discourse 
ethics as a minimalist one (following from Adorno‘s Minima Moralia) in the sense that it 
does not offer the solutions to moral problems. It does not pretend to stand ‗above‘ 
everybody and telling what to do but points out that it is up to the people themselves to 
find solutions to moral problems, since they are the ones who are going to live with 
whatever they agree upon. What Habermas does provide is a procedure that shows how a 
solution can be achieved; in other words, discourse ethics is formal not substantial in that 
it highlights the necessary conditions that enable a fair moral decision to be reached. It 
does not tell us what moral norms and values should be debated but that they can be 
debated: ‗[t]o that extent discourse ethics can properly be characterized as formal, for it 
provides no substantive guidelines but only a procedure: practical discourse.‘ (1990: 103) 
Habermas is consistent with the claim that moral discourse belongs to the intersubjective 
domain so that norms can only be validated in discussion with others. The only role left 
for the moral philosopher is that of offering his contributions to the public domain. 
 
The advantage of Habermas‘ program of discourse ethics is that by offering a formal 
procedure rather than the actual content of values and norms it minimizes its relation to 
the cultural values and norms of a particular historical moment. With this procedure it is 
always possible to challenge the values and norms so that they are retained if they remain 
relevant and replaced if they are outdated. The critical dimension of discourse ethics is 
that by proposing a minimalist and formal approach it becomes possible to challenge 
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what taken for granted. As Edgar puts it the role of discourse ethics is ‗to expose false 
consensus, rather than to affirm or anticipate any true consensus.  It is suspicious of any 
existing consensus.‘ (Edgar, 2005: 164) 
 
The need for Habermas‘ program of discourse ethics arises in connection with his 
analysis of western culture; as society has developed, it has moved away from a centred 
view of the world to a decentred one. As a result, there is a distinction between the way 
the world is and our experience of the world, an experience which might vary for 
different individuals. Ethical issues arise when the experience of the world differs 
between participants and it is through communication that these differences in norms, 
facts or life experiences are expressed. Any yet, despite these differences, it is still 
possible to communicate and understand each other.  Morality, in Habermas‘ view, 
provides the double function of protecting both the individual and the social, a function 
that in turn is a sign of the degree of rationality and progress within a society.  
 
The shift from the early writings on communicative rationality to the writings on 
discourse ethics is a shift of emphasis. While the moral dimension was considered as one 
of the four validity claims, the early writings subsumed the moral dimension under the 
broader category of the political where the rightness of a political system is justified as in 
Legitimation Crisis (1988). In the writings on discourse ethics this political concern 
remains but it is no longer a neo-Marxist analysis of ideology but is situated within the 
debates on the nature of justice within a liberal context. 
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Critical Remarks 
 
The writings of Habermas have generated considerable controversy from both those 
sympathetic to his project and from those critical of it. With regards to the narrow claims 
made of speech acts, it has been pointed out that Habermas‘s attempt to replace a truth 
conditional account of language with a pragmatic one fails to explain the complexity of 
speech acts. Finlayson (2005) argues that in everyday life, speech acts could easily 
include all three domains of meaning as one
iv
;  and while Habermas does recognize that a 
speech act can simultaneously communicate different aspects (truth or norms or 
subjectivity) with the possibility of challenging each aspect, he stresses that  it is only one 
that is usually thematizied. 
 
Sutton (2003: 52) raises the question of whether communication can ever be interest free. 
Strategic interests are part of discourse and therefore the neutrality described in the 
process of discussion and agreement seems to be highly optimistic. In response, 
Habermas has formulated the notion of ‗idealisations‘- a terms that replaces his earlier 
‗ideal speech situation‘ which described the assumptions inherent in language-use to 
achieve understanding. ‗Idealisations‘ are those elements presupposed or assumed within 
language-use so that communication and understanding can take place. They are not over 
and above language even though they are objective. When talking about facts, we assume 
that an objective world exists. When initiating a discussion with others, one ‗minimum‘ 
assumption underlying the discussion is that participants believe that the other is 
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sincerely motivated in the search for truth or morality. It might be the case that one finds 
out that the other is insincere, in effect, seeking to influence others through strategic 
actions. Whatever the case, one starts by assuming the sincerity of the other person, 
otherwise, no discussion will ever take place.   
 
It is clear that Habermas‘ theory of communicative action is a theory of argumentation. 
Participants in a dialogue rationally defend their views and criticise others. By 
argumentation, Habermas accepts the tools used within the discourse of philosophy (for 
example) the soundness of an argument, the logical or reasoning processes of deduction 
and induction. A number of critical points are raised by Calvin O. Schrag (in Ramsey and 
Miller, 2003: 15-16) who argues that by reducing the concept of communication to that 
of argumentation Habermas is neglecting other forms of communication. Argumentation 
is placed at the service of philosophy with arguments deployed to justify the validity of 
claims in the respective the cognitive, ethical and aesthetic domains. As a result, the 
validity claims serve an instrumental end. Ironically, as Schrag points out, the 
instrumental reason that communicative reason was supposed to counteract returns under 
the disguise of the validity claims. Communication, as it turns out, is instrumental. 
 
The value of Habermas‘s theory of communicative action is that it locates the lifeworld 
as the context within which everyday communication takes place: it enables both the 
reproduction of a society and provides it with the resources for change. So too, the theory 
of communicative action highlights another crucial feature in that the communicative 
competence of speakers and hearers create the very contexts of communication.  In their 
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ability to respond to various speech acts participants are establishing relations between 
themselves. This is why successful communication involves both understanding and 
accepting reasons for what is claimed. Moreover, his analysis also reveals that the bigger 
threat to modern society comes from the impersonal forces of the system that operates 
without meaningful communication. The main goal of Habermas‘ critical theory is that of 
restoring rationality to its proper and central place in human life. Since it is language that 
defines us as humans, and since understanding and rationality are inherent to language, it 
follows that humans are rational beings. By combining rationality with communication – 
communicative rationality – he is able to show the dynamics of social life both in terms 
of social order and its disruption:  social integration is achieved through the mechanics of 
communicative action while social conflict has its roots in strategic action. 
 
In this chapter, I have first (a) outlined the foundation of Habermas‘ theory of 
communication and developed it with (b) the concepts of discourse and validity. These 
are then situated (c) within the analysis of action as communicative, strategic and 
instrumental. The next section (d) continues with the relationship between the lifeworld 
and communicative processes set in opposition to systemic ones. The final section (e) is 
narrower in the sense that it describes Habermas‘ turn towards discourse ethics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
454 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this text has been to demonstrate the theoretical background to 
communication studies. These studies are frequently associated with matters related to 
film, TV, web design, advertising, photography and journalism. But such practical 
activities are organised within a theoretical framework:  theory and practice are not 
divorced but symbiotically interrelated to the extent that theory informs practice while 
practice reforms theory. It is therefore fruitful to provide an account of this theoretical 
framework and Communication: a philosophical approach offers an initial overview of 
the various aspects entailed by the concept of communication. 
 
The three themes that organise the material for this text are those of ‗production‘, 
‗reception‘ and ‗action‘. In dealing with the production of communication the role of 
context as it features in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, C.S. Peirce and Michel 
Foucault. Saussure inaugurated the study of signs as an internally regulated system that 
can be explained without reference to the world. C.S. Peirce also studied sign-systems, 
but his account is broader, in that it is not limited to an examination of the conventional 
signs of a language but seeks to explain the way everything - perception, nature, the 
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universe - can be understood as signs. Foucault, in his early writings, shows the way 
knowledge is produced and transmitted by employing a number of concepts - episteme 
and discourse - to describe this process. In his later writings he shifts emphasis to the 
relationship between discourse and power as they percolate from within institutional sites 
to society in general. 
In the section regarding the reception and interpretation of messages I have examined the 
context within which messages are received and interpreted. This section opens with an 
overview of Umberto Eco‘s theory of codes that allow for messages to be interpreted (as 
well as produced), keeping in mind the ‗encyclopaedia‘ that conditions the competence of 
the addressee. While through the theory of codes Eco studies the interpretation of signs in 
general, he is also interested in applying his insights to the narrower domain of textual 
interpretation. After Eco, I turned to Derrida whose view on the nature of language as a 
disseminating ‗force‘ has influenced his account of the interpretation of texts. This 
account is considered radical in that it allows language to escape from the control of the 
author. Gadamer highlights the importance of language in the interpretation of messages, 
while articulating interpretation in terms of a dialogical relationship between the 
interpreter and the text.  
 
In the last four chapters I examined the relationship between the communicative process 
and the actions this entails. The starting point is the work of J.L. Austin who was the first 
to develop the idea that through the process of communicating one is doing something, 
one is performing an action. Traditionally the study of language had focussed on 
descriptive statements, while Austin introduced the notion of performative utterances as 
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playing an important role in the communicative exercise. This account segregates 
language into two groups, constatives and performatives, a segregation that Austin later 
goes on to re-configure in his theory of speech acts. P. Grice and J. Searle both develop 
Austin‘s ideas. Grice‘s analysis of conversational interactions led to the development of 
the idea of conversation implicature and to a discussion of the maxims that govern 
conversations and to the ways in which such rules or maxims may be flouted, leading 
(possibly) to the breakdown of the process of communication. Searle extends the analysis 
of speech acts to elaborate the necessary conditions for the generation of speech acts 
while also providing a classification that accounts for their various types. The work of 
Habermas combines the insights of speech act theory with social theory. His theory of 
communicative action attempts to explain the way a society can evolve rationally - 
despite conflicts - through the process of communication.   
 
The philosophy of communication is a growing branch within both philosophy and 
communication studies, and although it has been traditionally studied as part of the 
philosophy of language, it is rapidly achieving an identity of its own. This text hopes to 
make a small contribution towards making progress in that direction. 
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